ML20072R031

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Procedure PPM 13.1.1, Classifying Emergency
ML20072R031
Person / Time
Site: Summer, Columbia  South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/1983
From:
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
Shared Package
ML20072R027 List:
References
PPM-13.1.1, NUDOCS 8304050426
Download: ML20072R031 (27)
v • d • e


Text

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'ASillNGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM J RO aE

uNCONT PROCEDURE NUMBER wm c"@TUNTROLLED l DATE

U " "*" EMERGENCY PLAN IMP [MENTIkG PROCEDURES SECTION 13.1 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TIT LE

  • 13.1.1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 13.1.1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide the Shift Manager, Plant Emergency Dire. tor, and plant operations persbnnel with the necessary information and a bethodology to guide them in property identifying and classifying an emergency situation. Refer te Attachmen't D, " Bases for the Classification Methodology,"

for a discussion of the strategy used in the development of this procedure, the general descriptions for each classification of emerge.ncy, and othar back-ground infort:1aticn.

CAUTION: This procedure is only a guide to emergency classification. The final consideration in au classifications is one of judgment on the part of the Plant Emergency Director.

13.1.

1.2 REFERENCES

WNP-1, 2 Emergency Preparedness Plan NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 WNP-2 Technical Specifications 8304050426 830315 PDR ADOCK 05000395 usuctouse nuuetR sevisio n n u usca pac.E nuvees F PDR 13.1.1 0 13.1.1-1 of 26 WP-597 R1

13.1.1.3 PROCEDURE .

Responsibility Action Plant Emergency Director .1 Maintain the sole responsibility for timely classification and declaration of any WNP-2 emergency situation. Utilize guidance specified in this procedure and attach-ments, professional judgment, and the recommendations of the Operations Manager, Shift Manager, Control Room Supervisor, and Shift Technical Advisor.

a. Refer to Attachment A, " Guidance for Classifying Emergencies," for a listi.1g of symptomatic initiating conditions and sit 1ation based initating conditions.
b. Refer to Attachment B, " Symptomatic
  • Initiating Conditions Summary," for a quick reference listing of symptomatic initiating conditions.
c. Refer to Attachment C, " Situation Based Guidelines Summary," for a summary listing of situation based initiating conditions to be used in classifying abnormal events.
d. Refer to Attachment D, " Bases for the Classification Methodology," for back-ground information used to develop this procedure.

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Responsibility Actirn -

  • Plant Emergency Director ~ e. Refer to EPIP 13.1.2, " Plant Emergency (contd.) Dire,ctor's Instructions," for actions and responsibilities necessary after -

an emergency has been classified.

Operations Manager .2 Function as the Plant Emergency Director until relieved by the Plant Manager or Assistant Plant Manager.

Shif t Manager .3 Function as the Plant Emergency Direct e until relieved by the Operations Manager,

, Assistant Plant Manager, or Plant Manager.

.4 Maintain primary responsibility #or moni-toringthestatusofhlantparametersand other initiating ccnditions upon which emergency classification depends.

.5 Recommend an appropriate emergency classi-fication to the Plant Emergency Director or Operations Manager for any observed WNP-2 emergency condition. Utilize guidance specified in this procedure and attach-l ments, professional judgment, and the ,

recommendations of the Control Room Super-l visor, Shift Technical Advisor, and Reactor Operators.

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Responsibility Acticn .

Control Room Supervisor, .6 Monitor the status of plant parameters and Shift Technical Advisor, other initiating conditions upon which the Reactor Operators emergency classification depends, and inform the Shift Manager if any parameter approaches or exceeds emergency action levels specified in attachments. Refer to Attachment A, " Guidance for Classifying Emergencies."

Control Room Superviscr, .7 Recommend an emergency classification to Shift Technical Advisor the Shift Manager and/or Plant Emergency Director based upon plant conditions and the guidance specified in the ettechments to this procedure.

13.1.1.4 ATTACHMENTS A. Guidance for Classifying Emergencies B. Symptomatic Initiating Conditions Summary C. Situation Based Guidelines Summary D. Bases for the Classification Methodology PHUCLDUHL NUMBER HLViblON NUMBLH PAGE NUMBER WP 598 13.1.1 0 13.1.1-4 of 26

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J ATTACHMENT A , ,

i GUIDANCE FOR CLASSIFYING EMERGENCIES INTRODUCTION ,

Emergency classification is the final responsibility of the Plant Emergency

, Director based on the recomendatic.1s of technical and operations staff.

