ML20072J097
| ML20072J097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1982 |
| From: | Roy D METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290923 | |
| Download: ML20072J097 (177) | |
Text
._
UNITED STAT,ES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK dot ------------------------------------------x l
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, s !
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMAPNY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and :
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, t 80 CIV. 1683
-against- (R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., :
Defendants. :
x gf Deposition of The Babcock & Wilcox Company, by DONALD HENRY ROY, taken by plaintiffs pursuant to notice, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, Esgs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Tuesday, February 2, 1982, at 9:40 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles Shapiro, a certified Shorthand Reporter and i
Notary Public within and for the State of
~
l New York.
l l
8306290923 820202 PDR T
ADDCK 05000289 PDR DOYLE REPORTING. INC.
v CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPoRTERC 369 LEXINGTON AVENUE WALTER SHAPIRO, C.S.R. NEW Yon x, N.Y. 10017 CHARLES SH APIRO, C.S.R. TEs.Epwo N E 212 - 867 8220
1 2
'( 2 Appe a rance a:
3' KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4 425 Park Avenue New York, New York 5 -
By: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ.,
6 of Counsel 7
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
8 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 9 New York, New York 10 By: ROBERT B. FISKE, JR., ESQ.
-and-11 K. ANN MCDONALD, ESQ.,
of Counsel 12 gg 13 Also Present:
}
14 DAVID TAYLOR 15 JOHN ARBO 16 JONATHAN QUINN 17 18 * *
- 19 20 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and 21 among the attorneys for the respective parties 22 hereto that the sealing, filing and certification 23 of the within deposition be, and the same hereby
,- 24 are, waived; that the transcript may be signed N- 25 before any Notary Public with the same force and
1 3 2 effect as if signed before the Court.
3 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that 4 all objections, except as to the form of the h 5 question, are reserved.to the time of trial.
6 7
8 DONALD EENRY R O Y, having been 9 first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was 10 examined and testified as follows:
11 EXAMINATION BY MR. SELTZER:
12 Q Before March 1979, what, if anything,
' r( ) 13 was done in the Engineering department to review 14 systematically significant transients at B&W plants?
15 A The only systematic thing we would do is 16 associated with the receipt of SPR's, site problem 17 reports, if they happened to have been prepared for 18 a particular transient. They may or may not be 19 prepared for all transients. If they were and there 20 were issues called out on the site problem report 21 to be resolved which involved engineering people,:that 22 would be one avenue for having information regarding 23 transients. That would be the only systematic l
l gS 24 mechanism.
l \~
25 We had, of course, in providing services
l
< 1 Roy 4 2 to our customers in the event that after some 3 abnormal transient the customer would approach us with 4 doing certain analyses to support bringing the plant 5 back into service. That would be another avenue 6 that we would be involved in, post-transient service 7 to the customer. They would be the two principal 8 means.
9 occasionally we would seek to obtain from 10 the customer enough data to take -- on a transient 11 to use it to benchmark our computer codes. They would 12 be the three avenues of dealing with transient
( 13 information primarily.
14 Q The first avenue that you described was 15 the use of site problem reports. You said that those 16 would only come into the engineering department if 17 there were issues called out in the SPR for review 18 by the engineering department.
19 What was your understanding about how a l 20 determination was made in the SPR to' call'out an l
21 issue for engineering department review?
g 22 A I think I said, or should have said, that 23 the SPR may come in, but rather whether we take
/^N 24 action on it or not would be determined by whether U
25 there was an issue called out in the SPR that would
-. ,. . , , . -n, -
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1 Roy 5 2 require engineering service to help resolve it.
3 We could receive them for information 4 purposes also. The basic determination of how those Ih 5 SPR's would be dispatched would be in the nuclear 6 service department who would be the first recipient 7 of them from the site and review them and then 8 transmit them to various organizations in engineering.
9 Q During the years immediately before the 10 Three Mile Island accident, was the engineering 11 department on the distribution for every site problem 12 report?
() 13 A I believe so, but I may be mistaken on that.
14 I believe so, either, you know, we received it for 15 information or it was transmitted to us to perform a 16 service, but I am not absolutely certain of that.
17 Q Did you have any section or unit within 18 the engineering department that had as a regular 19 assignment reviewing site problem reporte to see if 20 there were problems that needed engineering attention?
21 A. Yes. I recall that time period integration 22 --
the integration unit had a role. I think at one 23 point in time I encouraged -- and I am not sure this 3 24 was captured in a procedure in that time frame --
,)
25 that they be routed to the plant integration unit.
1 Roy 6
) 2 That was in the plant design section.
3 Q I think I confused you. Did you say 4 you are not sure in what time period plant integration h 5 had that responsibility? -
I 6 A Yes,' I am not sure it was something that 7 we did in plant design during the whole time I was 8 there or the time that integration existed or a 9 portion of the time, but at one point in time I 10 recall encouraging that the SPR be routed to the 11 plant integration unit.
12 Q That was Bruce Karrasch's outfit?
() 13 A Yes, sir.
14 Q Do you know the name of any particular 15 individual in plant integration who had as a 2
16 principal responsibility the job of r'eviewing site 17 problem reports?
18 A No, I do not.
19 Q Do you know whether before the Three Mile 20 Island accident the review of site problem reports v
21 in plant integration ever generated projects for the 22 engineering department?
23 A I can't recall any specific ones, if 24 they did.
25 Q Since the Three Mile Island accident, L
l
1 Roy 7
() 2 you recommended that the site problem reports be 3 reviewed in more detail to look for generic engineering 4 problems, didn't you?
h 5 A I think in cooperation with Mr. Kosibt.,.
6 who managed the nuclear service department, we did 7 go through an exercise of reviewing the SPR procedures 8 to see whether any changes as a consequence of the 9 Three Mile Island accident would be appropriate.
10 Q Based on that review, did you implement 11 a program for having the site problem reports reviewed 12 with greater scrutiny to determine whether there
-() 13 were generic engineering problems disclosed in them?
14 A No. The result of our review would be 15 what I would characterize more as fine tuning.
16 I required the unit managers to sign off on the SPR's 17 and we also defined more, with more clarity, the role 18 of the engineering unit manager and the organization 19 and customer service called maintenance engineering, l 20 their role in reviewing these SPR's.
21 Q Before the Three Mile Island accident, l
22 what was the engineering department interested in in 23 the site problem reports?
-s y 24 A Primarily we would be interested in any l
.d 25 action ite'ms which we were expected to carry out
1 Roy 8 2 in resolving whatever problem was called out on the 3 SPR.
4 Q What do you mean by the phrase " called h 5 out"? .
6 A The SPR form would identify a problem, 7 The originator of that SPR would, if appropriate, on 8 an SPR, would suggest follow-up actions with respect 9 to that problem, and some of those follow-up actions 10 would involve engineering. Normtlly that would be 11 information that wuold be transmitted to us by the 12 service manager or project manager, and we would
( 13 work with him in carrying out whatever work was 14 appropriate for the engineering department, and that 15 would be the principal thing we would be looking for.
16 Q So before the Three Mile Island accident, 17 the routine was that the authors of the SPR would have 18 to identify the need for an action item by engineering?
19 A They would suggest what they thought --
20 "they" being the originators -- was the appropriate i
I 21 follow-up action. That would not preclude engineering 22 or customer service, you know, from adding to that, 23 suggesting other mechanisms, but the first suggestion
] 24 would be provided by the originator of the SPR, and
%)
25 that might not occur every time but it was a general
1 ,
Roy 9
- 2 practice for them to do so.
3 Q Other than the practice not invariably ;
,. 4 followed in identifying action items in SPR's, was h 5 anything else done on a systematic basis to develop 6 a list of corrective actions that needed to be taken 7 in response to plant transients?
I 8 MR. FISKE: Well, I think I am going to 9 ' object to the form of that question.
! 10 Could you read it back, please.
11 MR. SELTZER: Let me just restate it.
12 MR. FISKE: All right.
() 13 Q In addition to whatever was done with 14 the SPR's, was anything else done on a. systematic 15 basis to develop a list of corrective actions needed 16 to be taken in response to plant transients?
17 A We had an avenue for doing that in what 4
18 was called a PCA later, a multiple contract i 19 applicability, called it an MCP program, that if the 20 SPR identified the information which could affect 21 other units, other plants, either those under 9 construction, that this provided a mechanism for 22 23 listing follow-up actions, or information that would 24 be appropriate to transmit to potentially other 25 affected contracts.or customers.
I L
l I
Roy 30 2 Q What do the initials PCA stand for?
