ML20077F009
| ML20077F009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077E995 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9412130233 | |
| Download: ML20077F009 (11) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y.
2-E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5f WASHINGTON D.C. 2066M001
,f SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO LICENSEE RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 89-19 AND PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADEji FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
1.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated December 10, 1992, as supplemented on March 8,1994, Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCo), the licensee for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), submitted Technical Specification (TS) Change Request (CR) 154 entitled " Modifications'to Technical Specifications Sections 15.3.5 and 15.4.1."
This submittal was the first of three change requests to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the commitment made by WEPCo in their letter dated December 3, 1991, to upgrade their TSs.
As part of this submittal, TS changes are proposed to complete WEPCo's response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-19, " Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47, ' Safety Implications of Control Systems in LWR [ Light Water Reactor) Nuclear Power Plants' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)." This generic letter recommended that licensees provide automatic steam generator (SG) overfill protection together with appropriate plant procedures and TSs.
The staff evaluation of this change request i_s presented in two separate sections.
In the first section, the licensee's response to GL 89-19 is addressed, including the associated TS upgrades.
In the second section, all remaining TS upgrades are addressed.
2.0 SG OVERFILL PROTECTION (GL 89-19) 2.1 Backaround By GL 89-19, the NRC recommended that a system be provided to mitigate main feedwater overfill events for all boiling and pressurized LWRs that currently do not have such protection.
This action was part of the technical resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-47, " Safety Implications of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants."
Furthermore, it was requested that all LWR plants have TSs that address the operability of the overfill protection systems that are provided in response to the GL.
9412130233 941200 ADOCK0500g6 PDR P
WEPCo responded to GL 89-19 by letters dated March 20, 1990, July 31, 1990, and December 10, 1992.
In its March 20, 1990, submittal, WEPCo described the SG overfill protection system for PBNP, Units 1 and 2.
In its July 31, 1990, submittal, WEPCo applied for a TS change which would add a monthly test of the logic for high SG water level (part of the SG overfill protection system, which isolates main feedwater) at PBNP. The December 10, 1992, letter, proposed an additional LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) for the high SG water level instrument operating conditions, and also served as a resubmittal, for completeness, of the July 31, 1990, letter. The December 1992 letter, proposes a total of 34 TS changes intended to improve the quality of the Point Beach TSs and to bring them closer to the newer standard TSs.
In a letter dated January 8,1993, WEPCo requested that Technical Specification Change Request (TSCR) 138, dated March 30, 1990, and Technical Specification Change Request (TSCR) 140, dated July 31, 1990, be withdrawn from the docket. The requested changes have been included in TSCR 154.
2.2 Iyaluation Overfill protection for cach LWR consists of protection channels that initiate the termination of main feedwater flow to the reactor vessel for a BWR or to the SGs for a PWR, on sensing a high water level condition. The overfill protection mitigates the consequences of main feedwater control system failures as an event which could lead to overfill conditions, as well as limiting the operating water level to within the bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis.
GL 89-19 requests that license amendments be proposed to provide TSs for overfill protection, including requirements for LCOs, setpoints, and surveillance requirements, which are commensurate with the safety actions required by the existing plant TSs.
Per GL 89-19, an acceptable overfill protection system design is one which (a) is separate from the feedwater control system, so that it is not powered from i
the same source, (b) is not located in the same cabinet as the feedwater control system, and (c) the cables are not routed so that a fire is likely to affect both the feedwater control system and the overfill protection system simultaneously. However, common-mode failures that could disable overfill protection and the feedwater control system, but would still cause a feedwater pump trip, are considered acceptable failure modes, j to GL 89-19 identifies three groups of Westinghouse-designed plants to be considered. PBNP is consistent with Group I, with the following exception.
PBNP uses a two-out-of-three hi-hi SG water level initiating logic, which is safety grade, and uses one out of the three channels for both level control and overfill protection. The system isolates main feedwater (MFW) by closing the MFW control valves. This arrangement is the same as that described for the MFW isolation of the Group I Westinghouse plants, except that the MFW pump is not tripped at PBNP.
Instead, a recirculation line allows limited flow back to the main condensers for pump protection.