These inputs may come from the Control Room, Technical Support Center, or Emergency Operations Facility. The most likely mechanism is for the Shift Manager to make recomendations based on plant parameters or initial dose assessments. Initially, however, during b3ck-shifts, the Shif t Manager will j also function as the Plant Emergency Directur, and recommendations will cume i to him fro.a the operating crew. ~

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The situation based and sympto'matic initiating conditions (Emergsncy Action 1.evels) for each class of emergency are as follcws: (Refer to Attachment D,  :

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  • Bater fcr the Classification' Methodology," for in explanition of the bases of til initiating conditions.)

cal 3710N: This procedure is only a guide. Proper judgme,nt based on a " safety first" principle trust be used as the final consideration for all l cla:sifications.

'A . Unusual Event (See EPIP 13.1.2 for Actions.) c If any of the following conditions exist, consider declaring an Unusual Event.

1. S.ymptomatic Initiating Conditions (Unusual Event)
a. Lo Lo reactor vessel water level (-50 inches).
b. Reactor pressure greater than or equal to 1148 psig.

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c. Drywell pressure greater than or equal to 1.89 psig. '
d. Drywell pressure less than or equal to -2 psig for a period of one hour or more.

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e. .Drywell floor and equipment drain sump flow greater than or equal to 36,000 gallons in any 24-hour period.
f. Drywell floor drain sump flow rate greater than or equal to 5 gpm.
g. Drywell temperature greater than or equal to 135U F for a period of ei;ht hours or more.
h. Suppression Fool water temperature greater than or equal 0

to 110 F with reactor power greater than or equal to one l i percent.

i. Suppression Pool level arcater than or equal to +2 inches er less than or equal to -2 inches for a pericd of one hour or more. .
2. Situation Eased Initiating Conditions (Unusual Event)
a. Any plant condition requiring plant shutdown as a result of exceeding the limiting conditions for operation and associated action items, (as defined in the WNP-2 Technical Specifications) and is of immediate safety concern or where other than a normal controlled shutdown takes place. Examples of this condition include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) A stuck-open main steam relief valve.

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(2) Loss of fire protection systems that thrGaten the normal .

level of plant safety.

(3) Release of radioactive material in liquid, gaseous, or particulate form in exc5ss of Technical Specification.

limits as verified by sample analysis.

b. Natural phenomena and other hazards at or near the site that threaten the normal level of safety of the plant. Examples of such hazards include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Floods (River Pumphouse in danger of inundation).

8 1 (2) Earthquake (an'y earthquake detected by the seismic instrumentation)'. ,.

(3) Tornados (actuel sightin:3 offsite within the exciusion area). ,

i (4) Aircraft crash or train derailment on sit 6 di. not affect-

ing safzty-related equipment. .

l (5) Explosions on site, but not affecting plant operation.

(6) Toxic or flannable gas releases near or on site.

i (7) Visible ash fallout from volcanic activity.

(8) High winds, sustained above 80 mph.

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c. Any plant condition at or near the plant that warrants .

, increased awareness on the part of plant personnel. Examples of this condition include, but are not limited to,'the following:

(1) Transportation of a contaminated injured individual from the plant to an offsite hospital.

(2) Loss of all offsite power.

(3) A fire requiring activation of the Plant Emergency Team (firebrigade).

(4) Reactor scram initiated, all roas not full in, but reactor is subcritical.

(S) A breach of security, such as attancted sabottge.

(6) An area radiation alarm Hi and an incressino or sustained high level confirrei by direct measurement, i

B. Alert (See EPIP 13.1.2 for Actions.) t If any of the following initiating conditions exist, consider declaring an Alert.

1. Symptomatic Initiating Conditions (Alert)
a. Power range monitoring system detects reactor power at greater than or equal to five percent, ten or more seconds after a scram.
b. Reactor water level less than or equal to -129 inches.

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c. Main steam isolation valve clcsure logic met; bLth inb::ard and i outboard valves on one or more lines fail to close.
d. Containment isolation logic met, but both inboard and outboard valves on one'or more Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) lines fail to close.
e. Reactor pressure greater than or equal to 1250 psig.
f. Elevated release activity greater than or equal to (later).
2. Situation Based Initiating Conditions (Alert)
a. A condition where a safety system instrument has failed to initiate an automatic protect)ve ac'; ion such that the safety 1 hits coulo be exceeded. Examples of this type of situation ,

include, but are not limited to, the foll'owing:

l (1) Tota? loss of reactor vessel water level indication.

b. Natural phervaiena and other hazards that represent a substan-tial degradation in the level of plant safety or vr rant the use of additional personnel for accident asstsscent and in-plant response. Examples of such hazards include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Flooding or potential flooding that directly affects plant

! safety systems.

l (2) Sustained wind speeds in excess of 100 mph.

