ML20076F499
| ML20076F499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076F486 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306140142 | |
| Download: ML20076F499 (4) | |
Text
'
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 0 PEGION
...2 CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ot
,I A' GEODGI A 400 Chestnut Street Tower II May 11, 1983 83 MAY 17 A 8 : 45 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-0IE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/83-05 AND 50-328/83 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS The subject OIE inspection report dated April 14, 1983 from R. C. Lewis to H. G. Parris cited TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation and one Severity Level V Violation.
Enclosed is our response to the subject inspection report.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY a
L. M. Mills,iManager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 l
l 8306140142 830526 PDR ADDCK 05000327 An Equal Opportunity Employer C
{
ENCLOSURE RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-327/83-05 AND 50-328/83-05 R. C. LEWIS' LETTER TO H. O. PARRIS DATED APRIL 14, 1983 Item 327, 328/83-05-01 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Ouide 1 33, Revision 2, 2/78, including discharging liquid radioactive waste as effluents. System Operating Instruction SOI-77.101 " Cask Decon-tamination Tank Release" provides requirements, conditions, precautions and instructions for releasing the cask decontamination tank (CDCT).
Contrary to the above, procedure SOI-77.1C1 was not implemented in that on February 10, 1983, during a planned release from the CDCT, valve 0-77-573 waa open causing the inadvertent release of approximately 5300 gallons from the Monitor Tank. SOI-77.1C1 requires that valve 0-77-573 be shut before commencing the release. The SOI valve check list had been completed by two auxiliary operators. The open valve was identified by the licensee and inmediatoly shut. Calculations performed by the licensee demonstrated that the concentrations of radioactive material inadvertently released did not exceed 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table II limits.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement IV). This violation applies to both Units.
1.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
Reasons for the Violation if Admitted As stated above, the SOI-77.1 valve checklist had been completed. The primary reason for this event was personnel error in that the SOI valve checklist showed double assistant unit operator (AUO) verification that valve 0-77-573 was closed before the start of the release when it was actually open. The AUOs involved stated that they could not specifi-cally remember checking the valve for position. The primary AUO assumed that the valve was shut from a previous shift when he had closed it.
The configuration log and the radweste log book indicated the valve as being open, and the AUOs should have noticed this. If applicable instructions had been followed properly, the event would not
{
have occurred. As requested in your report, a comparison has been made between this event and the February 11, 1981 inadvertent containment spray event. Communication breakdowns, inadequate procedures, clear authorities and responsibilities of AUOs, and inadequate on-the-job c
' h w _le4b M e
.s s
do.
,%-i +]%.
=
'e 9th i-a wm=
=
_ ~
l training were contributing causes for the 1981 event. There are no root cause similarities'between this event and the previous occurrence.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The unplanned release was started at 0225 CST on February 10, 1983. At 0335 CST the radwaste operator discovered the open valve and immedi-ately shut it, thereby terminating the release. The shift engineer was then notified. An investigation was begun to gather data and assess consequences, and an investigation was also performed by the Indepen-dent Safety Engineering Group. NRC was notified and the resident inspectors provided with appropriate information. This event resulted in a total of approximately 5,300 gallons unplanned release from the monitor tank. The tank contents were sampled, and an event analysis determincd that no 10 CFR Part 20 limits ut technical specification limits were exceeded for activity levels.
4 Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken to Avoid Further Violations A.
Appropriate ' disciplinary actions were taken with regard to the personnel responsible for this occurrence.
B.
Training meetings were held with each operations shift group from February 17, 1983, to March 10, 1983, with the operations Supervisor presiding. The title of the meetings was " Attention to Detail," and the importance of proper system alignment, the purpose and responsibility of double verification signoffs, and the conse-quences of signing checklists without full knowledge of the status were stressed.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on February 10, 1983, when valve 0-77-573 was closed terminating the unplanned release.
Item 327, 328/83-05-02 10 CFR 50.72(a)(8) requires each licensee of a nuclear power reactor to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible, and in any event, within one hour by telephone of any accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled radioactive release.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of an unplanned release in that on February 10, 1983 the licensee discovered that they had inadvertently released approximately 5,300 gallons of radioactive waste water from the monitor tank at 0335 cst and the NRC Operations Center was not notified until 0703 cst.
l
~..-
0
, {
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I).
This violation applies to both Units.
1.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
Reasons for the Violation if Admitted The cause of this violation has been attributed to personnel error.
10 CFR 50.72 requires a one-hour immediate notification to NRC as indicated in Administrative Instruction (AI) 18. The shift enginaei-and shift technical advisor 1:mnediately reviewed technical specifica-tions which did not address this situation and did not look at AI-18 untli necessary information aoout the event was assembled. Operations personnel were gathering data and requiring samples to be taken for analysis before reportability requirements were recognized.
3 Corrective Steos Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achjeved The NRC Operatlons Center was notified at 0703 CS't.
4 Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken to Avoid Further Violations, l
A.
All shift engineers have been oautioned to make 1:nesdiate phone l
l calls as needed in accordance with AI-18.. They were,also cautioned to look closely at each event to determine ths type:of reporting required.
B.
Shift technical advisors (STAS) have been given primary responsi-bility for advising the shift engineer on reporting requirements.
A memorandum was sent to all STAS on this subject on March 24, 1983, with renewed emphasis on AI-18 (10 CFR 50.72) requirements.
C.
Appropriate disciplinary action was taken.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on February 10, 1983 L..
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _.. _ - - - - - - - - -