3 A Problem cross contracts appliability 4 would be the closest that I could come to that.
h 5 g o.x, -
6 And that program became the multiple 7 contract applicability program? Is that what you said?
8 A Yes, that is my perception, evolved into 9 the multiple contract applicability program.
10 what section or unit was responsible for Q
11 either the problem cross contract applicability or 12 multiple contract applicability program?
() 13 A The PCA or MCP could be filled out by 14 anyone that was acting on a problem. For example, 15 if it was some equipment problem, it could be --
it 16 would be primarily the responsibility of equipment 17 engineering. That would then be routed to principally 18 the service manager if it were an operating plant, or 19 the project manager if it were a plant under 20 construction, or to both if it covered, had 21 applicability to both operating and plants under 22 construction, and the principal person responsible 23 for reviewing the suggested actions and authorizing
(- 24 that follow-up would be the service manager or project V} 25 manager.
1 Roy JJ
' (O) 2 Q Neither the service manager nor the 3 project manager is a person in the engineering 4 department; right?
lh 5 A That's correct. .
6 Q was there any systematic involvement of 7 any section or unit in the engineering department in 8 the PCA o!' MCA programs?
9 A Prior to the Three Mile Island --
10 Q Yes.
1 11 A --
accident?
12 Q Right.
() 13 A Not that I recall.
14 Like I say, I did have some image of a 15 central involvement of integration, but not in the 16 sense that you are talking about. There wasn't a 17 point contact for following and tracking all of the 18 PCA's or MCP's that would be originated, that I recall.
19 Q Are you saying that from time to time 20 plant integration might be called upon-by somebody 21 to assist with a PCA or an MCA, but that'they were not 22 expected to function on a regular basis on PCA's 23 and MCA's?
24 A To my recollection, that is correct.
3, 25 Q. Before the Three Mile Island accident,
- - - _ . .. . . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ ~ . . . - .
l 1 Roy 12 2 what types of actions was B&W taking in response to 3 problems that were discovered in engineering department l 4 reviews of transients? l 5 A Well, across the. broad range, I would 6 limit it to just transients, but in the broad range 7 of observing operating experiences, principally 8 focused on equipment issues, equipment malfunctions.
J 9 We could transmit recommendations and 10 suggestions to our customer for improving that 11 equipment performance through site instructions; that 12 is one avenue.
(). 13 We also, as a consequence of our 14 observations of equipment outage factor, factor data 15 relating to equipment malfunctions would identify 16 those items which were making a major contribution 17 to lost capacity days and would then formulate and 18 propose suggestions to our customers. We generally 19 transmit these through owners Group meetings or Users s
20 Group meetings, to offer to work with them and help 21 improve that performance and increase the availability 22 of the plant, so the availability improvement program 23 was an initiative of B&W's which sauld cause un to 24 act on whatever, you know, experience we might observe
! .\
25 that could help improve performance, and that might
e l' Roy 13
) -
2 include observations from transients. Primarily 3 though they would be focused-on equipment issues,-
4 improvements in equipment performance.
t-lll 5 Q Before the Three Mile Island accident, 6 did the review of plant operating experience sometimes 7 also result in recommending different procedures for 8 operation? ;
I 9 A I wouldn't have any experience with that 10 in the engineering department. Issues associated 11 with procedures would be principally handled by our 12 nuclear service department, customer service
() 13 department, so I don't have any recollection of our 14 involvement in procedure suggestions or reviews 15 or that sort of thing for operating plants prior to 16 the Three Mile Island.
17 Q Did you ever attend any Users Group 18 meetings before the Three Mile Island accident?
19 A Yes. I don't recall any specific ones, 20 but I have been to Users Groups and Owners Group 21 meetings.
22 Q Was one of the functions of Users Group 23 and Owners Group meetings-to.give B&W an opportunity-24 to advise customers about problems that had general 25 - applicability to Bsw equipment?
-l 1 Roy 14 2 A I would say they would have a combination 3 of purposes or many purposes. That could be one.
4 Q Was that one?
5 A That could be one. I don't know a 6 specific, but yes, that could be a purpose.
7 We would also -- you know, it is an avenue 8 for the customer to give information to us in what 9 he thought his needs were.
10 We would give status reports on items 11 that we were already under contract to perform, a 12 status of tasks which we were alrea'dy under contract
( 13 to perform, so it would be three things. You might 14 have a number of reasons for calling in and working 15 with an owners Group committee or subcommittee.
16 Q At the --
17 A ch, excuse me.
18 one other item is probably one of the most 19 helpful things, where they have dialogue with each 20 other on it, in sharing experiences and discussions, 21 which was, by the way, the most effective way for us l
22 to get some initiative going on an availability l 23 improvement program.
24 Q By "us" you mean B&W7 O.s.
25 A Us collectively, B&W and the customers.
3 s
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' I 1 Rhy 15 s
2 MR. FISKE: By "they" you meant the 3 customers in that answer? -
l 4 THE WITNESS: Yes. !
h 5 g At the. Users Group meetings that you f
6 attended, there wars other Ssw employe.es also 7 attending? s 8 A Yes. I don't recall any specifi --
.i 9 g I am not asking you for specifics.
/
10 A Yes, we wou.1d generally have several B&W i
y 11 personnel in attendance. ..( ~ ,
12 Q Was one portion of tiic meet.Ong - '
deveted j l i
[ 13 topresentationsbysswpers'onne1%l.[/ / ;
14 A Yss, than could be. Ifjwe were1giving'a
( .
i 15 status on task items, yes, that'c$uld happen. AgaI.n
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16 I don't recs 11 any specifics, but yeU. ;
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. p, 17 Q Let me Just clear something up. I You 4 ,
18 say it could be and the makes it sound'like maybe r ,
19 it was, maybe ,it wasn't. What I am esting .y'ou , and O
20 I am not trying o pin yo'u down to' a psrt'icuiarj' ,
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meeting or a particular individual,, but I would[lik,e 21 a<
9 22
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to know, do you reca!.1 that at Users Group meetings I t
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23 there were B&Wepersonnel who stood up and gave. ~ (s I <* ,
[ f ) [J , ,I 24 presentations? '
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'd .; # j .. i 25 Mai FISKE: I think one of the probinas
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1 Roy 16
_ 2 with the question, Mr. Seltzer, is you are 3 trying to ask him sort of a general question i . 4 about these meetings in general without referring k 5 to any particular meeting. .
. 6 MR. SELTZER: That's right.
7 MR. FISKE: And when he says it could be 8 that this would happen, he may well be saying 9- it might happen at one meeting and not happen 10 at another.
a 11 MR. SELTZER: That's fine.
12 Q All I am seeking out is whether at B&W
) 13 Users Group meetings you can recall BsW personnel 14 standing up and making presentations.
15 MR. FISKE: You mean were there any 16 meetings that he attended where that ever happened?
c l7 MR. SELTZER: Right.
, 18 A I can't recall a y .Afic meeting where
, is that happened, but that would be quite likely. It
-20 certainly could and I am sure has occurred.
- 21 Do you recall anybody from Bsw speaking
- f -Q
,' i ' -
22 at a Users Group meeting to discuss an equipment
'., 23 prob?.em that had arisen at one or more plants which
'pl 24 the Bsw company thought might have general
- (-) t n J -
applicability to B&W plants?
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1 Roy 17
( 2 A Prior to the Thee Mile Island accident?
3 Q Yes.
4 A I don't recall a specific meeting in llh 5 that time period. .
6 Q Do you recall any meeting where anyone 7 from B&W discussed the problem of operator termination o
8 of high pressure injection?
g A At an Owners Group or Users Group meeting?
10 Q Yes.
11 A No.
12 Q Do you recall any meeting at which anyone 4
() 13 from Bsw discussed the problem of saturation in the 1
14 reactor coolant system outside the pressurizer 15 causing pressurizer water level to rise?
16 A Not in any meeting that I personally 17 attended.
18 Q That is what I am asking you.
19 A It may have occurred, but I don't recall l
- 20 being present a t. any such meeting where that was 21 discussed.
22 Q You don't recall that being discussed 23 by anyone; is that right?
24 A Not at any meeting that I attended. It 25 may have been discussed at other meetings, but I i
l
- .. _ . . _ _ _ _ - , . ~ _ - . . . _
1 Roy 28 I
) 2 don't have any recollection of it being discussed 3 at a meeting in which I was in attendance. I don't 4 recall it.
lk 5 Q Has anyone ever told you that the 6 phenomenon of saturation causing pressurizer water 7 level to rise was discussed at any Bsw owners Group 8 or Users Group meeting that took place before the 9 Three Mile Island accident?