The SG 1evel instrument loop components used for SG overfill protection are safety-grade and addressed in the TSs, as they are also used for the low-low steam generator level reactor trip actuation.
The MFW control valves are closed on a 2/3 hi-hi steam generator water level signal by venting the valve
air actuators through two parallel solenoid valves. One of these solenoid valves also isolates air to the actuators.
Either of these solenoid valves is able to vent the actuator pressure within sufficient time t.o protect from an overfill incident.
Both of these solenoid valves are environmentally qualified.
The overfill protection system at Point Beach Nuclear Plant uses three water level channels per SG, each channel being powered from a different instrument bus.
Each of the instrument buses is connected to its own battery and DC bus through an inverter.
Each of the channels is located in a different instrument cabinet. One of the three channels also supplies the MFW control system. The 2/3 logic uses energized relays in series which are fed from different instrument buses. The loss of power will de-energize the relay and close the MFW control valves.
The overfill protection system solenoid valves have Battery "D05" as their power supply, and are fed through a series of DC distribution panels.
If the power supply is lost, the solenoid valves will operate to prevent overfilling the steam generators. DC power is required to keep the solenoid valves in their proper position for normal operation. Air is required to keep the MFW control valve open.
Loss of DC power will de-energize the solenoid valves, isolating air to the MFW control valve operator and releasing the air in the operator, closing the valve. The MFW control system for the "A" SG is powered from the 120 volt AC, "Y01," " red" instrument bus, which is powered from the battery or the "D05" battery charger. The MFW control system for the "B" SG is powered from the yellow channel inverter. The yellow channel inverter uses the "D106" battery or the "D V 6" battery charger as its source of power.
Failure of the inverters or tailure of the associated DC buses will cause the MFW control valves to close, preventing overfill of the SGs.
The logic for the overfill protection system is functionally tested monthly, SG 1evel transmitters are calibrated each refueling, and feedwater isolation valves are tested each refueling.
TSs for calibration and functional testing of the overfill protection system, as well as an LC0 regarding instrument operating conditions for high SG 1evel, are proposed as part of TSCR 154.
The WEPCo response does not specifically meet one criterion of GL 89-19 because some fire locations could disable both the automatic overfill protection system and the normal MFW control system. WEPCo indicated that the loss of SG 1evel indication for fires in these areas was identified in the Point Beach Appendix R review. As a result, alternate wide-range steam generator level indication is available outside the control room, independent of the fire zones of concern for the "B" steam generator on each unit.
There is no such alternate wide range level indication for the "A" steam generator available at either unit.
This would necessitate operator action to ensure a feedwater isolation in the event of a fire-related loss of steam generator level instrumentation.
TSCR 154 states that "the feedwater system will be automatically isolated by tripping the associated main feed pumps and shutting the associated main feedwater regulating valves." The required operator actions will be identical to the actions already existing for the remaining items in Table 15.3.5-4 (INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR ISOLATION FUNCTIONS).
The operator actions require the plant to be placed in hot shutdown within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, should the minimum number of operable channels not be satisfied.
. 4 The existing-PBNP TSs for systems that initiate safety actions define requirements which the NRC has previously reviewed and found to be in conformance with the applicable regulatory requirements for TSs, namely those
. set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 with regard to limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and surveillance requirements.
The licensee has proposed TSs for the overfill protection system which are equivalent to the existing TSs, and which ensure operability of the system at appropriate times.
2.3 Conclusions Recardina Response to GL 89-19 The licensee's overfill protection system design is acceptable because it is separate from the feedwater control system, because it is not located in the same cabinets as the feedwater control system, and because emergency procedures specify the operator action to ensure the feedwater isolation for fires which could affect both the feedwater control system and the overfill protection system simultaneously.
In addition, the proposed TSs for the overfill protection system are acceptable because they ensure operability of the system and are consistent with existing requirements for systems providing a commensurate level of safety.
Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's response to GL 89-19 is acceptable.
3.0 ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADES 3.1 Backaround TSCR 154 includes 34 distinctly noted proposed TS changes and several miscellaneous changes.
These changes have been grouped into five categories:
(1) Additions to upgrade the TSs; (2) Modifications to better align with Standard TSs; (3) Modifications which are consistent with current staff positions; (4) Editorial changes; and (5) Miscellaneous changes (no WEPCo change number).
