ML20077J678
| ML20077J678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1982 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077J677 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8308180069 | |
| Download: ML20077J678 (71) | |
Text
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PART I FINAL REPORT, NOVEMBER 2, 1982 ON THE D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SMALL-SCALE JOINT EMERGENCY EXERCISE i
OCTOBER 21, 1982 i
i EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS NUMBER OF EVALUATORS State of Michigan 3 Federal Berrien County 4 Federal - 2 Contract D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant Unknown - Observed by NRC Roving Exercise Observers 2 Federal Involved States not Participating:
None Involved Localities not Participating: None PREPARED BY THE:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 4 AGENCY, REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH FEDERAL CENTER BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN 49016 8308180069 830809 PDR ADOCK 05000315 F
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PART II EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This is the Final Exercise Report of the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant exercise ccnducted October 21, 1982.
The exercise was held during normal duty hours commencing at 8:00 a.m. and terminating at 1:30 p.m.
FEMA Region V observations and reccamendations were consolidated from the individual comments made by the eleven evaluators present during the exercise 4
at the various localities participating.
The exercise scenario and Federal evaluator list is attached.
The State emergency operations center (EOC) in Lansing was activated to coordinate communications received from the utility and to provide direction and control in support of the Berrien County effort. This was a. full-scale exercise for the County and small-scale for the State.
Evaluators were placed at the State EOC in Lansing, the County EOC in Berrien County, at the Joint Public Information Center located at the Laka Michigan Community College, and at the Watervliet High School to eval-uate reception and congregate care procedures. All of the comments given by the evaluators are consolidated into the State and Berrien County portions respectively depending on the applicability of the comment.
This exercise d'id not include the demonstration of the alert and notifi-I cation criteria.
This was demonstrated during the March 30, 1982 exercise and has been tested monthly since; therefore, the demonstration during this exercise was waived.
I The State should make reference to 10 CFR 50 appendix E, part IV, section F (training) to note the specifications outlined for a small-scale exercise.
The State evaluation team was unaware of the third component selected for demonstration during the exercise until the pre-exercise briefing was held
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I on October 20, 1982.
It was apparent, during the meeting, a clear knowledge of the specifications outlined in 10 CFR 50 appendix E, part IV, section F (training)' was lacking. The State representatives and FEMA R-V represent-atives together' determined from the scenario the third component would be Section IX, Reentry and Recovery.
The volunteers who assisted at the Watervliet High School included the American Red Cross and thirty-four junior high and senior high school students.
Their support enhanced the demonstration of reception and care capabilities as reflected in the Berrien County' assessment which follows in Part III of this Final Exercise Report..
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The specific comments regarding off-site jurisdictions based on the observations of the two (2) Federal teams follow.
FEMA Region V concluded from the obtervations that the State of Michigan and Berrien County have adequately demonstrated the capability to protect the public in the event of an accident at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant. This was the third i
demonstration of the State and Berrien County's preparedness in the event of such an accident at the D. C. Cook facility.
The comments and recommen-dations that follow are given to assist these jurisdictions in further develop-ment of their radiological preparedness capabilities.
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I.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITIES & RESOURCES (Working space, internaa communications and displays, communications, security)
STedE:
The overall facilities and resources of the State are adequate for the conduct of emergency operations. However, backup communications are e
required between the State EOC, the plant EOF, and the JPIC.
Improve-ment is necessary in the status board for readability and relocation.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
The Berrien County E0C was overall of very high quality. The primary communications system was the Law Enforcement Inf ormation Net (LEIN) radio with telephone backup.
In addition, there were direct telephone lines to the facility and the State EOC with backup by Michigan Emer-gency. Preparedness Police System (MEPPS) and amatuer radio. The working space and amenities of the EOC were adequate with displays arranged in view of all the participants. An emergency generator was available f
for backup power.
The message handling procedures were very good and unobtrusive. Security was good, requiring identification and was pre-sided over by two uniformed personnel. Maps were posted displaying evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers and population t 'L distributions. The displays could be f. proved somewhat by giving the d
t[aps larger titles and displaying thcm at eye level.
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-II..
ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF (Staffing, 24-hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness) r
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STATE:
Not required during the small-scale D. C. Cook exercise.
BERRIEN COUNIY:
The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff was adequately demonstrated on a1 previous exercise.
A simulation of this capability was given durinf this exercise by the Emergency Services Director.
An actual demonstration for this exercise was not possible because of the prior activation of the EOC and staf f.
The Sheriff's Department has the capability for initial notification on a 24-hour basis.
III.
CAERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 10rganization, control, leadership,supportbyofficials,information flow between levels and organizations, decision making, checklists and procedures)
STATE:
Generally adequate organization and control with a smooth decision making capability. There appears to be a lack of procedures regarding the request for Federal response.
The State plan.should be more explicit-concerning an individual assigned to do this.
This is a repeat dis-ii crepan,cy.
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3 BERRZEN COUNTY:
The overall emergency management of the Berrien County EOC was clearly understood and leadership of the EOC was handled effectively by the Emergency Services Director.
A shift change was adequately demon-strated during the exercise.
Briefings were held periodically through-out the exercise with reports given by each organization. The emergency classification system that was used was consistant with the facility's and follows NUREG-0654 recommendations.
IV.
PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION (Means,of notification, e.g., sirens, vehicles, or other systems, notification timeliness)
STATE:
This was not observable at the State level.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
The County adequately demonstrated their capability to activate the siren sysetm. The activation of the sirens takes place monthly,and, therefore, was not demonstrated for the exercise.
The Emergency Broad-
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cast System can be put into operation directly from the EOC.
Transient population that may be located at parks, lakes and rivers are further notified through the use of police cars with PA systems.
The Coast Guard is used for notification on Lake Michigan.
It is suggested that draft EBS messages be added to the plan with instructions to the public.
(see Attachment 2, October 4, 1982, siren test results)
V.
PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (Publications, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordin-ation) l STATE and BERRIEN COUNTY The JPIC provides adequate work space and equipment for the press and State, County, and utility public information staff.
The JPIC can be l
cperational in two hours and expanded if necessary.
Press briefings I
during the exercise were concise, well coordinated, and with the excep-l I
tion of the first briefings, timely. Charts diagrams and maps were available for use by the briefers.
Plant engineering and Radiation Health personnel should be available in the JPIC to assist the utility spokesperson in responding to technical questions.
A period for questions and answers was allotted after each briefing.
Spokespersons vere not available to the news media for individual interviews. We suggest consideration of a post-exercise cross-talk with news media personnel to further refine procedures.
An emergency information brochure has been distributed to the permanent local population.
Information dis-tribution to transient population was not verified during the exercise.
- 4 VI'.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (Staff and field operations, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculation, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations)
STATE:
Not observed due to State small-scale exercise involvement.
r BERRIEN COUNTY:
The County relies on the State for accident assessment duties. Field monitoring teams that are sent from the County are removed from the field and used as backup as soon as the State teams arrive on the scene.
Instruments that are used, including dosimeters, are described 4
in the plan. These Civil Defense instruments are'available and their j_
limitations are recognized.
VII.
ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (Sheltering, evacuation,ieception and care, transportation)
STATE:
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- Not observed at State level during small-scale exercise.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
Adequate relocation centers have been established outside the 10-mile EPZ as shown_on maps in the Berrien County EOC and in the State plan.
This was demonstrated at the Watervliet High School relocation center.
This school has excellent facilities for cooking, eating, showering, and sleeping.
The supplies and equipment are quite adequate. The staff was very knowledgeable with experience in operating such centers for natural disasters. However, the number of staff (5) at the center was j
minimal for this exercise. akt excellent demonstration was given of the j
radiological monitoring and registration procedures for evacuees, using student volunteers to represent evacuees. The radiation monitoring was thorough but could use some improvement in details.
VIII.-
HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES.
(Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment)
STATE:
.Not observed due to the: State small-scale exercise.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
The County adequately demonstrated their ability to control access to evacuated areas, including the.re-routing of I-94 traffic around the plume. 'The County Health Department has on hand an adequate supply of KIL (potassium iodide) for emergency workers and mobility. impaired persons.
KI'was not needed for the general population because evacuation was chosen
- for the protecti'.'e action. The only KI used was for emergency-workers.-
The State Health Department makes the decision for emergency workers to 3
exceed protective action guides (PAGs) in' case of life saving' activities.
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5 IX.
RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS STATE:
The State initiated reentry and recovery in an expeditious manner based on data received from the utility.
It is generally felt more familiarity with procedures in the plan for recovery and reentry would facilitate a smoother shutdown. Recommend an exercise to accommodate an extended reentry and recovery phase.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
The County demonstrated the process used for reentry and recovery, which is dependent on guidance with is provided by the State. Recommendations included radiological monitoring of the affected area for a period of time,that to be determined at some later date.
Fresh produce should be washed before use. An adequate demonstration of reentry procedures was accomplished.
However, more detailed information should be provided for evacuees returning home.
X.
RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario)
STATE:
All participants worked well together and combined their expertise in an orderly manner.
An increased proficiency was gained from the exercise.
BERRIEN COUNTY:
The exercise participants were able to gain valuable experience while working on exercise problems.
The scenario adequately tested most of the elements of responding organizations.
It is suggested that future exer-cises be structured so that actual demonstrations replace many of the simulated events.
Actual and simulated off-site activities were not clearly defined within the scenario.
Expected off-site activities need to be more detailed.
Scenario development should be a joint effort by the utility, County, and Stata exercise planners.
FEMA Region V evalu-ators suggest scenario planning meetings be held no later than 90 days prior to the exercise.
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-6 PART III NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION AND
SUMMARY
LISTINGS STATE
SUMMARY
I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES & RESOURCES (Space, internal comm., displays, security)
The overall facilities and resources of the State are adequate f
for the conduct of emergency operations.
However, backup commun-
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ications are required between the State EOC, the EOF, and JPIC.
Improvement is necessary in the status board for readability and positioning.
F.1.b Adequacy of Communications Systems (primary and backup) with Contiguous State / Local Governments within the EPZs The State has commercial phones, NAWAS, CDNAVS, and LEIN with an open line (dedicated) phone to the JPIC, EOF, and Berrien County. Communications systems are available for contact with the contiguous States and local governments as mentioned.
Headsets for persons manning open lines are recommended. The State has used these in the past; but due to equipment change, were unable to use them during this exercise.
F.1.c Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with Federal Emer-gency Response Organizations NAWAS, CDNAVS, CDNARS, and commercial lines are available to contact the Federal agencies..
F.1.d Adequacy of Communice.tions Systems Between the Nuclear Facility and Near-site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs The State EOC has dedicated commercial land line communications 4
with'the EOF, JPIC, and Berrien County.
