ML20076G896

Forwards Final Response to NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants-Resolution of Tap A-36. Response Includes Analyses for Loads Handled Over Reactor Vessel

ML20076G896
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	06/13/1983
From:	Kemper J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8306160310
Download: ML20076G896 (126)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:< PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 1881 -1981 PHILADELPHIA, PA.19101 (215)841-4502 JOHN S. KEMPER June 13, 1983 vice mesmear Esefelseg g N6hG Aesp Nf 5E ANCD. Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference:

Limerick Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Your letter dated December 22, 1980, transmitted NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants - Resolution of TAP A-36," and requested that certain information be provided. Our responses forwarding this information are as follows: a. The first part of the requested report, which provided the information identified as Section 2.1 of your letter, was transmitted by our letter dated June 18, 1981. b. Our second submittal, dated September 22, 1981, forwarded the second part of the requested report on information outlined in Section 2.2 and 2.3 of your letter. c. Our third submittal, dated April 2, 1982, forwarded certain information and results of analyses which were not available at the time the September 22, 1982 documents were forwarded. d. Our fourth submittal, dated January 31, 1983, provided additional information requested in the conference call between Philadelphia Electric Company, EGSG Idaho Inc. l and the NRC on January 6, 1983. The attached final report includes an analyses for loads e. handled over the reactor vessel. These studies accomplished by our NSSS supplier were unavailable at the time of our April submittal. This report completes our response on the information requested by your December 22, 1980, letter. 8306160310 830613 Sincerely, PDR ADOCK 05000352 ' A SKf B 1.1

w , 4p. 'As LIMERICK GENERATING STATION OVERHEAD HANDLIMG SYSTEMS REVIEW FINAL REPORT i ) l-Revision 2 March, 1983 5 I

7, LIMERICK GENERATING STATION OVEREEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS REVIEW FINAL REPORT CONTENTS 1.

SUMMARY

/ CONCLUSIONS 2.

RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION Information Requested in Section 2.1 (Changes to previous submittal) Information Requested in Section 2.2 (Load-handling systems near spent fuel) Information Requested in Section 2.3 (Load-handling systems near systems required for safe-shutdown or decay heat' removal) 3. REFERENCES Table 1 - Index of Overhead Handling Systems Table 2 - Load Tabulation Table 3 - Limerick Special Lifting Devices Table 4 - Refueling Floor Heavy Load Height Restrictions Appendix A - Systems Required for Safe Shutdown and Decay Heat Removal Appendix B - Hazard Evaluations Appendix C - Assumptions / Data for RPV Load Drops j Attachment - Safe Load Path Drawings -i-Revision 2 March, 1983

1 s, s. 1.

SUMMARY

/ CONCLUSIONS This report on overhead heavy load handling systems at Limerick was prepared in response to Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Reference 1 (Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter to all licenses dated December 22, 1980).

It also includes minor revisions to data previously transmitted to the NRC by Reference 2. The format of Section 2 of this repo rt follows that of Reference 1. Detailed information on each crane and hoist, including hazard evaluations, statistics, load / impact area matricies etc. are included in the Tables and Appendices. This review focused on cranes and hoists in Unit 1 and the common areas of the Limerick facility and included monorails and lif ting beams for which no hoists have been purchased but which may be used occasionally for equipment replacement or repair. Since the Unit 2 design will be similar to Unit 1 the conclusions of this report apply to Unit 2. An as-built review will a be performed for both Units to verify that dif ferences in layout for Unit 2 and modifications made subsequent to this report do not affect its conclusions. The reactor enclosure crane is the only load handling system capable of carrying heavy loads which could damage irradiated f uel if d ropped. Though the crane itself generally complies with the NUREG 0612 quide-lines, its special lif ting devices and associated load attachment points do not. This is particularly true for critical loads, where NUREG 0612 recommends twice the normal design safety f actor. Since these items have already been fabricated it is proposed to substitute proof load testing in lieu of full compliance with NUREG 0 612. All cranes and hoists were evaluated to determine whether i a dropped load could affect the ability to safely shut down the plant and continue to remove decay heat from j the reactor and fuel pool. Systems required for safe 1 shutdown and decay heat removal are listed in Appendix A and hazard evaluations are provided in Appendix B. In most cases it was possible to show that, based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems or other plant-specific considerations, no real hazard l P-24/6 -ii-Revision 2 March, 1983

s. so exists. In some cases it was found advisable to establish load carrying height restrictions or other administrative controls to eliminate concern about potential damage to safety-related systems. One load-handling situation which cannot be addressed by this report is the case where movement of a heavy load is so infrequent or unexpected that no crane, hoist monorail or lifting beam has been provided. These operations must be treated on a case-by-case basis with the load handling preparations, instructions and equipment based on NUREG 0612 guidelines, to assure that the probability of a load drop is extremely small or that the consequences are acceptable. d 2 e i 1 P-24/6 -lii-Revision 2 March, 1983 ) )

s. s. List of Effective Pages for the Limerick Generating Station Overhead Handling Systems Review Final Report Page Page Page Number Revision

• Number Revision Number Revision i

2 B-1 Original B-31 Original 11 2 B-2 Original B-32 Original lii 2 B-3 1 B-33 1 iv 2 B-4 Original B-34 Original 1 Original B-5 Original B-35 1 2 Original B-6 Original B-36 Original 3 Original B-7 Original B-37 Original 4 Original B-8 2 B-38 Original C-1 2 5 Original B-9 1 C-2 2 ) 6 2 B-10 Original C-3 2 ) 7 Original B-ll Original Table 1 Original I 8 Original B-12 Original Table 2 2 9 2 B-13 Original Table 3 2 9a 2 Table 4 2 10 Original B-14 Original 11 Original B-15 Original 12 Original B-16 Original Attachment (Safe 13 Original B-17 Original Load Path Drawings), 14 1 B-18 Original Original 14a 1 B-19 Original 15 2 B-20 Original B-21 1 B-22 1 A-1 Original B-23 Original A-2 Original B-24 1 A-3 Original B-25 1 A-4 Original B-26 Original A-5 Original B-27 Original A-6 Original B-28 Original B-29 Original B-30 Original

• Original prepared September, 1981 Revision 1 prepared March, 1982 Revision 2 prepared March, 1983 P-41(b)/9

- iv - Revision 2 March, 1983

s... e. INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.1: This information was previously submitted and was based on a general review of the Limerick overhead handling systems. Changes are required as a result of the detailed review which followed. These changes are listed below by paragraph number. Parag_raph 2._l-1 Holst Categorization The hoists below were not identified during the initial review. They have been incorporated in Table 1 as Items 61, 62 and 63. Items 62 & 63 belong to the group of hoists which carry heavy loads in the vicinity of safety-related During the detailed review it was determined equipment. that other hoists should also be included in this group. These additions are based on a change in the interpretation of the term load path to include areas celow grating and -hatches, and on more conservative assumptions regarding routing of electrical conduit. Tables 1 and 2 have revised accordingly. Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room Hoists (Item 61) Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room Hoists (Item 62) North Stack Instrument Room Dumbwaiter (Item 63) Paragraph 2.1-3-a Safe Load Paths Some of the safe load path drawings have been revised to clarify the load path, or to reflect a better understanding of the load handling methods. Paragraph 2.1-3-c Load Tabulation Revisions have been made to Table 2, Load Tabulation, and a hazard elimination category has been assigned to each load / impact area combination (where applicable) as required by Section 2.3-2. Parag_raph__2_.l_-3-d Special Lifting Devices In the list of critical loads the number of fuel pool gates should be "two Lair per unit". Minor changes have been made to Table 3 based oE new information. - P-24/6

s. s. INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.2: 2.2 " SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or in storage. Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that, in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III." P a r a g r a p h _2_._2 - 1 " Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel." ,Respo_nse The following cranes are capable of carrying loads over spent fuel: Reactor Enclosure Crane - Overhead bridge crane with a. 125 ton and 15 ton hoists, equipment number 00H201. b. Refueling Platform - Gantry crane with one fuel handling grapple hoist and two auxiliary 1000 lb. capacity hoists, equipment number 10S272. Fuel Pool Jib Cranes - 1000 lb. capacity, equipment numbers c. OAH208 and OBH208. d. Fuel Channel Handling Boom - Jib crane, 500 lb. capacity, l equipment number 10H224. Paragraph 2.2-2 " Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool." T-24/6 :

c Res_ponse The refueling platform is excluded from the above category since its hoists do not carry heavy loads. All loads are less than or equal to the weight of a fuel bundle. The two auxiliary hoists have load cells with interlocks to prevent them from lifting anything as heavy as a fuel bundle. The jib cranes are excluded from the above category since they are not required to carry heavy loads. Since their capacity of 1000 lbs. exceeds the heavy load definition, the jib cranes will be derated to a capacity of 700 lbs. This will be accomplished by adjustment of the load limiting device and establishment of necessary admini-strative controls. The channel handling boom is excluded from the above category since it does not carry heavy loads. Its capacity is less than the weight of a fuel bundle. Parag_raph 2.2 _3_ " Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or addi-tional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

Response

The reactor enclosure crane has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely l small for the loads listed below. The basis for this evaluation i was compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, except where noted. l l Load _ Handling System Infor_m__ation Item 1: " Provide the name of the manufacturer and the design-rated load (DRL). If the maximum critical load (MCL), as defined in NUREG 0554, is not the same as the DRL, provide this capacity." ' Response: i Manufacturer - Harnischfeger Corporation. Design-rated load I (DRL) 125/15 tons. Maximum critical load (MCL) - 110/6 tons. P-24/6 1

Item 2: " Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system with respect to the features of design, fabrication, inspection, testing and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by the identifed alternatives specified in NUREG 0612, Appendix This evaluation must include a point-by-point comparison for C. each section of NUREG 0554. If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain applications in lieu of complying with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, this should be explicitly stated. If an alternative to any of those contained in NUREG 0554 or NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on the proposed alternative to demonstrate its equivalency."

Response

A detailed evaluation of the reactor enclosure crane was made with respect to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.104 which preceded NUREG 0554. A point-by-point comparison of the crane features with the sections of the regulatory guide is presented in Table 9.1-12 of the Limerick FSAR. The auxiliary hoisting system does not meet all of the design criteria of either NUREG 0554 or R.G. 1.104. Specifically, the means of load attachment is not of redundant design. As an alternative we propose to reduce the load rating for the auxiliary hoist from 15 tons to 6 tons when handling critical loads. This will effectively double the design safety factor and provide an additional margin for wear and dynamic loads. Item 3: "With respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a safe shutdown earthquake, provide a description of the method of analysis, the assumptions used, and the mathe-matical model evaluated in the analysis. The description of assumptions should include the basis for selection of trolley and load position."

Response

Load-bearing members and main hoist equipment of the reactor enclosure crane are designed in accordance with seismic Category I criteria so that the crane can structurally withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and maintain the fully rated load in a static position during the following an SSE. The crane was analysed using a 41-node lumped-mass model to determine natural frequencies. To assure that the worst case would be included, three trolley positions were analysed (end of span, 1/4 span and center of the bridge). Highest and lowest positions of the rated load were considered for each trolley position, as P-24/6

s. .. o. well as a no load condition. Accelerations at the crane supports were determined based on crane natural frequencies and reactor enclosure response spectra. It crane damping was assumed for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and 24 damping was assumed for the SSE. Resulting crane stresses were then calculated based on the worst case seismic loads. Design stresses were limited to 0.9 Fy in bending, 0.85 Fy in tension and 0.5 Fy in shear where Fy equals the material yield stress at the design temperature. Restraints were installed to preclude derailment of the bridge or trolley under seismic loading. Item 4 & 5: " Provide an evaluation of the lifting devices for each single-failure-proof handling system with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6." " Provide an evaluation of the interfacing. lift points with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6."

Response

We consider lifts of the following loads to meet the criteria of NUREG 0612, Sect. ion 5.1.6. Spent Fuel Cask - Limerick is under construction. Since licensing a. under 10CFR71 is not evidence that the spent fuel shipping cask lifting device and lift points meet the requirements of NUREG 0612, the NUREG 0612 requirements will be a basis for selection of shipping cask (s) for Limerick. b. Refueling Shield - The special lifting device for the refueling shield does not fully meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6. In particular it does not satisfy the ANSI N14.G-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety factor for lifting devices which carry critical loads (see Table +3). We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a l demonstration of design adequacy we propose to; perform a load test of the lif ting device at 150% of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examination of its load bearing i welds. There are four lifting points on the refueling shield itself. They provide a minimum static factor of safety of 4.8 with respect to material ultimate strength. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6,; safety factor requirement.

Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying load test of the lift / points.

J I i, j P-24/6 .i 'r j -l -J -v

o s. o. c. Fuel Pool Stop Logs - The special lif ting device for the fuel pool stop logs does not fully meet the requirements of Section 5.1.6. In particular it does not satisfy the ANSI N14.6-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety f actor for lif ting devices which' carry critical loads (see Table 3). We We dc!not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demon-stration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of lifting device at 15G% of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examination or its load bearing welds. There are two lifting lugs on each fuel pool stop lo. They w provide a minimum f actor of safety of 7.25 with respect to material ultimate strength, plus an additional margin of 25% for dynamic loads. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612 safety factor requirement. Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying load test of the lif t points.

/

d. Fuel Pool Gates - The fuel pool gates are carried using conven-tional slings. These slings will be selected according to NUREG c, 0612, Section 5.1.6(1). There are two lift points on each fuel pool ga te. They provide a minimum static f actor of safety of 9.3 with respect to material ultimato strength. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor requirement. We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reliability and, since this item has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requireme nt. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a 150% load test of the fuel pool gate lif t points, followed by non-destructive examination of the load bearing welds, Fl[el Pool Jib Crane and Channel Handling Boom - These heavy / i e. loads are carried near the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool, wher'e a load drop could affect fuel. Conventional slings are c used. These slings will be selected according to NUFF" 0612, Section 5.1.6(1). In each case there is one lift poin-che a load which has a minimum static design safety factor of 6 l / with respect to material ultimate strength. This does not f' satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor require-ments.,We do not believe that an increase in safety f actor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reli- ' ability and, since these items have already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to , f ull compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a P-24/6 Revision 2 March, 1983 \\

I e demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of each lift point at 150% of normal load followed by nondestructive examination of the load bearing welds. Paragraph 2.2-4 "For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section (2.3] of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following informa-tion for each crane: Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of elec-a. trical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circum-stances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to en-sure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such. interlocks. b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Stand-by Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations c. (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed tech-nical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations. d. Analyses performed to demonstrate, compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the" guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed." P-24/6 so..o.

