ML20072J100
| ML20072J100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1981 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-1, TASK-2, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290925 | |
| Download: ML20072J100 (103) | |
Text
-
j hd 453 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,
=
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
[('.
METROPOI,ITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, i
Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
-against-t THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
E I
_y 1
G i
Continued deposition of Defendant THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY by JOSEPH J.
- KELLY, JR.,
taken by Plaintiffs, pursuant to I
adjournment, at the offices of Kaye. Scholer, Fierman. Hays & Handler, Esqs., 425 Park i
Avenue, New York, New York, on Thursday, May i
7, 1981, at 9:10 o' clock in the forenoon, I
before Walter Shapiro, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New Ycrk.
1
~
hhhA$O[f0 50 DOYLE REPORTING. INC.
T pg CERT:FIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 Lax 1NGTON AVENUE 1
WALTER SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
New Yonn. N.Y.
1 M17 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
TttreMcNE 212 - 867 8220 s
3
454 2
1 2
Appea ra nce s:
3 KAiE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS..
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, Now York By:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.
6
-and-ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
7 of Counsel 8
9 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
10 Attorneys for Defendants One Cha.ae Manhattan Plaza 1,1 New York, New York 12 By:
DANIEL F.
KOLB, ESQ.
-and '
13 PATRICIA VAUGHN, ESQ.,
14 of Counsel 15 16 17 18 10
'20 21 22 23 24 25
F 455
- 3 1
(-
i I
2 MR. MacDONALD:
I would like to mark 3
for identification as GPU Exhibit 158 a copy 4
of a memorandum from J.
J.
Kelly to C.
D.
(
5 Morgan dated September 28, 1979, a three-page 6
document.
The second page is a memo from 3
7 Tally to Kelly, September 14, 1979, and there 8;
is also a third page.
9 (Three-page document consisting of a
'10 l September 28, 1979 memorandum (from J.
J.
11 Kelly to C.
D.
Morgan, a September 14, 1979 stl 12 memo from' Tally to Kelly, and a third page Q#
13 was marked GPU Exhibit No.
158 for 14
. identification as of this date.)
15 J O S EP H J.
KE L LY, J
R.,
16 resumed, having been previously sworn by a
.17 Notary Public, and testified fur.ther as
'18 follows:
19 EXAMINATION (CONTINUED)
_20 B'? MR. MacDONALD:
21-Q Mr. Kelly, did you write GPU 158 in or 22 about late September 1979, the first page?
23 A
Yes.
)
24
'Q Would you look at the middle of the 25 paragraph, the only paragraph on that page.
You C
w
456 4
1 Kelly 2
see where the sentence begins "Our primary tools..."?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
It says:
"Our primary tools for this
(
I 5
analytical work are" done by " Power Train und TRAP."
6 MR. KOLB It does not say "done by."
7 Q
"... Power Train and TRAP," T-R-A-P.
8 Do you see that?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
What are Power Train and TRAP?
11 A
Power' Train is a name of a B&W code.
It is a 12 hybrid code consisting of some analytical computers,
)
\\/
13 and some digital computers.
14 TRAP is another B&W code.
It is a 15 straight, transient, digital code.
16 Q
Were both of these codes used in B&W's 17 transient analyses?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Were they used in transient ~ analyses 20 prior to the TMI-2 accident?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
Were they B&W primary tools for 23 analytical work on transients?
24 MR. KOLB:
At what point in time?
25 MR. MacDONALD:
Prior to the TMI-2
v'-
~'
457 5
1 Kelly 7 r~%
e i
N/
2 accident.
A They are only two of several codes.
I mean, 3 i r=
4W there are Fuel Management Prediction codes.
There
(
6 are coden used by the Emergency Core Cooling System.
6 I don't know what you mean by " primary."
7 Q
As' you' used it in that sentence, "Our 8
primary tools for this analytical work," how did'you -
anted it 15 as a position of Licensing that every one of these 16 start.at the PSC.
17 Q
Did you obtain a response f rom Licensing? -
18 A
Ye8-19 Q
What was the substance of Ehat response? -
~'
A The substance was if I had any doubts that it 20 21 may be a preliminary safety concern to go ahead and submit it as a preliminary safety concern.
22 23 Q
Attached to your memo are two pages under-()
24 the' heading "ATOG Potential Design Questions'- ANO."
l Were-these some of the potential l
25
'b u_1
-f I
485 l 33 i
Kelly n
2 pr blems that were raised that you were referencing in your October 19th memo A
Yes.
(
Q
-- that were being raised for the first time to the participants in the developir.g and 6
reviewing of event trees in ATOG?
MR. KOLB:
Would you read the question 8
again?
g 10 A
They were being raised by the participants fr the first time, yes.
12
)
Q Did these all --
3 MR. KOLB:
I would j ust like to insert something.
I think because of the witness' use of inflection that there may be'some lack 4
of clarity here.
He is-saying words"with g
18 emphasis, but when they are writ $en 'down tihey may not make the point, and I jus't think we
, gg ought to be clear as to whether he is saying in-all of these questions that no one ever 21 raised these problems before,.no one ever thought of them before, or whether he is O.
saying that these individuals themselves hadn't V.
24 raised them or thought of the:ri before.
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2 MR. MacDONALD:
Fine
'I thought his N
_3 testimony was fairly. clear on' that.
/
4 MR. KOLB:
I don't think anybody,in the
(
5_
room'has any trouble.
6 Am I right, you are talking about those
~
individuals?
e
'g MR. MacDONALD:
Let me ask the questions,
0 and deal,with the answers that we have.
I don't i
10 think there-is any problem.
i gg MR. KOLE:
Do you agree with me, he is 12 speaking only of individuals?
.s 13 MR. MacDONALD:
We.have the testimony.
g4 MR. KOLB:
Mr. Kelly ought to explain.
15 You and I understand because we.are hearing j,16 the words with-inflection, and the written g7 record may not'be.as cl e'a r a s it. s ho'uld ' b e o n,.
r s
gg what-exactly,he
.'.s referring to.
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y gg MR. Ma'cDONALD:
I think the record is
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r clear on it.
If'you have any prob 1.em_ wit-h
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it, you are entitled to clear'. it up wit'hh
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+-c 22 questioning.
I think at this point in' time, r.
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the. roc'oyd]and 23 we have let's just go on.
I i
. [~,J gj-don't
. s, seI tha h there-is any p.roblem'in
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unde rstandin,g.. f, 25 whec Mr. Kelly said so far.-
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407 35 g
Kelly
[h MR. KOLB:
We will come back and 2
larify it then if that is necessary, but it 3
w uld be so simple to simply let him emphasize 4
(
5 the point now so,it is all here in one place.
6 If y u prefer to do it the other way, that is your right.
7 g
BY MR. MacDONALD:
Q Were the numbered items on the second g
10 and third pages f GPU 160 treated as PSC's or, to gg use your terminology, " handled via the PSC route"?
A Not all of them.
12 O
\\'J Q
Which ones were, if you can tell?
13 A
I don't remember.
g4 15 Q
S me were and some were not?
A Yes.
16 Q
Did you or any of the other people who g7 inv lved in developing and reviewing of event were 18 trees for the ATOG program speak to any of the
~
gg i
20.
ther individuals participating in the program to discuss some of these potential problems that had
(.
become apparent to you with those individucls?
r
(?
MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
93
~
i s
I don't think that is very well phrased.
It could be unclear.
"5 ll,
M:
i::7
488 36 i
Kelly O
2 THE WITNESS:
Would you read it again, please.
Q Let me try and break it up for you.
4 1
Did either yourscif or the other members f the ATOG program who were developing and reviewing 6
the event trees discuss these several potential 7
8 problems, as you referred to tliem in the second line o
your memo, with any of the other individuals 9
inv lv d in the ATOG program?
10 A
I don't remember.
g 12 Q
Did anyone discuss them with Mr. Twilley Y"
13 A
I don't remember.
N
""1
"#8 15 A
I don't remember, 16 MR. MacDONALD:
I would like to mark g
fr identification as GPU Exhibit 161 a copy 18 of a memo f rc m J.
J.
Kelly to Dis'tribution, gg dated August 21, 19*19.
l (Copy of a memo dated August 21, 1979 l
from J.
J.
Kelly to Distribution was marked 22
~GPU Exhibit 161 for identification as of this g
date.)
BY MR. MacDONALD:
489 37 i
Kelly A-2 Q
Is this a copy of a memo you wrote in 3
or about August 21, 1979 in the regular course of 4
business?
(
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You see the sentence in the first i
7 paragraph, the third sentence, which begins:
o 8
"Ever'yone involved..."?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
The sentence reads:
"Everyone involved 11 agrees that clear, simple and concise operating 12 guidelines are a major factor in future upgrading
\\
13 of plant availability and safety."
14 By "Everyone involved," were you 15 referring to everyone involved in the ATOG program 1
16 in this memo?
