ML20076L320
| ML20076L320 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1983 |
| From: | Bradley E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307190121 | |
| Download: ML20076L320 (14) | |
Text
_ _ _ _
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I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l
23O1 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699
/
PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 CDW ARD G. B AU ER, J R.
voce reassosat ano samamat counsmL CUGENE J. SR ADLEY assoceave esammab counsu6 DON ALD BLANKEN RUDOLPH A. CHILLEMI E. C. MIR K M ALL T. H. M AHER CORN ELL PAUL AUERE ACH assistant saman AL counse6 EDW ARD J. CULLEN, JR.
July 15, 1983 THOM AS H. MILLER. JR.
IRENE A. McMEMN A assestant counssk Mr.
A.
Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Limerick Generating Station, Units I&2 Power Systems Branch Open Items Re f erence :
Meeting Between Power Systems Branch and Philadelphia Electric Company on July 12, 1983 File:
GOVT l-1 (NRC)
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
The attached documents are revisions to FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.12.C, and the responses to Questions 430.57 and 4 30.62 which have been prepared as a result o f discussions at the referenced meeting.
The information contained on these draft FSAR pages changes will be incorporated into the FSAR, exactly as it appears on the attachments, in the revision scheduled for August, 1983.
Sincerely, 1)
Bradley Eug)ne JTR/gra/26 8 ool Attachment Copy.to:
See Attached Service List 8307190121 830715 l
PDR ADOCK 05000352 A
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.4 cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)
Judge Richard F. Cole (w/o enclosure)
Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure)
Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Ann P. Hodgdon (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure)
Judith A. Dorsey,.Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/o enclosure)
Thomas Y. Au, Esq.
(i-/o enclosure)
Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/o enclosure)
Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)
Donald S. Bronstein, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/o enclosure)
David Wersan, Esq.
(w/o enclocure) i Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
. Martha W. Bush, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Spence W. Perry, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure)
Docket and Service Section (w/o enclosure) l 6
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Medium-Voltage System The only medium-voltage ioads in the primary containment are two variable frequency reactor recirculating pump motors.
Each recirculating pump motor is fed by a 13.8kV motor generator set'.
The motor generator sets ~
are located in the turbine enclosure.
To protect the penetration assemblies, two redundant Class 1E circuit breakers are used in series to provide the required primary and backup protection.
Separate divisions of 125V dc-control power are used for the operation of these breakers.
Tripping signals for these primary and backup breakers are independent, physically separated, and powered from separate sources.
The mechanical integrity of the penetration assemblies' is maintained under the most severe fault condition.
b.
440 V System In addition to the primary circuit breaker, a backup breaker located in the same motor control center cubicle is connected in each circuit to provide backup protection of the penetration assemblies.
For all such Class 1E circuits, the primary and backup breaker overload and short circuit protection systems are qualified for the environmental conditions.
For all non-Class 1E circuits that penetrate into the containment, two b eakers are connected in series to' provide primary ana backup protection.
These non-Class 1E breakers are identical in design and construction to that of Class 1E breakers, thereby assuring high reliability.
Typical time-current characteristics of these protective devices indicate that the penetration assemblies can withstand the available fault current for the time duration required to trip either or both the primary and backup circuit breakers, c.
208 V and Lower-Voltage Systems The low-voltage control circuits powered from control power transformers are self-limiting in that the circuit resistance and/or short circuit capability limits the fault current to a level that does not damage the penetration assemblies #The remaining control and power circuits have a primary nd backup fuse or breaker to ensure fault isolation.
Typical time-current characteristics of these protective devices substantiate M & <2/a Y Rev. 14, 12/82 8.1.12
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The maximum fault current available from the control circuit transformers at the transformer terminals are as follows:
TRANSFORMER SIZE MAX. FAULT CURRENT ON SECONDARY 120 VA 15.6 A 200 VA 45.6 A 250 VA 21 9 A 350 VA 39 8 A The minimum conductor size for control circuits through the electrical penetrations is #8AW. Per the vendor, each #8AW con-ductor can carry 53 A continuously. The smallest wire size used in control circuits is #14AW. PECo Test Report #48503 shows that a #14AW wire can carry 75 A continuously without insulation break-down. Based on the above, it is concluded that both the conductor through the penetration and the rest of the control circuit can carry the maximum fault current developed by the control circuit transformers.
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A ground on each de system is annunciated in the control room by a Class IE ground detector dedicated to that division.
(8)
The integrity of the battery fuses is continuously monitored in the control room by the battery ammeters.
If the fuses should blow or be removed, the ammeters will read zero.7 M@ zWel[a (9)
The tripping of the battery charger output breaker is alarmed in the control room by the battery charger trouble annunciator.
Low de output current init'iates this alarm.
(10) A battery charg?r trouble alarm is provided in, the control room for each battery charger.
This alarm is initiated for the following I
conditions:
l ll High/ low de voltage l
Low de current Low ac voltage l
e.
A study has recently been completed which retabulated the de system loads based on the present design.
This l'oad information was sent to
~
the battery manufacturer to obtain the'resulting voltage profiles.
The results verified that the de bus voltages will remain above the design minimum voltages during any expected accident or post-accident mode of operation.
f.
All Class IE dc. equipment is rated and qualified to operate at the voltage it will see at the end of the battery duty cycle with the battery at the end of its life, which is defined as 1.75 volts per cell at minimum rated temperature.
A voltage drop study has recently been completed which verified that the minimum operating voltages will be available at the utilizing de devices when the
.Rev. 13,-11/82 430.57-4'
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INSERT "A" TO RAI 3+30.57 The fuse integrity is also continuously monitored by ERFDS as the signal fra the battery ameters is inputted to this caputer system and updated at least every 30 seconds. When battery current reads zero for longer than a specified time period, the power sys-tems status light changes colors on the ERFDS display to direct the operator to the power system sub-display where the current valve is displayed.-
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QUEjnION 430.62 (Section 9.5.2)
Consider the design basis seismic event with coincident failure of all non-seismic equipment and components.