.. (3) Severe electrical storms that cause major failure of

! safety-related instruments.

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(4) A t:rnado within the protected area b:undary, and .

, compromising safety-related equipment.

(5) An aircraft crash or train derailment compromising safety-related equipment.

(6) An explosion causing plant damage that affects the opera-tion of safety systems.

(7) Entry of toxic or flanrnable gas into plant facilities.

(8) Volcanic ash fallout severa enough to warrant plant shutdown.

(9) Centrol Room evacuation.

(10) A fire affecting a safety system.

c. Situations where a release of radioactive material nrrants offsite response or personnel to perform offsite monitoring, but does not require any protective actions. Examples include the following:

(1) Measured or projected offsite whole body dose rates greater than or equal to 0.5 mR/hr or 2.5 mrem /hr thyroid.

(2) Standby Service Water System high radiation level and inability to isolate.

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C. Site Area Emergercy (See EPIP 13.1.2 for Actions.) .

  • If any of the following initiating condi' ions exist, consider declaring a Site Area Emergency,
1. Symptomatic Initiating Conditions (Site Area Emergency)
a. Reactor pressure greater than or equal to 1325 psig.
b. Drywell temperature greater than or equal to 3400F.
c. Pritary containment integrity threatened based on exceedir, the follosing limits frem the Emergency Procedures (PPM 5.0 series):
1) (Mat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL)
2) 5;ppression Pool Lead Liu1t (SPLL)
3) rees3ure Suppression Pressure Limit (PSPL)
4) Heat Capacity Level Limit (HCLL) -
5) Primary Contaicaent Pressure Lirait (PCPL)
6) Drywell Spray Initiation Fressure Limit (DSIPL)
d. Elevated release activity greater than (to be determined).

! e. Reactor power greater than five percent and Suppression Pool temperature greater than 110 F and a safety relief valve open cg drywell pressure greater than 1.69 psig.

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2. Situation Based Initiating Conditions (Site Area Emergency) ,
a. Conditions where the Safety Limits and associated action requirements have been violated. Examples include the following:

'(1) Significant failed fuel, as verified by reactor coolant 3 ample analysis.

(2) Failure of the ECCS systems and other water sources to adequately keep the core covered above 2/3 core. height.

b. Situations where the level of safety has, or could be, degraded te the point of losing a plant function needed to protect the public. Examples include, but are not limited to, the

, following:

(1) Failure of the Sta.s?by Gas Treatment System to function when needed.

(2) Failure of' fuel cladding (uame as iteta C.2.a above).

l (3) F dlure or potential failure of the primary containment in such a way that would allow significant leakage.

c. Any plant condition that threatens the safety of the plant and j warrants the activation of the Technical Support Center, Opera-tions Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility for the t

purpose of accident assessment, in-plant response, and offsite response. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following: -

(1) Fire affecting safety systems to the point of inadequate control of the plant.

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(2) Elevated hydrogen levels inside containment, coupled with .

Oxygen concentrations sufficient to cause a potentially harmful pressure spike shculd the two gases ignite (this requires engineering analysis, refer to PPM later).

(3) An earthquake greater than the safe shutdown earthquake as indicated on the seismic monitoring system.

(4) Any natural or man-made event that jeopardizes the plant safety systems to the point of inadequate control of the plant.

(5) Failure of secondary containment isolation when required.

(6) FuelPoollevel'belowbottomoffueltransfergatIand t

decreasing (assumes spent fuel in the pool).

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d. A situation where significant release of radioactive material has or could take place. Examples include the following:

(1) Measured or projected offsite dose rates greater than or equal to 50 mR/hr whole body or 250 mrem /hr to the thyroid.

D. General Emergency (See EPIP 13.1.2 for Actions.)

. If any of the following initiating conditions exist, consider declaring a General Emergency.

1. Parametric Initiating Conditions (General Emergency)
a. Effluent release activity greater than (to be determined).

a.