17 THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat the 18 question, please?
19 Q
Were you referring by the term "Everyone 20 involved" to the people at Bsw who were participating 1
21 in the ATOG program?
22 A
No.
4 23 Q
Who irere you referring to?
24 A
The people that I had been in contact with, 25 utility representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory
,.,c w
w a-e e
-r
--,m
, ~ -
w
490 38 1
Kelly O
2 Commission that we had had discussions about the 3
ATOG program.
4 Q
On the second page of your memo under l
5 item III.D., do you see the sentence that begins 6
"Notwithstanding..."?
III.D.
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
The sentence reads:
"Notwithstanding 4
9 the apparent formality of the above, the success of 10 this program will depend upon a grea't deal of 11 informal communication between Customer Service and 12 Engineering."
'~
13 What did you mean by the phrase 14
" informal communication"?
15 A
Telephone conversations and face-to-face 16 dialogue.
17 Q
Was this something that you believed had 18 not existed prior to this time on an ongoing basis?
19 A
No, I was just trying to reinforhe and 20 encourage it, informal communication.
21 Q
In order for the success, for the record?
(_
A Excuse me?
g3 i
23 Q
In order for the success of the ATOG O)-
34 program?
g m
i A
Yes.
25 l
l
491 39 1
Kelly
/~
(_.T l.
2 Q
The second sentence reads:
" Performance 3
Engineers are encouraged to establish close feedback 4
contacts with simulator instructors, guideline writers, k
5 etc., through R.
C.
Twilley."
6 A
I'm s o.r r y, was there a question?
7 Q
No, there was not a question. -
8 Who were the Performance Engineers that 9
you were referring to there?
10 A
You want them by names, that Is what you are 11 asking?
12 Q
No.
i J
v 13 A
They were the members of the Engineering 14 Department in the Abnormal Transient Guideline 15 Program.
16 Q
And you wanted them to establish close 17 feedback contacts with simulator instructors, 18 guideline writers, et cetera.
19 Who was the "et cetera"?
20 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
2; Q
What did you mean by the "et cetera"?
22 A
I don't' remember.
23 Q
Were you a Performance Engineer at the
- (_)
24 time in the Engineering Department?
25 A
No, the term never worked.out, " Performance
I 492 40 1
Kelly
(~N
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2 Engineer." The concept never worked out.
We were 3
trying to start it with this, so no one was really, 4
by title, a Performance Engineer.
(
5 Q
By function, was anybody then a 6
Performance Engineer prior to this time?
7 MR. KOLB:
When you say " function," do -
8 you mean as the function was intended to be?
4 9
MR. MacDONALD:
Yes.
I 10 A
No.
11 Q
Prior to this time as an engineer in 12 the Plan Integration Unit, had you had any close g
t_J 13 feedback contacts with simulator instructors' during 14 the course of your employment at B&W7 15 A
If it was necessary for the particular:
16 assignment I was involved with, I would go and talk 17 to simulator instructors, yes.
18 Q
So you had talked to them from time to 19 time?
20 A.
Yes.
21 Q
Was it on a regular ongoing basis or 22 just as the needs dictated?
23 A
Just as my assignments required, yes.
/'
(,)
34 Q
On page 4 under B,
" Operating Guideline 25 Preparation Responsibilities," you will see item l
i
i 493 41 1
Kelly 2
No.
2,
" Review Event Trees."
A Yes.
3 4
Q That reads:
"Revi3w Event Trees - The
(
5 draft event trees produced by the Performance 6
Engineers are to be reviewed by Customer Service 7
(preferably simulator instructors)."
8 Was that objective ever accomplished 9
at B&W7 10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Was it done preferably by simulator 4
12 instructors?
i 13 A
Yes.
g4 Q
Do you know whether or not prior to 15 the time of ATOG draft operating procedures had 16 been reviewed by simulator instructors?
17 A
I don't recall.
18 Q
In the course of speaking with other 19 members involved in ATOG, did you come to find out that this was a new procedure instituted by 20 j,
21 the ATOG program?
~(
22
'A What is "this"?'
I'm sorry.
- 23 Q
"This" would refer to the review of
[)
24 draft operating procedures by simulator instructors.
25 A
Draf t o f event - trees?
l
494 42 1
Kelly f~
D) i 2
3 Q
Draft event trees.
4 A
Event trees were new to the ATOG program, so I
lh 5
review of event trees by simulator instructors 6
would be, yes.
7 Q
The question would be in terms of 8
review of draft operating procedures by simulator 9
instructors, did you have any discussion with 10 other members of ATOG who told you that this i
i j
11 would indeed be a new procedure?
12 MR. KOLB:
I am not clear now.
You say
.[3
'(#
1
]
13 the question would be, but your question 14 before wasn't as to operating procedures; it 3
l 15 was as to event trees.
i j
16 MR. MacDONALD:
No, the question refers i
i 17 to j
18 MR. KOLB:
Which question, the new one?
19 MR. MacDONALD:
This quest [on right now 4
refers to draft operating procedures and their 20 f
21 review by simulator instructors.
\\c-22 BY MR. MacDONALD:
23 Q
The question is whether or not in the I) 94 course of conversations with members of the ATOG 25 program,.you determined whether or not prior to 2
e y
e
-r g--
y-r-
3
(
495 1 43 1
Kelly G
k_)
2 ATOG there had been review of draft operating 3
procedures by simulator instructors.
4 A-I don't recall.
(
5 Q
In the first paragraph on page 4,
the 6
first sentence begins:
"The bases..."
7 Do you see that?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
It says:
"The bases for this expected 10 behavior is also included in this section.
That is, t
11 instead of just telling the operator that pressure 12 goes up during the initial phase of a loss of OV 13 feedwater, you should also explain why it goes up.
14 He should be able to follow the heat transfer and 15 hardware operation throughout the transient.
The 16 explanation should be written, therefore, for an 17 operator to clearly understand what is. happening to 18 his plant."
19 Was what you are explaining in those 20 sentences of that paragraph a new development within 21 the ATOG program?
22 A
No.
23 Q
Had you reviewed. prior procedures, O)
(
24 draft operating procedures, by B&W to see if they 25 explained why certain events were taking place
i l
496 44 1
Kelly O
2 during this transient?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Which procedures did you review?
I 5
A B&W Small Break Operating Guidelines, B&W 6
Inadequate Core Cooling Guidelines.
s 7
Q Both of those were prepared after the 1
8 time of the TMI-2 accident?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Did you review any procedures prepared 11 prior to the time of the TMI-2 accident?
12 A
Had I ever reviewed any procedure
[)
i
\\"#
13 Q
In the course of attempting to draft 14 procedures that explained to the operator why 15 something happened during the transient.
16 A
I don't remember.
17 Q
Do you remember whether any of the 18 pre-TMI procedures explained to the operators why 19 certain events were taking place durini the-20 transient?
I I
21 A
I don't remember any.
s 22 Q
As you understood it, this was'a 23 new development of the Small Break Operating (O) 24 Guidelines, Inadequate Core Cooling Guidelines, 25 and ATOG to give this explanation to the operators?
497 45 1
Kelly s
)
v 2
A To write it down and provide it with the 3
procedure I believe it was new, but it may have been 4
given in other forms in the past.
(
5 Q
But to your knowledge, not in the 6
procedure itself?
7 A
Not in the procedure itself.
8 MR. MacDCNALD:
I would like to mark as 9
GPU Exhibit 10 MR. KOLB:
Off the record.
11 (Discussion off the record.)
12 MR. MacDONALD:
I would like to mark as O]
\\'-
13 GPU Exhibit 162 a document, Bates No. T10000, 14 entitled " Babcock and Wilcox Company 15 Development of Operating Guidelines for the 16 Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines 17 Program."
18 (Document bearing Bates No T10000 19 entitled "BabcockandWilcoxComhany i
20 Development of Operating Guidelines for the 21 Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines 22 Program" was marked GPU Exhibit 162 for 23 identification as of this date.)
/^\\
t f
94 A
O.K.
x_/
~
25 Q
Have you ever seen a copy of GPU Exhibit
498 46 1
Kelly O
2 162 before?
3 A
I don't recall.
4 Q
You don't recall preparing it or
(
5 reviewing it or having any other input with regard i
6 to GPU Exhibit 1627 7
A I don't recognize it.
8 Q
You have no idea who might have written 9
it?
10 A
I don't remember.
11 Q
Do you remember how it found its way 12 into your files?
O 13 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
14 A
No.
15 MR. MacDONALD:
I would like to mark as 16 GPU Exhibit 163 a copy of a memo from J.
J.
17 Kelly to Distribution, dated December 21, 1979.
18 (Copy of a memo dated December 21, 1979 19 from J.
J.
Kelly to Distribution was marked 20 GPU' Exhibit 163 for identification as of this 21 date.)
22 BY MR. MacDONALD:
23 Q
Is this a copy of a memo you wrote on O
(_,).
24 or about December 21, 1979 in the regular course of 25 business?