Response

The reactor enclosure crane, though single-failure-proof itself, is included in this category when used to carry the following loads. Lif ting devices or lif ting points which do not meet the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, restrict the overall load handling combination to this category for these loads. Loads Carried Over the Spent Fuel Pool The reactor enclosure crane is prevented from carrying loads over or near the spent fuel pool by zone travel limit switches on the bridge and trolley. The associated electrical interlock can be bypassed by conscious operator action via a keylocked switch. Administrative procedures will be developed prior to plant opera-tion to control bypassing of the interlock. Loads which must be carried over the spent fuel pool will be carried by a high-reliability load handling system and are categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. Therefore the potential for the load drop over the spent fuel pool is extremely small. Loads Carried Over the Reactor Vessel l The following loads must be carried over the reactor vessel. None of these loads have lifting devices which meet the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6. They are therefore evaluated with respect to Criteria I through III of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1. a. Reactor well shield plugs - The reactor well shield plugs are f carried over the reactor vessel only with the drywell head in place. The drop of a shield plug could damage the drywell head and seal plate but would be less severe than the l drop of the drywell head or the RPV head. Therefore the drop of a shield plug will not damage fuel or cause unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel. b. Drywell Head - The drywell head is carried over the reactor vessel while the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and insu-lation support structure are in place. Depending on orientation a drop of the drywell head could damage the insulation support structure, rupture the RPV vent and head spray piping, damage the seal plate and impact the RPV itself. It is assumed that the effect of a drywell head drop on the reactor vessel is no more severe than an RPV head drop which is discussed below. This assumption is based on the fact that though the drywell head weighs about 13% more than the RPV, much of its kinetic P-24/6 I

s. b. energy will be absorbed by the insulation support structure and (cont.) the seal plate. Therefore a drop of drywell head will not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel. c. RPV Head, Steam Dryer, Shroud Head / Separator Assembly, Service 2 i Platform - General Electric has analyzed the consequences of a drop of these loads over the reactor vessel. This analysis showed that a drop of the RPV head, steam dryer or shroud head / separator assembly would not cause fuel damage or leakage from the reactor vessel. For a postulated drop of the service platform from its maximum carrying height it was determined that vessel integrity would not be affected but, based on a number of conservative assump-tions ( Appendix C), fuel damage could occur. These assumptions, which conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A, require that the service platform rotate 90' and fall into the vessel via the path of least resistance. This means that the platform must remain centered over the RPV within 15 inches and aligned with the plane defined by the guide rods within 1 3*. Under these conditions the platform will enter the vessel, strike and buckle one guide rod, shear off two of its wheel assemblies and just have enough kinetic energy to continue to fall, missing the Feedwater spargers and reaching the core. No credit is taken for deflection of the platform due to initial impacts or water resistance. Using an energy analysis similar to that used for the design basis fuel bundle drop the resulting fuel damage would be about 3 1/2 times that for the design basis fuel handling accident (Reference 3). In the light of the conservative assumptions above, the likeli-hood that a service platform drop would result in fuel damage is extremely small. In lieu of further analyses to demonstrate compliance with criteria I and II of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1 we propose to implement additional administrative controls to effectively preclude the possibility of fuel damage. The service platform will be lowered into the well with its center-line offset from the centerline of the RPV until it is within 10 feet of the vessel flange. Use of this procedure will eliminate the possibility of the service platform falling direct-ly into the RPV with enough kinetic energy to reach the fuel. It should also be noted that, though they do not fully meet the requirements of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, the service platform sling and lift points have a safety factor > 5 and the service platform is lif ted with the single f ailure proof reactor enclosure crane. In summary, with the exception noted above, analysis has shown that for postulated drops. of the RPV head, steam dryer, shroud bead / separator assembly and the RPV service platform, the evalua-tion criteria I through III of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1 are satisfied. No credit is taken for electrical interlocks or P-24(b)/6 Revision 2 March, 1983

l I mechanical stops, Standby Gas Treatment System operation or j h site specific considerations. A discussion of conformance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A and the infor-mation requested in Attachment 4 is provided in Appendix C. d. Service Platform Support (including seal surface protector) The diameter of the service platform support is too large to allow it to fit inside the reactor vessel and is much lighter than the loads above. A drop of the service platform support will not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel. e. Refueling Shield - The refueling shield has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. f. Jib Crane - The jib crane has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. g. Deleted h. Other Loads Over the Reactor Vessel - There are no other heavy loads which must be carried over the open reactor vessel. Loads which are carried over the reactor vessel only while the RPV head is on (e.g. the insulation support structure, the head nut A rack, the head stud rack and the head stud tensioner) will not G1 cause damage to the fuel if dropped. A drop of these items over the reactor vessel is less severe than a drop of the drywell head or the RPV head itself. Therefore, there would be no unacceptable leakage from the vessel. Heavy loads which need not be carried over the reactor well are restricted from this area during refueling (See safe load path drawings for the reactor enclosure crane). Administrative proce-dures will be developed prior to plant operation to control the movement of loads over the reactor well. INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.3: "2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EOUIPMENT REOUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUT DOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING l NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown -9a-Revision 2 P-24/6 March, 1983

F ~ and_ decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response 2.1-3-c." Paragraph 2._3-1 " Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, pro-vide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) informa-tion specified in attachment 1." Re_ slo _nse There are no cranes in this category except the reactor enclosure crane when it is used to carry the loads listed in the response to l Paragraph 2.2-3. l P_a_r_agraph_ _2. 3 _2_ "For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:" S u b p a r a g r a p_h_ a, "The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related-equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided 2.1-3-c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located in the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix." Respon_s_e_ This information is presented in Table 2 entitled ' Load Tabulation' P-24/6

I f Subparagraph b "For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considera-tions. Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considera-tion should be supplemented by the following specific information: (1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function.) (2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be pro-vided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concern-ing the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed. (3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedure or physical constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such considerations." Re,s_ponse ~ Table 2 indicates the basis for eliminating each load / area combi-nation from the hazardous category. Code letters used in the table correspond to the following hazard elmination categories: Crane travel for this load / area combination prohibited by a. electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following l this load drop in this area, Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider c. load / equipment combination. d. Likelihood of handling system failure'for this load is extremely small (i.e. NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, satisfied.) P-24/6 Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will e. not damage safety-related equipment. A detailed evaluation of each crane / hoist which was categorized according to Paragraph 2.1-1 as potentially hazardous is presented in Appendix B. The following method was used to evaluate the consequence of a load drop from these load handling systems: 1) The Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report and the separation drawings were used to establish whether there was anything safety-related in the load path or on the next lower elevation. Except for the refueling floor and a few other cases where there were very heavy loads or high lif ts, it was assumed that there would be no sequential failure that could affect more than one floor below the load path. The basis of this assumption is that the presence of large quantities of reenforcing bar in the floor will prevent the formation of very large concrete spall fragments which are free to fall to the next floor. Major safety-related items are listed in the Appendix B hazard evaluations. 2) A more detailed study of the separation drawings was made to determine whether there was sufficient separation of safety-related items (as indicated by associated electrical divisions) to establish that, if these safety-related items were required for safe-shutdown or decay heat removal, only one method of safe snutdown or decay heat removal could be affected. If so, no further evaluation was required. Generally, no attempt was made to determine whether or not the safety-related items were actually part of systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Appendix A provides a discussion of safe shutdown methods and lists the systems required for safe shutdown and removal of decay heat from the reactor vessel and spent fuel pool. 3) If there was not sufficient separation of safety-related items in the load path and on the next lower evaluation, note was taken I j of which electrical divisions were predominant. Safety-related j items associated with electrical divisions which were not pre-dominant were identified to see whether they were required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. For example, if most components in the load path were associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 (shutdown method 'A'), those components associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 (shutdown method 'B') were identified to see whether they belong to systems f required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. If not, then only one safe-shutdown or decay heat removal method could poten-tially be affected, and no further evaluation was required. P-24/6

4) If Step 3 was inconclusive safety related components associated with all electrical divisions were identified as necessary to establish whether there was sufficient distance between compo-nents of the two shutdown or decay heat removal methods to preclude the possibility of a given load drop affecting both methods. If so, no further evaluation was required. If the load handling hazard could not be eliminated by the 5) steps above, necessary adminstrative controls were established. For hazards on the next lower elevation, floor impact strength calculations were performed to establish what load carrying-height restrictions were needed, if any. In some cases, site-specific considerations were used to elimi-6) nate the need to consider some load / equipment combinations. For example, since there will be no major maintenance activities in the drywell during reactor operation, only the consequences of load drops which would affect decay heat removal or vessel integrity were considered for the drywell. Subparagraph c "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

Response

There are no interactions in this category. , Subparagraph d "For interactions not eliminated in 2.3-2-b or 2.3-2-c, above, demon-strate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted, the following in-formation should be provided:" (1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting' system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). . P-24/6

(2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. (3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

Response

As discussed in the hazard evaluations of Appendix B analysis was used to show that load drops from the following cranes / hoists would not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. Of this group only the reactor enclosure crane is designed to retain its load during a safe shutdown earthquake. Item numbers refer to Table 1. a. HVAC Equipment Hatch Hoist - Item 15 b. Reactor Enclosure Crane - Item 20 c. CRD Platform Holst - Item 33 d. Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Cover Hoist - Item 36 e. Control Roon HVAC Equipment Hoist - Item 58 f. Control Structure Fans i.ifting Beam Hoist - Item 60 No exceptions were taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. The information requested by Attachment (4) is presented below: a. Initial Conditions / Assumptions 1) Weight of the load is as shown in Table 2. 2) Impact area of the load is as shown on the load path drawings. l 3) Drop height is based on the maximum lif t of the hoist except for the reactor enclosure crane where the purpose of the analysis was to establish maximum drop heights. 4) No credit was taken for impact limiters or environmental drag forces. 5) The heavy load is assumed to drop with a zero initial velocity. ~ 6) The capacity of the slab is based on yield-line theory. 7) The capacity of the structural steel is based on a simple j span, elasto-plastic design i i P-24/6 Revision 1 March, 1982

8) Slab stiffness is based on an effective moment of inertia of a reinforced concrete beam. 9) Fixed and simply supported boundary conditions are used in slab analysis. 10) Energy loss due to local deformation of the object at im-pact is disregarded. Slab and steel framing system are assumed to take the full impact energy with spalling of concrete. 11) The average interf ace force from the dropped load is assumed to be supported by punching shear capacity of the concrete. 4 12) Existing dead load is considered insignificant compared to the impact load and is neglected in the evaluation. Seismic load and live load are not considered to be present at instant of load drop. b. Method of Analysis 1) Structural response of the structural component is computed in terms of deformation limits, resistance functions and dynamic characteristics. j 2) Interface forcing function is used in the determinatJon of the applied forces. 3)- Analytical and numerical techniques as per Bechtel Power Corporation Design Guide C-2.45 are used. 4) All calculations are done manually without computer assistance. 5) Height of drop is measured from the lowest point of the heavy load to the floor, unless noted otherwise. I c. Conclusion i See the Appendix B hazard evaluations for discussions of the results of these analyses. I i l l l l l i P-24/6 - 14a - Revision 1 March, 1982 l l L . ~

3. REFERENC ES

1. to the NRC letter to all licensees, dated December 22, 1980.

2. Philadelphia Electric Company letter to the NRC, dated June 18, 1981. 3. Limerick Generating Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 15.7.4, " Fuel Handling Accident." l l l l l l l l 1 l P-165/8 (a) Revision 2 March, 1983 l l L

Limerick Ovarhard Hcndling Syntsm3 R2ViGw September, 1981 TABLES 4

i ,[ m 1 F W D 1, A 1, E n r 4 9 I o h en 9, A 4 V i t wo 8 9, E A A A N 1, C / 9 / f E t a oi C A 4 8, 7 7 7 I N 8 N o R c:P I t 4 9 1 8 8 9 B I es a 9, 8 1 6 9 D 8 1, 9, 1 M1 etad tv E 8 roea xe B 5 C i rro el 4 e T 9 g S FPAI NE 9 9 1 a Y 1 P S r?en wo G r ydnoi N e I teOI t A A L h et a O D O O O / / D m f amtv N P N N N N N N a al exe A t Setel RINE H p D e A S n E oa H ii R d sr E e ue A A A A C C A N t lt a ci C l xr e EC R n yI t ? emdh f eat O O O O O O O atoa N N N N N N N SII P 0" 0" .tt 0" 0" O" 6 4 xrf '2 '3 '8 '7 aei '6 0 1 MVg 1 9 4 3 2 1 1 l a i r B B r e A A B B e.b 8 5 8 8 8 8 8 t qn 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 aeu MRN M M M M M M M N O N y n t i n 5 n n n o O C c o 1 o o o 2 t a t / t t t / p 0n 1 n 2 a 0 1 o 0 6 5 o / I C 1 1t 2 1 1 1t 1 T I g 1 3 1 2 05 6 0 N w 1 1 1 1 12 1 1 U r 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 D M M M M MM M M S '0 0 M v '9 0 E e 7 '9 7 i l 1 6 1 3 0 8 0 S' E 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 Y 1 S 5, E G I N 4, B I A L a 3, 3, 7, T D e 2 6 8 8 7 N r 7 2, A A 1 l f D A e d e g r E c e n d e e l i e a l eg e z r t d v Far B td t i 'e r p s E r eC ai a l n e n li F N e rr e sr s-a ie tl rueio C S oAe ns nB nrr bc aa oPnOH / t g ie e e eeet mit evt t i F e c pd bn dpn dt ns ovs hos cdbep O m ani ra nna nl ni cri eml aerbn a eur br our oieo eeo reo eeuru X N RPB I' C CPC CFDH RSH PRH RFTI P ED N 1 22 5 7 8 2 3 I .r 0 00 0 0 0 1 1 e tpe 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 H1 H H H H H M n sib H A4 a iu a B 0 0 0 0 0 A rroqt 0 CoHFN 1 O0 1 1 0 0 1 A 9 n s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 t I { ,;l 1I i

)

