ML20072L664
| ML20072L664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1994 |
| From: | Hansen A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072L670 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9409010056 | |
| Download: ML20072L664 (15) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
' f. i[ c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q
WASHINGTON. D C. 20555 0001 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-266 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.151 License No. DPR-24 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated October 6, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the. public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
k 9409010056 940826 PDR ADOCK 05000266 P
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- 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 151, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective immediately upon issuance. The Technical Specifications are to be implemented within 45 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h
Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: August 26, 1994 T
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[I ft UNITED STATES j
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON. D.C. N0001 0
%,a..,*4 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-301 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.155 License No. DPR-27 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated October 6, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be-conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.8 of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 155, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective immediately upon issuance.
The Technical Specifications are to be implemented within 45 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 i
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical.
i Specifications Date of issuance: August 26, 1994 J
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1 1
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS.151 AND 155 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.
EERQVf INSERT Table 15.3.5-5 Table 15.3.5-5 TS 15.3.10-1 TS 15.3.10-1 TS 15.3.10-6 through TS 15.3.10-6 through TS 15.3.10-10 (5 pages)
TS 15.3.10-10 (5 pages)
TS 15.3.10-15 TS 15.3.10-15 TS 15.3.10-16 TS 15.3.10-16 Figure 15.3.10-1 Figure 15.3.10-1
TABLE 15.3.5-5 INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR INDICATION 1
2 3
MINIMUM NO. OF OPERABLE OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS CHANNELS OF COLUMN 2 CANNOT BE MET 1.
PORY Position Indicator 1/ Valve 1/ Valve If the operability of the PORY position indicator cannot be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, shut the associated PORV Block Valve.
2.
PORV Block Valve Position 1/ Valve 1/ Valve If the operability of the PORY Block Valve Position Indicator Indicator cannot be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, shut and verify the Block Valve shut by direct observation or declare the Block Valve inoperable.
3.
Safety Valve Position Indicator 1/ Valve 1/ Valve If the operability of the Safety Valve Position Indicator cannot be restored within seven days, be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.
Reactor Coolant System Subcooling 1
I If the operability of a subcooling monitor cannot be restored or a backup monitor made functional within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
5.
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate
- 1 1
If the operability of the auxiliary feedwater flow rate' indicator cannot be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
6.
Control Rod Misalignment as 1
1 Log individual rod positions once/hr., after a Monitored by On-Line load change >10% or after >48 steps of control j
Computer rod motion.
i l
CApplies to presently installed combination of auxiliary feedwater pump discharge flow indicators and auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator indicators.
Unit 1 - Amendment S5,151 Unit 2 - Amendment 69,155
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15.3.10 CONTROL R00 AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS
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i Acolicability Applies to the operation of the control rods and to core power distribution 1
limits.
Ob.iective To insure (1) core subtriticality after a reactor trip, (2) a limit on potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution during power operation.
Soecification A. Bank Insertion Limits 1.
When the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises, the shutdown banks shall be fully withdrawn.'
2.
When the reactor is critical, the control banks shall be inserted no further than the limits shown by the lines on Figure 15.3.10-1.
Exceptions to the insertion limit are permitted for physics tests and control rod exercises.'
3.
The shutdown margin shall exceed the applicable value as shown in. Figure 15.3.10-2 under all steady-state operating conditions from 350 F to full power.
An exception to the stuck RCCA component of the shutdown margin requirement is permitted for physics tests.
4.
Except for physics tests a shutdown margin of at least 1% ok/k shall be maintained when the reactor coolant temperature is less than 350 F.
5.
During any approach to criticality, except for physics tests, the critical rod position shall not be lower than the insertion limit for zero power.
That is, if the control rods were withdrawn in normal sequence with no other reactivity change, the reactor would not be critical until the control banks were above the insertion limit.
' Fully withdrawn is defined as a bank demand position equal to or greater than 225 steps.
This definition is applicable to shutdown and control banks.
1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.f),fS,JfA,151 15.3.10-1 Unit 2 - Amendment No.E5,93,JAE,155
a.
The RCCA does not drop upon removal of stationary gripper coil voltage.
b.