499 47 1
Kelly O
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
On the first page under I.A.,
" Event 4
Trees," do you see the third sentence which begins:
(
5 "The engineers are also..."?
6 A
Yes.
~
7 Q
The sentence reads:
"The engineers are 8
also reviewing their event trees against existing 9
data for reactor trips at B&W plants."
10 What existing data for r,eactor trips 11 at B&W plants were the engineers reviewing their 12 event trees against?
O 13 A
Data that B&W had available on previous 14 reactor trips that operated.
15 Q
Were those SPR's?
16 A
Are you asking is that a possible source or 17 is that what they actually used?
18 Q
No, is that one of the sources---
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
that you are referring to in the phrase 91
" existing data"?
22 A
Yes.
i 23 Q
What else were you_ referring.to by the O( y -
24 phrase " existing data"?
A The Power Systems-and Control Unit maintained 25
~
f.
P-i 500
. 48 1
Kelly 2
descriptions of previous trips where they would 3
have parameter transit;if the utility supplied 4
them that, they could refer back to sequences of l
{l 5
events and that type of thing.
6 Q
Was this an attempt to bench mark the 7
event trees against actual plant transients 8
MR. KOLB:
Objection to form.
9 Q
-- to see whether or not they actually 10 functioned as designed?
t 11 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
12 A
Yes, it was an attempt to verify and build O
V 13 conficence in the methodology that he used to 14 develop event trees.
15 Q
Do you know whether or not this 16 comparison of procedures had taken place prior to 17 the ATOG' program?
18 A
I don't know.
19 Q
Have you heard of the term " core cooling 20 information display"?
21 A
Yes.
33 Q
Explain what that means.
23
.A It was a term developed by the Customer
~
24 Service Department members of the Abnormal Transient f
25' Operating Guideline-Team to describe an' earlier wv.
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y
l 501 49 1
Kelly O
2 version of what eventually became developed into 3
the ATOG display.
4 Q
What was contained on the earlier
(
5 version of the core cooling information display?
6 A
I don't remember.
7 Q
Is there anything in GPU Exhibit 163 8
that wo'uld help you identify what.was on that 9
display?
10 A
Page' 2 of GPU Exhibit 163 in %,aragraph Roman l
t I
11 numeral two, " Guideline Development," refers to an 12 Attachment 1.
That Attachment 1 is an example of O
13 an earlier version of the core cooling information I
14 display.
15 Q
What were the parameters that were 16 displayed on that?
17 A
Reactor coolant system pressure,. steam 18 generator pressure, steam generator temperature, 19 reactor coolant system temperature.
20 Q
And saturation was plotted also?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
That was to be all in the same display?
23 A
Yes.
/~T
()
24 Q
What developed out of ATOG relating 25 to such a" display?
502 50 1
Kelly AU 2
MR. KOLB:
Would you read the question 3
again?
4 Q
I will withdraw it and I will ask it
(
5 this way:
You said this -core cooling information 6
display was developed by people within Customer 7
Service.
8 Was t' sere anything that was incorporated.
9 in the ATOG program that was similar in any respect 10 to the core cooling information display?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
What was that?
13 A
As the ATOG program developed, more things were 14 added to this Attachment 1.
15 Q
What things were added to Attachment 1?
16 A
Subcooled margin was added, a subcooled margin 17 curve was added, an expected post-trip window was 18 added, reactor vessel riddle failure c rves were 19
- added, post-reactor trip target boxes were added, 20 a thermal shock curve was added, reactor coolant 21 pumpinet positive suction curves were added, fuel pin 33 compression limit curves were added.
23 Q
What was the reason that this was all 24 combined together on one display?
25 A
What we wanted to provide the operator with,
f 503 51 1
Kelly
)
2 a convenient method of identifying the symptoms 3
that we came up with as a result of the 4
symptom-oriented approach developed by ATOG.
5 Q
Such a display had not existed prior 6
to the time it was developed by ATOG?
7 A
Not to my knowledge.
8 Q
Did the display contain the key 9
parameters that an operator would need in functioning 10 during a transient?
t 11 A
It contains the parameters he needs to 12 identify the basic symptoms we developed.
He needs 13 additional parameters that are not on this display 14 in order to completely handle the transient.
15 Q
On page 3 of GPU Exhibit 163 under 16 Roman numeral three, " Program Interactions," in the 17 fifth paragraph you see the sentence that begins 18 with "Part II"?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
That paragraph reads:
"Part II of the 21 guidelines is to be used for operator training and 22 is a vital portion of the program."
23 What was Part II of the guidelines?
' (_)
24 A
Part II of the guidelines is the design basis 25 and expected plant response for the transients that T
1M S N
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'+
f 504
~52 1
Kelly 2
we studied and multiple failure combinations of 3
those transients.
4 Q
That was the basis on which the
(
5 guidelines were prepared?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Who participated in the preparation 8
of Part II?
Was that a function of the Engineering 9
Department?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Who was in charge of the preparation 12 of Part II?
O 13 A
Eric Swanson.
14 Q
The second sentence of that paragraph 15 reads:
"It represents an order of magnitude 16 increase in the value of guidelines over our 17 traditional draf t procedure approach. "-
18 When you used the phrase "our 19 traditional draft procedure approach," were you 20 talking about B&W's draft operating procedures 21 that were in existence prior to the time of the 22 d e e lo pme nt of ATOG?
23 A
Yes.
)
24 Q
And how did the development of the 25 Part II guidelines represent an order of magnitude
505 53 1
Kelly O
2 increase in the value of the guidelines over those 3
prior draft operating procedures?
4 A
In my mind, it gathered up into one spot all
(
5 the information the operator would need to 6
explain to him why he was doing the steps that 7
the procedural. portion of the guidelines were 8
outlining.
~
9 Q
That hadn't previously been gathered 10 together by the traditional draft procedure 11 approach?
12 MR. KOLB:
When you say " gathered b
\\-
13 together," do you mean in the form that ATOG 14 gathered it together?
15 MR. MacDONALD:
That he was speaking of.-
16 A
I was using " gather together" as written and 17 attached to the portion.
18 To my knowledge; the traditional approach 19 to draft procedure development did not do that.
20 Q
How did the traditional approach to 21 draft procedure deal with that backup?
22 A
Operators would come to B&W for simulator 23 training and classroom instruction on casualty
()'
24 controls and the reason steps were taken or 25 developed during.that portion of the training.
506 l
54 1
Kelly 3
,O 2
Of course, the utility's training 3
department was always free to call B&W and ask any i
4 questions they had on why they were taking I
(
5 particular steps.
6 Q
But it wasn't included as a portion of 7
the draft written procedures?
8 A
Not that I remember, no.
j i
l 9
Q Were you involved in the drafting of 10 the Inadequate Core Cooling Operator Guidelines?
11 A
No.
12 Q
Did you review any part of the Inadequate 13 Core Cooling Operator Guidelines after they were 14 created?
15 A
Not in an official review capacity.
I may 16 have read them.
17 Q
They were incorporated, were they not, 18 in the ATOG program?
19 A
Oh, yes, yes.
20 Q
Who was in charge of creating the 21 Inadequate core Cooling Operator Guidelines?
I.%
A The Project Engineer was Blair Fairbrother.
22 23 Q
What section or unit was he in?
()'
A At the time, he was in Plant Integration.
34 25 Q
Lid he report to you in Plant t
I
507 55 1
Kelly (h
V#
2 Integration at that time?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Who did he report to?
(
5 A
Mr. Karrasch.
6 Q
What was his title, if he had one?
7 A
I don't recall.
8 Q
What is your understanding of why the g
Inadequate Core Cooling Operator Guidelines were 10 created?
+
11 A
They were required by new regulation 0578 12' issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
13 Q
What was included in those guidelines?
14 A
What was the technical content?
I don't 15 understand.
16 Q
The basic substance of what the 17 guidelines spoke of.
~
18 t.
They tell the operator how to recognize 19 inadequate core cooling, and they give'him 20 instructions on how to restore normal plant conditions 21 from that state.
22 Q
It is a recognition through the use of 23 in-core thermocouples?
4 24 A
Yes.
4 25 Q.
These were new guidelines created by i
c-
508 56 i
Kelly O
2 B&W after the TMI-2 accident, is that correct?
3 A
Yec.
4 Q
Prior to the time of the TMI-2
(
5 accident, what were the purposes for which in-core 6
thermocouples were used?
7 Let me back up a little bit.
You were 8
involved in startup tests, is that correct?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Are in-core thermocouples used for 11 startup testing?
12 A
Yes.
O-)
13 Q
In what way?
14 A
I don't remember.
15 Q
Were procedures created by the Inadequate
~
1G Core cooling Operator Guidelines for the use of 17 in-core thermocouples to determine whether or not 18 there was a sufficient level of cooling in the 19 reactor core?
20 A
I d n't know.