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A 0 1, 3, 1 M I1 n r M G, C, A 8 9 I o h en l, V8 i t wo A A A A K A A B, 7, A A f E9 t a oi 8 7 / / L 8 7 2 L 4 4 I A C, 3 8 o R1 c:P Lt 2 2 N N I J, 8 A 7 7 es a 0 A 7 B, 3 M, et ad tv B, 3 9 E roea xe i rro el A A 2 e Tr g Se FPAI NE l 8 4 a Yb P Sm r?en e G wo t N yd n oi IP teOI t S S S S S A Le et a E O O E E E E / f amtv Y N N Y Y Y Y N DS N al exe A Setel H RINE DA n E oa I ii M d sr E e ue A C B I V t lt O a ci l xr e EC R n yI t ? S S S S S A emdh E O E O E E E / f eat Y N Y N Y Y Y N atoa SII P 1" 6" 0 "04 6 .tt 9 1 '5 '0 xrf 8 1 aei '0 67 6 6 4 5 5 MVL 3 1 1 5 1 2 0 1 ~ la i r B B B C C r e B B B B B A e .b 8 8 8 8 8 6 8 ) d t gm 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1E aeu e MRN M M M M M M M-M (G de N e O n N y n t P 5 n o C c n n nn n n 1 o t n i O a o o oo o o / t e p t t tt t t 5 n 2 h a 2o 4 a / w I C 2 2 54 6 3 1t 2c 1 n 1I I q 4 0 05 1 16 2 9 2 o T N w 2 0. 12 2 12 2 1 2 i U r 1 7t 11 1 11 1 1 1 t S MM M MM M M M a Ah D M co S '2 '3 '2 l M v '0 3 7 e '0 4 7 T l 50 1 0 1 1 5 5 5 E r S E 33 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 e Y h 1 S l t l o E G 6 e n N n. 1 w I ig A L a md y a B I T D e dl 6 1 r 2 N r 8 AB 8 1 8 1 D 1 m A A o r H .e n n f D A e lh m ga o E c .t e s cc a dr i d i ps nt m nt b lC tr s e t B ao l e HR v ii ios R Ea i t f d lt on w E r uo hni li ra uo oa o i l1 coo l r r. V e o oL oe cms Pr r r1 O S E aMH oes / h M rlt t pt r s th r t C r F e Cc pl tl s cis tCm cr ips l o O m At toi nii aui nAa ae cni eb a Na bha ohb eqo oNe ev eub ui b Sr CCl REI CI B RO RPl FJ l X N H e I l E b N 6 777 90 1 1 33 88 D .r 2 222 23 3 0 00 00 e tpe 1 111 11 1 2 22 22 o I t 4 1 1 1 1 1 n sih H HHH H H 1 1 1 1 1 1 / a iun 1 rrbqi_ 0 A8C 00 0 0 AB A8 t n 4 0 11 O0 s CoiEN 0 O0O 00 1 9 i o p me 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 H t 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 I_ l l 1

Page 2 of 9 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM REVIEN TABLE 1 September, 1981 INDEX OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS - UNIT I & COPNON Fire Crane Safety-Protection Safety Related Related Areas: or Hoist Material Max. Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip. Req. Vert. Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower Item Number Name/ Service Area

Elev, Drwq. Capacity Number Lift Path?

Criteria Elevation? Elevation 8 10-H116 Turbine 6 217' M-111 5-ton M-38BA' 30'-0" NO A NO 94A l Ehclosure 89A l Aux. Fquip. l Hatch Hoist 9 00-Hil7 Condensate 9 217' M-111 1-ton M-38BB 22'-9" NO A NO 94A Filter 89A,89B i Demineralizer i Holding Punps i Hoist 10 00-H118 Main Lube Oil 1 239' M-112 4-ton M-38BA 43'-0" NO A NO 95 2 Tank Holst 93 l 11 0A-H119 Recirc. Punp 6,7 269' M-113 24-ton M-38BA 25'-0" NO A NO 98A OB-H119 M-G Set Hoist ea. 88A,88C,88D,97 12 00-H120 Drywell 7 302' M-ll5 6-ton M-38BA 10'-3" NO A NO 99A Chiller 98A,98C,98D Hoist 13 10-11122 Drywel?. 7 302' M-115 6-ton M-38BA 42'-0" NO A No 99A Chiller 98A Hatch Ik>ist 14 00-H124 R EU Filter 11 313' M-121 5-ton M-38BC 17 ' - 4 " Mn C YES 48A i Demineraliz( r A7A Hoist

l Page 4 of 9 OVERIIEAD HANDLING SYSTEM REVIEN TABIE 1 September, 1981 I INDEX OF OVEIGIEAD HANDLitC SYSTEMS - UNIT I & C0fcON Fire Crane Safety-Protection or Safety Related Related Amas: j Holst Material Max. Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip. Req. Vert. Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower i Item Number Name/ Service Area Elev. Drwg. Capacity Number Lift Path? Criteria Elevation? Elevation i 23 00-H213 CRD Ptmp 6 200' M-110 5-ton M-38A 7'-2" NO A N/A 89A 1 lloist N/A 24 10-H215 HPCI/RCIC 11,15 217' M-118 10-1/2 M-38BC 56'-0" YES YES 44 E11uip. Iloist ton 42A 25 10-H216 Com Spray 11 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 Punps Hoist 42A,42B 26 10-11217 Core Spray 12 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 Punp Hoist 41 27 1ATI218 Reactor Encl. 12,16 217' M-118 12-1/2 M-38DC 32'-0" YES YES 44 j 1BH218 Cooling Water ton ea. 56'-0" 41 j HX & Com l Spray Pump Holst 28 10-11219 RilR Pumps 15,16 217' M-118 10-ton M-38BA 55'-9" YES YES 44 Hoist 31,32,42A 29 10-11220 Containment 11 253' M-119 6-ton M-38BA 16'-0" YES YES 45A Ekluip. [bor 44 11oist 30 1A-H221 Personnel Inck 16 253' M-119 20-ton M-38BC 16'-6" NO C YES 45A. 1B-II221 Hoist ea. 43,44 n 9An /A

I 1 1 8 L, C N9 n r K, A A A A 5 E1 9 I o h en 4, A A A A A A 7 5 7 5 i t wo J, A 8 8 0 9 A 0 9 4 4 4 4 V, E t a oi f 5 7 7 3 2 A 9 3 2 o Rr c:P I t H, e es a 4 0 2 5 Mb et ad tv 7 3 roea xe 4 E e Tm i rro el g Se FPAI NE a Yt r? P SP en Ge wo N S ydnoi I t eOI t S A S S S S S L et a E / E E E E E D f amtv Y N Y Y Y Y Y N al exe A Setel H RINE DA n E oa I ii R d sr I E e ue B C C V t lt O a ci l xr e EC R n yI t ? S A S S S emdh E / E E O E O f eat Y N Y Y N Y N atoa SII P 0" 3" 0" 0" "7 8 7 .tt 0 - xrf '0 4 aei '2 '0 '0 '0 0 MVL 1 1 2 '85 2 1 7 l a i r A C AB C B r e B B BB B B e.b 8 8 8 88 8 8 8 tqn 3 3 3 33 3 3 2 M-M M M-MM aeu MRN M M NO M y N t n i b C c n l n nn n n o [ a o o oo o o t p t 0 t tt t t a 0 5 I C 8 5 l 12 l 1 2 T I g 9 2 9 4 9 0 0 N w 1 2 1 3 1 2 2 U t 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 D M M M M M M M S s v 3 '6 '3 2 3 i 3 3 3 g D e T l 8 5 5 78 5 8 8 n S E 2 3 2 22 2 2 2 o l Y a 1 S c E G 26 6 1,1, 1, u L N B I c A L a T D e 5 2 5 15 5 1 6 N r 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 ht A A i H w D m k A e l o m e l sl e d E c eo r c a aa t t g e H i nB o i v Cv n rs d s R v tr n f v o o e ei ti u E r ae ag t r m l m nnnb nr u V e eg h n a e e ae r ei eB e I gs m b O S Hn Ci l SsRs sR i v r ph e / at l Pt t t o t a ue icn o F e Uhs ld s VsVs pts t&eo n vv ut a t O m Cci en Di RiRi sri oy qar i ao a Wxo ua Ro SbEb DCH Cf RC El C s X N FEH FH CH MI f f P I y E e D N 3 4 9 ,5 ,5 6 7 8 l I .r 2 2 2 33330 3 3 3 l 3 2 2 2 o 3 2,23 2,2 e t pe 2 2 2 1 H r 1 2 n sib H H H 1 1 4H4H2 t 1 a l u a rroqt 0 0 0 N3B303 0 0 0 n. COHEN 0 1 1 12I212 1 1 1 ts ib me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I t 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 I Ill

l n = N M n r 0 9 I o h en 2 X 2 I L A A V i t wo C N N A H A M 1, 0 Q 8 / / f E t a oi 5 4 0 0 9 7 1 1 1 o R 1 c:P I t 4 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 A 2 8 9 N N 8 es a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 7 6 M9 etad tv 2 l E 1 roea xe 1 e T irro el FPAL NE g S, W a Y r? P S en wo GN yd n oi A A I i teOIt S O O O O O / / et a E w L f amtv Y N N N N N N N DN S al exe A Setel H RINE DA n E oa H ii R d sr E e ue C A A A A A A V t lt O a ci l xr e EC R n yI t ? S emdh O O O O E O ) f eat O K N N N N Y N at oa N P SII P "9 0 6" 0 1 0 "0 0 .tt xrf '3 '2 '0 '6 0 0 1 aei 4 MVL 1 2 2 5 5 6 2 2 la i r M C A B r e B B B B e .b 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 t qs 3 8 3 3 3 3 2 2 n aet MRN M M M M M M M i f NON y t O i n n n P C c n o n n n n o o a o t o o o o t t p t t t t t a 0 5 5 I C l 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 T 11 I q 9 3 1 3 3 2 5 0 N w 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 0. U t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7t D h M M M M-M M M AS S '7 7 7 v '5 7 7 i D e 3 7 I l 5 3 9 5 5 1 1 1 S' E 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 Y r 1 S ru T G 2 .s ign. N 2, o B I A L a G. l md c dl T D e 5 2 9 0 2 0 N r 1 2 1 2 2 2 Dn AB A A

E i

dt p l n-l s i i DA e a i ii u m t pe E c e l y uo qt e& s on H i r ya BH Es D i ha Cw l ro re Sr R v nA eg e eC 'e o eel or C E r I V e i e tn tp tA tH tz t u e O S ac si ci sV s si. l ass ne / Mne al e uPt aH ah al p eroe i g F e an wdn d/s w wc wai seln hd O m Dna dna vri dg dt dru enca ci a Rer aar ieo an aa aeq ienr ar X N CtC RHC FdH Ri Rt RnE DGEC MB I EDN 9 2 6 7 8 0 1111 2 I . r 3 0 0 0 0 1 0000 0 e t pe 2 3 3 3 3 3 5555 5 1 1 1 1 l 1 l 1 1 A n si H H 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 / rrogn a iu i 0 0 0 0 0 0 ABCD 0 n CoHDN 1 0 0 0 0 0 1111 0 u_ n me 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 t 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 I 'h j{ tl i 4ll.I li j l <l l j ll I i

i Page 7 of 9 O/ElufEAD HANDLING SYSTEM REVIEW TABLE 1 Septsber, 1981 INDEX OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYS'ITNS - UNIT I & COPNON Fire Crane Safety-Protection Safety Pelated Related Areas: or Holst Material Max. Item In Item On Ioad Path Iquip. Reg. Vert. Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower Item Nunber Name/ Service Area

Elev, Drwg. Capacity Number Lift Path?

Criteria Elevation? Elevation l l 46 00-41503 Circulating CWB 217' M-5101 30-ton M-28 40'-0" NO A NO N/A Water Bldg. M-5102 Bridge Crane M-5103 47 00-11508 Madline Shop Admin. 217' A-7001 5-ton M-28 20'-0" NO A N/A N/A Decon. Area Bldg. Sht. 1 l Bridge Crane iS On-H510 Auxiliary A.B. 217' M-1290 2-ton M-38A 30'-0" NO A N/A N/A l Boiler Bldg. Bldg. Iloist l l 49 00-11511 Spray Pond Spray 268' M-338 3-ton M-38B 12'-4" YES YES 122A,D,123A,D 00-H513 Ptmp flouse Pond ca. 122B,E,123B,E lbists Pump flouse 50 00-11514 Control accm 8 200' M-110 3-ton Field 15' NO lL,1M,1N,1150 ygg Chiller Port-M-125 1A-1K able Gantry Ibist 51 00-H521 IIEPA Filter 19 191' M-141 15-ton M-38B 14'-0" to A NO 119A lbist 117 52 00-H530 Schuylkill S.R.P ll. 147' M-4302 5-ton M-38BA 48'-0" to A NO N/A River Bulk-head Ibist P-240/4

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TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION This table provides a load / impact area matrix for each crane and hoist. Hazard elimination categories are indicated by letters which correspond to the list below. Detailed hazard evaluations for each load handling system can be found in Appendix B. Hazard Elimination Categories Crane travel for tnis area / load combination prohibited a. by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to c. consider load / equipment combination. d. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied). Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop e. will not damage safety-related equipment. l i l T-23/56 l

P. 1 i TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-II201)

• Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact t

Ref teling Floor-Elevation 321' Refueling Holstway - Elevation 217' Area Columns 15.5-23, D-J Columns 22.5 - 23.5, D-F t l 1 Hazard Loads 3afety-Related "#* Y. Safety-Related Eyevation Elimination Elevation Elimination Equipment Equipment Category y Reactor Well Irradiated Fuel

217, None N/A 352'-o" a,c Shield Plugs (Up to 90 tons) l Strongback I Below Recirculation Systan Below N/A N/A 352' Electrical Otmponenta ;; b,e

217, wo l

Slab Fuel Pool Cooling Slab @j rN \\ mW re r /\\ Drvwell j /_Q O$ e Ilead { (104 tons) p3 $ n 1

• Eb 08 b8 M r b,e on WD

~ Sn w< oa Reactor Vessel E e llead B l (92 tons) Wa RPV llead Strongback y b,e 1_

• Table 1 - Item 20

l P. 2 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-11201)* l Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 L f ( Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 353' Refueling Hoistway - Elevation 217' I I Area Columns 15.5-23, D-J mlurms 22.5 - 23.5, D-F i l l Loads Safety-Related llazard Gafety-Relatea Hazard Elevation Equipment Blimination Elevation Equipment Eliminatiori n, %m c'nt-w ry a Steam Dryer I (40 tons) 352'-0" Irradiated Fuel a, e 217' None N/A l Dryer / Separator Sling Below necirculaticn Systen; Below i 352' Blectrical Ccuponents ; b, e 217' N/A N/A Slab Puel Pool h ling Slab tok o e 4P 81 3 m, Steam Separator ye L S i (74 tons) a,e a M Dryer / Separator u i l Sling 3:$ l Ny bue ?r* HE l e Fuel Pool Stop Cl* d Logs (35 tons)

se Lifting Assembly ji, i

r d a II y } N Y Y 4 i

• Table 1 - Item 20

i I P. 3 l l TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-11201)* Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Refueling Hoistway - Elevation 217' Area ~ Columns 15.5-23, D-J Loads safety-Nelaun Hazard Safety-Belateci Elimination Elevation Elevation Equipment gg..tlon Equipment Category i I Dryer / Separator Irradiated a,c 217' None N/A L j Storage Pit 352'-0" Fuel l Canal Plugs (45 tons) Recirculation System; BelN 217' N/A N/A Strongback II 2 Electrical Couponents ; b,e Fuel Pool Oooling Slab g, Slab rN ca :r re Fuel Pool Gates d O$ (~3 tons each) I ens I -a r e

s i

l d EE

re en eN l

mN Refueling Shieg d wa (22 tons) Refueling Shield y i Lift Rig d r V V 1 r 1r i f 8 I

