ML20077N422
| ML20077N422 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1983 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SNRC-961, NUDOCS 8309130088 | |
| Download: ML20077N422 (3) | |
Text
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SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD + WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 Dbut Dhl Number September 9,
1983 SNRC-961 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Equipment Environmental Qualification SER Outstanding Issue No. 9 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322
Dear Mr. Denton:
This letter provides information in addition to that provided in LILCO letter SNRC-952 dated August 15, 1983 concerning the postu-lated Control Rod Drop Accident (FSAR Section 15.1.33).
The equipment required to mitigate this event and achieve shut-down is:
1)
Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) 2)
Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) 3)
Shutdown Equipment 4)
Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Radiation Elements Items 1 and 2 detect the transient and initiate a reactor scram, as described in the FSAR.
With the exception of the in-core sensors (fission chambers) which are part of Item 2, this equip-ment is loceted in a mild environment in the Control Building.
Shutdown equipment (Item 3) may include equipment used for normal shutdown or equipment required for shutdown following a LOCA.
Equipment designated as Operability Code A for LOCA (that is, location in a potential LOCA harsh environment and required to operate) is included in the environmental qualification program with equipment operability required at postulated radiation levels significantly higher than postulated for a Control Rod Drop Accident.
Other required equiprent is located in buildings which remain in a mild environment even during a LOCA li.e. the Control Building).
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i Septcmber 9,.1983 SMRC-961 Page 2 Item 4,~ radiation monitors 1Dll*RE0ll A-D, detect radioactivity in the main steam line due to fuel clad failure in the event of a Control Rod Drop Accident.
Their required safety function is to initiate Main Steam Isolation. Valve (MSIV) closure.
These monitors also initiate reactor trip but no credit was taken for the operation of this trip in the accident analyses.
This equip-ment is included in the environmental qualification program with Operability Code B designation for one hundred eighty (180) days for LOCA and PBOC (Pipe Break Outside Containment).
Justification for interim operation pending their qualification was submitted in the Environmental Qualification Report (EOR) Revision 3 via LILCO letter SNRC-746 dated August 13, 1982.
The setpoint for the MSIV closure and reactor trip signals is 3.0 times full power background (Technical Specification, Draft Proof and Review Copy, (7/22/83), Table 2.2.1-1).
Based on the postulated forty (40) year normal dose of 4.9x105 rads (EOR, Revision 5, Figure D-2), the normal operation background could be expected to be on the order of a few rads per hour, but would vary depending on fuel condition and operational history and status.
The instrument range is 1,000 R/hr.
Since the required safety runction for these monitors in the event of a Control Rod Drop Accident is to initiate MSIV closure, their operability is required for only an extremely short period (seconds) 4 following fuel damage due to the fast rise in dose rate when fission products are swept with the steam into the main steam lines.
These monitors are located in the steam tunnel in the Turbine Building.
From the same calculation reported in SNRC-952, the postulated in-tegrated gamma dose in this location due to a Control Rod Drop Accident is 2.1x104 rads at one-half ( ) hour and 3.3x104 rads at one (1) hour.
Since the setpoint will be reached well before these dose levels have been delivered, the required safety function.is performed while the environment is mild.
Any subsequent failure would not mislead the operator or prevent satisfactory accomplish-i l
ment of safety functions by other safety-related equipment, as discussed in the EOR Appendix H Justifications for Interim Operation.
In view of the above, no change is required to be made to the harsh environment qualification program due to the consideration of the l
Control Rod Drop Accident.
It is our understanding that this information satisfies all outstand-ing staff requests for information needed to resolve SER Outstanding Issue No.
9.
Should there be any questions, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, J. L. Smith Manager, Special Projects JFE:jm Attachment cc:
C. Petrone-All Parties Listed in Attachment 1
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ATTACHMENT 1 Lawrence Brenner, Esq.
Herbert H.
Brown, Esq.
Administrative Judge-Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Board Panel Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Christopher & Phillips Commission 8th Floor Washington, D.C.
20555 1900 M.
Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Dr. Peter A. Morris Administrative Judge Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith Atomic Safety and Licensing Energy Research Group Board Panel 4001 Totten Pond Road U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue thG George A. Ferguson Suite K School of Engineering San Jose, California 95125 Howard University 2300 Fifth Street Washington, D.C.
20059 Stephen B. Latham,-Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West Second Street Daniel'F. Brdwn, Esq.
P.O.
Box 398 Attorney Riverhead, New York 11901 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel f
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Commission Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.
j Washington, D.C.
20555 9 East 40th Street i
New York, New York 10016 Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.
(
David A. Repka, Esq.
Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory State of New York Commission Department of Public Service Washington, D.C.
20555 Three Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Mr. James Dougherty 3045 Porter Street Washington, D.C.
20008
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