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2. Situation" Based Initiating Conditions (General Emerge'ncy) .
a. Loss of,'or high potential for loss of, primary containment and known core damage. Emergency Operating Procedures (PPM Volume 5) shodld be used as guidance in determining these

. conditions.

b. Any major event that could cause a degradation of plant safety such that the release of large amounts of radioactive material in a short period of time is possible. Examples include the following:

(1) Measured or projected offsite doses greater than or equal to one rem whole body or five times this level to the thyroid.

c. Any condition that warrants the activation of the Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center, and the Emer-gency Operations Facility for accident assessment, in-plant response, and offsite emergency response to aid in the imple-mentation of protective actions.

NOTE: A summary of symptomatic and situation based initiating conditions can be found in Attachments B and C, respectively.

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ATTACHMENT B -

SYMPT 0MATIC INITIATING CONDITIONS

SUMMARY

UNUSUAL EVENT o Rx Water Level LE -50 in o DW Temp GE 1350F for 8 hr o Rx Press GE 1148 psig o Supp Pool Temp GE 1100F and o DW Press GE 1.89 psig Pwr GE 1%

o DW Floor Drain Sump Flow GE 5 gpm o Supp Pool Water Lvl GE +2 in for o Total DW Sump Flow GE 36,000 gal / 1 hr 24 hrs o Supp Pool Water Lvl LE -2 in for o DW Press LE -2 psig for 1 hr 1 hr ALERT o APRM GE 5%, 10 sec. after scram o Containment Isolation Logic met, o Rx Water Level LE -129 in- but valves fail to close o MSIV Closure Logic met, but o Rx Pressure GE 1250 psig valves fail to close o Elevated release GE (later) i SITE AREA EMERGENCY t

o Rx Press GE 1325 psig o HCTL Exceeded o DW Temp GE 3400F o SPLL Exceeded o Elevated Release GE o PSPL Exceeded (to be determined) o HCLL Exceeded o Rx Pwr GE 5% and Supp Pool Temp o PCPL Exceeded

, GT 1100F and a TRV open or DW o DSIPL Exceeded Press GT T 69 psig l GENERAL EMERGENCY l

o Elevated Release GE (later)

O.

NOTE: GE = Greater than or equal to.

LE = Less than or equal to.

GT = Greater than.

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ATTACHMENT C .

SITUATION BASED GUIDELINES

SUMMARY

I. UNUSUAL EVENT

1. A condition that exceeds the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) and associated action requirements and is on immediate safety concern.
2. Situation threatens normal level of plant safety.
3. Situation warrants increased awareness on the part of plant personnel.

II. ALERT

1. A condition where a safety system instrument has failed to initiate automatic protective actions such that the design basis Safety Limits could be exceeded.
2. A situation which does or could represent a substantial degradation in the level of plant safety.
3. A situation which warrants the use of additional personnel for acci-dent assessment and in-plant response.

i l 4. A situation where a release of radioactive material warrants offsite I

response or monitoring, but does not require protective actions.

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III. SITE AREA EMERGENCY .

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1. A condition where the Safety Limits and associated action require-ments have been violated.
2. A situation where the level of safety has or could be degraded to the point of losing a plant function needed to protect the public (failed fuel or failed primary containment).

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! 3. A condition that warrants use of additional personnel for accident assessment, in-plant response, and offsite emergency response.

4. . A situation where a significant release of radioactive material has or could take place.

IV. GENERAL EMERGENCY

, 1. Substantial core damage and loss of, or high potential for loss of, l

primary containment.

( 2. Large amounts of radioactive material has or could be released in a l

short period of time, t

l 3. A condition that warrants use of additional personnel for accident assessment, in-plant response, and offsite emergency response to aid in the implementation of protective actions.

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ATTAC MENT D . .

BASES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY I. DISCUSSION -

This procedure is based on the guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and, where possible, uses the same symptomatic approach as the Plant Emergency Operating Procedures.

Using enhanced definitions of the various emergency classifications frorr-NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, and the safety parameter groups from NUREG-0'96,'

Section 5, a cla'ssification scheme has been developed that contains a dual methodology such that all abnormal conditions, even those beyond the design basis of the plant, will be accormnodated.

Emergency classification is arrived at by two metho'ds. The first method is by the use of predetermined safety parameters and their status. These are called symptomatic initiating conditions, and if any one of these parameters is in an unsafe condition, then the appropriate emergency classification is defined. To aid the operator in the implementation of this procedure, the symptomatic initiating conditions have been computer-ized. When a symptomatic initiating condition has been exceeded, the Graphic Display System (GDS) will display the appropriate emergency classification and the basis for that classification. If the GDS is not operational, Attachments B and C make useful quick reference guides.