21 Q
Did you ever review the procedures cn-22 read the procedures that were' created for the use 23 of in-core thermocouples in the Inadequate Core A
- [ )\\
o4 Cool'ing Operator Guidelines?
\\_
25' A
No.
57 1
509 Kelly O
2 Q
You testified yesterday -- I am not 3
asking you this to confirm your testimony; I will 4
put the question to you again -- that there were
(
5 only two instances that you knew of where the 6
rupture disc on the drain tank had blown during 7
a loss of coolant accident and that was at Oconee 8
and Davis-Besse, is that correct?
9 A
They ware the only two instances that I can 10 remember where the quench tank rupture disc had 11 blown, yes.
12 Q
On the day of the TMI-2 accident when O
13 you were informed that the quench tank rupture disc 14 had blown, did it occur to you at that point in i
15 time that the plant had undergone a loss of coolant 16 accident?
17 A
I don't remember being informed on the day of 18 the accident that the quench tank rupture disc had 19 blown..
20 Q
When you were informed that the quench 21 tank rupture disc had blown, did you, at that point 22 in time, identify that the plant had undergone a 23 loss of coolant action?
O t()
24 A
Yes.
j 25 Q
Did you make that determination from
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _. _ - _ - - _ _ _a
510 58 1
Kelly O
2 the fact that the quench tank rupture disc had 3
blown?
4 A
No.
k 5
MR. MacDONALD:
I don't have any 6
further questions at this point in time.
7 M R '. KOLB:
I have a few myself.
8 EXAMINATION BY MR. KOLB:
9 Q
Mr. Kelly, do you recall that earlier 10 in your examination you were asked dome questions 11 concerning whether the guidelines that you had 12 suggested and Mr. Dunn had suggested had, in O
13 substance, been disseminated on or conveyed by B&W 14
.to the operating utilities?
Do you recall that 15 question?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
I believe you were asked at one point 18 what you meant by "in substance" when you testified 10 concerning that subject.
20 For context, could you tell us again 21 what you meant when you indicated that, if I recall 22 your testimony correctly, that the guidelines that 23 you and Mr. Dunn had proposed had not, in substance, I
- P)
(
24 been conveyed to the operating utilities?
Could 25 you tell us what you meant?
-N
511 59 1
Kelly 2
MR. MacDONALD:
Are you asking him a 3
new question now to confirm prior testimony?
4 MR. KOLB:
I am asking him to indicate
(
5 again what he understood when he used the 6
words "in substance" when he answered the 7
question and, as I indicated, I think that to 8
the extent that I am asking that question it
(
9 is a repeat of a question that was asked 10 earlier, and I am putting it to him for 11 context.
MR. MacDONALD:
Could I hear the f\\
13 question?
14 (Question read) 15 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form of 16 the question.
17 MR. KOLB:
What is the basis for the 18 objection?
19 MR. MacDONALD:
Basically, I can't 20 understand whether you are asking him based 21 on prior testimony or, in fact, you are asking 22 him a new question what he means by the phrase 23 "in substance" in the context of. conveying
)
24 the ATOG guidelines to the customers.
25 Why don't you just put the question and
512 60 1
Kelly 0
2 ask him whether or not that is, in fact, the 3
case.
You are asking him to go back 4
MR. KOLB:
We are not talking about the
(
5 ATOG guidelines.
We'are talking about the 6
possibility that this information might have 7
been conveyed in substance or not prior to 8
the Three Mile Island accident; that is the 1
1 9
testimony that he gave earlier.
10 As far as whether this Is a new 1
11 question is concerned, this paralleic a j
12 question he was asked earlier, but I am asking O
~ ha:is answering it today.
13 it anew and 14 MR. MacD')NALD:
Could you just st,3te the 15 question for the record so that we are clear?
16 MR. K O L B,:
I think the request'is clear s
17 and I am letting the witness answersin.h'Es own 18 words.
d m
19 MR. Ma c DON AT;D :
I don't think it is clear.
20 Go ahead.
og BY MR. KOLB:
9 f
Q Go aheail, Mr. Kelly, just tell us what
. 22 p
w s
23' you meant.
t 4
s x.
~
O s
24 l
A What I meant by 'Jn'fubstnace" was that t h e' I
s x'
s
\\
2f exact words or some very Nic's'e va riation ' o f thos e
's I.
__________-_-r..
s
.513 61 1
Kelly O
2 exact words of either my prescription or Mr.
3 Dunn's prescription w'ere not transmitted to the 4
operating utilities prior to the ThreerMile Island,
(
5 to my knowledg'e.
6 Q
Did you mean by that, testimony that no i
7 information of that type had been previously 8
conveyud to the operators of the operatin'g utilities?
9 MR. MacDONALD:
I am going to object to l
10 the form of the question.
It'is leading.
11 Q
Go aheadi Mr. Kelly.
?
12 MR. MacDONALD:
Can I hear it reread, 13 please?
14 (Question read) 15 MR. MacDONALD:
My objection, stands.
i.
16 Q
Go ahead, Mr. Kelly.
I
- p.,
t 17 A
No.
t.
?
18 Q
Could you tell us, in your oun words, 10 what your understanding was as to whether 20 information of that type had been conveyed to i
21 operators previously?
s b
)
22 A
I had talked to simulator instructors abo'ut 23
'what they were teaching the operators from
(
24 operating plants, and they told me that they were 25 giving guidelines on variations of average t
~ =. _ - - _.
=.
x-
- i.,,
ei
,.514
? <;.
'62 1
Kelly 2
temperature control and reactor coolant system,
'k.
- ?
3 pressure and pressurizer level.
.2
,r 1
,:D 4
My prescription, Part B of my-
. :l*
(T
- 5 f
,v.
prescription, is essentially my attempt-to write s
6 down what I believed the simulator lastructors were x
4'
,already teaching.
.i 34 Q
Do you recall that earlier in your
\\
s.!
)
9 l
testimony you werecasked questions concerning the 10 procedures that _B&W had sent to its'. operating l
211
. utilities andithat, at one point, you were asked a 12 question as'to whether or not those procedures might 13 in some' respect be unnecessarily cumbersome?
Do 14 you rec'all that series of questions?
.f 1
't 15 -
A.
Yes.
16 MR.~MacDONALD:
I object to the extent 1
17
.that you are trying to characterize questions i.
- g.
and answers.
l-i.
13' If you want to go back and read the.
k
'. g -
- s..'
/s 2'01 question and the answer, fine, but I don't 11-
[+ ij --
(,
21 know whether those words were used necessarily
- 1- -
22 in that question.
PYY..
v 23 BY;MR. ItOLB :
d [ )-
24 Q
Mr.. Kelly, do you-r'ecall the question?
v 25 A.
- Yes, n..
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- - - +
e r
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515
.i 63 I
Kelly y-Q r Q
2 Q
When you responded to the prior question P
3 or questions and gave testimony with respect to 4
whether or not any existing procedures might be
(
5 unnecessarily cumbersome, could yoit tell us in what 6
sense you used and understood the phrase 7
" unnecessarily cumbersome" and I ask you to tell us 8
in your own words.
f 4
]
9 MR. MacDONALD:
I object again.
10 You are doing the same thing that you 11 admonished other people for doing in the 12 course of depositions and that is taking (D#
13 phrases and words out of context and 14 mischaracterising the prior testimony, but 15 BY MR. KOLB 16 Q
Go ahead, Mr. Kelly.
17
'A To me, if the operator is using event-oriented 18 procedures and has a casualty involving multiple 10 failures, he will find himself simultaneously using e
20 two or three or more event-oriented procedures, and 21 he would be opening these procedures, if he used 22 them at all, and be trying to operate out of 23 several of these things at once.
l
/'~~S
.?'vj 24 I mean that that was physically awkward 25 or cumbersome to do it that way.
l
[
. -___ ~
516 64 i
Kelly
(~)
U 2
Q Did you mean he couldn't do it that 3
way?
4 A
No.
(
5 MR. MacDONALD:
Objection.
6 Q
Mr. Kelly, this morning, Mr. MacDonald 7
showed you two documents, one of which was marked 8
GPU 161 and one of which was m.arked GPU 163.
9 Let me just put those docunents before 10 you and ask if you recall being shown those 11 documents.
12 MR. MacDONALD:
Off the record.
OV 13 (Discussion off the record.)
l 14 A
Yes, I recall seeing the documents.
15 Q
In 161, which is a meno from you to 16 1
Distribution, Mr. MacDonald called your attention lI l
to a sentence appearing on the first page, which 17 18 reada:
"Everyone involved agrees that clesr, simple 19 and concise operating gujdelines are a major factor 20 in future upgrading of plant availability and safety."
3 21 Do you recall his calling your attention 22 to that sentence?
gl.
A
.Yes.
24 Q
Do you recall that in 163, which is a 25 memo from you to Distribution, he called your 4
--w
-,e
-e m
~.--.
i 517 i
65 i
Kelly
(~%
-(_J.