10 MR. FISKE: You are talking about other 11 than in the presence of counsel?
12 MR. SELTZER: Right.
() 13 Q If counsel told you something that they 14 wanted you to say at this deposition, I don't want 15 you to tell me about that.
16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Soltzer, that is not the 17 basis for my objection.
18 MR. SELTZER: I am sorry, I thought that 19 is what you were referring to.
20 MR. FISKE: You know perfectly well that 21 anything Dr. Roy discussed with us or anything l 22 that he learned in the course of discussing 23 with us is'outside the scope of the deposition i
i r~% 24 and that is the basis for my objection. It is
(_)-
25 no different than the rule we have been following
1 Roy 19
- i 2 since the beginning in al2 these depositions i 3 on both sides.
4 Q You understand I am not asking you for lh 5 things that you only know about because Bob Fiske 6 or some other B&W attorney told it to you.
7 A Yes.
5 Q If you have an independent basis for 9 knowing something and it was also something that Mr.
10 riske or some other B&W attorney told you, I would 11 like to find out about your independent knowledge.
12 A I understand.
() 13 Q The question that I asekd was: Has 14 anybody ever told you that before the Three Mile 15 Island accident there was a discussion at a B&W Users 16 Group or Owners Group meeting of the phenomenon j
17 of saturation outside the pressurizer causing 18 pressurizer water level to rise?
- 19 A Outside of a discussion with counsel, 20 no, I am not aware that such a discussion took place.
21 Q Were you present at any Owners Group, 22 Users Group or operating experience seminar where the 23 Davis-Besse September 1977 transient was discussed?
24 A I don't recall one. No, I don't remember 25 one where it was, that I was there, no.
l 1 Roy 20 2 Q When is the first time, if ever, that you 3 can recall looking at the site problem report for 4 the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 incident?
h $' A I don't recall ever seeing an SPR on the 6 September '77 transient.
7 Q Are you saying that even after the Three 8 Mile Island accident when you were the head of the 9 engi6eering department, you never looked at the 10 Davis-Besse site problem reports?
11 MR. FISKE: He was head of the engineering
. 12 department before the Three Mile Island 13 accident also.
14 A I may have seen it after the accident with 15 counsel discussion, but I don't recall some independent 16 review of that SPR either before or after the transient.
17 Q So you can't recall after the Three Mile 18 Island accident going back, without counsel encouraging 19 you to do so or asking you to do so, and looking at 20 the Davis-Besse site problem report?
. 21 A I don't recall doing it outside of that 22 context.
23 Q Putting aside intercourse with counsel, 24 do you have any reason to believe that the Davis-Besse l 25 . site problem report called out any issue for engineering
1 Roy 21
, ) 2 department review?
I 3 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer --
4 A Since I didn't see it, I don't know lll 5 whether it did or not. I have no recollection of 6 seeing it.
7 Q And none of your subordinates reported 8 to you that it called out for engineering department 9 review?
10 A Not that I recall.
11 Q When you were the manager of the plant 12 design section, was Danny LaBelle one of your unit 13 managers?
14 A Yes, he was.
15 Q Of which unit?
16 A The safety analysis unit.
17 Q What was the role of the safety analysis 18 unit at that time?
19 A They were primarily responsible for the
! 20 preparation of safety analyses for the --
submitted l
21 through the licensee to the NRC for Chapter 15 of L 22 the PSAR and FSAR, the safety analysis reports.
23 From that basic mix, then they would 24 perform the functions of technical specifications 25 for the reactor protection system, identification
1 Roy 22 2 of environmental qualification conditions for 3 equipment and other related activities which would 4 derive from their basic function of performing safety lll 5 analyses. .
6 Q How did the safety analysis unit get its 7 assignments?
8 A Two ways. With respect to plants under 9 construction, their tasks and authorizations for 10 those tasks were from the project management department 11 that administered those contracts. Secondly, in 12 performing services for ou'r operating plant customers,
~
13 those tasks would be authorized by the service 14 department, service manager for that particular 15 operating plant.
16 Other work of a research and development 17 nature would be funded and authorized through the 18 research and development group of NPGD.
19 Q What work of a research and development 20 nature was Danny LaBelle's outfit responsible for?
21 Q Primarily they would be supporting the 22 development of new computer codes or modifications 23 to existing computer codes for performing safety
' 24 analyses.
25 Q To what extent was the Davis-Besse
,. - a --. ,- - -,. ,-
1 Roy 23 2 September 1977 transient used to benchmark computer 3 codes?
4 MR. FISKE: Before the accident?
h 5 MR. SELTZER: Ba' fore the Three Mile Island 6 accident.
7 A I recall at some point in time suggesting 8 or asking that we consider that transient for purposes 9 of code benchmark. I don't recall who I told or what 10 the time frame was, but --
11 Q Was it before the Three Mile Island 12 accident?
13 A Before the Three Mile Island accident, yes.
14 As a system transient analysis benchmark, 15 that is about my memory of it, and I am not aware of 16 whether we actually went through a detailed 17 benchmarking for that or not, but I recall suggesting 10 or asking that we review that transient for an interest 19 in benchmarking system dynamic models that we'use in i
1 20 doing transient analyses.
l 21 Q Just so that this is comprehensible to
- 22 people outside this room, when you refer to computer 23 codes you are talking about CRAFT and TRAP-2 and l
! l 24 some of the other computer models that B&W had 25 developed for simulating within a computer the
1 Roy 24 i
() 2 response of a B&W nuclear plant?
,.s.
1
, A 4 Q And you would use those computer simulations to do safety analyses, among other things?
lll 5 6 A Yes. Those codes in doing the safety l
! 7 analyses would be combined then with models which 4
[ 8 we would build for solving the conservation of mass 9
energy and momentum equasions along with whatever i 10 assumptions we were required to make under regulations
. 11 for doing safety analyses and then predict a response 12 of the plant. Digital computer simulations.
i
() 13 g Those computer simulations are only reliable if they fairly closely reflect the true g4 j
1 j , 15 response of the system in operation out at the i
16 customers' plants; right?
\
17 A That would be too narrow a definition.
j 18 For purposes of safety analyses the principal aim 19 one would have in min i is that it is a conservative l 20 ** Presentation of plant response to a transient.
21 Q In other words, the model was intended l 22 to err on the side of greater safety rather than i
23 less certain safety?
l 24 A Yes. These codes are primarily used to qualify the safety systems that are to act to 25
1 Roy 25 O~ 2 mitigate a transient, and so they represent -- they 3 are used two ways. They can be used in the early 4 portion of the design of the safety system. You l lll 5 -integrate between the designer and the analysis, and l
6 then after you have configured a safety system ;
7 design, you would use it to assure that you had a 8 conservative representation of response of the plant.
9 Q Could you explain in terms that a layman 10 could appreciate what it means, as you have used 11 the phrase, to benchmark a computer code?
12 A Yes. When a digital model is formulated
() 13 to predict the response of a system to some forcing 14 function, some dynamic situation, we want to model 15 the response of the system. In safety analysis, for 16 example, some off-normal condition that would lead, 17 say, to reactor trip and then some behavior of 18 pressure and temperature and flow and so forth. The 19 mathematical formulation of the principal equasions 20 that govern the phenomena that would be expected to 21 occur, principally thermal dynamics phenomena, haat 22 sources, heat losses, and so forth, are formulated
( 23 and cast into a computer program.
yg 24 Now, various subsets of that model, V
! 25 there can be very narrowly defined models and i
n
1 Roy 26 l l
() 2 assumptions that are employed which are benchmarked
, 3 by what are called ceparate effects. One takes 4 experimental data that represents closely the lll 5 principal thermal hydraulic phenomena that occurred 6 and you compare your mathematical results with these 7 experimental model results. That can also be 8 supplemented with what is called a more integrated 9 systems benchmarking where you model many of these 10 phenomena as closely in a scale model sense to the 1
- 11 operating system as you can and get what is called a 12 more integrated benchmark. The microresopic behavior.
() 13 occasionally, too, you can use data from the operating l 14 plants.
15 Q That is not experimental; right?
16 A It is not experimental, but for purposes 17 of benchmarking the codes it is the same kind of thing.
18 You have a certain set of initial and boundary ID conditions, you have got a certain response of the l
20 plant, pressurns, flows, temperatures, you model 21 that plant, the initial conditions and boundary 22 conditions as closely as possible and then determine l
23 how close you came. And the principal objective is 24 to be conservative with respect to predicting the l
25 response of that plant to whatever that initial
1 1 Roy 27
() 2 condition is.
