ML20077C449

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Clarifies Info Re Penetrations in Reactor & Svc Water Bldgs, Per 830711 Telcon.Safe Operation Assured During Time Required to Perform Alternate Shutdown Capability Analysis, Establish fire-area Boundaries & Implement Subsequent Mod
ML20077C449
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  
Issue date: 07/21/1983
From: Howe P
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Vassallo D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LAP-83-311, NUDOCS 8307260084
Download: ML20077C449 (2)


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SERIAL: ' LAP-83-311.

Carolina Power & Ught Company JUL 211983 Director of Nuclear Reactor, Regulation

. Attention:

Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2

-DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 APPENDIX R - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PENETRATIONS IN FIRE ZONE BOUNDARIES

Dear Mr. Vassallo:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) wishes to provide clarifying information concerning penetrations in the Reactor Building and Service Water Building ceilings / floors at' our Er'unswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP).

Mr. A. B. Cutter (Vice President - Nuelear Plant Engineering Department, CP&L)f-has discussed this matter previously ' wit,h Mr. R. H. Vollmer (NRC) in a telephone conversation on July 11, 1983~.

Our previous submittals dat d June 30, 1982 and October 1,'1982 were based on analyses utilizing a fire-zone approach which did not take credit'for zone boundaries such as floors and ceilings as three-hour rated -barriers'.

However, credit was taken for the boundaries as non-rated barriers providing protection agains*. the effects of a fire and thus eliminating the concern of separation denations between floors. The large non-rated openings in fire-area boundaries, (such as equipment hatches), were discussed in our previous submittals as were large openings in zone boundaries (such as stairwells).

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These were also shown on general arrangement drawings, but we did not identify j.

the small penetrations (such as conduit penetrations) in these non-rated boundaries.

The Alternative Shutdown Capability Analysis presently underway will address these openings and disposition them consistent with guidance contained in the R. H. Vollmer to D. G. Eicenhut memorandum dated May 25, 1983.

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8307260084 830721 PDR ADOCK 05000324 F

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411 Fayettevine Street

  • P O. Box 1551
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D. B. Vassallo-Based on the small size of the subject penetrations (relative to stairwells and other previously identified major openings), the high ceilings i

in these areas, existing fire protection features, and administrative control of combustibles, the continued safe operation of our plant during the period of time required to perform the. Alternate Shutdown Capability Analysis, establish the fire-area boundaries, and implement subsequent modifications is assured.

Should you have any questions, please contact me.

Yours very truly,.

P P. W. Howe Vice President Brunswick Project PWH/ lev (7397 MSG) cc:

Mr. D. O. Myers (NRC-BSEP)

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)

Mr. S. D. MacKay (NRC)

Mr. R. H. Vollmer (NRC)

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