State Police radios could be set up should the land lines fail; however, it is not regularly available.
Recommend permanent installation of State Police radio at these locations.
C.l.c Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources needed to Support-Federal Response The resources are available in the greater Lansing area to support the Federal response including lodging, restaurants, and trans-portation including air travel. Adequate space for setting up operations would be a problem.
Adequacy of EOC Working Space and Amenities The Stae was using their newly completed EOC in the basement of
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the Olds Plaza Hotel.
The Hotel is directly across the street from the State Capitol and f.s part of the day-to-day work space of the State agency and is adequate to support extended 24-hour I
operations.
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7 Adsquacy of EOC Security Measuras There is only one entrance to this EOC. Normal day-to-day security was in place.
H.3 Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
This was a very workable EOC with adequate equipment, ventil-ation, accoustics, and energency response personnel to adequately manage an emergency.
The communications room was adjacent to the operations room and very desirable.
J.10.a Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas Maps showing evacuation points, areas for access control points, relocation centers, decontamination centers, and evacuation centers were displayed.
J.10.b Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas There were no population distribution maps displayed in the EOC, thus this criteria was not met.
However, these maps were avail-able for reference in the plan and did not critically inhibit protection of the public.
SUMMARY
II ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness)
Not required during small-scale D. C. Cook exercise.
A.l.e Capability for 24-hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications Not observed.
A.4 Capability for 24-hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations Not observed.
E.1 Adequacy of Procedures used for Notification of Emergency Response Organizations Including Means for Verification of Messages -
.Not observed'.
E.2 Adequacy of Procedures used for Alerting, Notifying, and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel Not observed.
C.2.a If' appropriate, Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensees Near-site EOF Not observed.
8 F.1.a Adequacy of Emergency Response Communications Equipment used with Prompt Activation Not observed.
F.1.e Adequacy of Communications Equipment used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response Personnel Not observed.
l F.2 Capability to Communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities Not observed.
H.4 Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and Staffing of EOCs and other Facilities Not observed.
SUMMARY
III EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officfals, Decision Making)
Generally adequate organization and control with a smooth decision making capability. There appears to be a lack of procedures regarding request of Federal response. The plan should be made more explicit. An individual should be assigned to do this.
A.l.a Evidence that Specific Organizations have been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response The necessary department to carry out the State's limited role in this exercise were represented in the EOC.
A.l.d Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response Since this was a small-scale exercise, the individual-designated by the plan did not participate.
However, the person placed in charge ran the exercise in a smooth and precise manner.
A.2.a Demonstration that Primary & Support Functions & Responsibilities have been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements The representative of those departments required to respond to this exercise demonstrated a knowledge of their primary and support functions.
C.l.a Evidence that a Specific Person has been Authorized to Request Federal Assistance (State Only)
In the event Federal assistance is required, although not demon-strated in this exercise, a group in the State EOC would be authorized to request the-Federal response. They are vaguely-called " Executive. Group" which was represented by-the operations officer during this exercise; however, no designation by name
9 or dspirtments is mids in the plan to indicete those persons or departments included as " Executive Group." The plan needs revision for clarity.
D.3 An Emergency Classification System was Effectively used and was Consistent with that of the Utility A large emergency classification sign was used to clearly display action levels consistent with the utility.
D.4 Adequate Written Procedures are used for Emergency Actions Con-sistent with Facility Recc. and Local Offsite Conditions The procedures, as outlined in the plan, are consistent with NUREG-0654 and utility response which relate to off-site conditions.
Based on actions given in the plan, actions would be timely in consonance with utility and off-site conditions.
Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency Response Dir. & Staff, thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, etc.
Oral briefings were not frequently conducted, but the small number of personnel requested to respond to this scenario allowed for continuous " staff meetings," or cross-conversation.
Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by Elected Officials Not demonstrated - Not required.
SUMMARY
IV PUBLIC ALERTING & NOTIFICATION (Means of Notification - Sirens, Vehicles, or Other Systems)
This was not an observable action at the State.
Siren demonstrations were simulated at the County level.
E.5 Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Info Received from the Licensee, e.g.,
EBS Not observed.
E.6 Adequacy of Means used for Notification & Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume EPZ (within 15 minutes)
Not observed.
E.7 Effective use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Affected Areas Not observe d.
J.10.c Adequacy of Means used for Notifying all Segments of Transient and Resident Population Not observed.
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SUMMARY
V PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release, Coordination)
The JPIC provides adequate work sapce and equipment for the press and State, County, and utility public information staff.
The JPIC can be operational in two hours and expanded if necess-ary. Press briefings during the exercise were concise, timely, and well-coordinated.
Charts, diagrams, and maps could be utilized more to help explain technical information. The permanent and transient population is informed about emergency preparedness through the distribution of brochures.
G.1 Evidence of Dissemination of Information to the Public, within the Last Year Not observed.
G.2 Evidence of a Public Info Program for Permanent & Transient Pop in the Plume EPZ, such as Posted Notices, etc.
The utility mailed with September electric bills within the EPZ, the brochure," Emergency Preparedness in Berrien County." As new residents move in,the brochure will be mailed to them.
Customer Service representatives hand delivered the brochures to all public facilities such as parks, restaurants, and motels within the EPZ.
Supplies of brochures at public facilities are checked twice yearly.
G.3.a Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media have been Designated The utility invited the media to a pre-exercise briefing a week prior to the exercise. During the exercise, it was clear the JPIC was the source of information for the media. The media was briefed on a regular basis during the exercise, usually every half hour. The scheduled time of each press briefing was posted.
Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, where Appropriate The JPIC provided ample work space, telephones, and typewriters for the press.
The State, County, and utility shared their work space. This arrangement facilitated the exchange and discussion of information before press briefings.
The JPIC can be operational in two hours. All equipment for the JPIC is kept on site.
Add-itional space at the JPIC is available if needed.
Good security j
was provided at several checkpoints in the JPIC.
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Adequacy of Issued Press Releases Separate press kits were provided for radio, T.V.,
and print media.
Information from the State, County, and utility was consolidated into one concise press release per briefing.
Hard l
copy followed press briefings.
Videotape playback of all press l
briefings was also available. Technical information could have been translated to terms and concepts reporters and the general
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11 public could more readily comprehend.
The first press release issued did not have the stamp, "this is a drill, these events did not occur." This was corrected within a half hour.
6 C.4.a A Media Spokesperson has been Designated who has Access to all Necessary Information The Governor's Press Secretary provided the basic information at each press briefing.
His presentation was supplemented with additional information from the County and utility.
Information provided by the State, County, and utility did not conflict. The utility spokesperson could have utilized the prepared diagrams more to explain technical information during press briefings.
G.4.b Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokespersons The State, County, and utility were located in the same work space.
Information was coordinated at a round table discussion before each press briefing.
There was consthnt contact between the JPIC and EOCs.
G.4.c Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures The JPIC had a staffed rumor control office.
Radio and television newscasts were monitored.
Phone requests for information from the public are received by the rumor control office. Any mis-information is corrected through referral to the latest press releases and maps.
A log of incoming phone calls is kept.
Per-sistent misinformation is brought to the attention of State, County, and utility public information staff to address.
SUMMARY
VI ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (Staff & Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Technical calculations, use of PAGs)
Not observed - State small-scale exercise.
H.7 Adequacy of Off-site Radiological Monitoring Instruments Not observed.
H.12 An Adequate Central Point has been Established for Receipt and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media Not observed.
I.7 Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring within the Plume EPZ Not observed.
I.8 Adequate Capability to make a Rapid Assessment of Magnitude
& Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards Not observed.
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12 I.9 Capability for Measurement of Radiciodine Concentration in Plume EPZ under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)
Not observed.
I.10 Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)
Not observed.
I.11 Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)
Not observed.
J.10.m Capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PAGs, in Plume EPZ (State Only)
As soon as general emergency was declared the State issued instructions to evacuate the 2-mile zone and sectors, B,C, & D, to 5 miles. This criteria remains officially unobserved.
C.3 Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)
Not observed.
SUMMARY
VII ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception & Care, Transportation)
Not observed - State small-scale J.2 Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations Not observed.
J.9 Capability for Implementation of Protective Measures PAGs were recommended in conjunction with data relating to wind direction etc. received from the utility.
The State recommended evacuation of the 2-mile zone and section B, C, & D within 10 minutes of General Emergency / State of Emergency declaration.
This was officially unobserved due to small-scale exercise at the State.
J.10.d Adequacy of Methods used for Protecting Mobility Impaired Persons, including Institutionally Confined Not observed.
J.10.g Adequacy of Methods Used For Implementing Relocation of Populace Not observed.
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13 J.10.k Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for l
Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation l
Not observed.
J.ll Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, Etc. (State Only)
Within 10 minutes of General Emergency, the Department of Agriculture had recommended cattle be sheltered and placed on stored feed within sectors B, C, & D.
This criteria is officially unobserved for the State small-scale exercise.
J.10.h Adequate Relocation Centers have been Established at Least 5 miles & Preferably 10 miles Outside the Plume EPZ l
Relocation centers are outside the 10 mile EPZ, but not out to 20 miles.
Not observed officially.
Adequacy of Facilities, Supplies and Equipment at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers Not observed.
Adequacy of Staffing' at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers Not observed.
J.12 Adequacy of Procedures for Processing Evacuees in Relocation Centers, Including Health Care, Decon. 6 Rad. Monitoring, Etc.
Not observed.
SUMMARY
VIII HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES (Access Control, Adequacy of Equipment, use of KI)
Not observed.
State small-scale exercise.
J.10.e Adequacy of Provisions for use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Persons in Plume EPZ The State ordered KI for emergency workers within 2-mile zone.-
This was officially unobserved.
J.10.f Adequacy of Methods used in Making Decisions to Administer KI to Central Population Not observed.
J.10.j Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuated Areas j
Not observed.
K.3.a Adequacy of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day capability to Determine Dose Received
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by Emergency Workers Not observed.
14 K.3.b Demonstration of Adequete and Frequent Em2rgency Worker Dosimeter Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records Not observed.
K.4 Evidence that an Adequate Decision Chain has been Established to Authorize Exposure for Emer Workers in Excess of PAGs Not observed.
K.S.a Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels have been Specified for Determining Need for Decontamination Not observed.
K.S.b Adequacy of Measures for D2 contamination of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal Not observed.
L.1 Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel Not observed.
L.4 Adequate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radio-logical Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities Not observed.
M.4 Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure (State Only)
Not observed.
SUMMARY
IX RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures)
The State initiated reentry and recovery in an expeditious' manner based on data received from the utility.
It is generally felt more familiarity with procedures in the plan for reentry and recovery would facilitate a smoother shut-down.
