ML20078C012
| ML20078C012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1983 |
| From: | Kammer D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309270352 | |
| Download: ML20078C012 (2) | |
Text
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O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A, TENNESSEE 374ot 400 Chestnut Street Tower II September 21, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Ms. E. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Ms. Adensam:
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328 As discussed with Carl Stahle of your staff in telephone discussions on September 15 and 16, 1983, enclosed is a clarification of the justification to change the diesel generator surveillance requirement, 4.8.1.1.2.d.11.
The request to revise the technical specifications (TVA-SQN-TS-44R1) for units 1 and 2 at our Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was submitted by L. M. Mills' July 29, 1983 letter to you.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY p Sh D. S. Kammer Nuclear Engineer i
Sworn to a d subscri ed ber re me this d2/_ day of 1983 4 MsX 9h2k N'6f,ary Public OgOf My Commission Expires
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Enclosure l
cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 r
l Atlanta, Georgia 30303 l
8309270352 830921 h
PDR ADOCK 05000327 h l
P PDR L An Equat Opportunity Employer
e ENCLOSURE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION TO THE JUSTIFICATION TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.8.1.1.2.d.11 SEQUOYAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 With the diesel generator in test mode, a safety injection signal deenergizes the ES1AY relay. This deenergizes the R3X1 relay which opens a contact to block the diesel trips on high jacket water temperature, electrical overspeed, low oil pressure, and high crankcase pressure. The diesel remains tied to the shutdown boards. With offsite power available, the electrical trips on field failure, reverse power, and negative phase sequence are not blocked. This provides equipment protection for the noncritical situation. If offsite power is subsequently lost, the 86 LOR relay is energized which locks out these electrical trips. This leaves only the mechanical overspeed and the generator phase differential trips for equipment protection during the period where the diesel generators are the only ac power source. The diesels are tripped by the overcurrent relays on the loss of offsite power. Normal load shedding and sequencing will proceed from this point on, as verified by S.R. 4.8.1.1.2.d.7.
The overcurrent relay is set to operate at 143.5 perce'nt current. The relays take approximately five cycles to actuate.
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