Each category is discussed separately below.
3.2 Additions to Uparade Technical Specifications l
Eighteen of the 34 proposed changes are additions to upgrade the TSs.
Each is l
described below.
The corresponding WEPCo change number is provided.
Conditions for Reactor Trio (WEPCo Chanae No. 3)
Additions are proposed for TS Table 15.3.5-2, " Instrument Conditions for Reactor Trip." Proposed Item 11, Turbine Trips, includes the turbine autostop oil pressure and the turbine stop valve position, and states that the operator has 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to achieve <50% of rated power.
Proposed Item 15, Safety Injection, is being added.
Proposed Item 16, RCP (reactor coolant pump)
Breaker Open Position, is being added.
Additions are also proposed for TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." Proposed Item 15, Reactor Trip Signal From Turbine, and Proposed Item 16, Reactor Trip Signal From SI, are being added.
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Reactor Trio Breaker Conditions (WEPCo Chanae No. 4)
Additions are proposed for TS Table 15.3.5-2, " Instrument Conditions for Reactor Trip." Proposed Item 17, Reactor Trip Breakers, is being added together with a note explaining permissible bypass conditions.
The note states that "one channel may be bypassed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> provided the other channel is operable." This 8-hour period is a new requirement which is consistent with current plant practice, though it is less conservative than the current staff position. However, the staff is accepting this 8-hour period on a plant-specific basis because it adds conservatism to the TSs.
Feedwater Isolation (WEPCo Chanae No. 7)
Additions are proposed for TS Table 15.3.5-4, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions." Proposed Item 3a, Hi Steam Generator Water Level (part of resolution of GL 89-19), and proposed Item 3b, Safety Injection, are being added.
An addition is also proposed for TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." Proposed Item 8, Steam Generator Level, will now include a logic test as part of the resolution of GL 89-19.
Post-Accident Monitorina (PAM) Instrumentation (WEPCo Chance No. 11)
Additions are proposed to TS Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Indications." Proposed Item 15, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level, Item 16, RCS Wide Range Pressure, Item 17, RCS Narrow Range Pressure, Item 18, RCS Wide Range Hot Leg Temperature, Item 19, RCS Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature, Item 20, Pressurizer Level, Item 22, Containment Intermediate Range Pressure, Item 23, Containment low Range Pressure, Item 24, Condensate Storage Tank Level, Item 25, Steam Generator Wide Range Level, Item 26, Steam Generator Narrow Range Level, Item 27, Steam Generator Pressure, and Item 28, Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication, are being added.
Item 28, Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication, follows the format of Item 3 i
in Table 15.3.5-5.
The main difference is if the operability (of the shut position indication) cannot be restored in seven days, for item 28, the valve must be closed, or the plant must be in hot shutdown within twelve hours.
In addition, Item 5, Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate, and Item 21, Containment High Range Pressure, are being restructured for clarification.
Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration (WEPCo Chance No.14)
Additions are proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." Calibration requirements for the power range (Item 1), intermediate range (Item 2), and source range (Item 3) are being added for the nuclear instrumentation.
Feedwater Isolation on SI (WEPCo Chanae No.15)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." Surveillance requirements are being added as Item 17, Feedwater Isolation on SI, to ensure that the feedwater system can be isolated following a safety injection.
Condensate Storaae Tank level (WEPCo Chanae No. 17)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels."
Item 24, Condensate Storage Tank Level, is being added to provide surveillance requirements.
120 Vac Instrument Buses (WEPCo Chance No. 18)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels."
Item 14, 120 Vac Instrument Buses, is being added to require channel checks.
Analoo Rod Position (WEPCo Chanae No.19)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." A note is being added to Item 19, Analog Rod Position, to ensure that rod insertion limits are not being violated.
Overoressure Mitiaatina System (WEPCo Chanae No. 25)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." A note is being added to j
Item 32, Overpressure Mitigating System, to clarify that requirements are only applicable when the system is required to be in operation.
l Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate (WEPCo Chanae No. 26)
A modification is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels." The requirement for checking the flowrate at startup and shutdown would be changed to checking prior to entering power operation after cold shutdowns greater than 30 days.