Recommendation is made to have an exercise to accommo-date extended reentry and recovery phase.
M.3 Adequacy of Established Means for Informing Response Org.
that Recovery and Reentry can be Initiated (State Only)
Based on data received from the utility field monitoring teams, the State recommended to the Governor that the State of Disaster be rescinded. The State then directed reentry and recovery.
M.1 Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Reentry and Relaxation
-of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry Railroads were reopened etc., the State advised emergency workers to take KI~for three consecutive days.
More training and famil-iarity with the plan would smooth the reentry phase,although, all steps were taken, not without consultation and cross-check with
15 thm plan. Recommrnd in a future exarcice, thn exarcise would begin with General Emergency and incorporate an extended reentry and recovery demonstration.
SUMMARY
X RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (Benefit to Participants, Adequacy of the Scenario All participants worked well together and combined their expertise in an orderly manner gaining valuable experience.
N.l.b Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources This was small-scale at the State level not performing emergency operations, only supporting the County.
The scenario did require utilization of State communications, operations management, and direction for reentry and recovery.
Pre-exercise reviews of the scenario indicates scenario development can be improved. Actual and simulated off-site activities were not clearly defined within the scenario.
Expected off-site activities need to be more detailed.
Scenario development should be a joint effort by the utility, County, and State exercise planners.
Suggest scenario planning meetings be conducted no later than 90 days prior to the exercise to more completely develop of f-site exercise objec-tives and expected activities.
N.l.a Adequacy of Ex. to Test Integrated Capabilities & Major Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected Org.
It seemed the scenario was detailed enough to mobilize many of the response departments. However, at the State EOC, it was difficult to determine exactly how much was going on since each department worked independently and not all information was heard by the evaluators.
Benefit of Exercise to Participants Participants felt this exercise demonstrated the need for the State on-scene EOC. They also felt the lack of the on-scene EOC deprived their personnel of necessary experience.
16 BERRIEN COUNTY MICHIGAN
SUMMARY
I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES & RESOURCES (Space, Internal Comm., Displays, Security)
The Berrien County EOC was overall of very high quality.
The primary communications system was the Law Enforcement Information Net (LEIN) radio, backup by telephone.
In addition, there were direct telephone lines to the facility and the State EOC, backup by Michigan Emergency Preparedness Police System (MEPPS) and amateur radio.
Communication to the Federal emergency response organizations was through the State EOC. The working space and amenities of the EOC were adequate with displays arranged in view of all the participants.
An emergency generator was available for backup power.
The message handling procedures were very good and unobtrusive.
Security was good, requiring identification and presided over by two uniformed personnel. Maps were posted displaying evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers, and population distribution. The displays could be improved somewhat by giving the maps larger titles and displaying them at eye level.
F.1.b Adequacy of Communications Systems (Primary and Backup) with Contiguous State / Local Governments within the EPZs The primary communication system is radio Law Enforcement Information Net (LEIN) with telephone as the backup system, and a direct line to the facility and the State EOC.
F.1.c Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with Federal Emergency Response Organizations Through State liason/through direct line to State EOC using direct phone or MEPPS contact would be made with the Federal response team.
F.1.d Adequacy of Communications Systems between the Nuclear Facility and Near-site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs The facility is adequately able to communicate with the State and local EOC by radio and telephone, and able to contact the radio-logical teams by radio.
They can also communicate using area HAM operators to contact local EOCs.
C l.c Adequacy of Specific State of Local Resources needed to Support Federal Response Not observed.
Adequacy of EOC Working Space and Amenities Working space was adequate with desks, telephones, and displays arranged so all participants could view displays from where they set.
A well lighted room with good ventilation and an emergency generator for lighting.
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17 Adequecy of EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipm:nt, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures The message handling and displays were all very good.
Hard copy messages were nand carried ef ficiently and quietly.
Adequacy of EOC Security Measures Security at the EOC was good.
Picture I.D.s were required. Two uniformed persons were at security check point, sign in procedures were used.
H.3 Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
The overall adequacy of the EOC was good. Work area, including space for each organization was provided and telephones were abundant.
J.10.a Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas l
Maps were posted displaying evacuation routes, sampling points and relocation centers, It is suggested that maps be placed at eye level for better viewing and giving them larger, more legible titles.
J.10.b Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas There were adequate maps showing the population distribution.
Maps should be arranged for easier viewing.
SUMMARY
II ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF (Staffing, 24-hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)
The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff was adequately demonstrated on a previous exercise. A simulation of this capability was given at this exercise by the emergency director. An actual demonstration for this exercise was not possible because of the prior activation of the EOC and staff.
The Sheriff's Department has the capability for initial notif-ication on a 24-hour basis.
A.1.e Capability for 24-hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications capability for the 24-hour initial emergency response and manning of communications is done by the Sheriff's Police, a standard 24-hour operation.
A.4 Capability for 24-hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations An adequate demonstration of a shift change was demonstrated by all emergency staff.
E.1 Adequacy of Procedures used for Notification of Emergency Response Organizations including Means for Verification of Messages A call verification system was demonstrated adequately.
18 E.2 Adequacy of Procedures used for Alerting, Notifying and Mobil-izing Emergency Response Personnel Because of previous knowledge of exercise time, activation and notification could not be observed.
However, on previous exercises these procedures were demonstrated as adequate.
C.2.a If Appropriate, Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensees Near-site EOF Not observed.
F.1.a Adequacy of Emergency Response Communications Equipment used with Prompt Activation The Sheriff's Department communications equipment is adequate.
A 24-hour duty station that is used for initial and prompt notification.
F.1.e Adequacy of Communications Equipment used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response personnel This function could not be observed.
Activation of EOC was not properly demonstrated because of prior knowledge of exercise time.
F.2 Capability to communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities The County has an adequate capability to communicate with fixed and mobile medical facilities through the use of mobile radios and telephone.
However, the radio capability could be improved if radio was available at the EOC.
H.4 Demonstration of timely and Efficient Activaticn and Staffing of EOCs and other Facilities It was not possible to observe the efficient activation and staff-ing of the EOC.
The EOC activation was completed before the activation was to take place. Had prior knowledge as to exercise time.
SUMMARY
III EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officials, Decision Making)
The overall emergency management of the Berrien County EOC was good.
All organization responsibilities were clearly understood and leadership of the EOC was handled effectively by the Emergency Director. A shift change was adequately demonstrated during the exercise.
Briefings were held periodically throughout the exercise with reports given by each organization.
The emergency classifir.ation system that was used was consistent with the facility and followed NUREG-0654 recommendation.
19 A.l.a Evidence that Specific Organizations have been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response All service groups and organizations involved have been ade-quately established at the EOC.
A.l.d Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response The sheriff was the emergency service director during the first shift.
The second shift director was a County Board member.
A.2.a Demonstration that Primary and Support Functions & Responsibilities have been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements All organizations have been assigned functions and backup functions and responsibilities.
C.l.a Evidence that a Specific Person has been Authorized to Request Federal Assistance (State Only)
Not applicable.
4 D.3 An Emergency Classification System was Effectively used and was Consistent with that of the Utility The classification system used by the EOC and facility were consistent and followed 0654 recommendations.
D.4 Adequate Written Procedures are used for Emergency Actions Consistent with Facility Rece and Local Offsite Conditions Not observed.
Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency response Director and Staff, thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, Etc.
Frequent oral briefings were made by executive group with status reports from all emergency response staff.
Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by Elected Of ficials County Board Chairmen support and participation was adequate.
SUMMARY
IV PUBLIC ALERTING & NOTIFICATION (Means of Notification - Sirens, Vehicles, or other Systems)
The County adequately demonstrated their capability to activate the siren system. The activation of the sirens takes place monthly and was not demonstrated for the exercise. The Emergency Broad-cast System can be put into operation directly from the EOC.
Transient population that may be located at parks, lakes, and i
rivers are further notified with the use of Police cars with P.A. systems.
The Coast Guard is used for notification on Lake Michigan.
It is suggested that draft EBS messages be added to the plan with instructions to the public.
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20 E.5 Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Info Received from the Licensee, E.G.,
EBS An adequate system is available in the EOC for direct broad-casts from the EOC to the EBS network.
The station would at that time make public announcements on PAGs, etc.
E.6 Adequacy of Means used for Notification and Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume EPZ (within 15 minutes)
A siren system exists for the prompt notification and instruction to the public that is adequate, but not demonstrated during this exercise.
E.7 Effective use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Affected Areas The County Plan, (page 175) attachments 2 to appendix 1, has the emergency public information.
However, there is a need to have draft messages to the public giving instructions with regard to specific PAGs incorporated in the plan.
J.10.c Adequacy of Means used for Notifying all Segments of Transient and Resident Population The transient population along highways, in parks, along rivers, lakes, railroads, airlines, were notified by use of vehicles with bull horns and the Coast Guard along Lake Michigan.
SUMMARY
V PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination)
The JPIC provides adequate work space and equipment for the press and State, County, and utility public information staff.
The JPIC can be operational in two hours and expanded if necess-ary.
Press briefings during the exercise were concise, timely, and well coordinated.
Charts, diagrams, and maps could have been utilized more to help explain technical information.
Good press kits were provided.
The media should receive annual training in radiation concepts prior to the annual exercise.
Actual REPS do not constitute training.
The permanent and transient populatien is informed about emergency preparedness through the distribution of brochures.
G.1 Evidence of Dissemination of Information to the Public, within the Last Year Not observed.
G.2 Evidence of a Public Info Program for Permanent & Transient Pop in the Plume EPZ, such as Posted Notices, Etc.
The utility mailed with the September electric bills within the EPZ, brochures," Emergency Preparedness in Berrien County." As new residents move in, the brochures will be mailed to them.
Customer Service Representatives hand delivered the brochures
21 to all public facilities, parks, restaurants, motels.
Brochures are checked twice yearly.
G.3.a Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media have been Designated The utility invited the media to a pre-exercise briefing a week prior to the exercise.
During the exercise, it was clear that the JPIC was the source of information for the media.
The media was briefed on a regular basis during the exercise, usually every f
I half hour.
The time of each press briefing was posted.
Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, where Appropriate The JPIC provided ample work space, telephones and typewriters f or the press. The State, County, and the utility shared their work space. This arrangement facilitated the exchange and discus-(
sion of information after press briefings. The JPIC can be oper-ational in two hours. All equipment for the JPIC is kept on-site.
Additional space at the JPIC is available if needed.
Good security was provided at several checkpoints in the JPIC.
Adequacy of Issued Press Releases Separate press kits.were provided for Radio, T.V. and print.
Infor-mation from the State, County, and utility was consolidated into one concise press release per briefing with hard copy following.