2 attention to a sentence which appears on page 3,
3 which roads:
"Part II of the guidelines is to be used for operator training and is a vital portion 4
l 5
of the program."
6 It is followed by the sentence, "It 7
represents an order of magnitude increase in the 8
value of guidelines over our traditional draft 9
procedure approach."
10 Do you recall his calling your attention 11 to those two sentences?
12 A
Yes.
O 13 Q
Mr. Kelly, what, again, is your position 14 in connection with the development of the ATOG 15 program?
16 A
I am the Project Engineer Technical Leader.
17 Q
And in that position, you are familiar 18 generally with the program, its development,,its 19 progress?
I 20 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
21 You don't have to lead the witness.
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Now, sir, with the two documents that
'(
I have referred you to.and specifically with the 24 25 passages that I have mentioned in-those documents,
518 66 1
Kelly O
2 161 and 163, in mind, could you tell us generally 3
what the purpose is behind ATOG in terms of trying 4
to simplify procedures,in your own words?
5 A
ATOG is an attempt to reformat existing 6
procedures, to take the technical content available 7
in existing procedures and reorganize it and 8
represent it to the operator in as simple a form as 9
can possibly technically be developed, certainly 10 beyond anything that a qualified operator would 11 need, with the intention that the guidelines reach 12 the absolute minimum base level of simplicity that we O
13 could develop.
g4 Q
In 161, the sentence we have been looking 15 at, says:
"Everyone involved agrees that clear, 16 simple and concise operating guidelines are a major 17 factor in future upgrading of plant availability and 18 safety."
19 In view of the testimony you just gave, 20 does that sentence, as you wrote it, mean that the 21 present guidelines, the pre-ATOG guidelines, are not 33 cither adequate or understandable?
23 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
()
34 Q
Mr. Kelly?
25 A
I did n t mean to imply that they were not
- 1. '
l 519 f
67 1
Kelly l /"T U
2 adequate or understandable.
l -
3 Q
What did you mean,in your own words?
l 4
A That if we could find a simpler way of doing l
5 it, a clear and simple and concise operating 6
guideline would be an improvement.
7 Q
If you will look at the passage in 8
Exhibit 163 that I called your attention to a 9
moment ago, the one that reads:
"Part II of the 10 guidelines is to be used for operato'r training and 11 is a vital portion of the program.
It represents 12 an order of magnitude increase in the value of O
13 guidelines over our traditional draft procedure 14 approach."
f5 Do you see that passage?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Did you mean by that passage that the 18 current guidelines, the ones that are pre-ATOG 19 guidelines, are not adequate or understandable?
20 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the' form as 21 leading.
22 A
No.
Again, the way that we were doing it, the 23 operators were getting this training and why they
[
O).
(
24 should be taking appropriate steps during emergency 25 procedures from other methods.
What I wanted to do
520 68 1
Kelly 2
at ATOG was to gather all that information together 3
and make it readily accessible to the operators.
4 Q
Now, Mr. Kelly, you recall that you k
5 testified earlier in your examination concerning 6
discussions with Mr. Dunn, Burt Dunn, in which you 7
and Mr. Dunn discussed tne subject of possible 6
premature termination of high pressure injection.
9 Do you recall that testimony?
10 A
Yes.
i 11 Q
In what year did those conversations 12 take place?
0' 13 A
1977.
14 Q
Do you recall how many there were?
15 A
Two.
16 Q
In your own words, would you characterize 17 for us the degree of concern, if any, that Mr. Dunn 18 exhibited to you during the two conver ations?
l
)
10 MR. MacDONALD:
Are you asking for what 20 Mr. Dunn said to him?
21 MR. KOLB:
Mr. Kelly's impression of 33 Mr. Dunn's degree of, concern based either on 23 words that Mr. Dunn spoke, gestures or
()
34 expressions or any means of communication 25 that Mr. Dunn might-have used.
m.____
_ _..u_ _ _ - - - - -.------- - - - -
521 69 1
Kelly
/N U
2 MR. MacDONALD:
I will object to that 3
as on the grounds previously stated.
4 BY MR. KOLB:
(
5 Q
Go ahead, Mr. Kelly, characterize that, 6
if you would, in your own words and tell us the 7
basis for your view.
8 A
After the debriefing in Training Room B when 9
I returned from investigating the Davis-Besse 10 transient, Mr. Dunn told me that he'pould develop 11 scenarios whereby the operators, they could get in 12 trouble by prematurely securing high pressure d
13 injection.
Those words were in a normal tone of 14 voice.
15 He did not appear to be agitated to me 16 at all.
There was no sense of urgency that I could 17 detect or any anxiety that I could detect in his 18 words or any gestures that he made.
It seemed like 19 to me that he thought the matter ought to be 20 addressed, but I saw no sense of urgency.
21 Similarly, when I talked to Mr. Dunn 22 later in 1977, after writing my November 1st memo 23 and only receiving a reply from Frank Walters,
'~
3,h) 24 when I 6.alked to Burt Dunn that time and told him 25 my results and asked him if he would do something
70 1
g,117 522 2
about it, again, he replied that yes, he would take 3
care of it, but I got no sense of urgency from him 4
or any indication that to me that he believed it
(
5 ought to be handled very promptly or with any kind 6
of excitement.
7 MR. KOLB:
Do you have Exhibit 787 8
MR. MacDONALD:
Yes.
9 (Handing) 10 Q
Mr. Kelly, I am placing'before you a 11 document which has previously been marked as GPU 12 Exhibit 78.
It is Mr. Dunn 's memorandum of February Ok-)
13 9,
1978 to Mr. Taylor.
14 Do you recall testifying earlier with 15 respect to this document?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Do you recall that at the end of your 18 second day of examination on this deposition, you 19 were asked questions concerning the last sentence 20 that appears in that memorandum?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
The sentence reads:
"I believe this is 23 a very serious matter and deserves our prompt f~'j
-34 attention and correction."
%d 25 Do you know, for context, can you tell
523 71 1
Kelly 2
us again what your reaction was when you read that 3
line in the memorandum?
4 A
I believe it was an overstatement of the l
5 problem.
6 Q
In your own words, would you tell us
,7 why you believed it was an overstatement?
8 A
At the time I read this memo and the 9
environment in which I read that memo, the following 10 facts were already available to me 1.n my mind.
11 Burt Dunn's concern, after my debriefing 12 in the Training Room B meeting was, as I just
\\/
13 recently testified, not urgent or anxious that I 14 could detect.
i 15 I had studied the Davis-Besse transient 16 and they did, in my opinion, terminate high pressure 17 injection but with appropriate operator action 18 nothing happened.
No serious results r damage to 19 the core occurred.
20 Similarly, I had the telephone 91
. conversation with Fred Faist where he told me about 22 the October transient, 1977, at Davis-Besse where 23 this time they stopped the actuation of high pressure
(~/h 24 injection, which I thought was inappropriate but,
's _
25 again, I had the fact that there was no serious
72 1
Kelly 024
\\_)
2 consequences from that and no core damage resulted, 3
so I had two examples of where I thought there was 4
misuse of the high pressure injection system, neither 4
(I 5
of which led to any core damage or serious 6
consequences.
7 Additionally, I had talked to the 8
simulator instructors about what they were teaching 9
directly to the operators of the plants, and I was 10 convinced that we were teaching the ' proper thing at 11 that level.
I knew from my nuclear service 12 experience that B&W developed and issued draft 13 guidelines that would in some form talk about, in 14 written words, how to terminate high pressure 15 injection.
16 I knew again from talking to Burt Dunn g7 about the'results of my November 1st memo that he gobno gg did not even when he knew that I results 10 on mine, he still gave me no impression that he 20 was-anxious or demanding a prompt reply.
He.said 3g that he would take care of it for-me.
Then now, it 22 is February of 1978, and Burt's memo shows up, and 23 with those things in the environment of why I was A
(
)
./
94 reading it -- when-I was reading it, it says, "I
25
'believe this is a very serious. matter and deserves
,w-s c
ir-e r
e
525 73 1
Kelly v
2 our prompt attention and correction" I read that and said "Burt is just trying to increase his 3
4 probability of getting a response to his memo (l
5 because he knew that I didn't get one from mine."
6 Q
Mr. Kelly, do you recall that also near 7
the end of your second day of your examination in 8
this litigation, you were asked questions about the g
phrase "very serious matter," taken as a single 10 phrase?
Do you recall that?
E A
Yes.
gg 12 Q
Do you recall that, in words or Os 13 substance, you responded to the questions about g4 that single phrase and indicated that taking that 15 single phrase you did agree with Mr. Dunn?
Do you 16 recall that?
37 A
Yes.
18 Q
Now, when you said in subsbance, in gg words or substance, that you agreed, wh'at did yon
"**"?
20 MR. MacDONALD:
Objection.
I think you 21 l
are trying to testify as.tx) what he meant.
l 33 23 Are y u asking him what he knew?