Since it is virtually impossible to predefine a symptomatic initiating condition for every conceivable abnormal situation, a second method was developed to accomniodate those plant conditions which cannot be quantita-

. tively defined. The second method of determining emergency classifica-

,, tion is by the use of a set of discretionary guidelines. Unlike the symptomatic conditions, which are distinct, usually singular, quantita-tive parameters, the situation based initiating conditions represent multiple input situations that are. qualitative in nature and thus require more judgment in the classification process.

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II. CLASSIFICATION ' .

A. Unusual Ever.t

1. Definition An event at the plant or its surroundings where the level of safety has or could be degraded to the point of exceeding a limiting condition for operation (including associated action requirements), as defined in the WNP-2 Technical Specifica-tions, and is of immediate safety concern. It is also an event where increased awareness on the part of plant operating per-sonnel is warranted.
2. Purpose To bring the operating staff to a state of readiness and pro-vide systematic handling of information and decisionmaking.

B. Alert

1. Definition A condition at the plant or its surroundings where the level of safety has or could be substantially degraded, such as the failure of safety system instrument ettings which initiate automatic protective actions that preclude exceeding the design basis Safety Limits. It is also a condition where a small release of radioactive material warrants offsite response and/or monitoring, but does not require protective actions, or where the use of additional personnel for accident assessment

. and in-plant response is warranted.

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2. Purpose
  • To provide additional help in iasponding to the situation and provide systematic handling of information and decisionmaking.

Declaring an Alert will provide additional manpower in the <

Technical Support Center to help the normal operating crew in those duties not directly related to plant control, such as offsite dose assessment, technical problem evaluation, and comunications with outside organizations. It will also acti-vate the Operational Support Center which will provide addi-tional manpower to respond to. plant conditions. It will partially activate the Emergency Operations Facility to pr vide assist'ance in radiological events, if needed, and bring it to a

, state of standby readiness.

C. Site Area Emergency

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1. Definition A condition at the plant or its surroundings where the level of safety has or could be degraded to the point of losing a plant function needed to protect the public. This includes the vio-lation of Safety Limits and associated action requirements, as defined in the WNP-2 Technical Specifications, or where a sig-nificant release of radioactive material has or could take place. It is a condition that warrants use of additional per-l sonnel for accident assessment, in-plant response, and offsite emergency response.
2. Purpose l

.. To assure that all emergency response centers are activated, field monitoring teams dispatched, evacuation coordinators readied, and public informed. Declaring a Site Area Emergency will activate the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emeroency Operations Facility.

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D. General Emergency ,

1. Definition A condition at the plant or its surroundings where the level of ,

safety has or could be degraded to the point of substantial core damage and where the loss of primary containment has occurred or is projected to occur. It is also a condition where release of large amounts of radioactive material have or could be released in a short period of time. This classification warrants the use of additional personnel for accident assessment, in-plant response, and off-site emergency response. The implementation of protective actions for the public may be warranted.

2. Purpose To initiate predetermined protective actions for the public, as needed; to provide for continuous offsite assessment; initiate additional measures, as indicated by radiological releases; and to provide for' consultation and flow of information to and from the various offsite authorities.

III. ENGINEERING BASES FOR SYMPT 0MATIC INITIATING CONDITIONS Using the definitions in the previous section and a set of defined safety parameters based on NUREG-0696 safety groups

  • the following bases were established for each symptomatic initiating condition.
  • NUREG-0696 recommends use of five safety groups for defining the safety status of the plant. The five groups are reactivity control, core cooling parameters, coolant system integrity, containment integrity, and radioactivity control.

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A. Unusual Event *

1. Reactivity Control Initiating Canditions (a) None.

(1) Basis--N/A.

2. Core Cooling Initiating Conditions
a. Lo Lo reactor water level (-50 ches).

('1) Basis--Threatens normal level of plant safety and'

, warrants increased awareness on part of plant personnel. .

3. Coolant System Integrity Initiating Conditions
a. Drywell sump flow greater than or equal to 36,000 gal /24 hr.

(1) Basis--Violates a Limiting Condition for Operation. ,

b. Drywell floor drain sump flow greater than or equal to 5 gpm.

(1) Basis--Violates Limiting Condition for Operation.

c. Drywell pressure greater than or equal to 1.89 psig.

(1) Basis--Condition is an early indication of a

.. potential break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary that threatens the normal level of plant safety and warrants increased awareness on the part of plant personnel.

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. d. ' Reactor pressure y ssel great:r than or equal to 1148 psig. .