Technical information should be translated to terms that the general population can more readily comprehend.
G.4.a A Media Spokesperson has been designated who has access to all Necessary Information The Governor's Press Secretary provided the basic information at each press briefing.
The information provided the State, County, or facility did not conflict.
The utility spokesperson could have utilized the displays more to explain technical information.
G.4.b Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokes-persons The State, County, and utility were located in the same work area.
Information was coordinated at a round table discussion before each briefing. There was constant contact between the JPIC and the EOCs.
G.4.c Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures The JPIC had a staffed rumor office. Radio and television newscasts were monitored. Phone requests for information from the public are received by the rumor control office.
Any misinformation is corrected through referral to the latest press release and maps.
A log of incoming phone calls is kept.
Persistent misinformation is brought to the attention of the State, County, and utility public information staff to address.
22
SUMMARY
VI ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (Staff and field operations, monitoring, equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs)
The County relies on the State for accident assessment duties.
Field monitoring teams that are sent from the County are removed from the field and used as backup as soon as State teams arrive on the scene.
Instruments that are used, including dosimeters, are described in the plan.
These Civil Defense instruments are available and their limitations are recognized.
H.7 Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Instruments Civil Defense equipment is used for monitoring of off-site releases that are adequate for the County roll.
H.12 An Adequate Central Point has been Established for Receipt and Analysis for Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media Not applicable.
County teams rely on State analysis of data from State teams.
I.7 Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring within the Plume EPZ Equipment used is described in the plan, and is adequate. However, the equipment should be replaced with more applicable equipment.
I.8 Adequate Capability to make a Rapid Assessment of Magn!tude &
Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards The County does not have this capability; however, State team is relied upon for this capability.
I.9 Capability for Measurement of Radiciodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)
Not observed.
I.10 Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)
Not observed.
1.11 Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)
Not observed.
J.10.m capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PACS, in Plume EPZ (State Only)
Not observed.
C.3 Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)
Not observed.
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23
SUMMARY
VII ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception & Care, Transportation)
Adequate relocation centers have been established outside the 10 mile EPZ as shown on maps in the Berrien County EOC and in the State plan.
This was demonstrated at the Watervliet High School relocation center. This school has excellent facilities for cooking, eating, showering, and sleeping.
The supplies and equipment are quite adequate.
The staff was very knowledge-able with experience in operating such centers for natural dis-asters.
However, the number of staff (5) at the center was minimal for this exericse. An excellent demonstration was given of the radiological monitoring and registration procedures for evacuees, using student volunteers to represent evacuees.
The radiation monitoring was thorough, but could use some improve-ment in details.
J.2 Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations Not observed.
J.9 Capability for Implementation of Protective Measures Not observed.
J.10.g Adequacy of Methods used for Implementing Relocation of Populace Not observed because the scenario did not provide for a demonstration of this element.
J.10.d Adequacy of Methods used for Protecting Mobility Imnaired Persons including Institutionally Confined Not observed.
J.10.k Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation Not observed.
J.11 Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, Etc. (State Only)
Not observed.
J.10.h Adequate Relocation Centers have been Established at Least l
5 Miles & Preferably 10 miles Outside the Plume EPZ 1
Adequate relocation centers have been established outside the 10-mile EPZ as shown on maps in the Berrien County EOC, as depicted l
in the State's written plan, and as demonstrated at the Watervliet High School relocation center, Watervliet, Michigan, about 12 miles outside the plume EPZ.
24 Adequacy of Facilities, Supplies & Equipment at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers The Watervliet High School is excellent for use as a relocation and mass care facility because of existing utilities for eating, showering and bathing, private rooms for families, and a potential for recreational use. The supplies and equipment are adequate and would only require supplementing based on the length of time evac-uees would be required to remain at the center. The Red Cross exhibited a toiletry kit to be given evacuees on arrival at the center.
Adequacy of Staffing at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers The staff was very knowledgeable and had previous experience with this type of operation for natural disaster, such as floods and 4
snowstorms.
However, the number of staff at the center was minimal i
for the purpose of this exercise. Participating agency represent-i ation was limited to one person, except for the Red Cross,'which was represented by two individuals.
Representation consisted of a Rad Health Monitor from the County Department of Health, a County Public Health nurse, two supervisory persons, one from the Depart-ment of Social Services, and one from the Red Cross, and an i
additional American Red Cross volunteer who assisted with registra-i tion of evacuees.
J.12 Adequacy of Procedures for Processing Evacuees in Relocation Ctrs.
Including Health Care, Decon and Rad Monitoring, Etc.
1 An excellent demonstration of procedures for radiological monitoring i
and registration of evacuees was given at the Watervliet High School Relocation Center.
Thirty-four junior high and senior high student volunteers went through the complete radiation monitoring and regis-tration procedures for evacuees.
The registration forms were filled out in one copy only. However, the Director stated that in an actual emergency, standard forms in triplicate would be used (and she produced such printed forms). The radiation monitoring proced-ure was very good and reasonably thorough, but the monitor should have used the earphone on the GM counter, in addition to the meter, and he did not check the bottom of the soles of the shoes (he did i
check the sides though).
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SUMMARY
VIII HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES l
(Excess control, adequacy of equipment, dosimetry, use of KI)
The County adequately demonstrated their ability to control i
access to evacuated areas including the re-routing of I-94 i
traffic around the plume. The County Health Department has on hand an adequate supply of KI for emergency workers and mobility impaired persons.
KI was not needed for the general l
population because evacuation was choosen for the protective action.
The only KI used was for emergency workers.
The State Health Department makes the decision for emergency workers to exceed PAGs in case of life saving activities.
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25 J.10.c Adequacy of Provicions for use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutional 1 zed Persons in Plume EJZ The County Health Department has distributed or has on hand, adequate supplies of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized persons in the plume EPZ.
J.10.f Adequacy of Methods used in making Decisions to Administer KI to Central Population General population or public was evacuated and it was determined the need for KI was not necessary.
J.10.j Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuated Areas An adequate simulation of access control to evacuated areas and the re-routing of I-94 were observed.
However, a demonstration
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in future exercises would be helpful.
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K.3.a Adequacy of a 24-hour a day Capability to Determine Dose Received by Emergency Workers Dosimeters, both self-reading and permanent record devices, had been issued to emergency personnel.
K.3.b Demonstration of Adequate and Frequent Emergency Worker Dosimeter Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records The reading of dosimeters every hour may or may not be adequate, depending on background radiation.
The instructions given to emergency workers was to take readings every hour.
K.4 Evidence that an Adequate Decision Chain has been Established to Authorize Exposure for Emergency Workers in Excess of PAGs State Health Department makes the decision to authorize emergency workers to exceed PAGs for emergency workers.
K.S.a Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels have been Specified for Determining need for Decontamination The need for decontamination, PAGs are in the plan and will be acted upon by the County. However, personnel should have knowledge of the PAGs on decontamination.
K.5.b Adequacy of Measures for Decontamination of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal Not observed.
L.1 Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel Not observed.
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i-26 L.4 Adaquata Cepability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radio-I logical Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities l
Not observed.
- M.4 Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure Not applicable.
SUMMARY
IX RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures) l The County demonstrated the process used for recovery and reentry which is dependent of guidance that is provided by the State.
Recommendations included radiological monitoring of the effected area for a period of time that was to be determined at some later date.
Samples of water and food I
products would be taken to determine when normal usage could again take place.
Fresh produce should be washed before use.
This was an adequate demonstration of reentry procedures. How-ever, more detailed information should be provided for evacuees j
returning home.
j M.3 Adequacy of Established Means for Informing Response org that i
Recovery and Reentry can be initiated (State Only) i j
Not applicable.
M.1 Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Reentry and Relaxation of Protective Measures allowing Reentry l
l Procedures for reentry recovery operations were exercised by the i
County EOC personnel.
Radiological monitoring of the effected 4
areas was to continue for a period of time which was to be deter-mined at some later date.
Food products and water supplies samples 4
would determine when normal ~ usage could again take place.
Fresh i
produce should be washed before use.
An adequate demonstration of reentry procedures took place. However, more detailed infor-I mation for the evacuees returning home is needed, including the l
relocation centers and host areas.
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SUMMARY
X RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE l
(Benefit to Participants, Adequacy of the Scenario)
The exercise participants were able to gain valuable experience while. working on exercise problems.
The scenario adequately tested most of the elements of responding organization.
It is suggested that future exercises be structured so that actual demonstrations replace many of the simulated events.
N.l.b Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources The scenario adequately tested capabilities to mobilize local emergency response personnel and resources.
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N.l.a Adequacy of Ex. to Test Integrated Capabilities & Major Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected 9.rg The exercise was adequate to test capabilities and major portions of the response elements in effected organizations.
Benefit of Exercise to Participants The exercise participants were able to gain valuable experience while working together.to act upon PAGs and State recommendations.
It is suggested that future participation be demonstrated events and not so many simulated events.
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CH PART IV
SUMMARY
LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES STATE OF MICHIGAN C.1.a A specific person authorized to request Federal. assistance is not adequately provided for in the Michigan State Radio-logical Emergency Preparedness Plan. The reference to this criteria calls for the " Executive Group" to laake the decision to call in the Federal response.
The departments and specific individuals included in this " Executive Group" should be delineated in the plan. The plan shculd be revised to include this information.-
J.10.b Wall maps were not displayed showing population distribution by sectors in the 10-mile EPZ. A map should be procured and hung on the EOC wall for ready reference by the emergency
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BERRIEN COUNTY MICHIGAN There were no significant deficiencies noted during the evaluation of the D. C. Cook nuclear power plant exercise tt the Berrien County emergency.oper-c ations center.
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SUMMARY
LISTING OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES STATE OF MICHIGAN _
PLANS
.There were no minor deficienc es in the plans reported during the i
D.C. Cook exercise relating to the State participation.
TRAINING G.4.a Adequate information was disseminated at the Joint Public Inforn.ation Center by the State spokesperson.
However, the briefings could be improved through the use of prepared visual aids to enhance the media's ability to understand the technical information received.
M.1 Additional training, both formal and on-the-job, is recommended for the emergency response personnel representing the various departments. Although the reentry and recovery phase was adequately demonstrated, it appeared there was too much reliance on the plan in carrying out reentry and recovery.
The plans should be reviewed often. Too much reliance on the plan would slow the accomplishment of necessary activities during the reentry and recovery shutdown.
J RESOURCES It appears in the event an emergency arises which necessitates C l.c 1-a Federal response, adequate space to accommodate the Federal l
team would not be available in the operations room. Adequate space should be made available, if possible.