Spent Fuel Pit (WEPCo Chance No. 27)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies.for Equipment and Samplirg Tests." Water level verification is being added to Item 7, Spent Fuel Pit.
Control Rods (WEPCo Chance No. 28)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests." A requirement to perform a measurement of control rod worth is being added to Item 9, Control Rods.
Atmosoberic Steam Dumos (WEPCo Chance No. 29)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests." A requirement to cycle each atmospheric steam dump is being added as Item 28, Atmospheric Steam Dumps.
Crossover Steam Dumo System (WEPCo No. 30)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests." A requirement to verify the operability of
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each crossover steam dump valve is being added as Item 29, Crossover Steam Dump System.
Pressurizer Heaters (WEPCo Chanae No. 31)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling. Tests." Item 30, Pressurizer Heaters, is being added to require verification of availability of adequate pressurizer heaters.
CVCS Charaina Pumos (WEPCo Chance No. 32)
An addition is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests."
Item 31, CVCS Charging Pumps, is being added to require verification of the operability of the charging pumps.
DJ.lylion in Proaress Alarm (WEPCo Chance No. 33)
An addition is proposeJ to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests."
Item 32, Potential Dilution in Progress Alarm, is being added to require verification of alarm operability prior to placing the plant in cold shutdown. Verification of the alarm will be performed according to plant procedures.
fyv.aluation and Conclusion Reaardina Additions to Uoorade Technical Specifications All of the additions and modifications described in Section 3.2 above, enhance the PBNP TSs by adding test and evaluation requirements, and by clarifying applicability. They are also conservative and consistent with the TSs already approved by the staff at Point Beach. Therefore, these proposed TS changes are acceptable.
3.3 Modifications to Better Alian With Star,Jard Technical Soecifications Two of the 34 changes proposed by the licensee modify the TSs to more closely conform to Standard TSs (NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants").
Each is described below.
i Minimum
Dearee of Redundancy (WEPCo Chanae No,
1)
Changes are proposed to TS Table 15.3.5-2, " Instrument Operation Conditions for Reactor Trip," TS Table 15.3.5-3, " Emergency Cooling," and TS Table i
15.3.5-4, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions." The changes remove Column 4, Minimum Degree of Redundancy, from the tables, together with the definition and references to this in TS 15.1.C.1 and TS 15.3.5.C.
An end note is being added to all tables to ensure that the
-minimum redundancy is maintained.
Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitiaatina System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) (WEPCo Chanae Nc 61 i'
A change is propsed to TS Table 15.3.5-3, " Emergency Cooling."
Item 3.b, Trip of Both Ma n Feedpumps Starts Motor Driven Pumps, is being deleted as it j
does not provide a safety function.
~
Evaluation and Conclusion Recardina Modifications to Better Alian With Standard Technical Specifications The two proposed changes described above, clarify the intent of the TSs and/or delete unnecessary portions of the TSs, and are consistent with current staff positions.
In addition, the changes more closely align with the Standard TSs.
Therefore, they are acceptable.
3.4 Modifications Which are Consistent With Current Staff Positions Two of the 34 changes proposed by WEPCo modify the TSs to clarify statements and remove inconsistencies, consistent with current staff positions.
Each is described below.
Operator Actions (WEPCo Chanae No. 2)
Changes are proposed to TS Table 15.3.5-2, " Instrument Conditions for Reactor Trip," TS Table 15.3.5-3, " Emergency Cooling," and TS Table 15.3.5-4,
" Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions." The changes provide clearer direction to the operator.
Control Rod (WEPCo Chanae No. 34)
A change is proposed to TS Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests." Note 13 is being added to Item 10, Control Rod, to state that the requirement is not applicable when the reactor is subcritical.
Evaluation and Conclusion Reaardina Modifications Which are Consistent With Current Staff Positions The two changes described above, clarify the applicability of the requirements
)
and/or establish specific times for completion, enhancing the PBNP TSs.
In i
addition, they are consistent with current staff positions. Therefore, they are acceptable.
3.5 Editorial Chagat Twelve of the 34 chayy proposed by the licensee are editorial only, and do not change the meaning of the TSs.
Each of these is discussed below.
