ML20072K748
| ML20072K748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1983 |
| From: | Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8307060402 | |
| Download: ML20072K748 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA July 2, 1983 NUCLEAR HEGULATOBY COMMISSION (under, extension f>9Atdme)N V
9 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOA
'f
\\
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]y c:~c,,g.
Glenn O. Bright C3)
I Dr. James H. Carpenter m
u,y k
\\
James L. Kelley, Chairman
- Q>,%q} (p~, Gy,/,7; t
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.{,/
In the Matter of N E
)
Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al.
)
50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units i ani 2)
)
}
OL Wells Eddleman's Response to 1983 Updated DCRDR Including Revised and New Contentions A
On June 1,19 3., Annliennts sent ne their May 1983 DCRD9 update (1983 undate) which consists of about 13 nages of text, 2 nages of revisions to the 17 nages of text of their old DCRDR which change (without exclana tion) the number of discrenancies I
identified, and an annendix of resumes of the review team norsonnel for CP&L's DCRDR.
Based on the added information (or lack of any added informatien) in this update, I file the following additional and amended contentions (in some cases, only the basie is amended),
and note which contentions should stand from the DC9D7 contentions to which Anplicants responded 1-25-83 ("DCRD9 Desnonse").
This is being filed under an extension of time to 2 July from June 30, agreed to by Annlicants' attorneys Baxter and Flynn, staff counsel Barth, and anproved by Judges Bright and Carnenter in Judge Kelley's absence (I understand he's out of the count"y).
8307060402 030702
] (m2)
)
PDR ADOCK 05000400 G
D kb ' New Contentions
. 2,*
132 E CP&L is wrong in stating that its DCPDF undate;neet,
/
the. requirenents of sectinns 5.2h' and 5.2b or ru=EG-0737 Rev.1.
Without such connliance, the adequacy of control roon design and procedures is in doubt and the public health and safety are thereby endangered.
Rev. 1 BASIS : NU9EG-0737 section 5.P(a) requires a descrintion oc how itens 1,2, and 3 thereof will be complied with, but the undate does not address these itens in any way.
CP&L adn' tted in its 1-25-83 resnonse (DCRDR restense ) at 3 that the old DC9D9 did ne t address the se requirenent s.
The new one doesn't either, in its mere 13 nages of statenents.
Section 5.2(b) of NUREG-0737 Rev.1 requires a schedule (there is none in the update on the DCPDF) and to justify why discrepancies with safety significance weve uncorrected or only partly correc ted.
In the update, CP&L adn' ts that 2 such discrenancies were only nartly co"rected but gives no reasons why and doesn't even tell what they were.
In addition, the DCDDD undate says CP&L nanage-nent reviewed 2h other discrenancies and decided they were not significant for safety, but the discrenancies are not listed, the criteria for evaluation (if any) are not given, and no demonstration is given that these discrepancies (and each of then) is not safety-significant.
(See Undate Table 3-1 at iten 3.bb).
The=e are also h discrenancies "found not anplicable by neer review" -- aga'n no justification for such action is given.
Moreover, the DC9D9 undate is f ull of i nformati on that recu'.re-nents haven't been net yet.
At sectinn 2.0 it says the HERSs "will l
be used during final design evaluation, construction and vrocurenent."
6/Ap}$M G okkd
Y o e at nage 2-2 it says "Essex Corn and CP&L believe that when the Westinghouse Owners Group task analysis and Eeneric guidelines becone available and SENPP Energency One-etion Procedures (FOPS) are written, a verification and validation will reveal few, if any, hunan factors corcerns re the nain control boand."
At page 2-h it says the FOPS "will be" task analyted end that *nfo will be fed back into the F0DS and control rcen design veview.
At the botton of the rage it refers to "awea s wb5 ch could not he evaluated during the DC9DP" ( the old DC9DD).
In sun, this is an ongcinF process, not a connle ted one, so CP&L hasn't established that its control roon desi n and crocedures F
neet the requirenents of NUDDG-0737 Rev. 1 as noted above.
CP&L's promises and beliefs are not trustworthy because CP&L in the nart has failed to meet dead 1dnes and faile d to neet c o nit-nents, e.g. in establishing a CA /CC nroF.ra at Brunswick, in instelling alarns on water-tight doors at Brunswick (crucial to keeDinF the FCCS pures from being flooded, or the SH_9 nade innverable -- Tr. of 1979 renand hearings in th's docket, see een Dr. Leeds' exa-innt' on o' J. A.,
Jones of CP&L), in defective construction and desf gn of the auFnented of fgas systen at Brunswick, in failing to test the Brunswick contain-nents ($600,000 fine, see Staf f le tter te Bo9"d 3/83), in f a' ling to chlorinate the PHU at Brunswick, and so on.
