ML20077F267
| ML20077F267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1983 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8308010314 | |
| Download: ML20077F267 (9) | |
Text
9 DUKE POWER GOMPAhT e.o. nox aaino CIIAHLoTrE, N.C. 28242 IIAL H. TUCKEH (704) 373-4531 TELEPHONE veem r.eesomwr July 26, 1983
.uu....,=="
Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Dear Mr. Denton:
Section 15.4.6 of the Catawba Safety Evaluation Repc,rt provides a discussion of Confirmatory Item 41, ESF Grade Containment Purge Filter System Design.
Attached are revised Catawba FSAR pages which respond to this item.
Very truly yours, f$
/fff)
Hal B. Tucker ROS/php Attachment cc: 'Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
.U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW,~ Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Palmetto Alliance 21351s Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Mr. Jesse L. Riley M
Carolina Environmental Study Group; 854 Henley: Place-l g
' Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 i
8308010314 830726 PDR ADOCK 05000413 E
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TABLE 6.2.4-1 (Page 12)
Containment Isolation Valve and Actuator Data
- 22. During the injection phase of safety injection, these valves are closed.
Water from the refueling water storage tank (FWST) provides approximately 48 feet of head on these valves (* 20.8 psig).
This head will preclude any leakage through this penetration.
During the recirculation phase of safey injection, these valves are open to provide flow to N0 pump suction.
23.
The main steam, feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, sample and blowdown lines are all connected to the secondary side of the steam generator which is kept at a higher pressure than the primary side soon after a LOCA occurs.
Any leakage between the primary and secondary sides of the steam gene-rator is directed inward to the containment.
24.
Deleted 25.
Type C leak test not required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J because these containment isolation valves:
a.
Do not provide a direct connection between the inside and outside atmospheres of the primary reactor containment under normal opera-tion.
b.
Are not required to close automatically upon receipt of a contain-ment isolation signal in response to controls intended to effect containment isolation, and c.
Are not required to operate intermittenly under post accident conditions.
In addition, these penetrations have been evaluated per 10CFR50, Appen-dix J, III.A.d.
It was concluded that testing was not required.
26.
These valves are sealed against leakage by the Containment Valve Injec-tion Water System as discussed in Section 6.2.4.4.
27.
Type 8 test performed per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
28.
Deleted 29.
This system is required to be in operation during the Type A test in order to maintain the unit in a safe condition..Therefore, this penetra-tion will not be vented and drained.
30.
This penetration is a part of a closed system inside containment.
All piping inside containment is seismic Category 1 and therefore not subject to rupture as a result of a LOCA.
This penetration will not be drained and vented for the' Type A test.
31.
Valve closes on receipt of a high radiation or high relative humidity signal.
Rev. 8 W
CNS The containment purge supply fans, purge exhaust fans, and filter trains are controlled in two trains.
The controls are designed to have simultaneous start-ing and stopping of the matching supply and exhaust equipment.
The controls for the Incore Instrumentation Room Purge System are designed to have simultaneous starting and stopping of the supply and exhaust equipment.
The controls are also designed to initiate an automatic shutdow, and co -.ainment isolation upon receipt of a containment isolation signal.
IThecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemfiltertrainsaredescribedinSection 12.3.3.
9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation Each Containment Purge Ventilation System supply and exhaust penetration through the containment vessel is equipped with two normally ciosed isolation valves, each connected to separate control trains.
A failure in one train will not prevent the remaining isolation valve from providing the required isolation capability.
The isolation valves and containment penetrations are the only portions of the Containment Purge v'ntilation System that are engineered safety features, and are discussed in Sc alon 6.2.4.
Design specifications for the purge system isolation valves are presented in Table 9.4.5-1.
The containmerft purge exhaust system is isolated on high radiation or high l
relative humidity signals.
Relative humidity is controlled and monitored I
upstream of the containment purge exhaust filter trains.
Electric preheaters maintain 1 70% relative humidity.
l Since containment purge system operation is intermittent, relative humidity is l
monitored in the vicinity of the carbon adsorbers.
Carbon adsorbers are heated as necessary to maintain a suitable " storage" environment (1 70%
l i
relative humidity).