(1)* Basis--Condition indicates a failure of' pressure actuated relief valves and actuation of first set of saf ty relief valves and therefore represents a threat to the normal level of plant safety.

4. Containment Integrity Initiating Conditions
a. Drywell temperature greater than or equal to 135 F for eight hours.

(1) Basis--Violates Limiting Condition for Operation.

b. Suppression Pool temperatc ~ greater than or equal to 110GT and power greater than or equal to one percent.

(1) Basis--Violates Limiting Condition for Operation.

c. Drywell pressure less than or equal to -2 psig for greater than or equal to one hour.

(1) Basis--Violates limiting condition for operation.

d. Suppression Pool level greater than or equal to +2 inches above normal for one hour.

(1) Basis-Violates limiting condition for operation.

e. Suppression Pool level less than or equal to -2 inches below normal for one hour.

(1) Basis--Violates Limiting Condition for Operation.

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. 5. Radioactivity Cintrol Initiating Conditions *

a. None'.

(1) Basis-N/A.

B. Alert

1. Reactivity Control Initiating Conditions
a. APRM greater than or equal to five percent, ten seconds after a scram.

. (1) Basis--Condition indicative of a failure to scram and, since the automatic protective action (i.e.,

full scram) did not occur, the safety limits are-jeopardized.

2. Core Cooling Initiating Conditions
a. Reactor water level less than or equal to -129 inches.

(1) Basis--Safety Limits are jeopardized due to possible failure of automatic protective actions (i.e., high pressure core spray) to restore water level. This condition also represents a substantial degradation of the level of plant safety.

3. Coolant Systen Integrity Initiating Conditions
a. Main Stean Isolation Valve closure logic met, but both

.. inboard and outboard values on at least one line not closed.

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, (1) Basis--Situation represents a substantial degradation .

. in the level of plant safety.

b. Reactor pressure greater than or equal to 1250.psig.

(1) Basis--Same as 3.a above.

4. Containment Integrity Initiating Conditions
a. Containment isolation logic met, but both inboard and outboard valves on one or more Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) lines do not close.

(1) Basis--Situation represents a substantial degradation in the level of plant safety.

5. Radioactivity Control Initiating Conditions (Later)

C. Site Area Emergency ~ .

1. Reactivity Control Initiating Conditions
a. Reactor power greater than or equal to five percent and Suppression Pool temperature greater than 110 F and a Safety Relief Valve open cg drywell pressure greater than or equal to 1.69 psig.

(1) Basis--BWR Owners' Group accident analysis indicates ~

this unlikely condition could degrade the level of safety to the point of losing a plant function (fuel failure or containment failure) needed to protect the public.

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. 2. Core Cooling Initiating Conditions . .

a. None'.
3. Coolant System Integrity Initiating Conditions ,
a. Reactor pressure greater than 1325 psig.

(1) Basis--Safety Limit violated.

4. Containment Integrity Initiating Conditions i

D'rywell temperature greater than or, equal to 3400F.

a.

(1) Basis--This condition represents a situation where the level of safety could degrade to the point of

~

los,ing a plant function (i.e., primary containment) needed to protect the public.

b. Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) Exceeded (1) Basis--This condition represents a situation where the level of safety could degrade to the point of losing the primary containment which is neede to protect the public.
c. Suppression Pool Level Limit (SPLL) Exceeded l

l (1) Basis--Same as item c.4.b. above.

d. Pressure Suppression Pressure Limit (PSPL) Exceeded

! (1) Basis--Same as item c.4.b above.

r PH0CLDV H L (4UMULH HLViblON NUMBER PAGE tevMbER

,,.3,, 13.1.1 0 13.1.1-25 of 26 L - . _ _ ..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

e. HatCapacityLevelLiait(HCLL) Exceeded *

(1) Basis--Same as item c.4.b. above.

f. Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL) Exceeded (1) Basis--Same as item c.4.b above.
g. Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL) Exceeded (1) Basis--Same as item c.4.b above.
5. Radioactivity Control Initiating Conditions (Later)

D. General Emergency

1. Reactivity Control Initiating Conditions
a. None. .
2. Core Cooling Initiating Conditions
a. None.
3. Coolant System Integrity Initiating Conditions
a. None.
4. Containment Integrity Initiating Conditions 1
a. None.
5. Radioactivity Control Initiating Conditions (Later)

PROCLOOHL NUMBLH HLViblON NUMBEH PAGL NuvuER

,,,g 13.1.1 0 13.1.1-26 of 26

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