3 One other -- by the way, one other form 4 of benchmarking is what is called analytical llI 5 benchmarking. That is, I write down a model for some 6 phenomenon and I can use mathematical formulations 7 that are well established, close form analytical 8 solutions, and I check my computer program versus 9 this closed form analytical solution which would give i
10 you again the whole processes to arrive at assurance 11 that you have a reasonably adequate model of the plant 12 response, and the principal objective is that it be
() 13 a conservative representation, response, in terms of 14 safety. I hope that helps.
15 Q You have used a phrase that I don't think 16 a computer search of prior deposition testimony 17 would find other witnesses had used. You referred to 18 thermal hydraulic response. What do you mean by that?
19 A This basic conservation of mass energy 20 and momentum equasions in the presence of heat sources 21 or heat sinks collectively would be under the term 22 thermal hydraulic models.
23 Q You made it sound as if you were 24 ;
referring to somebody as a thermal hydraulic dynamicist.
l 0 I
25 Have you ever met an animal like that?
1 Roy 28
() 2 A That is a term for someone who has a l 3 working knowledge of these models and how to' simulate 4 a system whose dynamic response requires the llh 5 application of thermal hydraulic equasions.
6 Q Before the Three Mile Island accident 7 did B&W employ engineers that you would classify as 8 thermal hydraulic dynamicist?
9 A Yes, we had employees who had good working 10 knowledge of how to employ conservation of mass, 11 energy, momentum heat conduction equasions to predict 12 response of systems.
() 13 Q Were the thermal hydraulic dynamicists 14 at B&W employed in the engineering department?
15 Q We were not the only place for doing that 16 kind of representation.
17 Q Let's just start with were you one of the 18 places --
19 A Yes.
20 Q -- where those people worked?
21 A Yes, sir.
22 Q Were thermal hydraulic dynamicists 23 within the plant section?
p 24 A Yes, b 25 Q Within which units?
1 Roy 29
() 2 A Safety analysis, what we called the 3 methods --
excuse me, you said plant design section?
4 Q Yes.
llh 5 A Before the accident it would be in the 6 safety analysis section, in the emergency core cooling 7 systems analysis unit, the control systems unit would 8 have personnel who had a good working knowledge of 9 this discipline.
10 Q Is the discipline that you are referring 11 to one that in B&W's nuclear business dealt with how 12 water in the primary system dissipates heat generated 13 by the core?
14 A Yes, that would be one of the areas they 15 would be addressing in modeling system response.
16 Q That would be one of its most important 17 areas; right?
18 A That is an important one, yes, sir.
19 Q one of the things that B&W has to comply 20 with are the NRC criteria for effective core cooling; 21 right?
22 A Yes.
23 Q So that while you were the head of the l
plant design section, a principal function of tne l
p v
24 i 25 emergency core cooling system analysis unit was to V - ..
. . _ - . - ~ - = - . . . -. ..-- -~ ._ _
1 Roy 30
) 2 evaluate the ability of the B&W system effectively 3 to cool the core; right?
4 A Yes. They would be involved in those f lhh 5 analyses which would demonstrate the compliance of 6 the plant. It would involve more than just B&W
, 7 system and component scope of supply because they 8 would be modeling the plant. To demonstrate compliance 9 of those systems in the plant with 10 CFR 50.46 and 10 Appendix K.
j 11 Q Did that also include assuring compliance i
l 12 with the general design criteria?
() 13 A Those that related to LOCA, one best 14 interprets 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K as the way one 15 complies with a general design criterion.
16 Q You said you believe that you had 17 recommended or suggested before the Three Mile Island 18 accident that the Davis-Besse September 1977 event l
19 he used to benchmark E&W computer codes.
i 20 How had you become aware of the Davis-Besse i
21 transient to the exter.t that you knew there were k
22 features of it that would make it valuable for 23 benchmarking purposes?
24 A I don't know how. I thought about that s ?
l 25 but I don't recall.how I learned about its features l
1 Roy 31 2 or to what detail that I did in that time period. I 3 just recall that for whatever reason it looked like 4 one that should be evaluated for purposes of code khh 5 benchmarking, that it might be useful for that, 6 and that's all I recall about the sequence.
7 Q What was there about the Davis-Besse 8 transient that made it appealing for benchmarking 9 purposes?
10 A I can guess how I might have been led to 11 that, but the point that I was making in the response 12 is I don't recall what data inputs I had that led me
() 13 up to saying that it is an interesting one, why 14 don't you look at that and see if it would be a 15 useful benchmark, but I don't recall how I got to that.
16 Q I will ask you some other questions, 17 maybe it will refresh your recollection and maybe 18 we will get to the same place.
19 Before the Three Mile Island accident 20 how many other incidents were you aware of in which 21 a B&W reactor coolant system had gone to saturation?
22 A A transient on Davis-Besse comes to mind 23 where a question was raised about whether the 24 saturation point was reached other than in the 25 pressurizer, I believe, an overcooling transient at 1
1 Roy 32 2 Davis-Besse in which we were asked by the customer 3 to evaluate a couple of things. One was the --
the 4 component stress situation due to the overcooling and, lhk 5 secondly, whether during that transient we would have 6 predicted that the D and BR ratio would have gone 7 beyond acceptance limits on it. That is one instance, 8 and I don't recall any others, but that one does come 9 to my mind.
10 Q Is the incident that you are referring 11 to the one where they lost their level indication in 12 the pressurizer when the pressurizer went low?
() 13 A For the incident I have in mind, that 14 question came up. I don't recall now whether they 15 actually lost it, they may have, but anyhow the 16 question came up, and probably they did because the 17 question came up about losing -- about saturation 18 other than in the pressurizer, but that question was 19 raised on that transient, yes.
20 Q So that you were talking about the 21 transient that is different from the September 24, l l 22 1977 transient when, to the best of our knowledge, 23 there was no question of losing levels is that right?
i 24 A '
s best I can recall, that is true.
O 25 Sometimes I get those two mixed up, but yes, I think
)
1 l
1 Roy 33
, 2 that is a true statement.
, 3 Q Before the Three Mile Island accident 4 what, if any, other loss of coolant accidents were lll 5 you aware of having taken place at a B&W nuclear plant?
6 A I' don't recall any specific instances.
7 Q Bert Dunn came and talked to you about the 8 operator termination of high pressure injection 9 while the PORV was failed open at Davis-Besse, didn't 10 he?
11 A It did at Davis-Besse. The context of 12 that discussion then -- I don't rscall the specifics
( 13 of that conversation but, you know, in hindsight, 14 looking back on it, that is certainly a loss of 15 coolant accident situation.
16 Q And it was one that sas brought to your 17 attention before Three Mile Islands right?
18 A It came to my attention in discussion 19 with Mr. Dunn with respect to the termination of 20 high pressure injection. I don't recall the specifics 21 and whether we talked about loss of coolant accident 22 or whatever, but it came to my attention and I recall 23 it in terms of premature termination of high pressure 24 injection. What I am saying;is I don't recall enough 1 25 of the specifics of the conversation to know that
r - - - - - - - - - . _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l 1
Roy 34 0 2 we talked about it as a LOCA or whatever.
3 Isn't it a fact that the thing that was Q
4 intriguing to you about Davis-Besse and that made it 5
useful to benchmark was that'this was one of the rare 6
instances when there had been a loss of coolant 7
accident at a B&W plant?
8 MR. FISKE: You are asking, does he 9
recall that that was his state of mind at the 10 time?
11 MR. SELTZER: That is exactly right.
A As I said, I don't know what led me to --
13 I don't recall the specific conversation or my logic 14 process that led me to say that might be interesting 15 for evaluation purposes. I do remember arriving at I6 a conclusion that that might be interesting and asked 17 someone to evaluate the transient for that purpose.
O Q Did you ask someone in the ECCS analysis 19 unit?
20 A .I don't recall where it was, whether it 21 was there or safety analysis.
22 Q Did the engineering department have any 23 participation whatsoever in verifying that the simulator 24 used in B&W's training was adequately benchmarked?
25 A Noc to my personal knowledge. There could
1 l
1 Roy 35
' i
() 2 very well be communication, you know, in an informal 3 way among safety analysts or ECCS analysts and people 4 responsible for simulator modeling, but I was not aware of any -- any of that interaction and we did llk 5 ,
6 not have any systematic responsibility for reviewing 7 and approving those models.
8 Q so you don't know whether the Lynchburg g simulator's representation of transients agreed with 1
. 10 or was inconsistent with the computer models being 11 used for safety analysis?
12 A Prior to the accident at Three Mile Island,
() 13 not to my personal knowledge, no.
14- Q Do you remember any person whom you asked 15 to use Davis-Besse for benchmarking?
16 A I don't recall who I made the suggestion 17 to. I think my suggestion was along the lines of 18 "take a look at that transient and see if it would be 4
19 useful for benchmarking purposes." I do remember 20 arriving at that thought by some mechanism.