)
24 MR. KOLB:
Well, I disagree with you s
25 actually, as to his prior testimony on this W
a
i 526 74 1
Kelly (3
L_)
2 particular phrase,in terms of whether he has 3
had a full opportunity to explain what he 4
meant, and I am asking him in his own words
(
5 to explain what he meant.
6 MR. MacDONALD:
You asked him that 4
7 before.
8 MR. KOLB:
Let's assume he was asked it 9
before.
I am entitled to ask it again, 10 although I disagree with you whether he was 11 asked it before.
12 BY MR. KOLB:
13 Q
Mr. Kelly, in your own words, what did 14 you mean?
15 A
Taken as an insulated phrase in the abstract, 16 core uncovery leading to fuel damage is, of course, 17 a very serious matter.
That is what I. meant and 18 nothing more.
19 Q
Do you recall that the words " prompt 20 attention" as a phrase were also the subject of 21 questioning?
22 A
Yes.
r 23 Q
Do you recall that you answered questions
( ')
24 on the second day of your ex' amination indicating,.
~-
25 in substance, that looking-at that phrase alone you I
~p n
Y 527 75 1
Kelly O
2 agreed with Mr. Dunn?
Do you recall that?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
In your own words, would you tell us
(
5 what you meant when you answered those questions?
6 A
Again, taken in the abstract, anything that 7
has a reasonable probability of causing core 8
uncovery and serious core damage deserves prompt 9
attention and correction.
That is what I meant, 10 nothing more.
t 11 Q
Mr. Kelly, do you recall that you were 12 asked questions earlier in your examination T
s/
13 concerning your own training, simulated instruction, 14 and so forth at B&W?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Could you tell us, do you recall whether 17 you were trained as to saturation and/or opposite
~ '8 -
trending?
And by " opposite trending," I mean the 1
19 trending of pressuriser level and presAure in 20 different directions?
Do you recall whether you were
- 1 trained on those subjects?
(.
~
22 A
.No, I do not.
23 Q
Are you able to say categorically that
[~}
34 you were not trained on those subjects?
\\m/
25 A
No, I cannot say that.
528 76 1
Kelly O
2 Q
Do you recall that you were asked 3
questions about the day of the accident at Three 4
Mile Island?
I believe most of those questions came
(
5 yesterday.
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Could you tell us in your own words to 8
what extent during the day of the accident you had access to the facts concerning the incident and g
10 to what extent, in general, you did$not have access gg to facts, in your own words, Mr. Kel'ly?
I object to the form.
Ci 13 Are you asking him what he knew on the y,g day of the accident when?
15 MR. KOLB:
I think the question is 16 clear, and we will let the witness explain 37 in his own words.
gg A
We had that limited briefing in the classroom gg beside the simulator in the morning, an'd then I was on the airplane and traveling essentially away from 20 the entire situation for a series of hours until we 93 22 arri' red at Greg Schaedel's house in the afternoon 23 f March 28th, and at that point we were receiving inf rmation from Greg that he was getting in a 21 25 relay from Three Mile Island's Control Room, Lee
529 77 1
Kelly
,~(j-2 Rogers and to Lynchburg and back and forth.
That 3
type of information from Greg, we were getting.
I 4
didn't know at the time that there was information
(
5 going directly from the site or to Lynchburg or 6
what other forms of communication were in progress.
7 Q
At any point during the day of the 8
accident, did you receive information as to how g
the accident had developed in. the first place?
10 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
11 Q
Go ahead, Mr. Kelly.
12 A
Again, we had the limited briefing by Don
\\-
13 Hallman and Bill Spangler, and a briefing by Greg t
14 Schaedel as to the few things that he knew about 15 what had happened, when we got to his house.
16 Most of the information we were 17 receiving at Greg's house was on the current status 18 of the plant and on the attempts to reach system 19 stability to restart the reactor cooling pump, that 20 type of thing.
og Q
In terms of the facts you received, did 22 you, based on those facts or that information, as 23 y u viewed it at the time, stand in a position to
[]
draw conclusions as to how the accident had o4 s_/
25 developed in the first instance?
i
,w-
,,'n a-
,,n
-w
530 78 1
g,117 t
\\n) 2 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
3 Q
You are free to explain it in your own 4
words what your state of mind was.
l 5
MR. MacDONALD:
You are leading the 6
witness.
7 MR. KOLB The witness is free to 8
answer in his own words as he has been 9
consistently.
10 Q
Go ahead, Mr. Kelly, just tell us.
11 A
I was sent there to find out the sequence of 12 events and I wasn't getting enough information to 13 make that kind of determination to what was going g4 on.
15 Q
Before you left Lynchburg, did you 16 receive any instructions from anyone at B&W as to 37 whether conclusions should be drawn?
18 A
Mr. Hallman specifically said that because 19 of the limited facts that we had that de should not speculate or attempt to draw any conclusion, 20 that we should wait until we knew what was going 91 22 on before we tried.to form an opinion as to what 23 had to be done at that point.
3g Q
You have testified that you flew to 25 the general area of the Three Mile Island accident
531 79 1
Kelly O
2 on the day of the accident, is that correct?
l 3
A Yes.
4 Q
What was the purpose, as you understood
(
5 it, for your going to the site of the accident or 6
near the site?
7 A
Bob Twilley, Bob Winks, and I were directed 8
to go to the site and develop the sequence of 9
- events, that was our primary responsibility, and 10 assist Lee Rogers in any way we coul'd with any 11 problems that he may have.
12 Q
was it your understanding that you were O
13 actually to go to the site itself onto Three 14 Mile Island?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Were you allowed to do so?
17 A
No.
18 Q
What prevented you?
19 A
To the best of my knowledge, Metropolitan 20 Edison was limiting site access that day.
21 Q
Do you-recall that this morning you
(.
o l
32 were asked questions concerning.various computer 23 codes?
Some of the names used were Power Train,
~
24 CONTEMPT, TRAP.
Do you recall that testimony?
25 A
Yes.
e
532 80 1
Kelly 2
Q Do you recall you were asked various 3
questions as to possible inaccuracies or inabilities 4
with respect to those codes?
(
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Do you recall specifically as to Exhibit 7
158 you were asked about the last page of that 8
exhibit, the exhibit being a memo from yourself to 9
Mr. Morgan?
The exhibit, the third page, is 10 entitled " Inabilities of TRAP for Realistic Modeling 11 for ATOG."
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Just generally, Mr. Kelly, what were you 14 trying to accomplish as part of the ATOG program 15 in using these various codes?
O 16 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
17 Q
You can go ahead and answer, Mr. Kelly.
18 What was your objective?
10 A
We were trying to use the codes to develop 20 realistic parameter trends that we could use as al examples for the operator and also use to develop 33 the substance of the guidelines.
23 Q
Had the codes themselves be developed
[( >)
24 for otiser purposes?
25 A
Yes.
533 81 1
Kelly 2
Q
~
And when you were answering the 3
questions this morning concerning possible problems i
4 with these codes, inabilities, did you mean at any i
(
5 time to indicate that the codes were in any way 6
inadequate for the other purposes that they had been 7
used for in the past?
I 8
MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form of 9
the question.
10 It is leading; it is cha'.ra ct e riz ing 11 testimony.
l 12 MR. KOLB:
We will let the witness 13 answer and we will let him explain in his 14 own words.
15 Q
Mr. Kelly?
16 MR. MacDONALD:
I still have the 17 objection.
18 A
I did not mean to imply that they were in any
~
19 way deficient for their intended design purposes.
20 Q
Could you explain the prior purposes 21 in general,.the' purposes you had in mind.and the 22 degree to which, if at all,'the codes might be i
23 useful for one purpose and possibly not so useful
' (
24 forlanor.her purpose, just in your own words?
25
,MR.
MacDONALD:
I. object to the. form.
~
. ~
534 82 1
Kelly 2
Q Just tell us about it.
3 A
The TRAP code is a safety analysis code 4
developed to verify the design of the nuclear
(
5 steam supply system in response to severe overcooling 6
accidents such as major steamline breaks in the 7
secondary system.
It is used in the licensing 8
process of the B&W nuclear steam supply system.
9 In ATOG, I needed a transient code.
10 TRAP was the closest code that fit my requirements.
11 I was looking for a code that did not address 12 licensing concerns but that I could put in b)
's.
13 nonsafety-related systems and I could put in operator 14 actions and develop to the best of the code's 15 ability realistic responses that could be used for 16 operator examples of what he would really see if 17 this ever happened, as opposed to the original 18 function of the TRAP code which was to verify the 19 design of the plant.
20 Q
So again, they could be adequate for 21 one purpose and they might have to be modified for 22 another purpose, is that right?
23 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form 34 of the question.
~25 A
The TRAP code is accepted by.the NRC, to my
~
,w+,
535 83 1
Kelly
(~/1 1
s 2
knowledge, to verify the design of the nuclear 3
steam supply system defined by B&W on all our 4
current operating plants.
