ML20077C520
| ML20077C520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1983 |
| From: | Bradley E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GOVT-1-1, NUDOCS 8307260147 | |
| Download: ML20077C520 (7) | |
Text
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t PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
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2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 EDw ARD O. s AUER JR.
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EUGENE J. GR ADLEY j
Assocca,. er...at cow.s.k DON ALD RLANKEN 1
RUDOLPH A. CHILLEMI E. C. MlR K H A LL j
T. H. M AM ER CO RNELL PAUL AUERB ACH
..................6 July 20T 1933 EDW ARD J. CULLEN. JR.
THOM AS H. MILLER. JR.
IRENE A. McMENNA ases.,a.,c.w.amt Mr.A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 'No.
2 Division of Licensing U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
2055.4
Subject:
Lim'erick Generating Station, Units,I&2
- Containment Systems Branch Open Itens Re ference :
Telecon between Containment Systems Branch and Philadelphia Electric Company on July 17, 1983 File:
GOVT l-1 (NRC)
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
The attached docu ents are draft changes to FSAR Sections 1.13 and 6.2.4.3.1.2.1.I prepared as a result of the referenced telecon.
The information contai'ned.on these draft FSAR page changes will be incorporated into the.FSAR,. exactly as it appears on the attachments, in the revision scheduled for August, 1983.
Sincerely, r
r l
O-J)
Eugen J.
Bradley f
8307260147 830720 PDR ADOCK 05000 hy JTR/gra/26
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Attachment s
s Copy to:
See Attached Service List
cc:' Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)
Judge Richard F. Cole
.(w/o enclosure)
Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure)
Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Ann P. Hodgdon
.(w/o enclosure)
Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/o enclosure)
-Mr. Robert L._ Anthony (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Marvin I. Lewis.
(w/o enclosure) l
~ Judith A. Dorsey, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
. Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/o, enclosure)
Thomas;T. Au, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
,Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/o enclosure)
- Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.(w/o enclosure)-
Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)
Donald S. Bronstein, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/o enclosure)
David Wersan, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.-
(w/o enclosuru)
Martha W. Bush, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Spetice W.. Perry, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel-(w/o enclosure)
Docket and. Service Section (w/o enclosure) 4 i
1 1
4 4
4 4
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LGS FSAR containment isolation barriers, are maintained..All power-operated isolation valves have position indicators in the control room.. Discussion of instrumentation and controls for the isolation valves _is included in Chapter 7.
c 6.2.4.3.1 Evaluation Against General Design Criteria 16.2.4.3.1.1 Evaluation Against General Design Criterion 54 All piping systems penetrating containment, other than instrument lines,.are designed in accordance with Criterion 54.
6.2.4.3.1.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 55 Criterion 55 requires that lines which penetrate the primary 4
containment and form a part of the RCPB must have two isolation valves; one inside the containment and one outside, unless it can be' demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines are acceptable on some other basis.
The RCPB, as' defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.2 (v),
consists of the reactor pressure vessel, pressure retaining appurtenances attached to the vessel, and valves and pipes that extend from the reactor pressure vessel up to and including the outermost isolation valve.
6.2.4.3.1.2.1
' Influent Lines
- Influent lines that penetrate the primary' containment and connect
/directly to the RCPB are equipped with at least two isolation valves, one inside the drywell, and the other as close to the external side'of the containment as practicable.
6.2.4.3.1.2.1.1 Feedwater Line The feedwater lines are part of the RCPB as they penetrate the l
drywell to connect with the reactor pressure vessel.
Each of the l
two feedwater penetrations is provided with a serlys arrangement
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t of three isolation valves:
a.
A check valve is provided.inside the drywe.11 as close to the containment. wall as practicable.
For/a worst-case break of a feedwater line inside containment, it would l
.4 be impossible to ensure the operability'of the inboard i
check valve due to pipe whip forces.
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b.
A spring-assisted check valve is provided outside the drywell as close to the containment wall as practicable.
The spring forces the valve flapper in the closed direction, thus providing added assurance of valve seating in the event of low pressure in the supply l
piping.
The spring will not prevent flow in the Rev. 22, 07/83 6.2-48 J
MA LGS FSAR downstream (toward the vessel) direction but does create some flow restriction.
An air operator is provided with the check valve assembly.
This-air operator is normally pressurized, thus compressing the spring and reducing g
the flow restriction.
Depressurizing the air operator during normal operation allows the spring to partially j
move the valve disc into the flow stream to facilitate periodic valve operability testing.
c.
