ML20077A830
| ML20077A830 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1994 |
| From: | Burski R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-89-19, W3F1-94-0166, W3F1-94-166, NUDOCS 9411280050 | |
| Download: ML20077A830 (2) | |
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PR November 22, 1994 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No.-NPF-38 Generic letter 89-19 " Safety Implication of Control i
Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" Gentlemen:
The NRC on January 28, 1991 issued a memorandum from the NRC Chief, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, to the NRC Director, Division l
of Systems Technology, summarizing a presentation made by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) on November 20, 1990, on Generic Letter 89-
- 19. The CEOG presented an analysis to show that the safety benefits of implementing the Steam Generator Overfill Protection System (SG0PS) are not significant. The CE0G presentation focused on operator failure probability, steam generator tube rupture probability, the main steam line
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break (MSLB) location, operator action, and the negative impact of overfill i
protection.
Paragraphs A through E of the January 28, 1991 NRC letter
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discussed these items.
l Waterford 3 was instrumental in developing the CE0G position, and the November 20, 1990 presentation was made by Waterford 3 personnel. We endorse the CEOG position, and the analysis presented by the CEOG and summarized in the January 28, 1991 NRC letter is applicable to Waterford 3.
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6 Generic Letter 89-19, " Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" W3F1-94-0166 Page 2 November 22, 1994 Waterford 3 will complete a documented assessment by December 31, 1994 to determine whether emergency procedures and operator training need to be enhanced to provide additional protection for prevention of steam generator overfill.
If necessary, appropriate procedural or training enhancements will be implemented by December 31, 1995.
On a separate issue, Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 89-19, paragraph (4)(c),
recommends a reassessment of emergency procedures and operator training for small-break loss of coolant accidents for plants designed with high-pressure-injection pump-discharge pressures less than or equal to 1275 psi.
This recommendation is not applicable to Waterford 3.
The Waterford 3 high-pressure-injection pump-discharge-pressure must be greater than or equal to 1429 psid pursuant to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.f.1.
Please contact me or Robert J. Murillo (504) 739-6715 should there be any questions regarding this letter.
Very truly yours,
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Lj VWuc crz R.F. Burski Director Nuclear Safety RFB/RJM/tmm cc:
L.J. Callan, NRC Region IV R.B. McGehee N.S. Reynolds NRC Resident Inspectors Office J