• Table 1 - Item 20 l

l

P. 4 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION l CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (0 0-H201)

• cation

] Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 p Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Refueling Iloistway i Area Columns 15.5-23, D-J Columns 22 5 -23. 5, D-F Loads Safety-telateu Hazard safety-=lataal Hazard Elevation Equipment Eliminatim Elevation Equipment Eliminatier i re,vnrv Cat e rv i Spent Fuel 352'-0" Irradiated Fuel a,d 217'-0" None N/A Shipping Cask r (100 tons) RecircuLition Below Below System' Electrical d 217' N/A Cask Yoke !A 352' Ctmponents; Fuel Slab mk Slab Itx>l Cboling b$ l cn y

• e oD Service Platform a,e u o, 4

P. (5 tons) wg 'e Service Platform 3: $ Sling b,e Y* = E. ~ $E RPV Head a, c Insulation l l (9 tons) E< b,e V i f p f 1 r E i +

• Table 1 - Item 20

l 1 P. 5 .i I TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane ( 0 0-H 2 01)

• Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 I

Ibfueling Hoistway - Elevation 217' } Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Columns 22.5 - 23.5, D-F Columns 15.5-23, D-J Loads safety-Helaten Hazard Safety-Iblated Hg " gard Elevation Equipment Elimirvation Elevation U' Equipment ca tmm Cateoorv i Head Stud 352'-0" Irradiated a,c 217' None N/A Tensioner Fuel s i l Below Iecirculation, 3,1g, System; Electrical b,e N/A N/p g [,. (bmponents; Fuel j Pool Cooling <: o PN m7 i H h i i Head Stud oe d D O' Rac!d f (1-1/2 tons) l p i 3: p 1 -s ' e me N pa-d o3

r e l

l j y, % j Service Platforrr s' Support Includ-a,c we i ing -Seal Surface [a, ~ Protector E N 1 T' l 950 lbs. y y 1 b,e p p y l - (

• Table 1 - Item 20

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d N

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P. 12 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 Reactor Enclosure Equipment Ilatch Hoist (10-H131) CRANE / HOIST: i Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Ar a 16, Elevation 313' Impact Area Columns 21.5-22.5, D-E g I ~ E ion Elevation El tion Elevation Sa t Eq n g ~ Iloist Capacity: 217' g ton 313' None N/A None N/A Misc. Loads Below Electrical, Instr., b Below 217' Slab & ESW Piping 313' Electrical Conduit b BUIN k None Slab 201' Slab N/A e e1 r* 217' None N/A Hatch Plugs (5-1/4 ton ea.) 313' None N/A m t Below Elect::ical, Instr.' b Electrical conduit 217' Slab & ESW Piping

• g l

Below Slab b None N/A E

313, 1*

SM 'm< E t e 11 We IB E

• Table 1 - Item 18

f

ooa t(3a5De e*<otoi :w:<W5 s5 n

l s yr a 'y$ 2 3 1 P 9 1 me t I 1 e lba NO T

1. s I

T r A m o i L a tv U e ar B B dnm ri AT t ame f zit b b ala D i 1 Ec 1 A L O n s;t L C o t r i A m u ei V m d l u o d n ld I I e r o in C m 7 t t e c ho t C. c 2 o 1 a n a l o 2 13 e w a nl E R e M am c Ra r n - p d i c LB l u o K yi e r li l t or A o t i t u lic rt e T r c t f q ipe t c t u a 4 aE hil ne n r v 2 S C pE ol o t e CE C S l 2 E 2 n l o s o i r 8 n t b t m a n a u v a T 7 S o e l e l 1 S C r o l I 2 A C E O H/ ]J E s N y ge A a t ni R t e i i l C c r c lb n a A a om o P p oe i M a Cs t I C s a s &A c d tn o a so sl L o it ni L o ao .l 3., FC I )i ] l

P. 14 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 Recirculation Pump Motor Hoists (lA-H203, 1B-H20 3)

• CRANE / HOIST:

Location Reactor Enclosure (Drywell) - Unit 1 Impact Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 11 Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 16 Area (Hoist 1AH203) (Hoist 1BH203) Safety-Belated "^Y Safety-Nelated Hazard Loads Elevation Elimination Elevation tio" Equipment hhry Equipment Category Recirculation, E RV 254' Recirculation, ERV, RCIC & S/D cooling b,c l P P ng; Electrical b,c ii ton ac & 238' conduit; Unit 238' pipingfUnitcoolerj Electrical conduit cooler Re h. P g Below Containment b Motor Below Containment Vacuan (23 ton) 238' Reliefs; Suppres-b 238' vacuum reliefs; Slab sion pool ts'p. Slab Suppression pool e tenp. sensors sensors irculation, ERV 253' Recirculation, E RV, R g PlPing; Electrical b,c CIC & S/D cooling b'c Recirculation

253, Pump

& 238' conduit; Unit 238' piping! Unit cooler! Electrical conduit (13-3/4 ton) cooler 3 Co tainnent vacuan Bel Containment Vacuun n Be W D Relie fs ; suppres, b 238 reliefs; Suppression E 238' sion pool tatp. 81 pool taip. sensors Slab sensors sn 6<a e E5 j >e I. ak i .S t$ " Table 1 - Item 21 4 = m

eon 7on* gnuaNue EoEE 5s.;n:4 B Ft{tN - UI i 5 1 P 2 2 me t ) I 8 0 2 1 I I -B e O l N b O a I 8 T T 0 n A 2 o L ,l l I ya U B A A dgn A O r / T ( 2 a N z 5 ag D s 3 l A e l O n 1 n L a o r t i l C i t e n a n u b U v w F i e ot 2 J l dn d E te e E l e um t L o r hp a B o u r Si i A P s o u d T o o eq a l l l fE r e c F a r u n S I F E gn n r i o o l i t e t c u a T a f v 2 S e e e 5 I R R l 3 O E H/E N A a y R t e t C c r i ) n a A c. e o p aa l s i m pe db t I a nl a s Cn u c d o B0 o a tt 0 L o s l7 L i2 e( o/ u 't I1 F l I i .l1'i

i 1::l1 ii' l

l

P. 16 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 CRANE / HOIST: IIPCI/RCIC Equipment iloist (10-11215)* Location Impact Areas 11, 15 - Elevation 217 Areas 11, 15 - Elevation 177' A#** ( Columns 14-15, D-II

• ^

Saf ty-Related Hazard Nilm5 nation Elevation tion 8^ U'N" l Elevation Equipment Equipment ggq Category Electrical cable; I/ C lloist Capacity: 217' MIR, Becirculation b

177,

& Core Spray b i 10-1/2 ton ccuponmts IIPCI Turbine Below Electrical cable; Below N/A N/A (10-1/2 ton) 217' ,I C b 177' o !!PCI Pimp 91ab cmp mnts Slab g (8 - 1/4 ton) n 217e Electrical cable; HPCI/TCIC 177' mIR, Becirculation b & Core Spray b l cornponents o ICIC Turbine Electrical cable; Below 177' N/A N/A 5 2l MIR, IIPCI & ICIC b j (2-1/2 ton) } Slab BCIC Ptmp camponents i (3-1/4 ton) M Electrical cable; 217' MIR, Becirculation 177' ilPCI/ICIC & Core Spray b cmponents b E m (l} g Below Electrical cable; gg flatch Covers 217' HIR, IIPCI & ICIC 777 (9-1/4, m n ts b N/A N/A J{ e Slab Slab 8-1/2 tons) ,3 e $w ^ Table 1 - Item 24

P. 17 i LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 ~ CRANE /NOIST: Core Spray Pumps Hoist (10-H216)

• j Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Area 11, Elevation 217' Area 11, Elevation 177' (Below Hatchway)

Columns 15-17, G-J Hazard ) Loads Safety-Related Hazard Safety-Related Elevatior. imination Elevation Equipment Equipment MIR, lirirculation, b Holst Capacity: 217' HPCI & Core Spray 177 HPCI, BCIC l 5,,;, ton Ocznponents & Core Spray b I Core Spray l Pump ( 3-1/.2 ton) Belw N/A N/A Below Esd Systan ccm-b 177' g I

217, Slab

'ponend Slab "r: i 111R, Recirculation, HPCI, RCIC l Core Spray Pump IIPCI & Core Spray b 177' & Core Spray b Motor

217, ents am (3-1/4 ton)

E. Below IIPCI, BCIC, MIR, Below N/A N/A e. 177' 217' ESW systen con-b e Slab ponents Slab en SC Below RIR, Recirculation, HPCI, BCIC pe 11@@ Plugs 217' IIPCI & Core Spray b 177' & Core Spray b 't e (4-3/4 ton) Slab canponents f l (I Below HPCI, FCIC, MIR, Below N/A N/A 217' r:SW System com-b 177 Slab ponents Slab p4l

• Table 1 - Item 25

P. 18 TABLE 2 LOAD TABUIATION CRANE / HOIST: Core Spray Pump Holst (10-H217)

• i Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 12, Elevation 217' Area 12, Elevation 177' Area Columns 20-23, H-J (Below Hatcilway)

Loads safety-Belated zard Safety-Belated Hazard Elevation "8 1 " Equipment Equipment Core Spray and 177' Core Spray Iloist Capacity:

217, Recirculation

5. ton b

Sys h b piping, Instaunen-l Core Spray Pump (3-1/2 ton) Below Radwaste & ESW 1 217' Valves, pipias atti N/A N/a b 7 Slab electrical Slab n

r Core spray ana 4

Recirculation 177' b Core Spray Pump 217e 6 P P ng, instrumen-b Cbre Spray ii Motor (3-1/4 ton) g tation & electrical System Below Radwaste & ESW Below 217' Valves, piping _and 177' N/A N/A Slab electrimi b Slab E E" Core Spray and Core Spray Hatch Plug Recirculation 177' b System b (5-1/2 ton) 217' oiping; Electrica 1 &Tnstrnmontation Below Radwaste & ESW Below 217' valves, piping b 177' N/A N/A $ g-Slab & electrica.1 Slab c R " Table 1 - Item 26

P. 19 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 CRANE / HOIST: Cooling Water IIX & Core Spray Pump Hoist (10-H218)

• Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Area 12, 16 - Elevation 217' Impact g,

1 Area (Below Hatchway) l Columns 22, E-II r ' Hazard Loads Safety-Related Safety-lelated Hazard Elevation tion Equipment Equipment hkry MIR, Recirculation, IToist Capacity:" . 217' instnmentation & System b RCIC & Main Steam b 177' (bre Spray ,12-1/2 ton ea._ electrical i Cooling Water BelN IIeat Exchanger ESW & Radwaste 177 N/A N/A 217' Slab (24-1/2 ton) P1 Ping, valves & b instrumenta.tinn e Slab n MIR, Recirculation, Core Spray Pump RCIC & Main Steam S b Core Spray 1 Potor

217, instnrnentation &

S b a l (3-1/3 ton) electncal e i (3-1/4 ton) p. { Below ESW & Radwaste Below P b i 217' piping, valves & 177' N/A N/A i Slab instnmentation Slab en '<l I RIIR, Recirculation, a l RCIC & Main Stean b Core Spray E l Ilatch Plugs 217' instrumentation & 177' System b g (8-1/4 ton) electrical E 8 Scim Below 217' pp , va q s & b 177' N/A N/A y e 1 Slab Slab I l " Table 1 - Item 27 ) 1

P. 20 ? LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 1 l CRANE / HOIST: RHR Pumps lloist (10-H219)* Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 l Impact Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 217' Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 177' Area i; Columns 14-22, D-E (Belw Hatchway) l 4 Loads Safety-Belatec Hazard Safety-iblated H zard Elevation E untnation Elevation Equipment Equipment gon 1 l Iioist Capacity: Electrical j 10 ton 217' conduit & b 177' RHR Systan b g,C's RHR Pumo B01# (9-1/2 ton) Belm MIR, ESW valves; -Electrical b N/A N/A O f e "r: l en RHR Pump Motor 217' Electrical O' l conduit & 177' RHR Systan b b a .l (7 ton) MI's m, Belw Below 177' N/A N/A y 217' RIR, ESW valves; b l Slab Electrical Slab in en I Mm 1 i 217' Electrical Hatch Plugs conduit & 177' MIR Systen b o D 9 (8-l/4 ton) MOC's 3 (9-1/2 ton) Belm BelN RIR, ESW valves; j 7 b 177 217' Electrical Slab N/A N/A 5 4: b l Slab l* oo

• Table 1 - Item 28 I

i i i' ,i! l o4oN:ono JoDOH>~5e e$a$ E 5<ey .I n< r N" ,ew 1 2 P 9 2 me t I ) 2 i 0 2 1 1 1 e 0 l 1 b ( a N T O t I s T i n A o o L i l tv l U ar B r dne A o riam b b T o zi D D alm 1 A t 1 1 O n g L e t n m i .ip p n .i i U 3 p u 5 q 2 J l y ls 2 E a a at e n l c ;r cn I e itp i e I E t r o R ris ri P t u t L n u i B e s t 7 cde c v A m o a 1 enr e i T n l v e9 l oo l u i c e 5 f Ecc E u 3E a n l S t E E 5 n 1 o r n C o 1 s o t 1 n i c m t a a u a T e e l v '3 w' b S R r o e l3a I A C l 5 e5l O E 2 .B2S H/ t - i E u NA a y q t E R t e i C c r n a A c t o p a n p e i m a m t I a s C n i c d o a tn a L o so tr L it no o.. oo i 6._ CD t l l j il lj:i ! ji I14 i 11j

l L 5a* i oto8 7<P$ n 51 r 3tDo $ o,,:on t -n e$e t 4 2 2 P tn emp 0 i 3 u q m E e t I i 1 ) 1 2 e 2 l b I I a N B T O 1 I / 1 T m 2 AL 2 i l t U i B a in c A A ri T am c, l ( zi A a / b D E N 1 1 AO t 1 i L s t n i t o i 3 n 5 l I U 2 F o k t c 2 c n D l m o o ae e E L e i ct L r t 5 n is o ry B l u a A e s v 1 N t s e c T n o e 2 fq eR n l l 8"E EM lI o c E 0 s n 2 r E e 6 s n P r 1 n o o m i t a u t c e l a T a r o v 3 b 5 l3a S e A C e e5l I R l 2 B2S O E H/ E N y A a t R t e i C c r c n a A a. o p pa l i m ae e t I a s C nk n nc l c d to oo o a st sl L o i rr L o0 ei Il 2 PA l I,j;iii: 4 ,l .i l