F.1.d The State EOC han didicated commercial telephone lines connecting 7
them with the Emergency Operations Facility, Joint Public Infor-
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mation Center, and the County EOC; however, no permanent backup
. system _is available.
Installation of permanent State Police radios 'at these locations is suggested to complete a backup s
comadnications system.
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'1; E.7 The Berrien County plan should be revised to include draft messages to disseminate information to the public including instructions relating to specific protective action guides (PAGs) incorporated in the plan.
TRAINING G.4.a The spokesperson for the medic at the JPIC should utilize visual aides available to explain in more detail the technical information disseminated during briefings.
J.10.j Due to simulation of activities relating to access control during this exercise, evaluators determined more on-the-job training
.ould benefit the participants.
It is suggested an actual demonstration of access control be completed during the next exercise to determine the' County's actual capability to perform this function.
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J.12 Procedures were adequate, generally, for processing evacuees; however, more on-the-job training is recommended in radiation monitoring.
It is suggested that the earphone be used on the GM counter as well as the meter, and more thorough monitoring
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/K.3.b The evaluation team suggests. additional on-the-job training to
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demonstrate the capability'to take dosimeter readings at proper
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intervals directly relating'to background radiation levels rather than strictly on an hourly basis.
Taking readings hourly may or may not be adequate depending on background radiation levels.
K.5.a Action levels for decontamination are specified in the plan; however, emergency response personnel were not all knowledgeable of the PAGs for decontamination.
Additional on-the-job training for these persons is needed.
M.1 Although the reentry and re'covery demonstration generally was adequate, more detailed information should be given to evacuated e
individuals returning home.
These are to include water usage, food, fresh produce, etc. in detail.
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RESOURCES l
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< Th6 County has the capability to communicate with fixed and mobile
? medical facilities threegh the use of mobile radios.
It is recom-mended a permanent radio be installed at the ECO to improve the existing capability, t
Theequipment'uedforfieldmonito:kngintheplumeEPZis
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J.10.8 All ntescscry m ps vna postad on th2 EOC walla, but not wh:ro thsy ware casily racd.
Mrpo should b2 reistd to oya level and larger more legible titles should be added for easier reference.
J.10.b The population distribution maps were located in the EOC, but should be arranged for easier viewing by emergency response team.
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PART VI SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES A schedule for the correction of the significant deficiencies listed for the State of Michigan is to be provided to the Chairman, Regional Assist-ance Committee, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V, by December 3, 1982. These are listed in Part IV and include criteria items Col.a. and J.10.b.
Please complete Attachment 1 indicating the corrective actions to be taken and the date such actions will be implemented and return it to the Regional Assistance Committee Chairman by the due date.
There were no significant deficiencies noted in the Final Exercise Report for Berrien County.
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6 'e L - 183-21 Final l'xerc ise Report - Signitirant Deliciencies At tautetus: 1 D:_ta Deficiency Nttul;c-0654 i la C rrected Critcria Signifiernt Deficiency N:ted Corrcctiva Action Icplementcd by the Stcta C.I.a A specific person authorized to request Federal assistance is not cdequately provided for in the Michigan State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.
The plan should be revised to include this information.
J.10.b Wall maps were not displayed showin;;
population distribution by sectors in the 10-mile EPZ.
A map should be procured and hung on the EOC wall for ready reference by the emergency responders.
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Return to FE!!A Region V 12-1-82 D ite
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Cook 21 Final Exercise Report - Significant Deficiencies ATTACHMENT 1
~ IU'REE,"-0654 D to Deficiency N
__C,riteria Significant Deficiency Ncted Correctiva Action Irplemented by the Stata la Cctrected.
C.l.a A' specific person anthorized to request Federal assistance is not adequately provided for in the Michigan State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.
The plan should be revised.to include this information.
J.10.b Wall maps were not displayed showing population distribution by sectors in the 10-mile EPZ. A map should be procured and hung on the EOC wall for ready reference by the emergency responders.
3 Return to FEMA Region V 12-1-82 Date
/E8ac1Eenn niC AN ELEcr c
INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY AEP
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October 29, 1982 sus;EcT:
October,1982 Siren Test From:
Roland Begor To:
Dan Bement Jim Collis Per your requests, attached are the results'of the October,1982, siren i
test. The sirens are sounded the first Saturday of each month at noon.
Verification of siren activation is detennined by a counter on the power supply to the siren motor.
At the time of the test, sirens 4 and 9 were out of service due to pre-viously identified problems. All remaining sirens were determined to be operating, except sirens 2 and 6.
Follow-up checking revealed that these two sirens were not sounding due to failed radio control boards.
Presently, all sirens have been repaired and are in service.
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SIREN INSPECTION CHICK LIST i..'mC,, ni h R/T i
I!'. alii 3%
DATE:
10/4/82 INSPECTORS:_ D. Strzelecki E. Danapilis PLEASE NOTE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS: OIL LEAKS, VANDALISM, BROKEN METER SEALS, ETC.
SIREN i
PREVIOUS PRESENT OPER.
NOTES COUNTER i COUNTER i HURRICANE 1
000022 000023 1
jpe each,1toenn -
radio removed hWM HURRICANE 2
000016 000016 0
from service, g
w 4-reeves HURRICANE 3
000012 000013 1
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HURRICANE 4
0UT 0F SER 7 ICE 8/27/82infafg HURRICANE 5
000027 000028 1
d' rodt bened -
[
{e#[e jj"{
- "i HURRICANE 6
000010 000010 0
2_
PENETRATOR 7
000010
- Ov0011, 1
- ewireE,:: e s:ar ed,
coun:e sv PENETRATOR 8
000252 000257 5
ed 0.s.
w r,Au bend PENETRATOR 9
0UT 0F 5ER" ICE 10/1/82.g a Ae g e.eAh m W oocca.-
PENETRATOR 10 000009 000010 1
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HURRICANE 11 000009 000010 1
HURRICANE 12 000011 000012 1
BANSHEE 13 000037 000038 1
HURRICANE 14 000012 000013 1
REVIEWED BY:
l' [G 7/22/82 Rev i1 DRS/mtr
Tc reaerarmmergency wranagement Agency a.
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Regien V 300 Stuth Wacker,24th Floor, Chicago,IL 60606 (312) 353-1500 October 13, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant Offsite REP Exercise Evaluators and Observers FROM:
Chief, Natural and Technological Hazards Division
SUBJECT:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise, October 21, 1982 The 1982 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise is scheduled for Thursday, October 21, 1982, from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
This will be a small-scale exercise.
The Pre-Exercise Briefing is scheduled for 1:30 p.m., Wednesday, October 20, j
1982, and vill be held at the Holiday Inn, Benton Harbor, Michigan. All I
evaluators and observers assigned by FEMA are expected to ' attend.
l l
r.xercise participants include the E=ergency Services Division, Michigan State Police; Berrien County officials and Office of Emergency Preparedness;
{
and the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Powe'r Plant.
The offsite evaluator assignments for this exercise are:
1.
State Energency Operations Center Energency Services Division Michigan State Police 111 South Capitol Avenue-Lower level Lansing, Michigan 517 373-0617 Ray Kellogg, Team Leader, FEMA Region V Barbara Bailey, FEMA Region V 2.
Berrien County Emergency Operations Center Office of Emergency Preparedness Sheriff's Department Building (Basement) 919 Port Street St. Joseph', Michigan 616 983-7141, extension 216 Den Hule,t, Team Leader, Argonne National Laboratory Ed Robinson, FDIA Region V Don King, FEMA Region V c
_______.__1._____
2 3.
Joint Public Information Center Theatrical Building Lake Michigan Community Center Napier Avenue Benton Harbor, Michigan Patricia Stillwell, Disaster Reservist, FEMA Region V
'Ed Ronne, Disaster Reservist, FEMA Region V 4.
Reception, Congregate Care and Decontamination Center (Includes evaluating local hospital (s) and/or Host Care Facilities)
W/er V/d/Nnee High School
'51 F:g1+ 0:roet g,,,, At-N44es, Michigan Woodie Curtis, FEMA Region V Red Cross Advisor Richard Holtzman, Argonne National Laboratory The Federal offsite exercise director for the Donald C. Cook exercise is Dan Bement. His assistant is Rick Anthony.
If you wish additional informa-tion, call Dan or Rick at FEMA Region V Technological Hazards Branch, FTS 372-6011, or cocmercial telephone 616 968-8142, extension 6011.
The outdoor varning system vill not be sounded during the exercise.
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Octccer 21, 1982 DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT FEtiA/NRC EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE I.
INTRODUCTION The Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant is required to participate in an annual joint Emergency Plan Exercise with the State of Michigan and Berrien County. This exercise is conducted for the purpose of assuring the health and safety of the residents of Berrien County Michigan. The Federal government participates in this annual exercise by evaluating the emergency response capabilities of the a
licensee, state and local government.
The exercise is scheduled to be conducted on October 21, 1982.
It will include the American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEPSC), the mobilization of Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, state & local personnel, and resources.
These organizations will demonstrate their separate and combined capabilities to respond to an accident at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
The exercise should demonstrate that response individuals and agencies are adequately trained to perform according to current plans and procedures.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the scenario, or plume release information regarding times, content, size, and weather pattern used.
The exercise will be observed and critiqued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Cormission (NRC).
This manual has been prepared to assist exercise controllers, evaluators, and observers in the conduct and evaluation of the exercise.
This manual contains all information and data necessary to prcperly ccncuct the exercise in an efficient and coordinated r.ar.ner.
Sections of the car.ual are as folicws:
1
~
7
- E I, T9B2 SECTI0ft I:
Introduction SECTI0tl II:
Licensee Objectives and Guidelines This section defines the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company objectives, and sets forth guidelines for conduct of the exercise to meet those objectives.
3e pe/
SECTI0ft III:
Licensee Observer / Controller Instructions pirector This section provides general instructions to American Electric cott o 'i Power Company exercise observer / controllers in conducting the a
exercise.
SECTION IV:
Exercise Scenario
~
This section describes the postulated sequence of events, occur-ring at the Donald C. Cook fluclear Plant, requiring response by various on-site and off-site emergency response organizations.
Included in this section are copies of all exercise messages which will be utilized to control the progress of the exercise scenario.
SECTI0ft V:
Parameters
- ((
- This section contains scenario-time-related information concerning
- 7 #
plant conditions.
Copies of this manual will be provided to exercise observer / controllers prior to the exercise.
Fellcwing the exercise, ccpies of this manual will be distributed to Lcy exercise participants.
2 e
II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AED GUIDELINES Exercise objectives and guidelines have been developed through coordination of the. Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, the State of Michigan, Berrien County, Michigan, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Emergency Management Administration.
The exercise guidelines have been developed to test and reflect the capabilities of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant emergency organizations in meeting the objectives set forth below.