The RCCA does not step in properly when the proper voltage sequences are applied to the control rod drive mechanism coils.
It shall then be assumed inoperable until it has been tested to verify that it does drop.
c.
If the bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, or, less than or equal to 30 steps, and the rod position indicator channel shows a misalignment from the bank demand position of 24 steps, the RCCA shall be assumed inoperable until-l it has been tested to verify that it does step properly.
d.
If the bank demand position is between 215 steps and 30 steps, and the rod position indicator channel shows a misalignment from the bank demand position of 12 steps, the RCCA shall be assumed inoperable until it has been tested to verify that it does step properly.
2.
Specification 15.3.10.C.l.b can be modified by the following:
a.
If an RCCA does not step in upon demand, up to six hours is allowed to determine whether the problem with stepping is an electrical problem.
If the problem cannot be resolved within six hours, the RCCA shall be assumed inoperable until it has been verified that it will step in or would drop upon demand.
b.
If more than one RCCA does not step in, apparently due to electrical problems, the situation shall be rectified or clearly defined that it is an electrical problem and the RCCAs are capable of dropping upon demand or an orderly shutdown shall commence within six hours, 3.
No more than one inoperable RCCA shall be permitted during sustained power operation.
4.
When it has been determined that an RCCA does not drop on removal of stationary gripper coil voltage, the shutdown margin shall be maintained by boration as necessary to compensate for the withdrawn worth of the inoperable RCCA.
If sustained power operation is anticipated, the insertion limit shall be adjusted to reflect the worth of the inoperable RCCA.
Unit 1 - Amendment No.4,7f,JJ0,151 15.3.10-6 Unit 2 - Amendment No. #,E0.JJ3,155
D.
Misalianed or Drocoed RCCA 1.
If the rod position indicator channel is functional and the associated RCCA is more than 12 steps indicated out of alignment with its bank demand position and cannot be aligned when the bank demand position is between 215 steps and 30 steps, then unless the hot channel factors are shown to be within design limits as specified in Section 15.3.10.B-1 within eight (8) hours, power shall be reduced to less than 75% of Rated Power. When the bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, or less than or equal to 30 steps, the allowable indicated misalignment is 24 steps between the rod position indicator and the bank demand position.
2.
To increase power above 75% with an RCCA more than 12 steps indicated out of alignment with its bank demand position when the bank demand position is between 215 steps and 30 steps, an analysis shall first be made to determine the hot channel factors and the resulting allowable power level based on Section 15.3.10.B.
When the bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, or, less than or equal to 30 steps, the allowable indicated misalignment is 24 steps between the rod position indication and the bank demand position.
3.
If it is determined that the apparent misalignment or dropped RCCA indication was caused by rod position indicator channel failure, sustained power operation may be continued if the following conditions are met:
a.
For operation between 10% power and Rated Power, the position of the RCCA(s) with the failed rod position indicator channel (s) will be checked indirectly by core instrumentation (excore detectors, and/or thermocouples, and/or moveable incore detectors) every shift and after associated bank motion exceeding 24 steps in one direction.
b.
For operation below 10% of Rated Power, no special monitoring is required.
E.
RCCA Droo Times 1.
At operating temperature and full flow, the drop time of each RCCA shall be no greater than 2.2 seconds from the loss of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry.
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Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49,76,86,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No. EE,80,90,155 15.3.10-7
Basis Insertion limits and Shutdown Marain The reactivity control concept is that reactivity changes accompanying changes in reactor power are compensated by control rod motion.
Reactivity changes associated with xenon, samarium, fuel depletion and large changes in reactor coolant temperature (operating temperature to cold shutdown) are compensated by changes in the soluble boron concentration.
During power operation, the shutdown banks are fully withdrawn. Fully withdrawn is defined as a bank demand position equal to or greater than 225 steps.
Evaluation has shown that positioning control rods at 225 steps, or greater, has a negligible effect on core power distributions and peaking factors.
Due to the low reactivity worth in this region of the core and the fact that, at 225 steps, control rods are only inserted one step into the active fuel region of the core, positioning rods at this position or higher has minimal effect.
This position is varied, based on a predetermined schedule, in order to minimize wear of the guide cards in the guide tubes of the RCCA's.