At Harnis, CDE L's QA/QC orogran is a connitnent not to have defective eduirnent installed.
Yet 95f> of a sanple of LOO nine hanfers reinsnected af ter the NRC inspector found defects in nine hangers OKd by CD&L Harris QA/CC turned out to be defective.
This record shows that CP&L cannot be trusted to neet connitnents in design, onerat*cn, or conirstruction.
The best way to nake sure they keen the!" DCPDP connitmente, then, is to have a contention that they haven't done so, so that only by proving they have done so can they get a license.
-g-132 F CP&L's Harris 1 and 2 control roons do not connly with all requirenents of NU"EG-0737, Rev.1.
Without assured connliance with these requirenents, CP&L's ability to nrotect the nublic fron the danger of serious nuclear accidents or inadvertent radiation releases is $n doubt.
BASIS:
Applicants admit they're not in co-n11ance with nev. 1, 1-25-83 resnorse at 6.
The May 1983 DCuDo undate does nnt even address numerous specific requirenents of Devision 1; in addit *on to the SPDS requirenents (contention 132 B, see below), they utterly fail to connly with the following reouirenents: 5.1(b)(iii) (*0737 Rev. 1, n. 10) for a connarison of the disply and control roon requirenents with a control rcon inventory te identify nissinF displays and controls.
No nention of thi s is in the original DCRDR, see at 1,2 and 5.
No nention of thi s is in the 13 nages of update text frcn 1983 Section 5.1d (No0737 Rev. 1 at 11) requires verifi cation that each '3esign inprovenent will nrovide the necessary correct!on without creating any "unaccentable" hunan engineerinF discrenencies because of significant contribution to increased risk, unreviewed safety questions, o= situations in which a tennorary conditi ons in which a reduction of safety could occur.
Coord'rati on with the S"DS is noted as something that should be done.
Nei ther the old DCPDF nor the undate even nention SDDS,
and no coordination is shown in any of them, between the S"DS and the overall control roon design effort.
Unreviewed safety questions and tennorary conditions are not addressed in the DCPDF or the update, and neither gives criteria for finding that discrepancies created by changes (EFDs created) a"e "accentable".
There is no verification of conoliance with 5.1d and no procedure of schedule for it in CP&L's DC RDR.
5.1 of NURBF-0737 Bev 1 j pgMgj 47y is a lis t of " Requirements" (ibid, ton of n.10).
-3A-(#132 P is on rage h)
& construct'en ene"gency onerating 132 G The designgor the Harris control noon andjpwocedures using HERSs is inconulete and has not been
,. evalunted o-ann"oved.
It has not been shown to neet the requirenent s of NUDEG-0737 Dev. I with respec t to human fac tors.
Without co nnlianc e with these requirene nt s, the nublic health and safety is endange"ed in the event of an a ccident at Harris because hunan factors nar worsen or cause an accident.
BASIS.
Annlicants DCPDR undate admits that this orneess 's not connleta.
Ther Hunan Engineering Dequirenents Snecif'catfens "are being used" but their use has not been connleted or evaluated.
CP&L's cronise alone is not enough to assure that the" will be nronerly used -- look at CPS-L's record of not keening nronises failure to innlenent CA/CC at Brunswick, f a' lure to Fet the Brunswick watertight doo"s alarned, release oc low-level radwaste to scran ya"ds and landfills att Svunswick, Ha""!s nine hance-s appvoved even though 2/3 o the, were later founi derect've when all wewe c
re-insnected (95% of the first h00 rechecked were defective).
NUREG-0737, Rev. 1, p.1 says its provisions are recuirement s.
Until CP&L has shown that it actually HAS connlied with these requirenents, not just on paper and in nronises, but fn actus1 design and cons truction of the con trol roon and in ac tual nrncedures,
we are not assured that these requirenents are net.
i i
bd 1A f i Section 5.2 of NUREG-0737 requires (ite, b) that the DC9DR provide a "sunnary justification"for leaving HED's with safety significance uncorrected or partially corrected.
No such is in the DCRDo or the update (see at Table 3 1, iten 3.h the only justification is basically CP&L " reviewed then" case by case.
That's not a justificat".on.
Tha t 's no t an exnlana ti o n.
CP&L sinnly has fa' led to cennly with tPis requirement.
It has not justified its decisions on the HFDs. Applicants also ca' l to meet requi"enents of N-0737 D.1 7.1 -- the undate shows the Ha*-is FOPS are still not written.