A.
Exercise Objectives 1.
For the Indiana & Michigan Electric Company (licensee) Emergency Response Organization:
a.
Demonstrate proficiency' in classifying the
/
emergency condition.
b.
Demonstrate prompt and effective notification and alerting procedures and methods.
c.
Demonstrate the ability of the Donald C. Cook
~
Nuclear Plant Emergency Organization to maintain effective control of operations.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to perform on-site rad-iological monitoring and assessments, e.
Demonstrate protective measures considered, and used to protect D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant personnel and the general public.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to perfcrm off-site dose assessment projection and provide prompt warning to local, state, and and federal agencies, and the general public.
3
...o.
October 21, 1982 g.
Demonstrate the reliability, and effective use, of ne emergency communications equipment and procedures.
h.
The Operations Staging Area will be activated and will demonstrate its ability to:
1)
Provide a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency.
2)
Perform personnel accountability.
i.
The Technical Support Center will be activated and will demonstrate its ability to:
1)
Provide plant management and technical support to Operations personnel.
2)
Provide a location for necessary support personnel
- =..
to operate from, thereby preventing congestion in the control room.
e==
3)
Relieve the operators of responsibilities other than event mitigation until the Emergency Operating Facility is functional.
4)
Perform Emergency Operating Facility functions for the Alert Emergency class, and for the Site Emergency and General Emergency classes prior to Emergency Operating Facility activation.
j.
The Emergency Operations Facility will be activated and will demonstrate its ability to:
1)
Provide management of overall licensee response.
2)
Coordinate radiological and envircnmental assessment activities.
3)
Determine reconcended public protective actions.
4)
Communication /coordinaticn of emergency response activities with federal, state and local agencies.
j
~ u
Oc8cber 21,1982
[
k.
The American Electric Power Service Corporation Initial Assessment Group will be activated and will demonstrate its ability to:
l 1)
Provide initial technical and management support to the plant.
2)
Obtain additional support, as required, to respond to the event.
1.
The American Electric Power Service Corporation Engineering Emergency Operating Facility will be activated and will demon-strate its ability to provide engineering and design support in response to the event.
The Joint Public Information Center will be activated and will m.
demonstrate the capability of developing public informat' ion releases in conjunction with state and local representatives.
l Demonstrate the ability of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant n.
i Emergency Organization to integrate its activities with those of the other participating emergency response organizations (county, state, and federal).
Demonstrate recovery techniques in the ability of the Donald C.
o.
Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Organization to de-escalate (de-activate) corporate and plant emergency response activities and inform the general public.
p.
Derronstrate the ability to participate in a post-exercise critique to determine areas requiring additional capability improvements.
5
___.___.________________________.________________c'_
(
q.
Demonstrate shift augmentation capabilities (Emergency Plan Table' 12-1, Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission Table B-1) and activation of the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility during off-shift hours.
2.
For Berrien County and the State of Michigan:
a.
Demonstrate that all parties to the exercise are aware of their operational management responsibilities during a nuclear accident and that proper organizational control and support are maintained pursuant to Act 390, P.h.1976 and the concept of operations delineated in the Michigan Emergency Preparedness Plan.
b.
Familiarize local government emergency services personnel with
(,
the emergency organization and the interrelationships between local, state, federal and the Indiana & Michigan Company plans for response to all levels of radiological emergencies, Exercise and evaluate the ability of agencies and individuals to c.
properly execute their plans according to a consistent emergency action level scheme.
d.
Familiarize all parties with notification and reporting arrangements and alerting and mobilization procedures for emer-gency personnel.
Exercise communications between the plant and off-site facilities e.
and disaster relief forces, including understanding the content of messages received and message administration.
f.
Exercise the Joint Public Information Center concept of information exchange, media briefing, rumor control, press activities, and release ccordinator.
6
' October 21, 1902 r.
g.
Provide for the development of written messages intended for the ~
public and to exercise procedures for initiation of public.
alerting and notification.
h.
Establish an emergency operations center as specified in the Berrien County plan and to demonstrate its adequacy in terms of 24-hour staffing capability and physical setting.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of participants to implement correct protective actions to protect the public.
l j.
Demonstrate the ability of participants to take adequate exposure o
\\
control measures and to institute decontamination procedures as necessary.
j k.
Provide sufficient pre-exercise training specified in NUREG-0654 to familiarize participants in the radiological emergency re-sponse concepts, procedures, and actions delineated in the Berrien County Emergency Operations Plan.
B.
2xercise Guidelines To define the " extent of play" by the exercise participants and meet the aforementioned exercise objectives, the following exercise guidelines have been developed:
1.
The exercise is designed to be a " free play" exercise.
Prewritten or command message are inserted by the exercise controller / observer at given times to. cause or influence particular emergency actions or 7
responses. All other exercise actions are determined by participant response to the emergency conditions.
2.
Participants will respond to scenario conditions and take appropriate actions to protect workers and the general public. Mitigation or degradation of scenario conditions will not be allowed in the interest of controlling licensee, state, and local involvement in the exercise.
3.
The exercise will be conducted on October 21, 1982.
The exercise will begin at 8:00 a.m. and last until 1:30 p.m.
The last one and one-half (11) hours of the exercise will support recovery actions by the state and county.
4.
The exercise will commence with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an " ALERT" or possibly a " SITE EMERGENCY".
Plant condition's will progress to a " SITE EMERGE.NCY" and
" GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION".
=
5.
The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protec-tive actions for the general public.
6.
Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities.
.7.
Two (2) radiological monitoring teams will be dispatched for the purpose of testing response time, communications, monitoring, and sampling procedures.
Each radiological monitoring team will be accompanied by a controller / observer throughout the exercise.
Each team will rende-Ivous with its controller / observer at the Operations Staging Area, located in the basement of the office building.
8
Ler-n, du -
8.
The State of Michigan is conducting a small scale exercise and as such will be conducting their activities frcm the Lansing Emergency. Opera-tions Center.
State participation will be limited due to a full scale exercise with Detroit Edison's Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant on February 2, 1982.
9.
Berrien County will activate their Emergency Operations Center in St.
Joseph, Michigan.
All personnel will perform their prescribed func-tions.
10.
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant will activate the Technical Support Center, the Operations Staging Area, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
11.
The American Electric Power Service Corporation will activate the Initial Assessment Group and the Engineering Emergency Operating Facility in New York City.
12.
The Joint Public Information Center will be activated providing a central location for news releases to be made. Members of the local press will be invited to participate in the exercise at the center, and press briefings regarding the event will be conducted.
13.
Procedures for the activation of the Early Warning System (EWS) will be demonstrated, up to but not including siren activation.
14.
The postulated accident conditions will require the assembly of non-essential site personnel at the Operations Staging Area.
When required by the exercise scenario, the site emergency alam will be sounded and persennel assembled. However, once on-site assembly and accountability procedures have been completed, non-participating personnel will be allcwed to rett. n to their normal work stations.
C
~
October 21, 1982 15.
Participation by Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant personnel directly involved in responding to the emergency shall be carried out to the fullest extent possible, including the development of radiological monitoring teams and post accident sampling teams.
16.
Exercise participants will include the following organizations:
a.
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company.
1)
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant On-Site Emergency Organization.
2)
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company Ft. Wayne and Bridgman Public Affairs Organization.
b.
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
1)
American Electric Power New York Emergency Response Organization, 2)
American Electric Power Columbus Public Affairs.
u.:
Berrien County and all supporting local agencies as identified c.
in the Berrien Ccunty Emergency Operations Plan.
d.
State of Michigan - Michigan State Police, Emergency Services Division.
Active participation in the exercise will only be required of the above listed organizations.
If the exercise scenario requires that any other organizations and/or officials be contacted, they shall be contacted for the purpose of checking communications only.
All federal responses to an emergency, including those of the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan and the Department of Energy, shall be simulated through 10
eswew,as, ass
~
FalA cr NRC personnel stationed in Chicago or Bethesda, respectively.
17.
If required by the exercise scenario, alternate means of accessing the plant shall merely be simulated and not actually implemented.
However, on-site security personnel should exercise their procedures for restricting access to the site.
i 18.
It should be clear to all participants in the exercise that in the event an operating unit at D. C. Cook is in jeopardy, the exercise nay be terminated at the discretion of the Cook Plant manager, thus releasing personnel to perform necessary on-site functions.
l No other live ar simulated events are to be included in the " extent of play" of
[*
the exercise.
I l
l i
11
D i
00flALD C. COOK PLAllT FDIA/NRC EHERGEllCY RESP 0flSE FIELD EXERCISE OCTOBER 21, 1982 Il0TE:
The information contained in this scenario is completely hypothetical and is not to be thought of as a probable accurrence.
A series of incredible events have been combined to fully test the response of various agencies.
7 A.
Iftlll AL CONDITIONS Both Units are operating at 100% power.
Unit one has been in operation for one (1) month, and Unit two has been in operation for five (5) months.
All Unit one paramgters are normal and stable.
Unit two has a small amount of steam generator tube leakage as R-15 is 1.4 x 10 cpm. A surveillance test was run on Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feed pump on 1600-2400 shift last night and vibration was high and smoke was coming from the inboard pump bearing.
A surveillance run was started on Unit two AB diesel at 0445 hours0.00515 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.357804e-4 weeks <br />1.693225e-4 months <br /> with an auxiliary equipnent operator and a trainee at the diesel.
B.
IlETEOR0 LOGICAL CONDITIONS U
Wind is from 205 and a speed of 20 miles per hour.
The temperature at 180 feet, temperature at 30 feet (AT) g is equal to -1.1 C.
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C.
IIISTORY FOR PAST 3 HOURS At 5:00 a.m., during a surveillance run on Unit two AB diesel, an explosion occurred rendering the diesel generator inoperable. The explosion was followed by a fire which was classified as a " SITE EllERGENCY" by the Shif t Supervisor.
The Shift Supervisor implemented his energency call list and was directed by the Plant Manager to n.otify the Berrien County Sherriff's Department, Michigan State Police, Nuclear Regulatory Comm-ission, and other agencies (as directed by PHP 2080.EPP.012) of the condition. At 5:22 a.m. the fire was extinguished.
At 5:25 a.m., after arriving at the site, the Plant Manager declassified the condition to "N0 EMERGENCY" and so notified all previously notified organizations of the "N0 EMERGENCY" condition, and that further emergency actions were unwarranted.
A surveillance run on Unit 2 CD diesel was started at 5:30 a.m. and completed successfully at 6:30 a.m.
Plant personnel are attempting to determine the extent of damage to the Unit 2 AB diesel and the availabil-ity of spare parts on-site.
