ML20077L219

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Amends 192 & 184 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively, Revising TS Re Cold Leg Injection Accumulators
ML20077L219
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  
Issue date: 12/27/1994
From: Hebdon F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20077L227 List:
References
NUDOCS 9501110261
Download: ML20077L219 (12)


Text

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  • g UNITED STATES o

B NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

'f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20ea64001

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-327 SEOU0VAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 192 License No. DPR-77 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated September 9, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; f

C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

I 9501110261 941227 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P

PDR l

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'2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No,'DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows*

(2) Technical Soecifications i

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.192, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

)

i FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

Frederick J. Hebd, Director Project Directorate 11-4 l

i Division of Reactor Projects - I/II j

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

December 27, 1994 f

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i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. lo?

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77, i

DOCKET NO. 50-327 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are

- identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of. change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 f

3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B3/4 5-1 B3/4 5-1 f

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o 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

[plD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained ', orated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of borated water, c.

Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron, d.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 683 psig, and t

e.

Power removed from isolation valve when RCS pressure is above 2000 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

a.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the boron concentration not within Ifmits, restore boron concentration to i

within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

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  • Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

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F r

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 124, 140, 147, 192

\\

t EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) r SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg in' action accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

j 1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in each cold leg injection accumulator, rnd 2.

Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is fully open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hou.'s after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume, that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank,f by verifying the boron concentration of the cold leg i

injection accumulator solution.

7 c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is abova 2000 psig i

by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.

j

  1. 0nly required to be performed for affected accumulators that experienced volume increases.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 12, 124, 147, 192

~~

4 3/4.5 ' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l

BASES' 3/4.5.1 ACCLMULATORS j

The OPERABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a sufficient. volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor _

> core in the event that the RCS pressure falls below the specified pressure of i

i the accumulators.

For the cold leg injection accumulators, this condition occurs in the event of a large or small rupture.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure l

that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. The limits in the specification for accumulator volume and nitrogen cover pressure are analysis limits and do not include instrument uncertainty.

The cover pressure limits were determined by idestinghouse to be 615 psia and 697.5 psia. Since the instrument read-outs in the control room are in psig, the TS valves have been converted to psig and rounded to the nearest whole.

i numbers. The actual nitrogen cover pressure safety limits in SQN's design documents are 600.3 psig and 682.8 psig. The minimum boron concentration ensures that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the post-LOCA (loss of coolant accident) recirculation phase based upon the cold leg accumu-lators' contribution to the post-LOCA sump mixture concentration.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered'to be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, rrinoval of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation wi+h an accumulator inoperable for any reason i

except boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. Under i

these conditions, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and 4

prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability

~

is not required.

For an accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, the limits for operation allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return boron concentration to within limits. This is based on the availability of ECCS water not being affected and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality j

during reflood because boiling of ECCS water in the core concentrates boron in the saturated liquid.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS i

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem 3rovides long term core cooling capability in the recircu-lation mode during t1e accident recovery period.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 155, 140, 192

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k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N

f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20eeH001 4,.....,o TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-323 SE000YAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.184 License No. DPR-79 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated September 9, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common i

defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

_.- _ _ j

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.184, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.h Frederick J. Hebdo, Director Project Directorate 11-4 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

December 27, 1994 t

l 1

1

i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. int FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 l

DOCKET NO. 50-328 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B3/4 5-1 B3/4 5-1 L

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R 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG' INJECTION ACCUMULATORS i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

)

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of i

borated water, j

i c.

Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron, j

d.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of batween 600 and 683 psig, and e.

Power removed from isolation valve when RCS pressure is above 2000 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

r ACTION:

a.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at-l 1 east HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer i

pressure to 1000 psig or-less within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the boron concentration not within limits, restore boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

l l

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  • Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

i l

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 113, 131, 133, 141, 184

aq,y,,-

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in each cold leg injection accumulator, and 2.

Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is fully open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume, that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank,# by verifying the boron concentration of the cold leg injection accumulator solution.

c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve nperator is removed.

1 i

t

  1. 0nly required to be performed for affected accumulators that experienced volume increases.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 113, 133, 184

i 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

For the cold leg injection accumulators this condition occurs in the event of a large or small rupture.

The limits on accumulator volume, baron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. The limits in the specification for accumulator volume and nitrogen cover pressure are analysis limits and do not include instrument uncertainty.

The cover pressure limits were determined by Westinghouse to be 615 psia and 697.5 psia.

Since the instrument read-outs in the control room are in psig, the TS values have been converted to psig and rounded to the nearest whole numbers. The actual nitrogen cover pressure safety limits in SQN's design documents are 600.3 psig and 682.8 psig. The minimum boron concentration en-sures that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the post-LOCA (loss of coolant accident) recirculation phase based upon the cold leg accumulators' contribution to the post-LOCA sump mixture concentration.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. Under these conditions, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

For an accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, the limits for operation allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return boron concentration to within limits.

This is based on the availability of ECCS water not being affected and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood because boiling of ECCS water in the core concentrates boron in the saturated liquid.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either sub.cystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of sup)1ying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures wit 11n acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 131, 184

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