- ~ - kyrO"S Eos&w"E,v.ni5 g :<rn# j Il ' swN i it 3 2 P 1 3 me t I ) 1 3 2 e 2 l H b a 0 T N 1 O ( IT t A s L i U o B H d A r T X a b b b z H al D HE A p O u s L n 1 y a S e t l 1 l l i o C n 3 s o r t=t r

tt U

8

tt 2

r 2 a n l l lnn l l nn e e a aeo a aeo E t e n F mm c cmc c c nC u L a r o - p it ir it i r B W u i D yi ri ri n ri ri A s t t u tu tase tu tas cd ctot cd ct o e q en en s en en m T r o a o l v 7 aE l o lbtwy l o l ot f E( S EC EC t c e 1 s Ec A c n l A a E E 4 1 n e o R r o 2 s i t 1 n t N' b w'b c m a c 3 l3a T a a u v 3 l3a 8 e8l S e e l e 8 e8l 2 B2S R r o l 2 B2S I O A C E H t / ~ e a v e E N y ir H' s A a t te e s R t e i ag e l C c r e v d c rnl n a A a ea i n d tr o P p nh n u i M a ec ae u B t I C gx rg a s B en e eE c d tn R 'e nab o a soU t U eh u L o itCna'b CgcT L u W6x H 8,W o e T RRE o-RNH I Ji!ij ij l 1; !l i]!l{j i.l'\\! f I l

a$:sMMs@ t*<o $ E ggat 1sh n r1h ko":Ofs mE s 4 2 P 2 3 me t I 1 e l b ) a N 4 O 2 T 2 I H T n A 0 n L 1 Hy ( U ar 2 B dno m 5 ri g A A c T o 3 ame / D zit N D n al a EC l A g o l O n 1 i L i t l t a l d i v e n n e d u a U l e F H E t t,. 2 n d l Me e E e e m t L n r r - p a B n u o yi i A a s o t u d T h o l e q a f C l F aE r c s r l n g I e E n u i n F r l o o e i t u t c f a T a e v 2 S e R e 5 I R l 3 O E H/E NA a y t R t e C r i l n a' A c e a n o p i a p n l a. a t I a s Cs h c d b C tl o a s l L o i0 e L o 0-u I 5 F I 1

P. 25 l TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION ~ CRANE / HOIST: CRD Platform Hoist (10-11229)* Location Reactor Enclosure (Drywell) - Unit 1 Impact Area 15 (Drywell), Elev. 253' Area l Loads safety-lelatal llazard Elevation Equipment Elimination i Category RHR Shutdown Holst Capacity: 253' Cooling line e 1 ton i CRD Removal Below Suppression Pool Platform 238' Tenp. Sensors; b,c Slab Vacuan Reliefs (~ 1350 lbs. w/CRD i $I E. r.oa u sk s seo 3

n sh m >=

N >* n3 we en HM em co a ~ we I r

5.

mt

• Table 1 - Item 33

i h. $ o E w 2 s O o W $. e 'l< o IIE F$* m I 5I 6 2 P 5 4 33 3 224g m e 3 t 22 I 3 3 2 1 H e A l 1 b a N T O IT r A o ,l L gu U s C t dg A s r c, T i az b b o aHg D H 1 AO l t L a i v n l s o U o f m 36 d s o;e e 78 r Psi e e r R 22 tt e no l 2 / e a n

g e

r n l nnl ose inr ee =iopo se E c. u o Rm L l s i p tic sSm B v o t vi Sp e u A r l a tu nst p yu r. e T e c v fq i ei p c S n e a a tn u ua F, E M eU STV E l V E R r S o n M t l o c l 6' i a e t mb e w a 6 T R y v 8 8 i8 a r S e 3 2 e3l D l 2 B2S I O E H/ ]j E N y ) A a t s. R t e i ea C c r cn ve n a A aoml o g ptaa. i a eVs t C2t b a s /Sfl c d tn e o a soni0 L o itil0 L o ae2 H 1_M R (1 ,:il! l1 .l li

@ wN.0S& ClODpH >*= D@ t'n< dam ww<POz f t 8P ,$e ~ 7 2 P 5 3 me ) 6 t 3 I 2 H 0 1 1 e ( l t b N s a O i T I o T l n f A &y L l U a ar B v no

1. Mt A o

!^ g T m e b e a D R "lEC AO t L r a 1 3 s l f oe C 5 o t 2 k i d Psi t rl s n n

1. n e

noe 2 a U o e n osr C i i n E e t - m o se m L l r a Wp N sS B a u v e u iu r.u A s s e

1. E q

p yc T o o l l a p l E u uV s c ST i n D E l l n r e o o w i t y t w'b c r a o8 T a D v 3 S e e 5 l 3a I R l 2 e2l B S O E H/EN A a y R t e t k C c r i s n a A c a o p a C w i m p h t I a l a s C a c d s o a tn o L o so pt L it sr o ia 1~ DC II 1,I J 1jlll' i!f ii lllIl'fIll ,l 111l l

P. 28 d TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION l CRANE / HOIST: Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Cover Hoist (10-H237)* ~ i 4 Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Areas 11 - Elevation 283' Area 16 - Elevation 283' Impact Columns 15-17,H-J Area Columns 20-21, F-G l Loads safety-aelated bzard Hazard ty-ted Elevation Eliminatica Elevation gyg g Equipment E9 1P Categorv cateoorv doist Capacity: Electrical; Electrical; 83, b 283' Hydrogen b 1 ton Hydrogen h-Recombiner H[5ver Recombiner ombiner C i Below Belm Electrical onryluit 283' Electrical e slab conduit; @k 83 b b CRD hydraulics m :r

p. e o

u U s

t S

$o5

r e tn

-pN e a co et u o 5 W 6. m*

• Table 1 - Item 36

P. 29 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Equipment Hatch Bridge Crane (10-H238)

• Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 15 - Elevation 253' Area 15 - Elevation 217' Area Columns 21.5 - 22.5, D-F (Below hatchway)

Loads Safety-Belated Hazard Safety-Belated Hazard Elevation Elevation Eliminatim Equipment g g. tion Equipment Category 1' IIoist Capacity: ~ 283 None N/A None N/A 25 ton Miscellaneous Below Below Electrical; RHR Electrical b Instrunentation; 283

217, condsit ESW piping b

l slab Slab 2'

r 4

s D Os

n ms De 5

m tQ (n

• <m ete B

en We l U C U E

• Table 1 - Item 37 i

r: rO(1a

1. uE 5 me t% tea 5 Wws. 8*

C n at kuN: UE 'O 3 P 8 3 m e t I I 1 ) 9 e 3 l 2 b H a N T O 0 I 1 T ( n A o L e i U n ty B a ar dno A A r ri g / T C ame N b zit D a 1 al a EC l A e l O r t L A i t n F i u e U c 3 D d d e n n 5 t o a t c a 2 2 n e 5 n i e l Pm e r n a E t u o 5 c p e L n s i 1 i B i o t yi n r A a l a e u o t T M c v i q N c n e 1 aE e s l D E l E R E 4 C r 1 I o n t 5 s o c 1 n i a m t w e a u a 3 o'b T R e l v 5 l3 a S r o e 2 e5l B2S I A C l O E H/E NA a y e R t e t C c r i n a A c nd o P a o o i m pt R t I a 1 a s C l c d o o a t re L o s tv L i ni o or I UD I i .I,

4l

li l

I!l

P. 31 i TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION s CRANE / HOIST: Diesel Generator Bridge Cranes (lA-H501, 1B-H 501, 1C-501, 1D-501)

• l Location Diesel Generator Rooms - Unit 1 Impact Elevation 217' Area Columns 15.5-21.5, South of Reactor I

Enclosure i Loads safety-mlated 'llazard Elevation Elimination Equipment Category 4 Diesel Generatort b j lioist Capacity: 217' I 15 ton Auxillaries i Diesel Gen. l Parts Below N/A N/A 217' O j l Slab e _t._ M 1 e s e t ~ 2R e d / y i S \\ W + r / O s n / y e i h f A 5 p o r o s s y f v c f.f s 1! (

- l, r

i r ( / - ( gn / \\ r e , I t' ; i. e ', n y a i r / 1.' j / e n r .s e y g .g* Q., ,l ,t' ? 5 A ')" QC l l 4, y, W ,( _

• 1

~ 4 / ~ I ' t _f ( e [ / ~/

• Table 1 - Item 44

, u i. E h t ' / t. t

,p, _. //, s" / P. 32 c,, r! c .t 4 , e LOAD (TABULATION I TABLE 2.- s 1 CRANEhllOIST: Spray Pond Pum'p Iloists (00-H511, 00-H513)

• Location Sprah Pond Pump fiouse - Common 5

/ Impset Columns 1-3. 5,B-C Columns 3.5-6, B-C 4 ( 00-H513) Artes ,( 400-H51D ,e i t ( Saf -Relatect ""I"? l Safety-wlama llazar.d Elevation Elimination loade' Elevation g Equipment Elimination Equipment Category t cateaory + / i r iloist Capacity: 268' Safety-related b 268' Safety-related b ~ Electrical 3' ton ea. -Electrical RHR Service Below 4,- ~ ms&M BelN WW&W 4 b 268' Valves b Water an:1 W ~ ' W alves Slab (IcopsB,D) 260,. (Loops.A,C) e Valves Slab N

r o

a IF. eu a W e-ue tn M ,etasa

oe<

Hw a m c w

• Table 1 - Item 49

t l , i i l i! s* e .W-tMotnli :s C < P e # n r o$n:unD tga esa :d r g5 5B 3 3 P ) 4 1 5 H 0 5 0 0 m ( e t t I s i o H 1 y e r l t b n a a N T O G IT e l A n L b o U a i t ty B ar r A np T o b c P m e t D a 1 r n A F C O e o l m L l m i o h C C 0 n 0 xx l m 2 t ;a 2 o e N I E o r n sc l ri e R u o J oer LB rlt n t i tlc o l c t AT o u a 7 nie N r r v 2 ohl CCE t t e n S l 9 o E 1 C l n s o o r 8 n i t m w t n a u o b a 0 l '0 a o e l v 0 e0l T C r o e 2 B2S S A C l I O E H/E N y A a t s R t e i u C c r c o n a A a e o p p n i m a a t I C l a l c tn es o so cd L i t sa o io H3 ML 1 i l j II1i\\ l' l i' i! l<

l .k

M<>eC s

o<oM onO cOua5me tMotnU r n e Nt ", W@ 4 3 P 3 5 me t I 1 e lba N T O IT

• A s

n L t o U s ity B i 6 ar A A o dno / rig b N T H 9 ame D l 7 zit al a A i 1 2 EC O a ll L r t n o i o n n i l o U t J u o M a e r t t CVt v H, II n a n 2 l e o e CEC e e e l 5 le I E n r E m n t L n u 9 - p

e o

B u s 1 yi sgg N na A T o t u 'V i k T l 2 5 e f q I pEim m c 1 aE a n 7 S pT , 1 e E t 1 S r 1 s n o n o t s m i c a u t 0 w a e l o '3 a b 9 a e r o v 3o2 l T 5l R A C e 5t~ e S 2 I l 2 B s O E H /E s N e A a v l R t e C c r a s n a A mV e o p a v l i m en to a t I a s Si V c d t o a na L o il c L ao s i Ms M I lll ll 1 ,;1 I j! ii'!

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t i r i n e. o40N7WMa 2 g sw*5e t*<ot $w :o <poC e we<Pmpo: H xaMn: geo" s r s c 7 3 P 8 5 m e ) t 4 I 2 1 H 1 0 0 e ( l t ba N s T O i I o T H A n L t o ,,i U n tv B e ar A m d no T p rig b e i an e z ut D u a l.a A q H tC O E n L o C m A m d d d e e V o H C 2 e t t t 0 M at a a; l ll 2 m 3 ln l a ea o K e e e E o e n Pm ri .i c rc p L R r o y yr yr B u i 6 ti A l t t 2 eu tt tts ec T o c a fq ec f e 'O C r u v 5 a E fe S al al G t r e n t l 0 SE SEP o S E 2 C n l s o o 8 n i r m t t a u a b T n e l v 4 a g4 S o r o e 0 0l I C A C l 3 3S O E H /E g: - N y A a t i R t e C c r can n a A po C o p at At i m C Vn t I 3 He a s c d s/ m tn .p o a so ci L o it su L o iq H 2-ME 1j i l l ,11j

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eo A

L o u Bp msTs / B M s 5 E i y ue n n A o 1 tu uvl e T l l eq clos 1 fE aao l c e n 2 2 a Vvp w E 1 S t 6 e r , 1 n W o 1 o t 1 s i w'b c n t o2 a a s m a 0 l8l T e a u v 2o3 e1s S R e l e 8t2 B I r o l 1 O A C E H I /E - s, eC N y: .i, A a t flB R t e C c r .i eb c imA n a A a le7 o p i m p es3 a Rs1 t I a s C A-c d m 7 tnue5 o a L o souv-L .l t c l V o aaS H2 VvP

P. 39 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION s 4 CRANE / HOIST: Control Structure Fans Lifting Beam lloist* Location Control Structure - Unit 1 Impact Area 8, Elevation 321' Area Columns 21-24.5, K-M Loads Safety. w a W .lazad Elevation E ui ment di*i"" 9 P i ,morv Hoist Capaca,.ty: _ 304' to Electrical 321' conduit b _2 : ton e Contro1 Room { HVAC Fans Electrical conduit; s e 304'

o o Slab Qg "MQ o,

e 0 a, V:nm 3: $, w w nw o u We .e*m n I wa Ne B en

n a

d e i g 1

• Table 1 - Item 60

l r j ,'j,! s i+ i! i ~. @ oe:ruDO :DoDHroe m<$n9* n0< rot s

8 gO Hey 1

6 no s i t ty I aro A Mit r g / i m e N 1 ala e 0 HEC l 4 3 ba 1 T P 3 no d i e t t ) a a y lt e v a en n e w Re o l h - n N E c yp ti t i ep a f H aa 5 S s 1 w t o s al n i e e o b o r B i '3 a ( t 1 l H A a 3 S v m e N o l O o E I R T n A n L o a i U F ty B ar d no A r 1 r g b T a 'mb e 3 p I 3 z t D p a 'l a A U t n l EC l O i o L e n i r U t d u a e s v t o e a t t l e l E l c r E e n i 2 lu l n u D R e ad a m cn c E E s -y p io i L o r l 6 3 t i rc &c BA o c 1 2 e u tc T t n f q e 4 aE l l c E a 5 1 S E E e r 1 R o n t s m n c a u o .i a e l t e r o w R A C a 1 o T v 3 l S e 3 e I B S OH/ENA a su R t e &o C c r e n a A sn o p mla i m Fl t I e a s Ni c c d s o a M L o L t l ij lia ,;i < ,i

i l

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l<

l' 'l ,i n o O<oe:oDo :esDM>*=ne t<De 1r . n e n reai :o< pet ND eecH n 2 3 4 6 P s t I 1 e lbaT N r O e I t i T a n A w o ,i L b U n ty a ar BA D dno t rig ame b g T m zit D o al a A R EC l l O t L nem urt det s '2 t n l 2 n I 3 ae a l c a 3 K l m i c E c e e n J B p r i L 4 B v r o i t e r yu cl te A h u i eb cl T S t t 2 t q l a eb c a 2 eE f Ec l a h u v t r e 5 a Ec r t l S o S E 1 N 2 n l o o s .i w r 8 m t '2 o'b t n a t a 3 l2 a u 3 e3l T o e l v S C r o B3S e A O I l O E H/E &s N A a y u R t e t ko i se C c r c an n a A a o p p Ca i m a l C rl t I ee a s t) tc c d sn l s o a io L o ot ii L H FM [ 1 } I j4! l l lll !ll

s. Overhocd Handling Systems Review Revision 2, March, 1983 TABLE 3 LIMERICK SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES P.1/1 Load Design Complies Item Special Lifting Device