At 5:45 a.m. the Michiana Regional Dispatcher reported a " TORNADO WATCH" in effect for the area 20 miles either side of a line from Hammond, Indiana to Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Shif t Supervisor notifies persons '
in the plant of a possible tornado and to be observant for this.
1
Et_sgi t t ) M.Lt.hK!U iil4L
- p l'ESSAGE EXPECTED TlHE HUNDER HESSAGE LICEllSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0750 1
TO:
Shif t Supervisor FROM:
llichiana Regional Dispatcher This is the Michiana Regional The Shift Supervisor takes Local authorities have taken Dispatcher calling to advise steps to test run:
appropriate actions, you that a water spout has been
- 1. U-1 AB and U-l CD diesel.
sighted 10 miles !! cst of D. C.
- 2. U-2 CD diesel.
Coo.k by way of the National
- 3. The diesel driven fire Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-pumps.
i s tra tion. The weather alert, The Shif t Supervisor also dir-previously issued, has been ects the exterior of the plant upgraded to a " tornado warn-to be inspected for loose ing."
equipment or materials.
0755 2
T0:
Unit Supervisor FROM:
Auxiliary Equipment Operator Auxiliary Equipment Operator Shift Supervisor advises all e
reports that he saw what he persons to cone into plant for
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thought was a large funnel sa fe ty.
cloud out over the lake.
l 0800 3
TO:
Shif t Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller The plant has just experienced Shift Supervisor initiates trip a trip with a blackout.
U-2 recovery operations.
Actions conditions are as follows:
are to be taken to place plant 1.
All shutdown and control in safe condition.
rods are fully inserted.
2.
A turbine trip and genera-tor trip have occurred.
HESSAGE EXPECTED TillE NUMBER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0800 3
3.
Both feed pump turbines Shift Supervisor initiates trip (C0!aT) (CONT) have tripped.
recovery operations. Actions 4.
CD diesel has tripped and are to be taken to place plant restarted.
It is presently in a safe condition.
carrying its emergency loads including the U-2 East HDAFP.
5.
The West MDAFP is not run-ning and the safeties on S/G
. numbers 1 & 4 are lifting.
0801 4
10:
Unit Supervisor FROM:
Auxiliary Equipment Operator An Auxiliary Equipment Operator has just called the control room and indicated that he saw L
a tornado pass by the plant and that:
1.
765 lines from Unit 2 main transformer are on the ground.
t.
2.
765 tower near 69 KV yard has fallen on 69 KV yard, dam-aging 12 EP) and 12 EP2 trans-formers, 1 EP and 2 EP breakers and the 69 KV pole by the loop feed enclosure.
0801 5
T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller The fnllowing alarms are re-ceived:
a 9
)
i,una to althalo l }ht 11ESSAGE EXPECTED TiliE libMCER MESSAGE LICEllSEE ACT10!iS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACT10 tis 0801 5
1.
Dif ferential has operated (C0!1T) (C0flT) on 765 KV buss.
2.
CB 12 AB & CB 12 CD trip.
3.
CB BE tripped.
4.
5.
34.5 KV TR 201 CD volt low.
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0802 6
T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller All AC power is lost to U-2 as The Shift Supervisor:
indicated by zero voltage on 1.
Requests to have Mainten-the emergency busses.
The CD ance check the diesel, diesel has tripped.
The Shift 2.
Declares an " ALERT" and Supervisor called the Auxiliary notifies the Operations Equipment Operator at the dies-Superintendent and Plant el and was advised that the Manager.
diesel tripped and that it had 3.
Activates the Technical been making unusually loud Support Center.
noises while running.
4.
Directs U-l to prove op-erability of both their diesels.
0802 7
TO:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Reactor Operator The Reactor Operator at the The Plant Manager notifies, ac-The Benton liarbor State Police steam generator panel reports cording to procedure:
Post forward a " Post Disaster that the East MDAFP has trip-1.
Derrien County Sherriff's Report" per procedure.
ped.
Department.
^
11LI Alltil SClflARIO 11HL x
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11ESSAGE EXPECTED TlHE UUt:BER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0802 7
2.
Michigan State Police.
(C0!iT) (CONT) 3.
Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission.
4.
American Electric Power response personnel, of the " ALERT" condition due to loss of all on-site and off-site AC power.
The plant is inves-tigating the condition and fur-ther updates will be provided as they become available.
0804 8
T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller Steam Generator levels are Upon the Operations Superinten-presently decreasing at the dents arrival in the control rate of approxinately 2%
room, the Shif t Supervisor re-per minute, quests use of the Unit cross tie from a Unit 1 HDAFP, due to t
loss of heat sink occurring.
0804 N/A Upon arrival in the control room, the Plant Manager recog-nizes the impending " SITE EMER-GENCY" and recommends activa-tion of the Emergency Opera-ting Facility and the Joint gg Public Information Center.
The Shift Supervisor should be following the loss of all station AC power procedure.
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- LLIMRlO l ][il DLinALLU a
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14LSSAGE EXPECTED TIFIE I;UllBER
!!ESSAGE LICEllSEE ACT10lls EXPECTED 0FF-SITE ACT10liS G815 N/A The Technical Support Center is essentially fully staffed.
They begin coming up to date on events that have occurred and initiating consuunications with off-site organizations. The Technical Support Center ar-ranges for a radiation monitor-ing team to check the site boundary due to steam generator safeties blowing.
0818 N/A A " SITE EMERGENCY" should be declared, the Nuclear Emer-gency Alarm sounded, and j
j accountability performed due l
to being without power for
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greater than 15 minutes. The l
!t should nutify the Derrien l
y County Sherrif f's Department f
and flichigan State Police of this condition.
Shift Supervisor should be following the " Loss of all 1
station AC power" procedure g
where possible.
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'UI. l AILLit SCEriAN10 'flHL
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!!ESSAGE EXPEf
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' i 1111 flUI:ULR liESSAGE LICEtiSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0819 ft/A The Plant Manager notifies the Due to the escalating condi-Bentnn liarbor State Police that tions, the Benton liarbor State due to time without power, Unit Police Post sends a followup 2 has escalated to a " SITE nessage to Lansing Operations.
EI4ERGENCY". Investigations Operations again notifics duty are now being omde to deter-staff from the Emergency Service mine if radioactive gases are Division / Michigan State Police being released.
and Radiological Health Division
/Departnent of Public ilcalth.
After conferring with Radiolog-ical Health Department / Depart-mer.t Public Health, Emergency
/
Services Division / Michigan State 7
Police recommends that mobili-I zation of State and Local Emer-gency Operating Centers is ad-visable due to the nature of the incident.
The Michiana Regional Dispatch-
?.
er is notified of damage at the plant, and that restoration of power is critical to the safety of the plant, and to the health and safety of the public. (sim-ula ted).
0820' 9
T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller Reactor coolant pressure is The Shift Supervisor diagnoses a 1920 psi and decreasing. Con-leak into containnent, probably tainment pressure is 3.8 psi through the reactor coolant pump and increasing.
Containment seals.
area monitor R-2 is increasing.
lil All.l.O SCI.IIARIO lilit VI.SSAGE EXPECTED 11HE HUtiBER HESSAGE LICEllSEE ACTI0tlS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0821
!!/A The Shift Supervisor requests the Operations Superintendent or Technical Support Center to determine if anything can be done to provide an electrical tie from Unit I to Unit 2 in order to have charging due to the suspected leakage from reactor coolant pump seals.
0822 10 T0:
Operations Support Area Manager FROM:
Maintenance Team at Diesel The problem with Unit 2 CD The Operations Support Area The Emergency Services Division /
diesel is that the bearings Manager reports this infor-Michigan State Police notifies appear to have gone out and.
mation to the Technical the Governor's Office and rec-the crankshaft damaged.
Support Center.
ommends at least partial mobil-ization as per the Radiological Health recommendation. The Governor's Office issues auth-ority to begin " call-up" and de-clares a " STATE OF DISASTER".
Emergency Services Division /
Michigan State Police notifies Berrien County that a " STATE OF g
DISASTER" has been declared by the Governor and to begin action in accord with the local plan.
L *,
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1____
m (0
MESSAGE EXPECTED IIME Hul;BER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0825 11 TO:
Shift Supervisor FRON:
Operations Superintendent The East Unit 1 motor driven The Shif t Supervisor directs The Berrien County Emergency auxiliary feed pump should that a lineup of auxiliary feed Operations Center will connun-be used innediately.
water from Unit 1 East motor icate directly with the State driven auxiliary feed pump Emergency Operations Cent ar un-to Unit 2 steam generators til the on-site Emergency Opera-21 and 24 be performed.
tions Center is fully activated.
0830 N/A Technical Support Center should be staffed and opera-tional.
0840 12 10:
Shift Supervisor FRON:
Auxiliary Equipment Operator The lineup from Unit 1 motor The Reactor Operator initiates The Technical Support Center is driven auxiliary feed pump auxiliary feed from Unit 1 to advised of a " STATE OF DISASTER" to Unit 2 steam generators Unit 2 steam generators 21 and proclamation and directed to 21 and 24 is complete.
24.
communicate with the State Emer-gency Operations Center.
0841 13 10:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller Steam generator safeties reset The Shift Supervisor directs as feedwater from Unit 1 begins that a reactor coolant systgm to supply numbers 21 and 24 cooldown to 3.90 psi and 446 F steam generators.
be initiated.
1
i
^
IIESSAGE EXPECTED TIME rit:tiGLR MESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0843
~i:/A The Technical Support Center The State Emergency Operations will ensure that conomnicators Center Lansing is partially maintain full tine communica-mobilized and direct communica-tiens with the assigned loca-tion lines are established with tions.
the plant and Berrien County.
0850 14 10:
Shift Supervisor FR0ft:
Observer / Controller Lower containment sump level The Shift Supervisor directs is 78%; containment dew point persons to try to determine is 96%; and containment area reason for adverse conditions radiation monitor, R-2, is in containment.
increasing.
NOTE:
ThTabove indications are caused by leaks out the reactor coolant pump seals of 50 gpm each for a total of 200 gpm. This condi-tion will worsen as reactor
?.
coolant pump seals deteriorate.
The Joint Public Information Center is now operational at Lake Michigan College Consnuni-ty Center.
0902 N/A The Technical Support Center' The State Emergency Operations I
establishes communications with Center Lansing establishes a the Emergency Operations Facil-direct line to the Joint Public ity and begins to transfer Em-Infornation Center at Lake ergency Operations Facility Michigan College and provides functions to the Emergency state assessment to sant.
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MESSAGE EXPECTED ilHE IlUHt?ER MESSAGE LICEtiSEE ACT10llS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0902 ti/A Operations Facility.