High carbon adsorber bed relative humidity is alarmed.
A fuel handling accident inside the containment has been analyzed assuming the Purge System is in operation during refueling operations.
This analysis is described in Section 15.7.4.
9.4.5.4 pspection and Testing Requirements The nonessential components are not normally in operation and are accessible for periodic irspection.
Essential components and controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter as required by the Technical Specifications.
9.4-15 Rev. 8
Table 12.3.3-6 (Page 3)
Comparison of Containment Purge Filter System With Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978 Paragraph Compliance Status C-3-k Adsorber section design includes a manual water spray system.
Single-failure criterion is not considered in its design.
C-3-1 In Compliance C-3-m In Compliance l
C-3-n 1980 version of ANSI H509 is followed.
C-3-o In Compliance C-3 p In compliance with the following clarifica-tion:
1980 version of ANSI N509 is followed.
~
C-4-a In Compliance C-4-b Since all filter banks are arranged for external servicing, three feet of speara-tion between filter banks is not necessary.
Two and one half feet are provided for in-spection purposes.
C-4-c In Compliance C-4-d Containment purge system operation is Tech Spec limited.
C-4 e Tn Compliance C-5-a In Compliance C-5-b In Compliance 1
C-5-c In Compliance C-5-d In Compliance.
C-6-a In Compliance C-6-b In Compliance Rev. 8
h Table 12.3.3-6 (Page 2)
Comparison of Containment Purge Filter System With Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978 Paragraph Compliance Status C-2 g (continued) locally.
System discharge flow is recorded at the control room.
Relative humidity is monitored prior to filtration and high humidity is alarmed.
C-2-h Not applicable - the system is not designated as Class lE electrical equipment except for I
its containment isolation functions.
C-2-1 The Containment Purge System operates con-tinuously during the postulated fuel hand-ling accident.
The system is automatically isolated during the postulated LOCA.
C-2-j Filter trains will not be removed as intact units.
Gasketless filter adsorbers are used -
which permits the fluidizing of carbon for external filling and removal.
In this manner, we comply with ALARA recommenda-tions.
C-2-k In Compliance C-2-1 In Compliance C-3-a System design does not include domisters.
l C-3-b Heaters are Seismic Category II.
C-3-c Prefilters are tested in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 52.68 and carry UL Class 2 labels.
C-3-d In Compliance t
l C-3 e In Compliance C-3-f In Compliance C-3 g In Compliance C-3-h In Compliance C-3-1 In Compliance C-3-j In Compliance Rev. 8
Table 12.3.3-6 (Page 1)
Comparison of Containment Purge Filter System With Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978 Paragraph Compliance Status C-1-a The Containment Purge Filter System is not an engineered safety feature.
System design is based on normal plant operation and shut-down modes.
System design does; however, ensure a safe release path from the contain-ment in the event of a fuel handling accident inside containment with the purge system operating.
C-1-b Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4 do not apply as the Containment Purge System is Technical Specification limited such that a LOCA is not postulated while the system is in opera-tion.
C-1-c See paragraph c-1-b.
C-1-d In Compliance C-1-e.
In Compliance C-2-a System design provides two (2) 50% capacity filter trains and fans.
System design does not include domisters or HEPA filters down-I stream of the adsorbers.
Heaters are used to control relative humidity prior to filtration.
C-2-b See paragraph c-2-a.
C-2-c In Compliance C-2-d The Containment Purge System is isolated during the pressure surge resulting from a postulated LOCA.
The system is not-required to operate during or.after the postulated LOCA.
C-2-e In Compliance C-2-f In Compliance C-2 g System instrumentation consists cf local flow and pressure drop indication.
System discharge flow.is totalized and *ndicated Rev. 8
TABLE 12.3.3-5 FILTER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS CARBON BED HEATER SIZE SYSTEM (MINIMUM DEPTH, IN.)
(KW)
Annulus Ventilation 2
45 Control Room Area Pressurizing 4
25 Fuel Handling Area Exhaust 2
80 t
. Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust 2
30 l_'ContainmentPurgeExhaust 2
100 W
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