A motor-assisted check valve _is provided in the feedwater line outboard of the above described spring-assisted check valve.
The function of these valves is to:
1.
Prevent HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU water from flowing upstream in the feedwater line, thus ensuring flow into the reactor vesse?..
2.
Provide isolation in the event of a fecdwater line break.
Additional isolation valves are provided on each of the lines connecting to the feedwater lines inboard of these motor-assisted check valves:
1.
Motor operated valves are provided on the HPCI, RCIC, and long path recirculation lines.
2.
A spring-assisted check valve is provided on the RWCU supply line.
This valvo is of a design similar to the outboard spring-assisted feedwater check valves described above.
Although not a containment isolation valve, a motor-operated valve is provided outboard of the spring-assisted RWCU check valve to provide isolation of this flow path in the event of og feedwater or RWCU line break doW% 4 h grg assidtd E.WCA) dad 0d O Because it is desirable to maintain all sources of makeup to the reactor vessel in the event of a LOCA, all isolation provisions associated with makeup through the feedwater penetrations are based on flow direction (i.e., check valves) or are remote-manually operated from the control room (i.e., motor operated valves, check valve motor operators, and air operators associated with spring-assisted check valves).
The long path recirculation lines do not serve a vessel makeup function and will therefore be provided with control interlocks or administrative 1y sealed closed (in accordance with SRP 6.2.4.III.f. definition) whenever reactor pressure is greater than 600 psig. A v A od mivdr e c.0Mitkb t$dk N OMWA in b tM of to @res.
Rev. [3 [9 L
/83 6.2-49
M n A C~
L/ Ps r v a
LGS FSAR Position (2), Clarification (3)
All systems penetrating containment have been evaluated and identified as either essential or nonessential.
Table 6.2-17 provides the results of this evaluation for each line, and Table 6.2-27 provides the basis for the selection of essential / nonessential systems.
Position (3), Clarification (2)
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Systems determined to be nonessential are provided with diverse, automatic isolation signals, except as described in the response to Position (1).
Manual valves are sealed closed as discussed in Section 6.2.4.3.
Position (4), Clarifications (4), (5)
The control systems for automatic isolation valves are such that resetting the isolation si nal will not result in the automatic Ganged reopening of containment reopening of these valves isolation valves is performed only wnere the operation of Sample inlet multiple valves is required for system operation.
and return valve controls for the drywell radiation monitors and combustible gas analyzers are ganged as described in Sections 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.8 and 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.1.
Reactor enclosure cooling water and drywell chilled water valve controls are ganged as described in Sections 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.10 and 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.11.
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Position (5), Clarification (6) i set at the minimum compatible with normal cperation.The s i
7.3.1.1.2.4.6 Section pressure setpoint. describes the selection of the drywell high 1
I Position (6), Clarification (7)
CSB 6-4 as discussed below. Containment purge valves comply with Bran closure times greater than 5 seconds:Two purge isolation valves have have closure times of 30 seconds.
2"-HV-105 and 2"-HV-111 An analysis of the radiological consequences of-a LOCA that occurs during purging was performed to justify the line size and the valve closure tim used in the purge system.
Using the assumptions of BTP CSB 6-4, e
the resulting doses were a small fraction of the 10CFR100 limits For local leak rate tests, the leakage rate of the purge penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests less than 0.60 La, in accordanc~e with Appendix J to 10CFR50.
Position (7) one of the following safety-related isolation signals:The c 7
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high drywell pressure a.
gpht gi[e4);
b.
reactor low water level
,1,1 th3 c.
reactor anclosure high radiation gN * -
refueling floor high radiation f
d.
In addition to the safety-related isolation signals listed abov the containment purge Eq( vent isolation valves
- ta e,
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i--"^r * - di---'er 1 Conte on receipt of a no safety-related i t. _ a north stack effluent high radiation signalp(see secham 7.(,J.l auJ fL5) y i
i An analysis has been performed to demonstrate that the offsit cparations would be less than both 10CFR100 and E e
Action Guide limits.
0800 Section 6.2.4 and Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 andThi casumes a pre-existing spike that results in coolant activity IcVels in excess of Technical Specification limits.
g methodology was in accordance with the letter from T.J. Dente The analysis (BWR Owners Group) to D.G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Ownsrs Group Evaluation of NUREG 0737 Item II.E.4 2(7)"" Supplement to BW Juno 14, 1982.
, dated
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