Weight, Safety with W

Factor

• ANSI N14.6

-1978? 1 Dryer & Separator Sling 40/74 5xW No (GE-F19-E008) tons 2 RPV Head Strongback 92 tons 5xW No 3 Head Nut & Washer Rack Sling 700 lbs. 5xW N/A** 4 Service Platform Rack Sling 5 tons 5xW No (GE-F21-E001) 5 General Purpose Grapple 600 lbs. 5xW N/A** (GE-F21-E001) 6 Refueling Sh'ield Lift Rig 22 tons 3xW No (Bechtel 8031-C-90) Reactor Well Shield Plugs & Up to 4.5(W+25%) No 7 Dryer / Separator Canal Plug 90 tons Strongback I (Bechtel) 8 Dryer / Separator Canal Plugs 45 tons 4.5(W+25%) No Strongback II (Bechtel) 9 Refueling Slot Shield Plugs 16 tons 4.5(W+25%) No Lifting Ass'y I (Bechtel) 10 Fuel Pool Stops Logs 35 tons 4.5(W+25%) No l Lif ting Ass' y II (Bechtel) L1 Spent Fuel Cask Yoke 100 tons i

• GE design safety factors based on material ultimate strength.

Bechtel design safety f actors are conservative estimates based on minimum ASTM material yield strengths. Actual design stresses are based on Ameri-can Institute of Steel Construction ( AISC) recommended allowables which vary with type of stress and component shape.

• • Not a heavy load P-240(b)

__. u-f { LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 2, March 1983 TABLE 4 REFUELING FLOOR HEAVY LOAD HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS (in feet and inches from floor to bottom of load) Floor Zone Weight Load (tons) A(4) B(7) C Drywell Head 104T 3'-0 l'-9 l'-6 RPV Head 92T 3'-0 l'-9 l'-6 Shield Plug 412 12T 4'-0 3'-0 2'-6 Stop Log 413 or 414 59T 3'-0 2'-0 l'-6 Stop Log #15 or #16 38T 2'-0 l'-6 l'-0 2 h Steam Dryer 40T 6'-0 4'-0 3'-0 Steam Separator 74T 5'-0 3'-0 2'-3 RPV Head Insulation 9T 7'-0 5'-0 5'-0 Miscellaneous Loads:(6) 25T and smaller loads 25T 5'-0 2'-6 2'-0 10T and smaller loads 10T 5'-6 3'-0 2'-6 ST and smaller loads ST 6'-0 4'-0 3'-6 2T and smaller loads 2T 6'-6 4'-6 4'_-0 1T and smaller loads IT 7'-0 5'-0 4'-6 Notes: l 1) only heavy loads which must be carried over reactor wells are A allowed in this area, up to elevations corresponding to Q2 limits for adjacent floor. 2) No heavy loads allowed over the spent fuel pools. 3) No height limits over the hatchway (hatch cover assumed to fail on impact). 4) Zone A heights are measured from the bottom of the pit or canal (a heavy load drop will cause floor grating to fail). 5) Height limits are based on allowing concrete spalling and yielding of reinforcing and structural steel. 6) Height limits are based on calculations for solid steel cylinders (length = 2 x diameter) and are assumed to be conservative for most miscellaneous loads. 7) Over hatched areas of Zone B miscellaneous loads (only) may be carried 6" higher than normal Zone B limits. A P-167/13

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..m. .m.m. 4 .~. __m m i APPENDIX A t. T SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 1 j DECAY HEAT REMOVAL l e i P-41(b)/7

,s APPENDIX A SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL The lists of systems required to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor and to remove decay heat are based on the " Analysis of Capability to Achieve Safe Shutdown", Chapter 5 of the Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report. The following specific assump-tions were made for the overhead handling systems review: 1. Of fsite power is assumed to be unavailable. 2. A single active component failure is not assumed to occur at the same time as the heavy load drop. 3. Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not assumed to occur at the same time as the load drop. The control room is assumed to remain habitable. The following paragraphs provide descriptions of methods that can be used for reactor shutdown and cooldown from the control room without offsite power. Each of these methods includes a system by which makeup water can be added to the reactor vessel, a system by which energy can be removed from the reactor vessel, and any support systems needed to accomodate energy removal to an ultimate heat sink or to return water to its supply source. i Although the safe shutdown analysis places primary emphasis on achievement of reactor shutdown using the methods described below, l many alternative shutdown methods would be available. Use of safety-related and nonsafety-related systems not addressed in the safe shutdown analysis, plus manual operation of certain equipment and controls, would provide numerous combinations of systems with adequate capability to safely shut the plant down. For the purposes of this safe shutdown analysis, two methods of shutdown that are operable without offsite power were selected for detailed study. Shutdown method A requires Class IE power from Divisions 1 and 3 (both ac and de) in order to be operable. Shutdown method B requires Class lE power from divisions 2 and 4 (both ac and de) plus de power from either Division 1 or Division 3 for ADS valve actuation in order to be operable. The two methods are [ described below, i l P-24/6 A-1 l

Method A After insertion of the control rods and closure of the main steam isolation valves, the RCIC system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the RCIC system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the RCIC turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the RCIC system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, operation of the RCIC system is terminated and the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following: a. Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and main steam isolation valves. b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in ad-dition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the com-l pressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instru-ment gas system will provide the necessary gas. If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply l line cannot be opened by its motor operater, the valve will be opened manually.) c. RCIC pump and associated valves. d. RHR heat exchanger "A" e. RHR pump "A" and associated valves (The outboard isola-tion valve on the shutdown cooling return line is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switch-gear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.) P-24/6 A-2

e...... f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The out-board valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.) g. RHRSW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1); RHRSW pump "C" and associated valves ( for Unit 2) h. ESW pump " A" and associated valves (for Unit 1); ESW pump "C" and associated valves (for Unit 2) 1. RHR compartment unit cooler " A" j. RCIC compartment unit cooler "A" k. Spray pond pump structure fan " A" 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans " A", "C", "E", and "G" m. Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "A" n. Suppression Pool Temperature Instrumentation o. Standby diesel-generators "A" and "C" p. Class IE AC Power Distribution System, Divisions 1 & 3. q. Class IE DC Powec Distribution System, Divisions 1 & 3. r. Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Ventilation. s. Spray Pond Pump Structure Ventilation t. Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation u. Control Structure Ventilation v. Control Structure Chilled Water w. Control Rod Drive hydraulic control units P-24/6 A-3

Method B After insertion of the control rods and closure of the main steam isolation valves, the HPCI system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the HCPI system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the HPCI turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the HPCI system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve J setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. Heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the 4 RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. t The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following: Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and a. main steam isolation valves. b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas. If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.) HPCI pump and associated valves c. d. RHR heat exchanger "B" e. RHR pump "B" and associated valves P-24/6 A-4 l l l

r o..... a f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The inboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 1 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 1 power is not available.) 9 RHRSW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); RHRSW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) h. ESW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); ESW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) j i. RHR compartment unit cooler "B" j. HPCI compartment unit cooler "A" k. Spray pond pump structure fan "B" 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "B", "D", "F", and "H" Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "B" m. Suppression Pool Temperature Instrumention n. o. Standby di_esel-generators "B" and "D" Class IE AC Power Distribution System, Divisions 2 & 4. p. Class IE DC Power Distribution System, Division 2 & 4 q. plus 1 or 3. Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Ventilation r. Spray Pond Pump Structure Ventilation s. t. Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation u. Control Structure Ventilation v. Control Structure Chilled Water System w. Control Rod Drive hydraulic control units The above safe shutdown analysis includes systems required for decay heat removal from the reactor vessel. Decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool is normally accomplished by the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system (FPCC). Since this is not a safety-related system and does not appear on the separation drawings no general attempt was made to see whether the FPCC P-24b/6 A-5

system would be affected by a load drop. If the system is disabled by a load drop the fuel pool can be cooled using the RHR 'B' pump and heat exchanger as described in Section 9.1 of the Limerick FSAR. The supply piping from the RHR system to the fuel pool and the return piping from the skimmer surge tank to the RHR pump suction was included in this review. In cases where components of the RHR system which are required for backup fuel pool cooling could be damaged by a load drop, credit is taken for FPCC system operation. A review of the area was then made to verify that the same load drop could not disable the FPCC system as well. The FPCC system is available after a loss of of f site power. 9 P-24/6 A-6

s*... * ' APPENDIX B HAZARD EVALUATIONS This appendix contains detailed hazard evaluations for each crane and hoist. Major safety-related items located in the load path or on the next lower elevation are listed. A description of the effect of a load drop on systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal is provided, followed by a conclusion. Unless otherwise noted, safe shutdown capability also includes the ability to establish or maintain a means of decay heat removal from the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool. A discussion of shutdown methods A and B is included in Appendix A. Shutdown method A requires the avail-ability of electrical divisions 1 and 3. Shutdown method B requires the availability of electrical divisions 2 and 4, plus DC power from division 1 or division 3 for ADS valve actuation. Where hazard evaluations conclude that electrical divisions 2 and 4 will remain available following a load drop, a review has been made to assure that the necessary DC power is also available. l l l l B-1 P-41(b)/8

LGS Ovarhocd H3ndling Systtm2 R3 view S3ptsmb3r, 1981 RUCU FILTER DEMINERALIZER HOIST (Item 14, Equipment Number 00-H124) This monorail hoist is used to remove hatch plugs and filter demineralizer elements from compartments on elevation 313' of the reactor enclosure. The safe load path is defined on the Item 14 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All items on the next lower elevation are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 except for a few conduit associated with divisions 2 and 4. None of the division 2 and 4 electrical cabling is required for safe shutdown. Therefore, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available for safe shutdown of the plant.

== Conclusion:== l Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related sytems, l a load drop by the RWCU filter demineralizer hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l l l l P-165(a)/6 B-2

LGS Overhttd Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 HVAC EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST .(Item 15, Equipment Number OOH 126) This monorail hoist is used to carry HVAC fans and miscellaneous equipment between elevations 304' and 350' in the control structure. The safe load path for this hoist is defined by the Item 15 load path drawing for elevation 332' and above and by the Item 58 load path drawing for elevation 304'. Major safety-related items in the-load path: (1) Electrical-conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: ( Below 304 ' -floor' slab) (1) Remote shutdown panels,10C201 and 20C201 (2) Electrical cable trays and condui't associated with the remote shudown panels (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: .All safety-related items in the load path (including conduit . embedded in the elevation 304' floor slab) are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for one division 4 conduit which' does not carry cable required for safe shutdown'. Therefore, at a minimum, shutdown method B wi31 remain available following R a load drop to safely shut down the plant. Calculations show that the elevation 304' slab cannot sustain a potential heavy load drop without spalling. The remote shutdown panel, and safety-related cable tray and conduit associated with all electrical divisions and both safe shutdown methods, are located below the 304' floor slab. It' is possible - that both safe shutdown methods could be affected by a heavy load drop from the HVAC equipment hatch hoist.

== Conclusion:== It is not possible to show by analysis that both safe shutdown methods could not be affected by a heavy load drop from the HVAC equipment hatch hoist. Therefore energy absorbing material will be used to pad the floor directly below the hoist or a redundant load bearing path will be provided when using this hoist to carry heavy loads. These administrative procedures will be developed prior to plant operation to assure that failure of the HVAC equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-3 4 4

s. '. LGS OvGrh3Cd Hcndling Systems R2ViGw S3ptcmbar, 1981 CONTROL ROOM CHILLER HOISTS (Item 17, Equpment Numbers, OOH 129, OOH 130) These monorail hoists will be used to service control room chiller OAKil2 and handle the equipment hatch plugs on elevation 200' of the control structure. [A portable gantry hoist (Item 50) will service control room chiller OBKil2]. The safe load path is defined by the Item 17 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Chiller OAKil2 & associated piping / instrumentation (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2 and 3) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: All safety-related items which are necessary for safe shutdown are associated with shutdown method A. Therefore should a load drop occur shutdown method B will still be available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== l Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, i a load drop by the control room chiller hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l l l l P-165(a) B-4

o....e LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST (Item 18, Equipment Number 10H131)

This monorail hoist is used to lift items between elevations 217' and 313' of area 16 of the reactor enclosure. The safe load path is defined on the Item 18 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 313 slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Division 4) l (Below 217' slab) (1) Emergency Service Water Piping (Division 2) (2) Electrical Conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) (3) Instrumentation (Divisions 2 & 4) (Below 201' Slab) ) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capabi,lity: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All compo-nents below the floor slabs at elevation 313' and 217' are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 except for three l conduit. These conduit are associated with Division 3 but are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore a load drop could l affect only shutdown method B. Shutdown method A will remain I available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. I P-165(a) B-5

LCS Ovorhocd Handling Systsms R3 view [ U' sN -- o.. Saptsmbar, 1981', .+ CONTROL ROOM HVAC LIFTING BEAM HOISTS ~; (Item 19) These hoists are used to carry HVAC fans and cooling coils between elevations 217' and 229'-8" in the control structure. ~ W The safe load path is defined on the Item 19 load path drawing. , Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Chilled water piping for HVAC coils (Division 1 & 2) (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lov'7_,eleva t ion : S (Below 217' slab) (1) Control room chillers OAKil2 & OBKil2 and associated instrumentation and piping (Divisions 1 & 2) (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 3 & 4) Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: The chilled water piping is at the same elevation and beside the hoist load and therefore cannot be affected by a load drop. Of the conduit in the load path, only the Division 2 conduit is required for safe shutdown. Since this conduit passes vertically Therefore through the load path a load cannot be carried over it. neither shutdown method would be affected by a load drop. On the elevation below the 217' slab there is strict separation of Division 1, 3 and Division 2, 4 equipment by a wall, except for some Division 4 conduit which is not required for safe Therefore, at least one shutdown method wor.-1 remain shutdown. available af ter a load drop to safely shut down the piant.