Emeroency Coolina (WEPCo Chanae No. 5)
The title of TS Table 15.3.5-3, " Emergency Cooling," is being changed.
Instrument Operatina Conditions (WEPCo Chanae No. 8)
The title of TS Table 15.3.5-5, "In' traent Operating Conditions for Indications," is being changed.
Eost-Accident Monitorina Instrumentation (WEPCo Chanae No. 9)
A note is being added to TS Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Indications," to provide additional guidance on its applicability, i
a
3 i
~fontrol Rod Position (WEPCo Chance No. 10) l e
i Item 6 of TS Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Indications," is being moved to Item 19 of TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum i
frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," so that only instrumentation associated with post accident monitoring is in TS Table 15.3.5-5.
TS Table 15.3.5-5 lutal Number of Channels (WEPCo Chanae No. 12)
Items 3 and 4 of TS Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Indications," are being updated to show that there are now two channels instead of one.
TS Table 15.4.1-1 Reformattina (WEPCo Chanae Nm _111 TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," is being reformatted for easier use.
Turbine Trio Functions (WEPCo Chanae No. 16)
Item 43, Turbine Overspeed Trips, in TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," is being reformatted and expanded for clarification.
Nuclear Instrumentation (WEPCo Chance No. 20)
Items 2 and 3 of TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," are being modified to state that the channel check will only be performed when the instrumentation is not blocked.
1 i-Nuclear Power Ranae Instrumentation (WEPCo Chanae No. 21)
Item 1 of TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," is being revised for clarification of the surveillance requirements.
TS Table 15.4.1-1 Surveillance Interval (WEPCo Chanae No. 22)
Note P of TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," is being revised for clarification of a surveillance interval.
TS Table 15.4.1-1 Surveillance Reauirements (WEPCo Chance No. 23)
Note (1) of TS Table 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Tests of Instrument Channels," is being revised for clarification of a surveillance requirement.
TS Table 15.4.1-1 Test Reauirements (WEPCo Chance No. 24)
Note (2) of TS Tule 15.4.1-1, " Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and lests of Instrument Channels," is being revised for clarification of a 1
test requirement.
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Evaluation and Conclusion Reaardino Editorial Chanaes The changes described above, provide clarification of the TSs, and do not change the intent. They are strictly editorial.
Therefore, they are acceptable.
3.6 Miscellaneous Chanaes Several other minor changes were made that were not part of the list of 34 WEPCo numbered changes.
In TS Section 15.3.5.D, the word " post" is added for clarification in the reference to the new title of Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation."
In TS Table 15.3.5-3, " Emergency Cooling," the actual bus numbers are being referenced in Item 3.b and the word " Buses" is being changed to " Loads" in Item 4.
Item 2.b of TS Table 15.3.5-4, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions," is being revised for clarification of the operating conditions for a steam line isolation.
The titles to Items 8, 9, 10, and 14 of TS Table 15.3.5-5, " Instrument Operating Conditions for Indications," are being revised for clarification.
Item 11 of TS Table 15.3.5-5 is being divided into two items resulting in a more conservative minimum number of operable channels.
Item 13 of TS Table 15.3.5-5 is being changed to accurately reflect the total number of channels of in-core thermocouples.
Footnote #9 of Table 15.4.1-2, " Minimum Frequencies for Equipment and Sampling Tests," is being modified by adding the statement, "but must be performed prior to exceeding 200 'F if it has not been performed during the previous surveillance period." This change results in a more restrictive testing frequency for Items 25 and 26 of Table 15.4.1-2.
The changes just described provide clarification of the TSs.
In addition, they are consistent with current staff positions. Therefore, they are acceptable.
The supplemental letter on March 8,1994, for the licensee's proposal modifies a proposed change.
In the original letter, Item 3.b.i of TS Table 15.3.5-5 is proposed to include a double asterisk (WEPCo Change No. 1) in the Minimum Operable Channels column.
The supplemental letter proposes to remove the double asterisk from both that item and the corresponding restrictions associated with the footnote. The change is cc,nsistent with the other items in the table and is equivalent to the existing specification.
Therefore, the change is acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments.
The State official had no comments.
5.0
[.NVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards
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consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 16236). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: A. Hansr" T. McGinty G. Dentel Date: December 8, 1994 l
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