21 Q At the time of the Three Mile Island 22 accident, could the Bsw computer codes that were in i 23 use model the response of the reactor coolant system i
l 24 to a small break at the top of the pressurizer?
i i
(h
(_/ !
l 25 A Yes, they had that capability to do that, j
t
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I i
1 Roy 36
) 2 certainly in terms of demonstrating -- within the 3 guidelines of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K, in terms 4 of an ECCS safety analysis, yes.
llh 5 g Do you know whether before the Three Mile 6 Island accident a transient analysis had been run 7 with the degree of precision required by 50.46 for 8 a small break at the top of the pressurizer?
9 A I don't recall any such analysis. In 10 terms of qualifying the emergency core cooling system, 11 that wouldn't be a bounding or worst case break 12 location or size in terms of demonstrating compliance
( 13 to 10 CFR 50.46, so I don't recall -- I know of no 14 such analysis for that case.
15 Q The system response to a small break at 16 the top of the pressurizer was different from the 17 system response to small breaks occurring elsewhere; 18 isn't that right?
19 A Well --
20 MR. FISKE: You mean in terms of its 21 impact on 50.467 or you mean different in any 22 way?
23 MR. SELTZER: I think that is getting much l
j 24 too global. I'am not there yet.
, 25 MR. FISKE: Are you asking whether there l
l
l 1 Roy 37 1
were differences in the reaction of the system j ) 2 j i~
3 if the break was at the top of the pressurizer 4
4 as opposed to somewhere else?
- I 5 MR. SELTZER
- Yes, that is exactly what 6 I asked.
! 7 A Each break location and size would have 8 some, you know, different response or elicit some 9 different response from the system.
i
- 10 categories of break sizes and locations 11 would have very similar kinds of behaviors. For 12 example, small hot leg breaks tend to look pretty much i
13 alike, small leg breaks at the pump discharge look
(
i
! 14 pretty much alike. But given a specific location, i
15 size and condition, if you change those conditions 16 then you will get some different response in terms i
j 17 of pressures and temperatures and flows and that sort i
! 18 of thing.
19 Q Let me put my question again --
i
- 20 MR. SELTZER: Can you~ read it, please.
l 21 (The reporter read the question as follows:
-22 "The system response to a small break at the l
i
. 23 top of the pressurizer was different from the 24 system response to small breaks occurring i 25 elsewhere isn't that right?")
1 Roy 38
( 2 A If we want to get into that, I think 3 we ought to characterize, you know, different.
4 What is different? For example --
kh 5 Q Let me ask you, very specifically --
6 A O.K.
7 Q -- what, if any differences in system 8 response were there for a small break at the top of 9 the pressurizer from small breaks located elsewhere 10 in the reactor coolant system?
11 MR. FISKE: As of what point in time 12 are you asking him for his knowledge on this
() 13 subject?
14 MR. SELTZER: That is a very constructive 15 suggestion.
16 Q. Before the Three Mile Island accident.
17 MR. FISKE: I try to be constructive 18 whenever I can.
19 Q Were you aware of any differences in 20 system response for a small break at the top of the 21 pressurizer as contrasted with a small break located 22 anywhere else in the reactor cooling system?
23 A We didn't analyze a break at the top of 24 the pressurizer for purposes o,f 10 CFR 50.46 analyses 25 so I don't -- I had no results that I, you know, would
1 Roy 39 2 look and compare on it. I can surmise differences 3 but we didn't have that -- perform that analysis 4 since it wasn't a bounding or worst case situation lll 5 to make any comparison. .
6 Q You said you could have surmized something.
7 Do you have any recollection of actually 8 knowing or concluding before the Three Mile Island 9 accident that the response of the reactor coolant 10 system to a small break at the top of the pressurizer 11 would be different from the response of the reactor 12 coolant system to a small break located elsewhere?
I~h 13 MR. FISKE: In other words, does he V
14 recall actually thinking about whether there 15 would be a difference and coming to some 16 conclusion; right?
17 MR. SELTZER: That is exactly what I mean.
18 A No. I don't recall making that kind of 19 observation.
20 MR. SELTZER: Let's go off the record for 21 a moment.
22 (Discussion off the record.)
23 BY MR. SELTZER:
f- 24 Q Prior to the Three Mile Island accident U
25 did you consider yourself an experienced thermal
1 Roy 40
() 2 hydraulic dynamicist?
3 A My hesitation deals with relative to what?
4 We have some very experienced -- I would say that was llf 5 not my principal discipline of expertise. I had 6 knowledge of the discipline to a certain extent, but 7 that was not my principal area of expertise during 8 my engineering career. Obviously I had courses in 9 it, but in terms of applying those courses and so 10 forth as part of my engineering responsibilities, 11 that was not my main discipline.
12 Q If you were listing your qualifications
() 13 in early 1979, would you have listed experienced 14 thermal hydraulic dyanmicist as one of your 15 qualifications?
16 Q Not in the context of building digital 17 simulations of systems that required the use of 18 thermal hydraulic mathematical models to predict 19 the response of the system, no.
20 Q Lee me refer you to page 32 of the 21 testimony that you gave before attorneys for the 22 President's Commission at a deposition on July 7, 23 1979.
( ,\
, 24 You were asked at the top of that page:
N~]
25 "Was the possibility that steam voiding in the core l
l l
1 Roy 43
() 2 might lead to a high pressurizer water level on the 1
3 one hand and a low reactor coolant inventory level l 4 on the other a known or predicted consequence of llh 5 the B&W design before the fall of 1977?"
6 And by you, Dr. Roy: "To my knowledge, 7 no, that wasn't. We didn't have analyses that we are 8 aware of the condition that would lead to that as 9 later on on the basis of analysis and that sort of 10 thing."
11 " Question: That awareness would have 12 occurred with an understanding of the September 24th
() 13 Davis-Besse transient; is that right?"
14 Mr. Egar says: "You mean that is the 15 event that triggered the understanding?
16 MR. ROCKWELL: Yes.
17 " Answer: I think that the knowledge 18 that, say an experienced thermal hydraulic dynamicist 19 or thermal hydraulic engineer, when confronted with 20 the question, could that happen, could there be 21 conditions, probably could think that one through.
22 certainly for me it surfaced with Bert Dunn's 23 observations following Davis-Besse 1."
24 In the sense that you referred to an O 25 experienced thermal hydraulic dynamicist or thermal
1 Roy 42
) 2 hydraulic engineer in your answer on that page, did 3 you consider yourself such an individual?
4 Q Well, I think we have to put this in the Ih 5 context here, this line of questioning, at least as 6 I recall this line of questioning at that time.
7 Principally what I had in mind was the ability to 8 analyze that situation, to construct the models and 9 analyze it, so that would require a thermal -- you 10 know, experienced thermal hydraulic dynamicist 11 to construct the mathematical models and to predict 12 all of the consequences of a break at the top of the
-( ) 13 pressurizer.
14 The element of rising level -- I mean I 15 wouldn't think, you know, that a thermal hydraulic 16 specialict would have to think that one through 17 because if you had a pressurized' tank and you open 10 a hole'in it, all the water is going to try to go
\
19 to the hole, so the consequence of, you konw, a 20 rising' pressurizer level when you open either a 21 PORV or a relief valve and then have, you know, the 22 tank fill up as the water tries-to make its way to the 23 hole, postulating that kind of response is not a very m
ss: .rg 24 difficult leap of logic. To analyze it mathematica11'y 2 ~ :,(
! 25 would-require an experienced thermal hydraulic X
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more than just what the_ response of pre $surizer 3
4 level would be. He would'be interested in discharge h 5 flow rates and flow rates in.the core m:d cladding
. l temperaturo responsa and so forth. That;I think is 6
7 the right kind of context for th.st sort cf-quest.ioning.'
/
8 As I recall, that ' question startsel with the ,
g considerations of that back at the dasign time for 1
10 the 177 plant,.which was outside of my knowLadge.
11 I wasn' t invc1ved 1.n tha.t design processt .and I ,
i
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12 believe that is where.that, sequence .of questions' i ,
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13 started from. But thatt is yhmit'I .had $ in mind ;there ' ',
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15 Q Did there come a point in time when you 1, O'
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16 were awareithattthe response of the reactor coolant 7 .G o (, . ( /
17 system to a'ramall break at the top'of the pre d.iur'ites . ' -
( ,i ,
i 18 was different from the response 1to staall ' breaks' y -
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19 located elsewhere? ,
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1 i 4 20 MR. FISKE: You mean,(did there come a -
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',n MR. SELTZER:
"Doesnkt tnat necessaril'y
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23 [ have to be part of sy que e ti'on_, ' prior i to today? '
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); 2 else could I be asking for his gaining that
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1 4 A Prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
llI 5 Q- No, prior to today.
i ', ,
6- Did there come a point in time, ever,
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7 when you became aware that the response of the
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8 _ reactor coolant system to a small break at the top
, 9 of the pressurizer was different than the response to
'A ,
10 a small break located somewhere else?