The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time and assume the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn. A 10% margin in reactivity worth of the control rods is included to assure meeting the assumptions used in the accident analysis.
So a reactor trip occurring during power operation will put the reactor into the hot shutdown condition.
In addition, the insertion limits provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod ejection and provide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors.
The specified control rod insertion limits take into account the effects of fuel densification.
The rods are withdrawn in the sequence of A, B, C, D with overlap between banks.
The overlap between successive control banks is provided to compensate for the low differential rod worth near the top and bottom of the core.
When the insertion limits are observed and the control rod banks are above the solid lines shown on Figure 15.3.10-1, the shutdown requirement is met.
The maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs at end of core life and is based on the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. AB,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55,155 15.3.10-8
Figure 15.3.10-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 2.77% reactivity at end-of-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown.
All other accident analyses assume 1% or greater reactivity shutdown margin.
Shutdown margin calculations include the effects of axial power distribution.
One may assume no change in core poisoning due to xenon, samarium or soluble boron.
Power Distribution Design criteria have been chosen which are consistent with the fuel integrity analyses.
These relate to fission gas release, pellet temperature and cladding mechanical properties.
Also the minimum DNBR in the core must not be less than the limit DNBR in normal operation or in short-term transients.
In addition to the above, the peak linear power density must not exceed the limiting kw/ft values which result from the large break loss-of-coolant accident analysis based upon the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200 F.
This is required to meet the initial conditions assumed for loss-of-coolant accident.
To aid in specifying the limits on power distribution, the following hot channel factors are defined:
F,(Z), Heiaht Decendent Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods.
Imposed limits pertain to the maximum F,(Z) in the core.
F[,EnaineerinaHeatFluxHotChannelFactor,isdefinedastheallowance on heat flux required for manufacturing tolerances.
The engineering factor allows for local variations in enrichment, pellet density and diameter, surface area of the fuel rod and eccentricity of the gap between pellet and clad. Combined statistically, the net effect is a factor of 1.03 to be applied to fuel rod surface heat flux.
Unit 1 - Amendment No.49,E6,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No.55,90,155 15.3.10-9
Fl,, klear Nhalw Rin M Gaml Fadr, is M I M as W M io M the integral of linear power along a fuel rad to the average fuel rod power.
Imposed limits pertain to the maximum FL in the core, that is the fuel rod with the highest integrated power.
It should be noted that FL is based on an integral and is used as such in the DNB calculations.
Local heat flux is obtained by using hot channel and adjacent channel explicit power shape: which take into account variations in horizontal (x-y) power shapes throuphout the core.
Thus, the horizontal power shape at the point of maximum heat flux is not necessarily directly related to FL.
For normal operation, it is not necessary to measure these quantities.
Instead it has been determined that, provided the following conditions are observed, the hot channel factor limits will be met:
1.
Control rods in a single bank move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than 24 steps from the bank demand position, when the bank demand position is between 30 steps and 215 steps.
A misalignment of 36 steps is allowed when the bank position is less than or equal to 30 steps, or, when the bank position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, due to the small worth and consequential effects of an individual rod misalignment.
2.
Control rod banks are sequenced with overlapping banks as described in Figure 15.3.10-1.
3.
The full-length control bank insertion limits are not violated.
4.
Axial power distribution control procedures, which are given in terms of flux difference control and control bank insertion limits, are observed.
Flux difference refers to the difference in signals between the top and bottom halves of two-section excore neutron detectors.
The flux difference is a measure of the axial offset which is defined as the difference in normalized power between the top and bottom halves of the core.
The permitted relaxation of FL allows radial power shape changes with rod insertion to the insertion limits.
it has been determined that provided the above conditions 1 through 4 are observed, these hot channel factor limits are met.
In Specification 15.3.10.B.I.a, F, is arbitrarily limited for p s 0.5 (except for low power physics tests).
Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55,155 15.3.10-10
in a deliberate manner without undue pressure on the operating personnel because of the unusual techniques to be used to accommodate the reactivity changes associated with the shutdown.