Demonstrate that there will be effective intra-plant communications with all safety related areas to attain a safe, cold plant shutdown following the seismic event.
RESPONSE
.Section 9.5.2.3 has been changed to provide the requested information.
Following a design basis seismic event with coincident failure of all non-seismic equipment and components, Limerick will attain a safe, cold plant shutdown from the main control room without the use of intra-plant communication becauce a)) actions required under this scenario are taken in the control, room. Howev e c, be e ra s. 7% -th e g
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located in safety-related areas, are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA requirements as described in Section 3.2.
The criteria for this selective basis and the design basis for seismic Category IIA supports are described in Section 3.2.
9.5.2.2
System Description
The plant communication systems consists of the intra-plant public address (PA) system, the private automatic branch exchange (PABX) telephone system, the intra-plant maintenance telephone system, the evacuation alarm and river warning system, and the in-plant radio system.
Descriptions of these systems are given in the following sections.
The plant communication systems are illustrated in riser diagram
_. form in Figures 9.5-2 through 9.5-7.
@ ' TASc rT A3 9.5.2.2.1 Intra-Plant Public Address (PA) System The PA system is a 6-channel system permitting simultaneous usage of a page line and five party. lines for intra-plant use.
Loudspeakers powered by individual amplifiers are located throughout the plant with muting facilities provided where required.
The PA system is provided with a telephone line matching network for operation of the page channel by the PABX system described in Section 9.5.2.2.2.
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Y o$tfg$fhY?f 9.5.2.2.2 Private Automatic Branch Exchange Telephone System (PABX)
The private automatic branch exchange telephone system (PABX) equipment and cabling is supplied and installed by the telephone company.
The telephones are located throughout the plant.
The power for this system is. supplied from a non-Class 1E motor control center which is powered from the Division 1 safeguard power system.
this MCC (10B129) is automatically shed on a LOCA but can be manually reconnected in the control room. {fg y -[-
9.5.2.2.3 Intra-Plant Maintenance Telephone System The intra-plant maintenance telephone system is part of the PABX system consisting of telephone jacks.
Portable PABX (dial-type) telephones may be connected to the maintenance telephone jacks.
This system provides an additional station-to-station, intra-plant communication system for use during startup,.
maintenance, and normal operation, and consists of telephone jack stations located at various selected areas throughout the planL.
Rev. 20, 05/83 9.5-20
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e 9.5.2.3 Safety Evaluation The communications systems are not safety-related and are classified as non-Class 1E.
When components of the communications systems are located within seismic Category I structures, these components are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA requirements described in Section 3.2.
The basis for providing Category IIA supports is to prevent the communications equipment from falling on safety-related equipment andimpairingitsabilitytoperformsafeshutdownfunct(ons during a seismic event j Insert t rom Mt T. 5-G_j c
The systems described above are conventional and have a history of successful operation at similar existing plants.
System design considerations include diversity and operational reliability.
Physical and electrical separation is provided between primary and backup systems to minimize the possibility of a single occurrence affecting more than one system.
The communications systems have adequate flexibility to keep plant personnel informed of plant operational status at all times.
If one handset station of the PA system is damaged or inaccessible or if extreme background noise prevents its use, multiple handset locations at each plant elevation provide easy access to an alternate handset of the PA system.
Failure of a single PABX telephone station does not affect the balance of the PABX telephone system.
If failure of the central exchange or some other such failure makes the complete system inoperable, the public address system is used as backup in-plant communications.
The public address system is powered from a Class 1E 440V motor control center through a 430V-120V transformer and a 3-phase, l
120V distribution panel.
The transformer and panel are seismic Rev. 19, 04/83 9.5-22
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The cabling for these systems is rouit d in independent and separate conduits and no other systems' cal;l en are routed in these conduits.
For this reason and reasons ul plant safety, this panel remains connected to the Class 1E bus during a LOCA.
The Class 1E 440V motor control center is poworod by the Division 4 Class 1E 440V load center.
The Class 1E douv l
motor control center and load center are part of the Class 1E ac power system (Section 8.3.1.1.2).
Failures of the fire alarm oc PA systems will not affect the Class 1E bus because of the use of ME2d overcurrent protection devices.WLeoprtRfrAy4ngcuntfeg.
The PABX telephone system is powered by a non-Class 1E power source which can be connected to the Division I diesel generator.
l Failure of any or all of its components will not affect any nuclear safety-related equipment.
o.n d N L - h l a d S S.d s'o $>5fi fu During the loss of both offs te power and the diesel generatoc associated with Division 4 bus, communication is maintained bu l
the PABX telephone system 0.91It is not necessary for plant df~'N personnel in safety-related' areas of the plant to communicate Mr.vt To with the control room in order to achiev? a safe, cold shutdown of the plant following a design basis seismic event.
The failure f oQ 4-of any non-seismic communications systems will not adversely affect safe shutdown capability.
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.___:p 9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing _ Requirements The communications systems will be tested by a preoperational test (1-P-99.3).
Systems described above are conventio,nal and have a history of successful operation at similar existing plants.
These systems will be in routine use and maintenance, and this will ensure their availability.
Also, these systems will be used extensively during the preoperational and startup phases.
Any deficiencies wil'1 become readily apparent and will be corrected.
The power sources, foc the private automatic branch exchange telephone system and Class 1E bus for the public address system, are tested separately via the preoperational and startup test program.
9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEM The plant lighting system provides illumination levels required for safe performance of plant operation, security, shutdown, and 9.5-23 Rev. 19, 04/G3
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