ML20077E525
| ML20077E525 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1991 |
| From: | Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 90-11, NUDOCS 9106100453 | |
| Download: ML20077E525 (5) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.
t A
hannonce Vancy A.ebh[t toi MNht h+k Crerw.<
- Th e. ANN Skb
~
' ' ' ' ~ ~
JUN 071991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Centlemen:
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennensee Valley Authority
)
50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS 50-327 AND i
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - SPECIAL REPORT (SR) 90-11, REVISION 3 - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN AND 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R 1
This SR is being revised to provido additional information resulting from
~
an investigation of fire barrier discrepancies that were reported in SR 91-03 dated May 7, 1991.
The changes f tom TVA's original respon s.) are designated by vet tical bars in the right hand margini.
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8422.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
/
/
/
/DD E.
allace Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosuro ec: See page 2 I
i i
9106100453 910607 g(,h' PDR ADOCK 0500022_e,
,r PDR g
2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JluN071991 Er.c lo su re cc (Enclosure):
Mc.
S.
C.
Black, Deputy Director Project Directorato 11-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, haryland 20852 Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
i ENCLOSURE l
14-Day Follow-Up Report Special Report 90-11, Revision 3 Description of Condition This special report addresses the requirements of Licence Conditions 2.C.13.a and 2.C.13.c of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License regarding the SQN fire protection plan and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.a requires TVA to maintain and implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan, which in part, commits to walls of specified fire-rated durations in certain plant locations.
Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.c requires SQN to conply with certain sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, that stipulate regnirements for fire barriers between certain cables and equipment.
On May 31, 1990, during performance af extensive reviews conducted as a result of corrective actions for a previou.<ly identified fire protection plan noncompliance (Special Report 90-06 dated April 24, 1990), three noncompliances with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.a and one noncompliance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.c were identified.
1.
A wall panel above Fi e Door C53 located on control building, Elevation 732 (ref erence Final Saf ety Analysis Repc rt (FSAR}
Figure 1.2.3-3) has a welded frame that does not have an acceptable relieving mechanism for thermal expansion that could occur during a fire.
The wall support frame is restrained se that thermal expansion during a fire could result in deflection tha could degrade the wall as a fire barrier. Additionally, the wall contains an exposed steel plate supporting two electrical boxes.
2.
A wall panel above Fire Door C23 (connecting the computer room and corridor on control building, Elevation 685) has exposed structural framing above the corridor ceiling. The wall gypsam board docs not cover the ends of channel studs above the doorframe.
3.
An Appendix R fire barrier with a 1-hour fire rating located at Column Lines A8 between Column Lines Q and R of auxiliary building, Elevation 714 (reference FSAR, Figure 1. 2.3-4 ),
is restrained and does not allow for thermal expansion.
4 Two walls surrounding Fire Doors C57 and C63 located on control building, elevation 732 (reference FSAR, Figure 1.2.3-3), are constructed of wood fiber and gypsum sand mixture.
A fire-tested configuration corresponding to this design could not be identified.
Therefore, the fire rating of the walls is indeterminate. The walls provide fire separation between the conference room and NRC office in the Technical Support Center and the adjoining relay room.
The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols.
A condition adverse ta quality report was also initiated to document the problem and its corrective action.
Telephone notification to NRC and subsequent confirnation by f acsimile were made in accordance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.H.
a
e.
Cause of Condition The noncompliances associated with thermal expansion (Items 1 ard 3) have been attributed to a deficiency in the original wall design.
A noncomp.iance concerning exposed steel plate is also identified in Item 1; this aoncomplianc.e resulted f rom f ailu: e to perform an adequate review of the field change request (FCR) that added U.e electricci boxes to the wall.
The exposed freming noncompliance (Item 2' nrm.ted frc7 inattention to detail by the Modifications engineer insta' i n, tas wall and the previous change control process not requiring furthe.
'f!
tion of the installation.
Additionally, the drawing of this wall conta!
t, t unique section detail tat may have contributed to this noncomplit ac by not being specific. The cause of noncompliance Item 4 above has been attributed to a design deficiency in the origir.al wall des 2gn because the design as specified did not correspond to a fire-tested confitiration.
Analysis of Condition There are no plant systems or components considered inoperable or incapable of performing their design functions as a result of the condition described in this report. The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols.
The roving fire watch patrols, coupled with the existing fire detection and suppression systems in these areas, provide assurance that a fire in these areas would be identified so that appropriate response actions could be initiated.
Corrective Action The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols. As a result of evaluation by Nuclear Engineering, corrective actions have been developed to modify the suljact walls to bring them into compliance with the applicable Unit 2 License Condition requirements. Those corrective actions include (1) modifying the steel framing in the panel above Fire Door C53 to al'ow for thermal growth and applying fireproofing insulation on the exposed steel, (2) installing additional Type X gypsum board ta cover exposec structural framing above the corridor ceiling in the panel above Door C23, and (3) documenting the acceptability of the barrier located at Column Line A8 between Column Lines Q and R of the auxiliary building, Elevation 714; this documentation verified the acceptability of the barrier as currently constructed based on similar UL-approved configurations, low fire load, and the area's automatic suppression and detection. Additionally, minor maintenance has been performed on the wall to ensure compliance.
Corrective Action Nos. 1 and 2 were completed June 1, 1991.
The walls at Fire Doors C57 and C63 Item 4, in the NRC office and conference room in the technical support center, will be replaced with Underwriter's Laboratory-approved material that extends to the concrete ceiling.
Accomplishing this modification requires penetrating an existing asbestos ceiling.
Because of the hazards assoc.ated with asbestos, the modification to replace the walls will be done concurrently with a modification to replace the asbestos ceiling.
This scheduling will enable removal of the asbestos ceiling, replacement of the existing walls, and installation of a replacement ceiling if needed. This coordination significantly increases the scope of j
work required; therefore, these walls will be replaced by October 1, 1991.
._-____._m.....m.____
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _... _. ~.. _ _. _. _ _. _ _ _ _. _
The new change control process includes a return to operability walkdown by the Modifications cognizant engineer, Operations, and the system engineer, whict.
should verify the modification was installed as required and the system or component can be returned to service. This verification provides assurance that individual oversights are identified and corrected before returning a system or component to operable status.
Commitment r.
Replacement of the walls at Fire Doors C57 and C63 will be completed by i
October 1, 1991.
1394h i
I
,~;
-