11- A Do you have a specific difference in mind?
12 Q You tell me. Maybe we got sidetracked 13 :hefore.
14 What, if any, differences are you aware of 15 between the response of the reactor coolant system to 16 a small break at the top of the pressurizer and the 2
17 response of the system to a small break located 18 anywhere else?
19 A We don't analyze -- we don't analyze
^
20 using our ECCS models breaks at the top of the
' I 21 pressurizer.
[
. 22 Q I understand that also -- I suspect 23 since the Three Mile Island accident you have used D .
'~.. --
.s- .24 your most sophisticated model to analyze that break.
~
(-)x
.25 A We used the TMI-2 sequence of events as a
~; ,
3
1 Roy 45 2 benchmark and it is going to be different than 3 breaks elsewhere in a lot of ways.
4 The question is: In declining order of Q
h 5 importance, what are the differences in system response 6 that you are aware of to a break at the top of the 7 pressurizer as contrasted with small breaks located 0
elsewhere?
9 MR. FISKE: Well, I am going to object 10 to that part of the question asking him to put 11 these in some rank order of 1:sportance.
12 If you want him do list the different 13 ways it might be, I have no objection to that, 14 but if you want him to characterize which one 15 is more important than another, I think it 16 depends on important for what purpose. But 17 if you want to start by asking, what are the 10 differences, I have no objection to that. Let's 19 see where it goes from there.
20 .MR. SELTZER: I don't want to get bogged 21 down in trivial differences. I want to give it 22 some context so if we were sitting in on a l
l 23 meeting with Dr. Roy and some of the other top l
24 people at B&W c.nd they were discussing 25 significant differences in system response, l
1 \
l 1
s 1 Roy 46
( ). 2 I would hear it in roughly the way that he i
3 might list the differences at such a meeting. ,
4 A If I were in such a meeting and just asked lhf 5 to surmise if I were to do an analysis or I had an 6 analysis sitting in front of me for a PORV or a 7 relief valve openpath versus breaks elsewhere.
8 I would expect to see differences in collapsed 9 water level versus time, that is , inventory in the 10 system. I would see differences in core flow versus 11 time. I might see differences in cladding temperature 12 response versus time. I would see differences in
(} 13 pressure decay versus time. I would see differences 14 in mixture level in the core versus time pelhaps.
15 They would be the principal parameters that I would 16 be contrasting for an ECCS analysis 17 Q When is the first time that you became 18 aware that the small break at the-top of the 19 pressurizer produces a rise in pressurizer water l 20 level which is unlikc the response of pressurizer l
21 water level to small breaks located elsewhere?
22 A well, I certainly recall that in Z3 discussions with counsel following the Three Mile 24 Island accident. I don't recall that coming, to my
.C) 25 recollection, prior to that on it as a -- in some i
e
".- ,e ,-,a.,.- w--n,-s.,,- ,.-ea ,, ,- , , - , - - - - , , - - - - + , - , , , , , - . ~ , ,
1 Roy 47 2 conversation or so forth. I just don't recall that 3 someone transmitted that or something that stuck into 4 my mind as a principal consequence of the Davis-Besse.
lk 5 I just don't recall when and whether and how that 6 might have come to my attention prior to the Three 7 Mile Island accident.
8 Q Well, although Ann Mcdonald has put the 9 transcript that you had in front of you away, at page 10 32 you said that "certainly for me it surfaced with 11 Bert Dunn's observations following Davis-Besse 1."
12 A Yes. At that time I had a distinct, or
() 13 at least I thought I had a distinct remembrance of 14 that in discussing it with Bert. That would certainly 15 be one avenue. Today I can't picture Bert standing 16 there and that, now, coming in my mind. There have 17 been a lot of things that passed through the mind 18 since then, but that would certainly be one avenue, 19 and at the time I was talking to Mr. Rockwell I had 20 an image of it or may have surmised that that was 21 transmitted to me during Bert's discussion on it.
G 22 Q And the "it" you are referring to is the l
l 23 knowledge that a break at the top of the pressurizer i
r"' 24 led to a rise in pressurizer water level?
t 25 A Really more in the context of the operator i
1 Roy 48 2 response to that at Davis-Besse, but I don't recall that conversation enough to say yes,.-Bert Dunn 3
4 transmitted that to me during our discussions
- h. 5 sometime after the Davis-Besse 1.
6 Q Today you don't recall that clearly enough?
7 A No.
8 Q But apparently on July 7, 1979 you did.
9 A Yes, enough to respond to the question 10 that way.
11 Q Looking at page 32 of your testimony, were 12 you asked those questions and did you give those 13 answers, to the best of your recollection?
14 A on this page, yes, sir.
15 MR. FISKE: You mean -- are you asking 16 whether he remembers giving those particular 17 answers? That is one thing. We are not going 18 to dispute this is the testimony he gave.
19 A I am assuming that the reco,rder put it 20 down right on here. And in the context of ECCS analyses, that would not be, you know, a major factor e 21 22 in the analysis that we would perform in qualifying 23 an ECCS systera or looking at compliance to 10 CFR 50.46.
24 MR. FISKE: Is this a good time.for a 25 mid-m rning break?
,n - + n , , , , , - -
+- w
1 Roy 49 j
( 2 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
3 MR. FISKE: Or maybe you are right in the 4 middle of something.
8 lll 5 MR. SELTZER: N o ., this is a good time for 6 a break.
7 (Recess taken.)
8 BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q Before the Three Mile Island accident, 10 what, if any, program existed for having the safety 11 analysis unit review in any systematic way plant 12 operating problems?
/~T 13 Q Well, one of the avenues we have talked O
14 about is that the customer service department in 15 reviewing an SPR and deciding where to dispatch it, 16 could dispatch it to the safety analysis unit so 17 they could receive SPR's if the person routing it 18 would think it would be of interest to safety analysis.
i 19 That would be the only systematic means 20 other than the case where a customer might identify 21 a task which he wished us to perform in analyzing 22 in a post-transient situation, some response to an 23 NRC question, and then that would be directed to 24 safety-analysis if it had required safety analysis l
' (~) l
\_/ i 25 people to do work. l l
l
1 Roy 50 Did you take any steps before the Three
( 2 Q 3 Mile Island accident to get the safety analysis unit 4 involved in a more rystematic review of plant lll 5 operational problems? .
6 A I recall an instance where safety analysis 7 Personnel, Bob Vosburgh sent me a note on encouraging 8 greater involvement in safety analysis in the review 9 of transients to whatever extent we did the reviews, 10 and I responded to that with a note back to Jim 11 Phinney to ask, you know, to keep that in mind and to 12 he aware of that and to really to encourage.
<- /~h 13 I think the substantive issues that would V
14 come up where we had to address questions which were 15 posed to the rustomer which would require safety 16 analysis assistance in answering that question as a 17 service to the customer, then they would be involved 18 through the task orders.
19 Q At the time you wrote to Phinney you were 20 the head of the section that included the safety
'21 analysis unit; right?
22 A Yes.
23 Q so you had responsibility for that unit; 24 right?
l 25 A I can't recall whether I did that as j l
l
\
_ _ _ . _ . __ ___ _ . _ . _ , _ _ __ __ . . _ . ~._ _ , , _ .
1 Roy 51 engineering manager or plant design manager- but I 2
3 think it was plant design manager.
4 Q If it was before August 1978, it was 5 while you were the plant design manager?
ll 6 A Yes. It just occurred to me I don't 7 recall whether I was in the engineering department 8 job or the plant design job. My recollection is I 9 was the plant design manager.
10 Q I think it was May 1978, which would be 11 several months before --
12 A Yes.
() 13 Q -- you became the engineering department 14 manager.
15 What, if anything, happened as a result 16 of the memo that you sent to Phinney.
17 A I don't recall any specific actions that 18 occurred on that. Again I viewed it as reminding 19 Jim Phinney. I sent it to someone else and I don't 20 recall who that was.