(
5 Q
As far as you are concerned, is it 6
adequate for that purpose?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
I mentioned a moment ago, you were 9
asked specifically about particular codes and one 10 of them was Power Train, and you were asked 11 questions as to the adaptability of Power Train to 12 the ATOG program.
f')h
\\-
13 could you just tell us, in your own 14 words, what has happened with respect to Power 15 Train and its use in the ATOG program?
16 A
Power Train is a code used to predict the 17 plant's response while it is operating at power and 18 supplying electricity.
gg When we got into the abnorAal transient 20 operating guideline development, we decided early 21 in the program that the key for the operator to n.o enter the abnormal transient operating guideline was a reactor trip.
23 f'/)
With that input, the behavior of the 44 x.
25 plant prior to reactor trip became very unimportant
I 536 84 1
Kelly O
2 to us, and Es a result, the ATOG program, as 3
actually run, had very little requirement for a 4
Power Train computer codes it was used to a very
(;
5 limited extent.
6 Q
Do you recall being shosn Exhibit 160, 7
GPU Exhibit 160, this morning?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Do you recall questions concerning the 10 discovery of problems by members of'the ATOG working 11 group?
12 A
Yes.
O' 13 Q
Just so the record is clear, would you 14 tell us, in your own words, did you mean to say 15 earlier -- this goes back to Lae point I asked Mr.
16 MacDonald to clarify earlier -- did you mean to say 17 earlier that the problems that you mentioned were 18 being discovered for the first time by people in the 19 ATOG group or did you mean to extend it beyond that 20 and indicate that the problems were being discovered 21 for the first time by anyone at Babcock & Wilcox?
22 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
23 Why don't you just ask him what he
()
33 meant instead of suggesting answers to the v
25 witness as you have been doing throughout the
P 537 85 1
Kelly 2
examination.
G ahead.
3 4
MR. KOLB:
This goes back to the
(>
5 clarification I asked for earlier.
6 BY MR. KOLB:
7 Q
Go ahead and answer the question, Mr.
8 Kelly.
Just answer the question first.
9 A
The problems outlined in Exhibit 160 were 10 identified by members of the ATOG working team.
I 11 don't know if they were identified by anybody_else 12 in the B&W organization or not prior to that time.
('N.
\\"'
13 MR. KOLB I don't have any additional g4 questions at this time.
Thank you.
15 BY MR. MacDONALD:
16 Q
Let me just follow up on a few things 17 you had mentioned previously in your~ answers to 18 Mr. Kolb's questions, gg In your discussions with simulator instructors in 1977 regarding B&W training on HPI, 20 og did you discuss specifically with any of those
(-
22 instructors which utilities they were teaching?
g3
.MR.-KOLB:
At that particular moment?
f~}
MR. MacDONALD:
At that
- t. me in 1977.
g v
25 A
I remember _them saying that they aching
538 86 1
Kelly g
(_)
2 Davis-Besse.
3 Let me qualify that.
I don't mean 4
that day.
I meant in the process of the normal
(
5 business.
6 Q
Was there anybody else that they 7
mentioned that they were teaching specifically?
8 A
Not that I recall.
9 Q
Did you ask any of the instructors 10 whether they had been specifically teaching operators 11 from Duke regarding the HPI?
12 A
I don't recall.
13 Q
Did you ask them specifically whether 14 they had been teaching operators from Met Ed?
15 A
Not that I recall.
16 Q
Did you specifically ask them whether 17 they had been teaching operators from Florida Power 18 Corporation?
19 A
Not that I recall.
20 Q
Or any other utility that operates B&W 21-nuclear plants specifically?
22 A
Not that I recall.
23 Q
Your conversations with Mr. Dunn in 24 1977 were conversations prior to your receipt of the 25 Dunn memoranda, is that correct?
i
=. -. _
539 87 1
Kelly
(}
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Did you tostify earlier -- and I will 4
ask you again -- that you considered Mr. Dunn the 1
l 5
foremost expert at B&W in the functioning of the 6
ECCS systems, isn't that correct?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
And that he had more knowledge regarding g
those systems and their proper functioning than 10 anyone else at B&W?
e 11 A
In my opinion, yes.
12 Q
You also stated a short while ago, in 13 response to Mr. Kolb's questioning about your ideas 14 on the last sentence of GPU Exhibit 78, specifically 15 the phrase "very serious matter and deserves our 16 prompt attention and correction," in the abstract 17 as to what they meant.
18 Do you. recall testifying as to that?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Mr. Dunn, however",,in his February 9, 21 1978 memo was not speaking ofan abstract issue, 22 was he?
If you are having trouble, let me do this.
23 In the second paragraph of Mr. Dunn's 24 memo of February 9th, the last sentence, it says:
25 "Had this event occurred in a reactor at full power
.~
~
4 w
88 1
Kelly O
2 with other than insignificant burnup it is quite 3
possible, perhaps probab3e, that core uncovery s
4 and possible fu'el:: 2unage, wou,1d have re s'ul te d. "
~ ~, u
(
,5 DavisEbssse at'that time of the
\\
s 6
September 24, 1977 transient.was not operating at N
i full power,-was.it?'
N 7
s on
)
8 A
It was not.
9 Q
It'was opera't'l'ng at somewhere around 9
- s s
10 percent power?
N
{Y g
i' N
\\
11 A
Yes.
S.
+
N 2
~
N
,"NN' 12 Q
Did you unders ani ' by Pf r. Dunn's
^
O 5
N' s
'ust read that he was j
relatibg 13 statement that I have
\\.
14 his concern that if-the event had1 occurred at t
4 w
15 Davis-Besse, namely HPI terminationsprematurely'in sy 16 a plant at full' power,\\ that it was guite possible, 17 perhaps probabl,e, that core uncovery.,and possibl'e v
18 fuel damage wo;ild have resulted?
h Ibememberthinkingthat, 19 A
I don't no.
20 Q
You don't remember coming to that i
og underjftaaliing when you read that sentence, "Had
(.
~
, this'ie've' t-occur.ced in a reactor at full power 22 n
' wg 1.,
23 with othe'r than'tknsignificantburnupit is'quite k
OO 94 possible,iperhaps probable, that core uncovery
~
1.
(
25 and possible fuel damsge would have resulted"?
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\\.
i,
-t
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~
5.
L g
89 1
541 Kelly
/")
2 A
No.
3 Q
That did not convey to you at the time 4
you read that that there was a serious concern of l
5 Mr. Dunn's that if the events that had occurred at 6
Davis-Besse occurred at a plant at full power that 7
you could have possible core uncovery and fuel l
8 damage?
9 A
No, for the reasons that I testified with 10 Mr. Kolb asking the questions, I didn't think he 11 we7 meaning what he said.
12 Q
You did not think that when Mr. Dunn 13 said that had the event occurred at. full power with 14 other than insignificant burnup it was quite 15 possible, perhaps probable, that the core uncovery 16 and possible fuel damage would have resulted?
You 17 did not believe that as it was' stated by Mr. Dunn 18 as Manager of ECCS?
19 A
That's right, I thought he was overstating 20 it.
21 Q
so you didn't believe that possible 22 core uncovery or fuel damage might occur if the 23 plant at full power had undergone a similar
(
24 tran'sient and, operators reacted in the same way as 25 at. Davis-Besse?
I
-i+
u a
mmaa:
542 90 1
Kelly 2
MR. KOLB Would you read the question 4
3 back?
i 4
(Question read)
(
5 A
No, I don't even believe that today.
If they 6
had shut the core block valve in ten minutes at 7
TMI-2 as they did at Davis-Besse, I don't think 8
they would have had core damage.
9 Q
Would you have any reason to doubt the 10 ability of Mr. Dunn to come to his conclusion in 11 the last sentence of that second paragraph based on 12 his expertise in ECCS systems?
13 A
I am having some t r.o ubl e understanding whether i
14 you mean did I believe that when I read this or do 15 I believe that there are some circumstances that 16 Burt Dunn could envision where this would happen.
17 Q
Did you have any reason at the time 18 you read this to doubt what Mr. Dunn w s saying in 19 light of his knewledge and expertise i[ ECCS systems 20 at B&W7 21 THE WITNESS:
Would you read that again, 22 please?
23 (Question read).
.(
24 A
Yes.
I thought he was overstating it for the 25 reasons that I have already given you.
v
-, +,
I S43 91 1
Kelly es
(
)
v 2
Q But you had no reason to doubt it was f
)
his ability and expertise he could come to such 3
4 conclusion, did you?
(
5 MR. KOLB I am afraid I don't 6
understand what you mean by that question, 7
Mr. MacDonald.
8 Q
You never spoke to Mr. Dunn after receipt 9
of this February memo in 1978 up to the time of the 10 TMI-2 accident regarding what he had meant by the 11 terms he used in his February memo?
12 A
I never remember speaking with him about that, 13 that's right.
g4 Q
You never once questioned him to see 15 whether or not he believed he was overtating the 16 matter?