CP&L's uwonises, as shown re 13P F, can't be trusted.
132 3( reference, Annlicants' resnonse of 1-25-83, naFes h and 5) is sinnly given additbnal basis in that the DCPDn update, like the DC9Du, doesn' t even mention SPDS.
Not only does this violate the NUREG-0737 Rev.1, iten 5.16 requirement to coo"dinate the DCRDR with the~ SPDS, it appears to provide a bacis few saying that Apnlicants have no nlan for an SnDS at Harais, nor any schedule to put one in place x there, for ei ther unit's c ontrcl room.
Anulicantn admit,1-25-83 at h, that-the DcqDP fails to provide for an SVDS; it says this is uremature because there's no nroof they won 't af ter reviewing KUDrG-0737 Rev.1.
Eut after review of that, and a further delay from An"!1 14 to Juhe 1 for resnonce, they again make no mention of the SDDS in the control roon design review undate.
Since they are reau'. red to coordinate the DCDDR with the SPDS (-o737, recuirenent 5.1d), no nention of an SPDS innlies there isn't one.
The contention states that the design of the control room (not the "DCPD9" ) does not comply with NUPEG-0737 Rev. 1, see at iten 3.h and iten h.
Iten 3.E is anong the things required to connly with itens 5.la and b.
Auplicants have not daown that they even have a clan for an SPDS
/
Tor Harris.
, 132 C I:
The undate does give the qualifications of the DC9DP tean, but it fails to establish that they are " appropriate inter-disciplinary qualifications" or to give any criteria fer such a determination.
132 E C II:
Aunlicants adn' t,1-25-83 at 6, that they have not met these recuirements.
The 1993 DCDDo unda te mostly fa'Is to address these recuirements.
The undate virtually dunlicates in its section 2 the language auoted in 132 C II (1), fails to nake any conparisons to inventory, says no thing new a bou t audibic alarn systens, i nfornstf on recording and recall canability (132 C II iten (n3)), fails to provide the HTPSs (clains they will be/are being used), fails to show how HrDs were corrected, and fails to verify that each change nrovides the necessary correction.
The prcblens with 1cyout (also nart of 132 C II (3)) are cot cddressed at all in the undate.
But the update does say that the centrol roon floor and enble trays have already beer. set up according to the old DCPDR, pp2-2 and 2-3 Thus, this nroblen nas been " cast in concrete" by CP&L and given added basis.
Please note that this content'en addresses the centrol roen
. design itself, as well as the review thereof.
Aunlicants seen to niss or overlock this no'nt consistently in thei" vesnonses.
The cover letter of NUPrG-0737 Rev.1 says that its recuirenents replace those of KUDEG-0737 (botton of n.1).
By s ay
- ng tha t staffing levels are not strict recuirenents, it innlies the other recuirenents are strict.
CF2:L's f ailure to connly or set a schedule to conoly l
l with such requirements is thus a nere sericus failure.
1
. 132 D as or!ginally written is elin* nated by E.r. Utley's cover letter to the 1983 DCDD7 update, 6/1/83 at 2.
However, this letter F ves basis for a revised 132D as follows:
i 132 D II:
The Harris 2 control room has not been built in connliance with the recuirements of NU"rG-0737, Rev.1, and or of apolicable updates thereto, NUnEG-0700. It has no emergency proceduves.
Failure to assure safe control roon design and nroceduves for Unit P means that tne nublic health and safety is not adeouately protected.
To assure connliance wi th the above, Unit P's cort"o1 room must be evaluated not only as it is built, but after it is concleted --
to take care of remaining nonconnliances or naoblens identified pursuant to NU:BG-0737 Fev. 1 sect'on 5.1 a,b,c, and d; and to assure an operable SPDS ner sedtiens 3.h and h thereof.
BASIS :
The basis of the content
- cns above (including original basis of the old ones filed 1-8-83) shows that Harris 1 fails to meet these recuirements and o the=s, and ha r na SDDS yet.
de Utley's le tte= of 6-1-63 says un' t 2 will be essentially the same as Unit 1 as far as control roon desi n and construc t' nn.
Thus F
the failu"es with resnect to Unit 1 arnly to Unit 2.
CD&L can only show otherwise by building the unit P control room and conducti nF cocrdinated review of its design with the SUDS, providinr an S"DS, and comnleting emergency nvocedures for Unit P that comnly w'th NU9ES-0737 7ev.1.
Old contenLiot.s lh2 and 1hh, I w!11 let stand as written.
For contention 1h3, the DCRDo undate n"ovides no additional info.
However, Applicants point out that I haven't addressed the 5 factors for late-filed contentions for this one. (1-25 83 at 9.