21 Q Taylor, Jim Taylor?
22 A Yes, just to encourage this. I had no 23 personal feeling that they weren't being involved 24 when it was appropriate, but that obviously this was 25 a concern to one of the safety analysis personnel
- - , ,m- ._ _ - - - - - - . , , . , _ , , _ . - , , , , - , ,. -
y.-.,---...yr.--- e
i I l l
i 1 Roy 52
) 2 and I felt I ought to pass that along and encourage 3 that.
l 4 There may have been response and they lll 5 may have been involved to a greater extent. It 6 didn't come up again, to my knowledge, so I thought-7 that was appropriate based on my understanding of 8 what they were trying to tell me at the time.
9 Q As you sit here now, you don't know 10 what the response was of rainney or Taylor to your 11 memos is that right?
12 A That's right. I don't know what dialogue
( 13 may have occurred between safety analysis and customer 14 service in response to this. Like I say, I didn't 15 hear about it again.
16 Q You don't even know if any dialogue 17 occurred, do you?
18 A whether there was any or not.
i 19 g Why did you think Ph%nney was An appropriate 20 Person to send that communication to? l l
21 A Phinney was the -- as I recall, and I 22 don't know the exact job he had at that time, but 23 was the manager in the customer service department 24 who would have, as I recall at that time, responsibility O 25 for interfacing with the customer and dealing with !
l
,r ._.--r.. _ _ - . , . - , _ - , , , , ~ _ , , ,,. -- -e,.. . . , , , , . , , . . . - , - ,
1 Roy 53
)) 2 sits problem reports.
Q What did you intend that safety analysis 3
4 w uld do once it had identified safety issues in a review of plant operational problems?
lh 5 A I d n't believe I had at that time -- just, 6
you know, assisting it for safety issues. That is one 7
8 of the things. Again, involvement in post-transient 9
at operating plants could be a sort of benchmark 10 information. So there were several purposes that 4
11 would be served and are served by safety analysis 12 involvement in post-transient reviews.
13 Q Did there come a point prior to the Three 14 Mile Island accident when you recommended that there 15 be a a re intensive screening of operating plant 16 incidents so that the engineering department could 17 review them in more detail?
ig A Prior to Three Mile Island? I don't 19 recall one right now before Three Mile Island. I 2b just don't recall one right now. .
Q Let me show you a memorandum which Jim 21 I
l 22 Taylor wrote to Deddens on April 14, 1978 with a copy 23 to you. This is GPU Exhibit 255.
! 24 was Deddens your predecessor as manager of
-#\
25 *"9 1 "***1897 l
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1 Roy 54 2 A Yes.
3 Q Where is Deddens today?
4 A He is manager of business administration lll 5 and integration department. .
6 Q Is GPU Exhibit 255 a copy of a memorandum 7 that you received in or about mid-April in the regular 8 course of business?
9 A I am on distribution for it. Yes.
10 Q In GPU Exhibit 255, Taylor, who is your 11 company's head of licensing at that time, was suggesting 12 establishing "a routine practice of going further 13 than the site problem report system might otherwise
(
14 require..."
15 Do you see that?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Ee goes on to suggest "a management policy 18 which calls for a detailed incident report for every 19 significant incident affecting a B&W plant. The purpose 20 of these incident reports would be to pursue the 21 incident to the point where what happened was 22 thoroughly understood and that corrective actions i 1
23 could be outlined such that all reasonable things 24 had been done to minimize the possibility of the same O 25 or similar occurrences.on other B&W operating plants."
1
.-w.--
1 Roy 55 2 At or about the time that you got GPU 3 Exhibit 255, did you discuss these suggestions with j l
4 Taylor or Deddens? -
lh 5 A I don't recall any specific instances 6 where this memo was discussed with Jim Taylor, Mr.
7 Taylor or Mr. Deddens. I don't recall the specific 8 memo, but the desirability of working with our 9 customers on transients, where the reactor had 10 tripped and the plant had undergone a transient, 11 working with the customer to assess what had happened, 12 what useful lessons might be learned from it in
() 13 terms of avoiding the trip or improving performance 14 of equipment, and then sharing that information with 15 other customers, was a generic topic that I had 16 discussed with Mr. Kosiba and others. It was a 17 desirable thing.
18 Later on after Three Mile Island that led 19 to formulation of our TAP program, transient assessment 20 program. Frankly, you can't do that in isolation, 21 you've got to work very closely with the customer.
22 It has to be something he wants to do and he really 23 has to kind of invite you in to do that. It took a 24 long time to get to the position today where we are
\_ -
' doing this with some of our customers, not even all, 25 l
1 Roy 56 4
)
- ~-
2 because all don't want it.
I 3 So this was a policy which -- I don't 4 recall the specifics with Taylor and Deddens, but lll 5 even when I was in plant design and as engineering 6 department manager is something that we as a division 7 wanted to try to get our customers interested in and 8 work with them in putting such a program together 9 where we could go to the customer's site, augment 10 his staff in examining post-transient situations and 11 help identify areas for improvement and then share 12 that with other customers. That wns a service that f') 13 we had hoped we would be able to interest our V
14 customers in. To date, we have only become partially 15 successful in doing that.
16 Q Focusing just on the period before the 17 Three Mile Island accident, do you recall any specific 18 efforts to establish a program for "a detailed 19 incident report for every significant incident 20 affecting a B&W plant"?
21 A My only perception in that time span 22 was that it was an issue addressed in Owners Group, i 23 Users Group -- Owners Group situations.
l -
l 24 Q I am sorry, are you correcting your
! [h
\_/
25 answer juat to refer to the Cwners Group now? l l
I l
l 1 Roy 57
, 2 A Yes, the Owners Group. Owners Group 3 referred to operating plant owners.
4 We have subsequently in our TAP program 5 involved and presented this to our Users Group ll 6 for the backlog plants, but in that time frame, only 7 with respect to the Owners Group. I don't know of a 8 specific instance where the thing came up, but it 9 was clearly one which we had wanted to confront our 10 customers with and hopefully get them to support such 11 a thing. I don't know of a specific instance myself 12 prior to Three Mile Island.
() 13 MR. FISKE: Excuse me, I am a little 14 confused by the answer. Maybe --
15 MR. SELTZER: Go ahead.
16 MR. FISKE: I am not sure whether Dr.
17 Roy was referring in his last answer, when he 18 referred to the Owners Group, to this program j 19 that he referred to earlier that they had tried 20 to interest the customers in and when he was l
21 saying that they"had used the Owners Group 22 meetings as a vehicle to try to interest the 23 customers, or whether he was saying that the 24 Owners Group meetings were used to present,
]
- % ,/
l 25 whatever the phrase was, the detailed incident l
1
1 Roy 58 2 report for specific incidents. I just don't
)
3 understand which of the two he was saying 4 happened at the Owners Group meeting.
lll 5 THE WITNESS: As.I say, we had --
6 Q can you clarify that?
7 A To the extent that I am really talking 8 in terms of this was an item of interest to us and 9 getting our operating plant customers to join with 10 us in a program of assessing operating concerns, and 11 my perception was that that had been discussed at 12 Owners Group meetings with the service managers,
() 13 through the service managers. I don't know of any 14 specific instance, but that whole process or policy 15 really came to a head after Three Mile Island in our 16 TAP program.
17 MR. FISKE: 0.K., that clears it up, 18 I think, Dr. Roy.
19 , Q The Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 20 incident occurred at a time when the plant was still 21 in its startup and test phases isn't that right?
22 THE WITNESS: Could you read that back?
23 Q The September 24, the famous Davis-Besse 24 event took place when the plant was in startup and l %)
25 tests right?
l
9 1 Roy 59 d
() 2 A I believe -so. I don't recall that 3 particular circumstance at that time. But I believe 4 that is true.
You had a lot of Bsw personnel working lll 5 Q 6 at the site at the time of the September 24, '77 i
7 transisnt; right?
8 A I couldn't comment on that. I wasn't 9 aware of what our complement of people would have ;
10 been at the site.
11 Q Did you ever hear of a chap named Fred 12 Faist?
(} 13 A Yes, I know Mr. Faist.
14 Q Joe Kelly, did you ever hear of him?
15 A Kelly?
16 Q Joe Kelly.
17 A I know Mr. Kelly.
18 Q Did you ever hear that Fred was site i
'19 operations manager at the Davis-Besse plant during 20 startup and test?
21 A I don't know where Mr. Faist was in that
.22 time period. He has spent a lot of time-in the
!- 23 ' field so I don't recall him being the site manager 24 at that time.
l-O 25 Q Isn't it a fact that as events generally
1 Roy 60
) 2 were handled at B&W prior to the Three Mile Island 3 accident, when a B&W plant was in startup and test 4 you had B&W engineers at the plant site assisting lll 5 in the startup and test? .
6 A Yes.
7 Q Did you ever hear that B&W did not get 8 all the cooperation it wanted from Toledo Edison in 9 acquiring information relating to the Davis-Besse 10 September 24, 1977 transient?