Misalioned RCCAS The various control rod banks (shutdown banks and control banks, A, B, C, and D) are each to be moved as a bank; that is, with all rods ir, the bank within one step (5/8 inch) of the bank position.
Direct information on rod position indication is provided by two methods: A digital count of actuating pulses which shows the demand position of the banks and a linear position indicator (LVDT) which indicates the actual rod position.
The rod positiol indicator channel has a demonstrated accuracy of 5% of span (111.5 steps).
Therefore, an analysis has been performed to show that a misalignment of 24 steps cannot cause design hot channel factors to be exceeded.
A single fully misaligned RCCA, thtt is, an RCCA 230 steps out of alignment with its bank, does not result in exceeding core l
limits in steady-state operation at power levels less than or equal to rated power.
In other words, a single dropped RCCA is allowable from a core power distribution viewpoint.
If the misalignment condition cannot be readily corrected, the specified reduction in power to 75% will insure that design margins to core limits will be maintained under both steady-state and anticipated transient conditions.
The eight (8) hour permissible limit on rod misalignment at rated power is short with respect to tbc probability of an independent accident.
Because the rod position indicator system may have a 12 step error when a mis-alignment of 24 steps is occurring, the Specification allows only an indicated misalignment of 12 steps.
However, when the bank demand position is greater than or equal to 215 steps, or, less than or equal to 30 steps, the consequences of a misalignment are much less severe. The differential worth of an individual RCCA is less, and the resultant perturbation on power distributions is less than when the bank is in its high differential worth region. At the top and bottom of the core, an indicated 24 step misalignment may be representing an actual misalignment of 36 steps.
The failure of an LVDT in itself does not reduce the shutdown capability of the Unit 1 - Amendment No.A9,7/A,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No.55,777,155 15.3.10-15
rods, but it does reduce the operator's capability for determining the position
^
of that rod by direct means. The operator has available to him the excore detector recordings, incore thermocouple readings and periodic incore flux traces for indirectly determining rod position and flux tilts should the rod with the inoperable LVDT become malpositioned.
The excore and incore instrumentation will not necessarily recognize a misalignment of 24 steps because the concomitant increase in power density will normally be less than 1% for a 24 step misalignment. The excore and incore instrumentation will, however, detect any I
rod misalignment which is sufficient to cause a significant increase in hot channel factors and/or any significant loss in shutdown capability.
The increased surveillance of the core if one or more rod position indicator channels is out-of-service serves to guard against any significant loss in shutdown margin or margin to core thermal limits.
The history of malpositioned RCCA's indicates that in nearly all such cases, the malpositioning occurred during bank movement.
Checking rod position after bank motion exceeds 24 steps will verify that the RCCA with the inoperable LVDT is moving properly with its bank and the bank step counter. Malpositioning of an RCCA in a stationary bank is very rare, and if it does occur, it is usually gross slippage which will be seen by external detectors.
Should it go undetected, the time between the rod. position checks performed every shift is short with respect to the probability of occurrence of another independent undetected situation which would further reduce the shutdown capability of the rods.
Any combination of misaligned rods below 10% rated power will not exceed the j
design limits.
For this reason, it is not necessary to check the position of rods with inoperable LVDT's below 10% power; plus, the incore instrumentation is not effective for determining rod position until the power level is above approximately 5%.
Unit 1 - Amendment No.49,174,151 Unit 2 - Amendment No.EE.JJ7,155 13.3.10-16
FIGURE 15.3.10-1 i
CONTROL BANK INSERTION LIMITS POINT BEACH UNITS 1 AND 2 240 1
225 r'
88.50 %l
/
n c
t 2'o 7,
[
( Bank B insertion l
- 195 r
[
180 --
165 170!
f I
150 g
/
{'Benk C insertionj i
r 135
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/
120 105 i
i
/
/
l Sank D insertionj s
j i
60
/
o 45 -
/
30 l28.60%
/
0 1
0 6 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 85 70 76 80 85 90 95 100 i
Power Level 1% of ftsted Power)
I Note:
The " fully withdrawn" parking position range can be used without violating this Figure, i
Unit 1 - Amendment NO.gy,pp,pp,pp,N p,151 Unit 2 - Amendment NO.66,66.,90,W,y(1,155