== Conclusion:== j Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, l a load drop by the control room HVAC lifting beam hoists l will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l l l l B-6 P-165(a)

1., f,.*:y u

(- , LGS Ovorh2cd Htndling Syctcm3 R3viGw '] Saptsmbar, 1981 s r / = Reactor Enclosure Crane l' (Item 20, Equipment Number OOH 26I) The reactor enclosure crane carries a variety of heavy loads s, cver the refueling floor at elevation 352','and to and from grade elevation 217' through the refueling hoistway. The Item 20 load path drawings define the safe load paths. Major safety-related"iYems 'ill_ the load path: (1) Reactor vessel and fuel Major, safety-related_ items o_n the next lower elevation: (Below[352' slab'on elevations 313' and 331') (1) Reactor enclosure recirculation system fans, lAV213 & IBV213 . (2) Load center 10B201 ~(Division 1) and associated conduit (3) Load center 10D202 (Division 2) and associated conduit (4)' Recirculation system valve's/ instrumentation and associated s 5 (5), electrica1 cabling (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) Motor control center 10B219 - (6) Motor control center 10D220 (7) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following: (a) Motor control center 00B132 (Division 4) (b) Safeguard pump room unit cooler control panel IDC208 (Division 4) (c) Control room HVAC (Divisions 2 and 4) (d) ' Diesel Generater HVAC control panel (Divisions 3 and 4) l (8) Fuel Pool Cooling Piping (Below 217' slab) None. There is a solid concrete pedestal below the refueling hoistway which is structurally isolated from the reactor enclosure. l [ P-165(a) B-7 l

t. LGS Ovarhscd Handling Syctcms Rsview Rsvicion 2, March 1983 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Heavy load handling in the vicinity of spent fuel and the reactor vessel is discussed elsewhere in this report. For new fuel, A stored in the spent fuel pool, there is no potential for critic-Q2 ality due to a load drop for the reasons discussed in NUREG 0612, Section 2.2.4. A load drop into the reactor well could not affect safe shutdown capability since the well is only open when the reactor is shut down. Decay heat removal capability could be threatened only by a load large enough to damage the seal plate. Failure of the seal plate would not allow the large, heavy loads to fall into the drywell because their size is greater than the space between the RPV and the drywell. The reactor well and the drywell are lined with steel plate which will retain any concrete which is fragmented by swinging or f a-lling loads. It is doubtful that other debris large enough to damage shutdown cooling piping could fall through the labyrinth of intervening piping and structural steel. However, in the event that one shutdown cooling loop were disabled the other loop can maintain decay heat removal. Similarly, if debris from the load drop were able to cause leakage from exposed reactor vessel piping, makeup water could be supplied by any of a number of RHR and core spray injection lines until the leak could be repaired. Therefore, the drop of a heavy load into the reactor well would not affect decay heat removal capability. Loads carried over the refueling floor weigh up to 104 tons. Calculations show that maximum load carrying heights must be established to limit damage to the floor due to a load drop, in order to prevent a sequential failure which may ultimately jeopardize safe shutdown capability. As a basis for calculating these heights, concrete failure and bending of the floor l support beams is allowed. No failure which could cause damage to equipment on elevations other than those immediately below the refueling floor (331' & 313') is allowed. Refueling floor load height restrictions are described in Table 4. Administrative procedures to implement these restrictions will be developed prior to plant operation. I The only components on the elevations below the load path that j are associated with shutdown methods A and B are two load centers (10B201 and 10B202), their associated transformers and some elec-trical conduit. The two load centers are separated by a distance of more than 35 feet. All cabling which is associated with these load centers and is needed for safe shutdown enters the load cen-ters from below, and is not exposed. Therefore spalling from a ~P-165(a)/6 B-8

LGS Overhstd Handling Systems Review J '. Ravicion 1, March 1982 single load drop would not disable both load centers. All conduit associated with shutdown method B is located in the immediate vicinity of the 'B' load center and there is no conduit associated with shutdown method 'A' in the same area. Therefore a load drop on the refueling floor could cause damage to only one shutdown method. The other method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. An analysis was made to determine whether fuel pool decay heat removal capability could be affected by a load drop on the refueling floor. A common line from the skimmer surge tanks (16" HCC-106) to the fuel pool cooling system pumps (and to the RHR system intertie) is located below elevation 352'. It was concluded that, by ob-serving the Table 4 load height restrictions, a load drop on the floor area above the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line would pro-duce minimal spalling. The spalled concrete would be contained by the steel decking and would not damage the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, analysis of floor impact strength and the use of administrative pro-cedures to control load height, a load drop by the reactor enclosure crane in areas other than the reactor vessel and the spent fuel poo1* will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. Heavy load handling over the reactor vessel and over the spent fuel pool is discussed elsewhere in this report. P-165(a)/6 B-9

LGS Ovorhnsd Handling Systems Raview Septembar, 1981 RECIRCULATION PUMP & MOTOR HOISTS (Item 21, Equipment Numbers lAH203, 1BH203) These monorail hoists are used for removal of the recirculation pumps and motors, inside the drywell at elevation 253'. The Item 21 load path drawing defines the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in the load path: (Hoist lAH203) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3) (2) Recirculation system piping (Loop 'A') (3) MSRV discharge piping (4) Drywell unit cooler 1GV212 (Division 1 & 3) (Hoist 1BH203) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2 & 4) (2) Recirculation system piping (Loop 'B') (3) MSRV discharge piping (4) Drywell unit cooler lHV212 (Division 2 & 4) (5) Shutdown cooling supply piping, 12" DCA-104 (Loop 'B') (6) RCIC turbine steam supply piping, 4" DBA-107 Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (1) Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: The reactor must be in cold shutdown prior to removal of the recir-culation pump or motor. During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is the removal of residual decay heat. A drop of the recir-culation motor or pump could cause rupture of the recirculation pip-ing or shutdown cooling loop 'B' supply piping. In this event RHR shutdown cooling loop 'A' and any one of several combinations of RHR and core spray injection loops would be available to maintain core cooling and supply makeup water until the leak could be repaired. If suppression pool water were needed for makeup, pool temperature indication would still be available due to redundancy and separation l of the sensors.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling can be done only with the reactor in cold, shutdown, a load drop by the recircul'ation pump and motor i l hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l l P-41(b)/5 B-10 1

/',. * *.. LGS Ovarh2Ed Handling Systema R3 view Saptsmbar, 1981 HPCI/RCIC EQUIPMENT HOIST (Item 24, Equipment Numbars 10H215) This monorail hoist is used to carry HPCI, RCIC and core spray ~ system equipment on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. The Item 24 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) RHR piping and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (3) Main steam & recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2 & 3) (4) Motor control centers 10B211 & 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) HPCI ESW piping (3) RHR, HPCI & RCIC instrumentation (4) Motor control center 10B217 (Division 2) (Below hatchway @ 177') (1). Core spray, HPCI & RCIC system components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Of the various safety-related systems that have components located in and below the load path only the HPCI system is associated l with shutdown method B. Therefore, the remaining systems associated with shutdown method B can be used to shut the reactor down, and full shutdown capability will be retained if a system i other than HPCI is available to depressurize the reactor. This depressurization function can be provided by manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS). When shutting down the reactor without the aid of either the RCIC system or the HPCI system, the ADS serves to permit the operation of a low pressure core cooling system, rather than just allowing initiation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system. With this scheme of operation, two RHR pumps will need to be operated simultaneously, in which case the following components must be available in addition to those listed under " Method B" in Appendix A. (1) R!lR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" P-41(b)/5 B-ll

r...... LGS Overhard Handling Systcm3 RDviGw Saptsmbar, 1981 Since none of the above components (or their associated cabling) is located in or below the load path their availability is assured. Safe shutdown of the plant using shutdown method B modified as described above would be accomplished in the following manner. After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the reactor is depressurized by manually controlling the valves of the automatic depressurization system. The opening of these valves allows reactor steam to be discharged to the suppression pool. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the LPCI mode after reactor pressure has decreased to a nominal 295 psig. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating a different loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR loop operating in the suppression pool cooling mode is switched to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the HPCI/RCIC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. 4 P-41(b)/5 B-12

I t.,. LGS ovarhard Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 25, Equipment Number 10H216) This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray System Pumps, motors and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. The Item 25 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) (2) Main steam, Recirculation, Core Spray and HPCI system instru-men'tation (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) (3) RHR/ Core Spray Piping (loops A &C) (4) Motor Control Centers 10B215 and 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical Conduit & Cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) Liquid Radwaste System Valves (Division 1 & 2) (3) Emergency Service Water, HPCI, RCIC, and Containment Atmospheric Control Sytems Valves and Piping (Below hatchway @ elevation 177') (1) Core Spray, HPCI and RCIC System Components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: l The effect of a load drop is the same as for the HPCI/RCIC equipment hoist.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core Spray Pump Hoist (Item 25) will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. i i l l P-41(b)/5 B-13

v r,. LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 26, Equipment Number 10H217) This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray system pump, motor and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via a hatchway. The Item 26 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in_the load path: (1)- Electrical Conduit and Cabl*e Tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Core Spray, Main Steam, Recirculation and Containment Atmospheric Control System Piping and Instrumentation (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (3) Motor Control Center 10B212 (Division 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) Emergency Se'rvice Water Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Liquid Radwaste Valves and Instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (Below hatchway at 177') (1) Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4. None of the components associated with electrical divisions 1 & 3 are required for 2 safe shutdown. Therefore shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core spray pump hoist (Item 26) will not 4 jeopardize safe shut down or decay heat removal capability. B-14 P-41/(b)/5

• • . e I

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST & REACTOR ENCLOSURE COOLING HX HOIST 4 (Item 27, Equipment Numbers lAH218, 1BH218) These monorail hoists are used to carry core spray system components and heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR Piping & Instrumentation (Division 2) (3) Main Steam and Recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4) (4) RCIC Instrumentation (Division 1 & 3) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: -(Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit & cable trays (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4) (2) ESW Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Liquid Radwaste System Valves & Instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (4) Containment Atmospheric Control System valves & piping (Divisions 1 & 2) (Below hatchways at 177') (1) Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4) (2) RHR Instrumentation (Division 2) (3) HPCI Instrumentation (Division 2) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are safety-related items in the load path associated with shutdown methods A and B. There is a minimum horizontal separat-ion of 16 feet between any component of shutdown method A and any component of shutdown method B. There is similar (and corresponding) separation below the floor slab. Therefore only one shutdown method would be affected by a load drop and the remaining shutdown method would remain available to safely shut-down the plant. If a load were dropped th. rough a hatch to elevation 177' only shutdown' method B would be affected and method A would remain available.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the core spray & reactor enclosure cooling HX hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-15 MM

i I LGS Overhacd Handling Systems Review September, 1981 RHR PUMPS HOIST (Item 28, Equipment Number 10H219) This monorail hoist is used to carry RHR pumps & motors, HPCI, RCIC and Core Spray System components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. Major safety-related items-in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Motor control centers 10B222, 10D202 (Division 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3, & 4) (2) RHR valves and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (3) ESW valves (Division 3) (Below hatchways @ 177') (1) RHR system (Divisions 1 & 2) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is an boundary between Division 1 & 3 safety related items (west) and Division 2 & 4 items (east) at about the column 17 line, with a minimum horizontal distance of five feet between components associated with shutdown methods A and B. Below the 217' slab on elevations 201' and 177' there is strict separation between the electrical divisions (and shutdown method components) which is provided by a wall at the Column 18.5 line. There are a few items which are exceptions to this separation, however none of these items are required for safe shutdown. d The only potential hazard is that a load could be dropped between column lines 17 and 18.5, causing damage to a method B component on elevation 217' and spalling which could affect a method A component below the slab. This possibility is discounted for the following reason. All method B components are on the extreme south edge of the load path, at least 10 feet away from the hoist monorail (MCC 10D202 and cable trays above it). Loads which could affect these components must be those which are tall and could topple over (i.e. the ECCS pumps). Since 'these tall loads must' of necessity be carried close to the floor (because the lift of the P-41(b)/5 B-16 4

o.,. LGS Ovarhard HIndling Systcms Raview September, 1981 hoist above the floor is not much more than the length of the pumps) no significant spalling can occur due to initial impact if they are dropped (& if the pump falls on the MCC there will be little energy left for a secondary floor impact). Therefore only one shutdown method can be affected by a load drop and the remaining method will be available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the RHR pumps hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. } P-41(b)/5 B-17

p., LGS OverhDad Handling Systams Review September, 1981 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT DOOR HOIST (Item 29, Equipment Number 10H220) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the drywell equipment access door on elevation 253'. The safe load path is defined on the Item 29 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3) (2) Core spray piping (associated with Division 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Division 1, 2 & 3) (2) Motor control center 10B215 (Division 1) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Most safety-related components in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those which are not, are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could be affected by a load drop and, at a minimum, shut down method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the containment equipment door hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. t f a P-41(b)/5 B-18

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 PERSONNEL LOCK HOIST (Item 30, Equipment Numbers lAH221, 1BH221) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the personnel lock / equipment access door assembly on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 30 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR 'B' piping and instrumentation Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capabiligg: There are no safety-related items in the load path. On the next lower elevation most safety-related items are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4. Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 only a few are required for safe-shutdown and these are part of the RCIC system. Since the personnel lock assembly is part of the primary containment boundary it cannot be removed unless the reactor is shutdown. Therefore only reactor decay heat removal is of concern. The RHR 'B' shutdown cooling loop could potentially be affected by spalling of the 253' slab but the RHR 'A' shutdown cooling loop would remain available for decay heat removal. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the personnel lock hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-19 _J

LGS Overhaad Handling Systems Raview Septembar, 1981 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP HEAT EXCHANGER HOIST (Item 31, Equipment Number OOH 223) This monorail hoist is used for removal and replacement of heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 31 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) Containment atmospheric control valves and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat } removal capability: Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated l with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those items associated with ~ divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe-shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be affected by a load drop and, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, i a load drop by the RWCU heat exchanger hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. I i l I l P-41(b)/5 B-20 --ve-,e.----