Contravy to Anplicants' statement, the requirements listed.i n the contenti on is
. referenced narts of liUREG-0737 Rev.1 are quite snecific.
F e ' l u~e to connly with a lot of recuirenents is a good contention; I have no objection to senarating it for theF0F, E0Ps, TSC and OSC, i. e. tn nake it h narts addressing resnectively the EOF, E0Ps, TSC and OSC.
THE FIVE FACT 09S OF 10 CPR 2.71h for Eddlenan 1h3:
Contention 1h3 is tinely because faf lu=e to c onnly with the requirenents of 1;URFGo0737 rev. 1 could not nossibly be alledged before that docunent existed.
Applicants admit its basis is taue, in that the facilities haven't been built and NDC has not assessed connliance therewidl.
It won't broaden the issues because the control roon (FOPS) and the adecuacy of sunnort for the energency nlan have always been issues in this nroceeding.
It won't delay anything because di scovery on safety contentions doesn't staat until early 108h.
I know of no other parties cursu!ng th'.s issue.
So far as I an presently aware, no one else resn< nded to the site energency plan; no other intervenor raised the issues of Eddleman 1h3 with resnect to NUDEG-0737, Revision 1.
There are essentially no other neans whe*eby ny inte"est will be nrotected.
Staf" review nay or nay not deal with the itens I an concerned with.
CP&L may nor nay not fulf'll its obligations; if it doesn't, I have no recourse.
There can't be a sound record on this issue if there is no record, f
l The setting un of annronriate energency facilities is obv4 ously l
inportant to nrotecting the nublic health and safety.
I an able to analyze, critiaue.and cross-exanine on the issues of Fddlenan 1h3, and may be able to get expect assistance or witnesses.
Contention 1h3 is addressed furuner in ny 1-26-83 answer to Applicants, at 5-6.
This additional informatinn/ definition ncy be of use.
I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA July 2,1983 NUCLEAR BEGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
Glenn O. Bright l
Dr. James H. Carpenter
{
James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of
)
Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al.
)
50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 ani 2)
)
ASLBP No. 82-L66-01
)
OL l
CFRTIFICATE OF SERVICE l
I hereby certify that conies of Wella Eddlenan's Genewal Interrogatories and Interrogatories te Annlicants on -Fddleran 75, 80, 83/8h,6hf, and 67 (Third Set), and of Wells Eddlenan's Resnonse to 1983 Updated DC9DR, have been served on the attached aervice list, first-class US mail, postage prepaid, under an extension of time agreed to by Applicants' i
counsel Baxter and Flynn, Staff counsel Barth, and approved by Judges Bright and Carnenter in Judge Kelley's absence; the sane would otherwise have been due June 30.
This 2d day of July, 1983 s
F Wells Eddleman
l I
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLF.AR REGUIATORY C0!C4ISSION In the matter of CAROLIhA POWER & LIGHT CO. Et al. J Dockets 50-h00 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
)
and 501sh01 0.L.
l CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE l
Wells Eddlenan's General Interrog's I hereby certify that copies of r
and Interrogatories to Annlicants re Eddleman 75, 80, 83/8h, 6hr & 67 and of W.E Fesnonse to 1963 Undated DC9D9 He.YE been served this _2_ day of July 1983, by deposit in I
the US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose nane s are rarked with an asterisk, for whom service was acconplished by l
Judges Ja :es Kelley, Glenn Bright and Janas Carpenter (1 copy each) 1 Atonic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear 9egulatery Conmission Washington DC 20555 George F. Trowbridge (atterney for Applicants) l Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge R uthanne G. Miller l
1600 M St. h'd ASL3 Penel Washington, DC 20036 USNRC hashington DC 2C55 5 Office of the Executive Legal Director Phv111s Lotchin, Ph.D.
I Attn Docke ts 50-400/h01 0.L.
10B 3ridle Run l
Washington DC 20555 NC 2751h USNRC Chanel Hill Dan Read Docketing and Service Section[3 %)
CEANGI/FLP Attn Docke ts 50-h00/h01 0.L.
Box 52h Office of the Secretary Chapel Hill NC 2751h USNBC Wasnington DC 20555 John Runkle Karen E. Long
'~'
CCNC Box 991 307 Granville Rd Raleigh NC 27602 Chapel Hill Ne 2751h Bradley W. Jones USNRC Region II Travi s Payne 101 Marietta St.
Edelstein & Payne Atlanta GA 30303 Box 1260']
Rale 1 h NC 27605 5
Richard Wilson, M.D.
Certified by h
729 Hunter St.
Apex NC 27502
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