17 A
No.
18 Q
Did you ever ask anybody else at B&W ov[rstating 19 that they thought that Mr. Dunn was 20 the matter prior to the TMI-2 accident?
A No, not that I remember.
ng 33-Q And despite the fact that Mr. Dunn 23 mentions possible, perhaps probabis, core uncovery f'}
24 and'possible fuel damage, you yourself never v
25 foll wed up n Mr. Dunn's mem randa r any of the
544 92 1
Kelly 2
issues raised in his memoranda prior to the time 3
of the TMI-2 accident?
.4 A
Not that I remember.
(
5 g
You said you were in charge of the 6
technical background of the technical format for 7
the ATOG program?
8 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
9 Q
Was that technical background material 10 prepared for Part II of the ATOG program available 11 within B&W prior to the time of the TMI-2 accident?
12 A
Most of it was, yes.
O 13 Q
Can you recall what portions of it 14 that were not?
15-A Yes.
16 Q
Which portions were those?
17 A
What I meant was that we derived specific 18 examples from running the computer codes and from 19 developing of event trees insofar as they were used 20 as examples in Part II, the Training Manual, that 21 information was not available.
22 Q
But the technical information was 23 available?
).
24_
ji We reformatted a lot of it, but the technical p
25 information was there, yes.
545 93 1
Kelly 2
Q Did Customer Services prior to the 3
time of the TMI-2 accident have access to that 4
technical information?
i (
5 M9. KOLB:
What do you mean by " access"?
6 MR. MacDONALD:
Access in the sense that 7
they could look at it, review it, read it.
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Do you know whether or not they did, 10 indeed, look at it, review it, read 'it prior to 11 the time of the TMI-2 accident?
12 A
I don't know that, no.
13 Q
Prior to the time of the TMI-2 accident, 14 the operators in the control rooms at B&W nuclear 15 plants did not have access to procedures that had 16 been developed by ATOG which dealt with event trees, 17 did they?
18 A
Did you say prior to the TMI-27 19 Q
Yes.
20_
A Event trees were created after TMI-2.
l 21 Q
So despite whatever training utility 22 operators may have received from B&W, ATOG-type 23 guidelines, as developed after the TMI-2 accident,
[~)
24 were not available to those utilities operators in S.,,/
25 their control rooms prior to the time of the.TMI-2
l 546 94 1
Kelly 2
accident, is that correct?
3 ME, KOLB:
When you say "ATOG-type,"
4 what do you mean?
Do you mean ATOG guidelines
(
5 as such?
6 MR. MacDONALD:
We are not talking about 7
the specific ATOG guidelines obviously.
We 8
are talking about the formatted ATOG g
guideliner that they dealt with symptom-oriented l
10
)
approaches and with respect to event trees.
11 That is what we have been talking about for 12 two days and that is the question to Mr. Kelly.
13 A
To my knowledge, symptom-oriented procedures 14 were not available prior to TMI-2.
15 Q
To the operators of B&W nuclear 16 reactors?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Nor were event tree-type procedures 19 available?
20 A
Yes; correct.
21 Q
So, in other words, during a transient, 33 an operator at a.B&W nuclear operating plant, prior 23 to the time of the TMI-2 accident, would not have (nv_-)
24 access to the symptom-oriented guidelines or 25 event tree guidelines developed by B&W in the ATOG-
547 95 1
Kelly l
2 program?
A Prior to the ATOG program development, that's 3
4 right.
(
5 Q
On the day of the accident, the initial 6
briefing that you received lasted for approximately 7
how long?
8 A
30 to 40 minutes.
9 Q
And during that time, there were various 10 plant parameters that were recounted to people in 11 the room by Mr. Spangler and Mr. Hallman?
12 A
Plant status as they knew it was reviewed,
{
13 YC8-g4 Q
And there were some of those parar.eters 15 which you could recall hearing and some which you 16 did not remember whether you heard or not, correct?
17 A
Correct.
18 Q
If someone had a set of notes on which 19 those parameters being relayed by Mr. Hallman and Mr. Spangler were written down, do you believe that 20
'l they would accurately reflect what you were being 22 told that morning by Mr. Hallman and Mr. Spangler 23 in terms of the parameters that were being told --
24 MR. KOLB:
Please read the question 25 89^1"*
548 96 y
Kelly O
2 (Question read) 3 MR. KOLB:
I object as to form.
4 I think the question is unclear.
- Also,
(
5 I think that it is an imposition on this 6
witness to ask him questions about what 7
somebody might have written about an event 8
like that.
9 I think if you want to ask him what he 10 knows about the parameters or' what he remembers 11 or if you want to show him notes that, in 12 fact, were written,that would be O.K.,
but O
13 as far as the question goes you are really 1
14 just asking him to speculate.
15 MR. MacDONALD:
I think we have asked 16 questions on what parameters he can recall.
17 The only -- I will withdraw that question.
18 BY MR. MacDONALD:
19 Q
I believe you testified you have not 20 seen a set of notes that was taken at that meeting 21 in the morning given by Hallman and Spangler, correct?
,22 A
That's correct.
Sg Q
Do you know of anybody that did take (a~}.
24 notes there?
25 A
Not that I can recall.
i 1.
I 549 97 1
ge117
("%v) 2 Q
When you arrived at Mr. Schaedel's
)
3 house, he was receiving information during the 1
g 4
course of the afternoon of 3/28 from Mr. Rogers in
(,
5 the Control Room at TMI, is that correct?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
And Mr. Rogers had access to the 8
instrumentation in the Control Room at TMI?
9 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking if the witness 10 in fact knows that?
t 11 MR. MacDONALD:
What his understanding 12 is.
~
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
So despite the fact that you were not I
15 allowed on the site at TMI, Mr. Rogers, who was a 16 B&W employee, was on the site and was in the Control i
17 Room relaying information back to you and to others 1
18 at Mr. Schaedel's home, is that correct?
10 A
Correct.
20 Q
You testified a while ago that Mr.
21 Hallman told you before you left for TMI that you 22 should not speculate or draw conclusions regarding 23 what happened to be done at TMI, is that correct?
A
!,~-) -
24 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking him whether j
25 that was what he said in his prior testimony?
l
+
'98 1
Kelly O
2 MR. MacDONALD:
No, I am asking him if' 3
that is correct.
4 A
I didn't mean to imply that he was talking
(,
5 directly to me.
That was an instruction he gave to 6
the whole group there with the information they had
{
7 available at that time that we shouldn't be 8
speculating and trying to draw conclusions.
9 Q
That was in the morning, right?
10 A
Yes.
i 11 Q
You obtained more information throughout 12 the day, did you not, regarding the conditions at
\\~
13 the TMI-2 site?
14 A
Throughout the day, I was getting information 15 on the current status of the plant, yes.
16 Q
You had no instruction from Mr. Hallman 17 not to formulate any ideas or thoughts in your own 18 mind as to what was occurring that day, did you?
t 19 MR. KOLB:
.t any time during the day?
A 4
i 20 MR. MacDONALD:
That is-correct.
MR. KOLB:
Would-you read the question 21 22 back?
23 (Question read)
(x_ ).
94 A-
2<
25 5
1 102 554 f.
ss)
CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3
- ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 I,
WALTER SHAPIRo, CSR
_, a Notary i
5 6
Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of 9
JOSEPH J.
KELLY, JR.
was taken before 4
me on Thursday, May 7, 1981 consisting f pages 455 through 553 10 1
I further certify that the witness had g
been previously sworn and that the within
(
transcript is a true record of said testimony; That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties nor E
interested directly or indirectly in the matter 16 in controversy, nor am I in the emp.loy of any of the counsel.
18 INWITNESSWHEREOF,IhavehAreuntosetmy 19 hand this M
day of M %
,1981, 20 y
l 21 L
Y 64 3
O ggn7gg gggprpg,.CSR
(
.(_)
24 25 J
~
May 7, 1981 555 g
e a
kj I N D E X WITNESS PAGE f,
Joseph J.
Kelly 455 EXHIBITS GPU FOR IDENT.
158 Three-page document consisting of a September 28, 1979 memorandum from J.
J.
Kelly to C.
D.
Morgan, a September 14, 1979 memo from Tally to ew "elly, and a third page.,
455 fQ) 159 Copy of a memo dated October 15, 1979 from J.
J.
Kelly to R.
B.
Davis.
475
/
160 Memo dated October 19, 1979 from J.
J.
Kelly to R.
L.
Wright.
478 161 Copy of a memo dated August 21, 1979 from J.
J.
Kelly 488 to Distribution.
162 Document bearing Bates No.
T10000 entitled " Babcock and Wilcox Company Development of Operating Guidelines for the
{'-
Abnormal Transient Operating 4g7 Guidelines Program."
163 Copy of a memo dated Dececber 21, 1979 from J.
J.
Kelly to
/N Distribution.
498
( )
v k..
- - - - - - -