The Ener-(C0llT) (CONT) gency Operations Facility / Tech-nical Support Center establishes connunications with the Joint Public Information Center.
0904 15 10:
Radiation Monitoring Team FR0ll:
Observer / Controller The measured dose rate at the The Radiation Monitoring Team site boundary is normal back-reports this information to ground.
the Operations Support Area.
The Operations Support Area ensures the Technical Support Center /Energency Operating Facility also overheard this information.
The Technical Support Center requests that they continue to t
monitor between the plant and site boundary due to a loss of off-site power and monitoring capabilities of Unit 2.
0907 16 T0:
. Shift Supervisor FR0ll:
Benton liarbor Line Crew 12 AB & 12 CD breakers are destroyed, additionally, phase two of transformer 4 has the bushings broken off.
@la 0 Mild SCLHARIO Tlill y
c' HESS/,CE EXPECTED l illE Ill:!".BER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0910-17 T0:
Radiation Monitoring Team FROM:
Observer / Controller Measured site boundary dose The Radiation Fonitoring Team rate remains normal back-again reports titeir results to g round.
the Radiation Protection Dir-ector (in the Operations Sup-port Area) who ensures the Rad-iation Protection Hanager in 4
the Emergency Operating Facili-ty is aware of this data.
The Radiation Protection Manag-er advises the Radiation Moni-toring Team to continue moni-toring at the site boundary.
0915 18 T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller Containment pressure is now The Technical Support Center Denton liarbor Line Crew continue 8.4 psi and the ice condenser is working on a plan for their efforts to establish a is not in operation, placing the ice condenser power supply from 69 KY.
in service.
The Benton Harbor Line Crew estimates that it will take The Technical Support Center 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore AC pow-should also be considering the 4,
er from off-site. The 69 possibilities of providing AC KV supply appears to be the power to a Unit 2 charging pump most promising source.
from a Unit 1 diesel.
1'
_,g, ij HESSAGE EXPECTED T il1E NUMBER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 0917 N/A The Emergency Operations facility has assumed the com-nninication link to the State Emergency Operations Center.
0930 19 10:
Operations Support Area Hanager 1
FROM:
Maintenance Crew The spare generator for Unit The Shift Supervisor continues 2 AB diesel is in the ware-to make efforts to attain house.
The estimate on re-AC power elsewhere.
placenent, however, is app-roximately 3 days.
Repair of CD diesel will take at least that long.
1000 20 TO:
ALL PERSONS INVOLVED Ili Tile EXERCISE FROM:
Observer / Controller All persons involved in the exercise will be given the following information:
The scenario jumps ahead 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at this time.
The following is a list of the conditions that presently exist:
s
l 181 I A111.11 SCI IIAR10 1 Il!!.
- gg ! \\
~
IllSSAGE EXi'ECTED l il1E I.UliBER llESSAGE LICEllSEE ACTI0llS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 1000 20
'The containment pressure is at (C0flT) (CONT)
.1 psi ang the temperature is at 115 F, and the containmeng radiation level is now 7.1 x 10 R/hr.
Partial core uncovery has occurred.
A post accident samp-l ling team was sent out at 1600
}
to obtain a RCS sample.
The results of this sample indicated approximately 1% failed fuel.
The isotopic measurements were:
Activity of RCS pCi/cc le - 133 185.6 X - 135 5.19 Kr - 85 3.75 Kr - 87 0.9 I - 131 1.78 I - 133 2.75 In order to verify these measure-ments, it is decided to obtain a second sample.
The post accident sampling team should be formed and proceed with obtaining a sample.
4 Power was restored to U-2 at 2:00 p.m. by tying U-1 to U-2 through the auxiliary power supply break-er and isolating the fault at the loop enclosure.
DL1 Alt.LD LCLilARio llHE N
'E liESSAGE EXPECTED TIME flUMBER 11ESSAGE LICEliSEE ACTI0ilS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS The State Radiological llealth 1000 20 The State Radiological llcalth (C0flT) (CONT)
Monitoring Team are now in the area taking samples.
Earlier entry into the lower containment confinned a large anount of leakage from the reactor coolant pump seals.
A second source of power has been restored to Unit 2 via the 69 KV supply at 9:30 p.m. this evening (1 hourago).
Deliberations between the Technical Support Center, American Electric Power Service Corporation En-gineering Emergency Operat-ing Facility, and the Emergen-cy Operating Facility have been ongoing concerning cool-down.
The decision was made.to in-itiate recovery using procedure 2-OllP 4023.001.018 " Recovery with Safety Injection" required.
Completion of this procedure was accomplished and we are now 44 ready to initiate cooldown with the residual heat removal system.
The East train of the residual heat removal system is in the process of being placed in ser-vice at this time.
~s 6.*
u.
.i..... 4 9
--___.___..m.____
ui.initto dLLluddo 6 pjt j
iii
.e IlfSSACE EXPECTED I
1111E I;UllBER MESSAGE LICEfiSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACT10flS 1
1000 20 A Radiation Monitoring Team has f
(CONT) (CONT) remained at the site boundary
)
throughout the event, and remains there now, due to the conditions in containment and status of the plant.
1 l
Wind speed has now dropped to 8 mph.
Wind direction remains from 205".
l fiOTE:
All times in paren-I theses denote real time.
f L
2220 21 (1020) T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller
.l i
Area radiation monitors near The Technical Support Center l
the residual heat removal line should recognize that we are i
start increasing as the resi-now pumping coolant out of the l
?.
dual heat removal is placed system.
Radiological problems in service, could be significant since l
some fuel damage has occurred.
2222 22 (1022) 10:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller 4
Unit 2 R-26 monitor is The Shif t Supervisor and increasing from background of Technical Support Center 40 counts.
should try to come up with reason for this.
t'iTAlitifai3tDiMilo Till
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l
';s l
1-1ESSAGE EXPECTED TlHE NUllBER llESSAGE LICEllSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTIONS 2230 23 l
(1030) TO:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller 4
Unit 2 R-26 is 3 x 10 cpm.
Shift Supervisor directs the in service resi6:al heat re-moval pump to be removed from
- service, The Technical Support Center should request team to proceed to R-26 and begin taking read-ings 6" from R-26 detector.
2235 24 (1035) 10:
Post Accident Sampling Team Fl:0H:
Observer / Controller The following is a list of.
The Post Accident Sampling Team reactor coolant activity.
reports these results to the Rad--
iation Protection Director who
?.
Activity of RCS pCi/cc ensures the Technical Support Center receives this data.
Xe - 133 179.5 X - 135 3.3 Kr - 85 3.7 Kr - 87 0.04 1 - 131 1.74 1 - 133 2.25 I de i
n
(
(
I 1
MESSAGE EXPECTED TIHE
!!UHUER MESSAGE LICENSEE ACTI0tlS EXPECTED OFF %ITE ACTIONS 2240 25 (1040) T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller Unit 2 R-26 is off-scale The Shift Supervisor instructs j
high.
A flaintenance man the Plaintenance man to check l
reports to the control room with Radiation Protection for I
that he was in the area of possible personnel contamina-IRV.-310 (East residual heat tion.
removal heat exchanger out-let valve), and water was The Emergency Operations Faci-spraying out of the valve.
lity requests Operations Support Area provide on-site monitoring NOTE: Data from the unit vent team to determine conditions release pathway will be pro-for entry to residual heat re-vided to the Radiation Pro-moval exchanger area. Monitor tection Director, as request-team is dispatched (simulated) ed, by the observer / controller. from Operations Support Area This information may include to provide this information.
I radiation readings at six inches from the unit vent and unit vent
?.
sample data.
Teams will not be activated to perform these func-tions.
2245 26 (1045) TO:
Site Boundary Monitoring Team FR0!1:
Observer / Controller 4
The readings at the site The Technical Support Center boundary are as follows:
declares "GEllERAL EMERGENCY" flote:
Readings are to be pro-classification from information vided by the observer / control-from the Emergency Operating ler from data included in the Facility and from the site plant parameters section. Read-boundary monitoring team.
-ings will be provided as a func-tion of time and team location, j
l O
T.
NESSAGE EXPECTED 11ht litil;BER HESSAGE LICENSEE ACTIONS EXPECTED 0FF-SITE ACTIONS 2248 27 (1048) 10:
Radiation Protection Director FROM:
On-Site Monitoring Team The readings in the auxiliary The on-site monitor team re-building are as follows:
ports readings to the Emergen-cy Operations Facility then de-Note: Readings to be provided termines the clothing and stay from data in the plant para-tine for persons assigned to meters section and as a func-isolate the residual heat re-tion of team location.
moval valve IRV-310.
4 2300 28 (1100) TO:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Auxiliary Equipment Operator We have isolated the valve and The Shift Supervisor will the leak is now stopped, direct operators to place West train of residual heat removal in service and con-tinue with cooldown.
2 2315 29 (1115) T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller R-26 renmins off scale.
Shift Supervisor will maintain surveillance on R-26 nonitor.
2325 30 4
(1125) T0:
Shift Supervisor FROM:
Observer / Controller 5
R-26 is 3 x 10 and trending Monitor reduction in R-26
- down, reading.
O
titl/.lLLD SCEllARIO lif4L g
V1 o'
I4ESSAGE EXPECTED
-T il1E NU!1BER flESSAGE LICEllSEE ACTI0tlS EXPECTED OFF-SITE ACTI0f;5 2345 31 T0:
Shift Supervisor FR0!i:
Observer / Controller 3
R-26 reading 3 x 10 cp,,
2400 32 T0:
ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN Tile EXERCISE FR0f4:
Observer / Controller The time is now noon Saturday, Continue with normal cooldown Re-entry procedures begining to October 23.
ilo additional of Unit to check for fuel lift road blocks, close down con-releases have occurred since damage.
gregate care facilities, allow 12:01 a.m. Friday, October 22.
for orderly re-entry to area pop-
)
At 1:00 p.m. yesterday (Oct-ober 22) discussions with ulace, information through the JPIC and EBS as to proper proced- -
State, Radiological llelth, ures to follow, decontamination county, Federal, and I & II.
officials concluded with a de-of fresh vegtables, etc., assure; transportation exists to take escalation of the event to a evacuees back home, proper patrol-
" SITE El4ERGENCY". At 10:00 a.m.
ing of area by police until resi-this morning (Saturday, October dents have returned.
- 23) discussions were again ini-tiated between the above organi-zations.
At 12:00 p.m. the event was de-escalated to an " UNUSUAL EVENT".
gg DATA WILL BE SUPPLIED UNTIL 1:30 P.M. (REAL TIl4E) TO ALLOW FOR OFF-SITE RECOVERY.
ACTIONS.
END
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