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 CONTROL ROD DRIVE PLATFORM HOIST (Item 33, Equipment Number 10H229) This hoist is used to raise and lower the free end of the hinged CRD removal platform, located in the drywell at elevation 253'. The Item 33 load path drawing defines the safe load path. j Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) RHR shutdown cooling suction line, 20" DCA-100 (2) Drywell unit cooler ducting Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 238' slab) (1) Primary Containment vacuum relief valves assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: If the hoist were to fail, the free end of the CRD removal plat-form would fall about six feet and strike its support. Analysis 4 shows that, with a loaded CRD removal cask on the platform, the impact would cause the support to fail and allow the platform to strike the shutdown cooling suction line which passes underneath. However, the line would not rupture or be seriously deformed by the impact and shutdown cooling flow would not be interrupted. Damage to suppression pool temperature sensors could occur due to spalling of the elevation 238' slab but there is sufficient redundancy and separation of sensors to prevent loss of temperature indication. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and on impact analysis, a load drop by the CRD platform hoist would not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-21

..,,e LGS Overhand Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES SERVICE / REMOVAL HOISTS (Item 34, Equipment Numbers lAH233, 234, 235; 1BH233,234, 235; 10H230; 10H232) These monorail hoists, or come-alongs installed on the hoist trolleys, are dsed to carry main steam relief valves (MSRV's) and other valves on monorails at elevations 273' and 286' in the drywell, and to and from elevation 253' via hatchways. The Item 34 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path and below floor grating: (1) Main steam relief and isolation valves (2) ECCS system piping (including RHR shotdown cooling) (3) Drywell unit coolers (4) Containment isolation valves Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 238' slab) (1) Suppression pool temperature sensors (2) Primary containment vacuum relief valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: In order to remove valves in the drywell the reactor must be in cold shutdown. During cold shutdown decay heat removal is the primary safety concern. Calculations show that floor grating will not withstand the impact of a falling valve from any height. If a valve is dropped at specific locations in the drywell, damage to one shutdown cooling loop can be postulated but the other loop will remain available to continue decay heat removal. In the remote event that a dropped valve damaged shutdown cooling supply piping (between isolation valves and reactor vessel) or recircula-tion piping, makeup water can be supplied by the RHR or core spray systems until the leak can be repaired. There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors to prevent loss of pool temperature indication due to spalling of the elevation 238' slab.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling will only be done with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam relief valves service / removal hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-22

....e LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 DISPOSAL CASK CART REMOVAL HOIST (Item 35, Equipment Number 10H236) This monorail hoist handles the cart for the cask used for disposal of source and intermediate range detectors. It is located in the drywell between elevations 248' and 258', approximately. The Item 35 load path drawing defines the safe load path. 1 i Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below grating) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 & 4) (Below 238' slab) (1) Suppression pool temperature monitors (2) Primary containment vacuum relief valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Safety-related conduit below load path floor grating is not required for safe-shutdown. There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors so that damage resulting from possible spalling of the elevation 238' slab would not cause a loss of pool temperature indication.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the disposal cask cart removal hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. i P-41(b)/5 B-23

LGS Ovarhntd Handling Systems Review Ravicion 1, March 1982 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER COVER HOIST (Item 36, Equipment Number 10H237) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the hatch covers over the hydrogen recombiners at two locations on elevation 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 36 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (Area 11) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4) (2) Hydrogen Recombiner (Area 16) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) (2) Hydrogen Recombiner Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Area 11, below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2 and 3) (Area 16, below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2 and 3) (2) Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Panels (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: (Area 11) l Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those items associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be af fected by a load drop. Shutdown method B would remain available to safely shut down the plant. (Area 16) Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical dvisions 2 and 4. Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, one conduit located below the floor slab contains cable required for safe-shutdown. CRD piping also traverses the area below the floor. Analysis has shown that a drop of the hydrogen recombiner cover from the maximum hoist height of 8 feet will cause minor local damage to the elevation 283' floor slab but items below the floor will not be damaged. P-41(b)/7 B-24

LGS Ovarhecd Hnndling Systems R2 View Revision 1, March 1982

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Area 11 hydrogen recombiner cover hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and on analysis of the floor impact strength, a load drop by the Area 16 hydrogen recombiner cover hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. 1 i P-41(b)/7 B-25 l

LGS Ovarhotd Handling Systema Review Saptsmbar, 1981 EOUIPMENT HATCH BRIDGE CRANE (Item 37, Equipment Number 10H238) This crane is used to carry miscellaneous loads between elevat-ions 217' and 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 37 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2 & 4) (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 & 4) (2) RHR Instrumentation (Division 2) (3) Emergency Service Water Piping & Valves (Associated w/ Division 2) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrica'l divisions 2 and 4, except for one division 3 conduit which is not required for safe-shutdown. Therefore a load could potentially affect only shutdown method B. Shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the equipment hatch bridge crane will not jeopardize safe. shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-26

LGS ovarhead Handling Systsma R3 view Saptembar, 1981 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MAINTENANCE AREA CRANE (Item 38, Equipment Number 10H239) This crane handles control rod drives in the CRD maintenance area on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 38 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1 & 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Therefore a load drop could potentially affect only shutdown method A. Shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control rod drive maintenance area crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-27

LGS overhacd Hsndling Systems Review September, 1981 DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE CRANES (Item 44, Equipment Numbers lAH501, IBH501, ICH501, IDH501) These cranes handle diesel generator parts and miscellaneous loads. There is a separate crane for each diesel generator enclosure. The Item 44 load path drawing defines the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in each load path: (1) Diesel generator and auxiliaries (2) Emergency service water supply / return valves (3) Diesel generator air exhaust fans (4) Diesel generator controls & power distribution panel (5) Electrical cable and motor control center Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: Not applicable Effect of a load drop or. safe-shutdown or decay heat - removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the diesel generator enclosures. The diesel generator 'A' enclosure contains only items associated with electrical division 1, the diesel generator 'B' enclosure contains only items associated with electrical division 2, etc. Therefore a load drop in any one enclosure will af fect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, l a load drop by a diesel generator enclosure crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. i l P-41(b)/7 B-28 l

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LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 SPRAY POND PUMP HOUSE HOISTS (Item 49, Equipment Numbers OOH 511, OOH 513) These monorail hoists are used for handling of RHR service water and emergency service water system valves on elevation 268' of the spray pond pump house, and to and from elevation 251' via hatchways. The Item 49 load path drawing defines the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 268' slab) (1) RHR service water valves (2) Emergency service water valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray pond pump house. Safety-related items on the west side of the pump house are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those on the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. A concrete wall separates the two halves of the building. Therefore a load drop could affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond pump house hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-29

LGS Overh2Ed Handling Syste;ms R2 View September, 1981 CONTROL ROOM CHILLER PORTABLE GANTRY HOIST (Item 50, Equipment Number 00H514) This hoist will be used primarily to service control room chiller OBKil2 but can be used anywhere on elevation 200' of the control The Item 50 load path drawing defines the safe load structure. path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Control room chillers OAKil2 & OBKil2 and associated piping & instrumentation (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is a dividing wall on elevation 200' of the control structure. On the east side of the wall safety-related components are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. On the west side of the wall safety-related components are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for a few division 4 conduit which are located against the south wall and are out of reach of the portable gantry crane. Therefore a load drop can. af fect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room chiller portable gantry crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-30 P-41(b)/7

i [ e LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 MAIN STEAM TUNNEL MONORAIL HOISTS (Item 53) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for removal and replacement of main steam isolation valves or other valves and operators located in the main steam tunnel of the reactor enclosure (elevations 253' to 290'). The Item 53 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) (2) RCIC system piping and valves (3) MSIV leakage control system components Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Heavy loads in the steam tunnel (valves and operators) can only be removed from their systems with the reactor in cold shutdown. During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is to provide A load drop in the main steam tunnel will decay heat removal. not affect the shutdown cooling loop of either shutdown method. Decay heat removal capability will not be affected.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling will be done only with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam tunnel monorail hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-31 P-41(b)/7

e LGS Overhacd Handling Systems R2 View September, 1981 SPRAY POND RHRSW AND ESW PUMPS YARD CRANE (Item 55) A niobile yard crane will be used for removal and replace 7ent of RHR service water (RHRSW) and Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps through roof hatches in the spray pond pump house. The Item 55 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load paty.> (1) RHRSW pumps and valves (2) ESW pumps and valves (3) Spray pond pump structure supply air fans (4) Motor control centers (5) Electrical conduit Major safety-related iteps on the next lower elevation: (Below 268' slab) (1) RHRSW valves (2) ESW valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray pond pump house. Safety-related items on the west side of the pump house are associated only with electrical divisions 'l and 3. Those on the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. A concrete wall separates the two halves of the building. Therefore a load drop could affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond RHRSW and ESW pumps yard crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-32

LGS Ov@rhor.d Handling Systemo R: view Revision 1, March 1982 CONTROL ROOM HVAC EQUIPMENT HOIST (Item 58, Equipment Number 00H133) This monorail hoist is used for handling of HVAC fans on elevation 313' of the control structure and to and from elevation 304' via hatchways. The Item 58 load path drawings defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 304' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method. This includes electrical cable embedded in the 304' floor slab. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Analysis shows that, since the fan loads are small and the maximum drop height is just 9 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor slab, a load drop by the control room HVAC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-33 -W w-m -- - m

..i l LGS ovarh2Ed HEndling Systema R2 View September, 1981 WETWELL MONORAIL HOIST (Item 59) This monorail heist is used for maintenance activities in the wet-well of the primary containment. The Item 59 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in each load path: (1) Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Major safety-related items on the next lower evaluation: Not applicable Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: only the suppression pool temperature sensors are required for safe shutdown. There is sufficient separation and redundancy of sensors so that a load drop would not result in a loss of suppression pool temperature indication. i l

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by a diesel generator enclosure crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-34 L

.... o LGS Overhard Hnndling Systems Review 4 Revision 1, March'1982 i , CONTROL STRUCTURE FANS LIFTING BEAMS HOISTS (Item 60) Hoists will be borrowed from other locations to carry HVAC fans between elevations 304' and 322' of the control structure. The Item 60 load path drawings define the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: 4 (1) ' Electrical conduit (Division 1, 2, 3& 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation : (Below 304' Slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method. This includes cable embedded in.the 304' floor slab. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Analysis shows that, since the fan loads are.small and the maximum drop height is just 18 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor slab, a load drop by the control structure fans lif ting beam hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. 4 Y P-41(b)/7 B-35 f w-y- ,_-3 .y,.y_..m. r,y ...mm,

LGS Overhsad HEndling SystSms Review Saptsmbar, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE UPPER FAN ROOM HOIST (Item 61) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 331' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 313' via a hatchway. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 and 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 331' Slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (Below 313' Slab under hatchway) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: None of the safety-related items in the load path are required for safe-shutdown. On the elevation below the load path most items on the west side (Area 15) are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 and most items on the east side ( Area 16) i l are associated with electrical division 4. The items which are-exceptions to this rule are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore only one shutdown method could potentially be affected by a load drop. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure upper fan room hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-36 P-41(b)/7 t

~ LGS overhaEd Handling Systems R2 View September, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE LOWER FAN R'OOM HOIST (Item 62) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 313' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 62 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: ~ (Below 313' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) Standby liquid control system components (3) Load center 10B204 (4) Motor control center 10B225 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Safety-related items in and below the western portion of the load path (Area 15) are generally associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Safety-related items in and below the eastern portion of the load path are generally associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4. Items which are exceptions to this pattern are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore a load drop could potentially af fect just one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure lower fan room hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-37

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Septembe r, 1981 NORTH STACK INSTRUMENT ROOM DUMBWAITER (Item 63) This elevator is used to carry filter casks and other items between elevation 332' of the control structure and the north stack instrument room (elevation 410'). The Item 63 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 332' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable tray (Divisions 1, 2 & 3) (2) Motor control center 00B131 (Division 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related-items in the load path. All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for one division 2 conduit which does not contain cable required for safe shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be affected by a load Shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut d6wn drop. the plant.

== Conclusion:== ( Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the north stack instrument room dumbwaiter will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l B-38 P-41(b)/7 l

s LGS Ovarhcad Handling Systems Review Rnvision 2, March 1983 APPENDIX C ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA FOR POSTULATED LOAD DROPS OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD, STEAM DRYER, SHROUD HEAD / SEPARATOR AND SERVICE PLATFORM NUREG 0612 Appendix A conformance: The applicable guidelines of Appendix A were followed except that the weight of the crane load block was not always included in the total load, since reactor enclosure crane is single failure proof. The weight of the lifting device (strongback or sling) was included. i l P-165(a)/9 C-1

3 LGS Overhnad Handling Systems Review Rnvision 2, March, 1983 Information requested by Attachment 4: Initial Conditions / Assumptions RPV Steam Shroud / Service Head Dryer Separator Platform Load weight, tons 111.6 40 75.8 5 (1) (1) Impact area Point Distrubuted Distributed Concentrated (1) (1) Drop height, feet 25.5 N/A N/A 28 Drop location Over open Reactor Vessel Credit for No No No No impact limiters? Thickness of walls / N/A N/A N/A N/A slabs (1) (1) Drag Forces None Water Water None RPV Load combinations Dead Wt. None None None l l Material properties 70 Ksi 30 Ksi 30 Ksi (2) l (Steel, yield strength: l l l (1) The RPV is assumed to be flooded up to the top flange. The steam dryer and shroud head / separator achieve terminal velocity prior to impact on the upper flange of the top guide shroud. (2) Apropriate material properties were used for sequential impacts of the service platform with the guide rod, PPV flange and fuel. l ( P-165(a)/9 C-2 L

'\\ LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Ravision 2, March, 1983 Additional Assumptions: For the RPV head drop the dynamic stress in the RPV support skirt is assumed to be uniform around the circumference of the skirt. Potential load drops of the steam dryer, shroud head / separator or service platform onto the RPV flange (rather than into the vessel) are enveloped by the RPV head drop. The impact of the steam dryer is assumed to be absorbed by the shroud head / separator support structure. No credit is taken for energy absorbed by the steam dryer support brackets or the shroud head / separator. The following additional assumptions were applied to the service platform drop: 1. The service platform hand rails separate from the struc-ture at the initiation of the drop. 2. The service platform rotates 90* before entering the reactor vessel and its plane remains vertical throughout the drop. 3. The ser'vice platform impacts the fuel only once. 4. One hundred percent of the service platform kinetic energy is absorbed by the impacted fuel. 5. Bending and compression are the only two modes of fuel rod clad failure. 1 6. For all impacts prior to the core fuel impact, no kinetic energy is absorbed by the RPV and its internal components i or the service platform except the quantity of energy required to fracture a component. 7. No credit is taken for the drag forces due to water in the reactor vessel. i i P-165(a)/9 C-3 l' -}}