11 A I have no recollection of that coming 12 to my attention beyond -- past --
after the 1977
() 13 transient.
14 Q So although you said that there were some 15 that you think wanted to participate and give B&W 16 information about transients and some that don't, 17 you don't know of any problem B&W had getting 18 information about the September 24, 1977 transient; 19 isn't that right?
20 - A I don't know of a specific problem on that 21 transient. It just didn't come to my attention.
22 Q Do you know that B&W had a B&W reactimeter l 23 . hooked up to the Davis-Besse plant at the time of the i 11 s 24 September 24, 1977 transient?
N-25 A I don't recall that they did or didn't.
l
1 Roy 63
. ) 2 Q A reactimeter would capture a tremendous
.3 amount of data about plant response to a transient 4 if it were hooked up at the time of the transient; h 5 right? -
6 A Yes, it is a multichannel recorder which 7 would record dynamically a lot of the parameters 8 following a transient.
9 Q~ Taking a look at the first paragraph of 10 GPU Exhibit 255, do you see the sentence that begins 11 "The purpose of these incident reports."
12 A Yes.
() 13 Q Taylor is proposing detailed incident 14 reports "to pursue the incident to the point where 15 what happened was thoroughly understood and that 16 corrective actions could be outlined such that all 17 reasonable things that had been done to minimize the 18 possibility of the same or similar occurrences on 19 other B&W operating plants."
l l 20 Did you agree at.the time you got this 21 memo that more could be done by B&W to thoroughly l
! understand incidents that had occurred at B&W plants?.
22 i
23 MR. FISKE: Well, you mean could or should?
24 MR. SELTZER: Could.
25 A That I arrived at some conclusion based L.
1 Roy 62
( 2 on reading this memo? I don't recall the memo, much l
l' 3 less what conclusions I drew or any follow-up actions 4 on it.
llh 5 Q At the time that.this was written, April 6 '78, when you said you were having discussions with 7 others, you remember reports to Users Group meetings.
8 Was it your conclusion from the reports you were 9 receiving and the discussions you were having that 10 B&W could do more to " thoroughly understand" incidents 11 that had occurred at B&W plants?
12 MR. FISKEt I don't think there is much
() 13 point in putting the " thoroughly understand" in 14 quotes if he doesn't remember reading the memo.
15 A My view of this and in the context that 16 it had come up in discussions prior and after Three 17 Mile Island is that this is -- and after that -- is 18 the assessment of operating experiences at the plant 19 and more systematically reviewing those experiences 20 for what happened as a means.for improving availability.
21 of the unit that -- one primary purpose, that this 22 would have to be done with B&W outlining or proposing 23 and working with its customers to come up with a 24 program to do that.
O. 25 Q Did you understand that in addition to II I " - - -
/
1 Roy 63 2 improving --
3 MR. FISKE: I am not sure he finished 4 his answer.
k 5 Are you finished?
6 A Improving the overall availability of 7 the unit, improving the safety of the unit, and 8 obviously maximizing the -- or minimizing, rather, the 9 lost capacity days.
10 Q Did you believe in 1978 that it was an 11 important function for the engineering department to 12 try "to minimize the possibility of the same or
(} 13 similar occurrences on other B&W operating plants"?
14 A Requirement to do that?
15 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. Would you read 16 that back, please.
17 (Record read.)
18 A I guess I saw it as a very desirable 19 service to render, not just for the engineering 20 department but for NPGD to work with its customers and 21 help improve overall plant performance, the time the 22 plant spends on line. That would be more my driving 23 incentive for it.
24 Q In other words, if there was a problem O 25 that had shut down a B&W plant, you felt that it was
1 Roy 64 l ) 2 part of NPGD's objective to try to prevent similar 3 occurrences at other B&W plants? l 4 A I didn't see it as some obligation, llh 5 you know, some requirement, but that the enhancement
+ 6 of the performance by whatever means, and I believe 7 that availability, reliability and safety are very 8 closely connected, that that is desirable from many 9 standpoints, both as a service and that these plants 1
10 achieve the best possible performance record that 11 we can help achieve for them.
12 More from that standpoint we believed j ) 13 that we could bring some useful expertise in joining 14 with our customers to examine these experiences and 15 improve overall plant performance, as a desirable
] 16 service.
, 17 Q I take it you were familiar before the 18 Three Mile Island accident with the rapid cooldown 19 event at Rancho Seco that is referred to in GPU 20 Exhibit 225.
( 21 A Yes.
22 Q Did you know that your plant integration 23 manager, Bruce Karrasch, had been assigned to head a j .24 task-force to. analyze that incident?
23 A My best recollection of that is, after
, , - - - - - - ,, - - - - - , , - ,, -y-
4 1 Roy 65 2 the accident, the incident, this was a loss of NNI i 3 power event that led to an overcooling, and we were 4 4 requested by the customer to perform some analyses to I
5 look at the stresses which the components were i
j 6 subjected to, and as a' task, you know, task order 7 from him in terms of qualifying the components for O servicing and getting the plant back on line. I have 9 that remembrance of doing that work, and I think I 4
10 asked Mr. Karrasch to do that, as I recall.
- 11 Was it any part of the purpose of forming Q
- 12 the task force that B&W wanted to try to avoid a
() 13 recurrence of that type of outage at B&W plants in the 4 14 future?
?
! 15 A No, I don't think so. My recollection
]
l 16 was that we brought the group together, I wanted to l'
17 have single point responsibility for responding to the ,
18 f customer request to help get that plant back on line.
i
- 19 That was my recollection of what we put that task ,
i l 4
20 force together for. There may have been other tasks i I
. 21 but I remember specifically the component evaluation. I 22 Q All right. So you don't remember wanting 23 Bruce Karrasch's task force to consider how to avoid 24 a recurrence of that type of event in the future; 25 is that right?
r l
1 Roy 66 2 A I don't recall that being a charge or 3 purpose of the task force. I don't recall that.
4 Q Do you remember anyone ever suggesting llh 5 that B&W should intensively analyze the SMUD rapid ,
6 cooldown event to try to avoid a recurrence of that 7 type of event at B&W plants?
8 A I don't recall, to my knowledge, an effort 9 being made to do that.
10 Q You placed an emphasis in one of your l
11 answers on studying plant outages in order to improve 12 availability.
() 13 Was that the principal focus as opposed to 14 improving plant safety?
15 Q I think the best characterization of that, 16 and I believe I used it in one answer, was overall 17 performance, and that would include availability, 18 and obviously if we detected.some item of significant 19 safety implications, we would factor that in if that 20 was an observation that we had made.
21 I would like to think of it in terms of 22 overall performance when you look at or investigate 23 an operating experience.
24 Q Which has higher priority, availability 25 or safety?
s .. .
1 Roy 67 2 MR. FISKE: He just said that --
3 MR. SELTZER: I heard what he just said.
4 MR. FISKE: I don't see how you can answer ll 5' that question in the abstract. I mean it is 6 like what is more important, oating or drinking?
7 MR. SELTZER: To some people drinking is 8 more important, to some people eating is more 9 important. I think that is why'you ask different 10 people and you get different answers.
11 MR. FISKE: I think this is -- I think ha 12 said they are both important. You mean important
() 13 to him, important to the utilities, important
- 14 to whom? It is, you know --
15 Q In the review of operational problems at 16 B&W plants, as it was ongoing before the Three Mile 17 Island accident, which was more important to you, 18 improved availability or improved safety?
19 MR. FISKE: I will object to the form of 20 that question. Under the rules, you are allowed 21 to answer that. We will decide --
someone will 22 decide later whether that was a proper question.
23 A Safety is important. You have to look at 24 a specific case to determine whether it is more 25 important than something else. You know, in terms of i . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _J
1 Roy 6P
) 2 its probability or frequency of occurrence or this 3 kind of thing. But obviously in the operating 4 philosophy of NPGD safety is important. When I lh 5 Put together safety and availability, to me they are 6 closely related. In a given instance an availability 7 issue might be the thing that we would want to 8 address more directly because it might not have any 9 specific safety implications, whatever the experience 10 was. Obviously if one came up that had a major 11 safety incidence, we would want to factor that into 12 the overall evaluation on it. So you have to look
() 13 at the merits of each experience you are looking at.
14 Safety is obviously important.
15 Q You said that your principal concern 16 with regard to the SMUD rapid cooldown event was 17 getting that plant back on line; is that right?
18 A The task that we had, as I recall, assigned 19 to us dealt with responding to the customer's request
! 20 for analyses that would help him qualify his plants l
l 21 for continued service -- his plant for continued '
- )
22 service. l l
23 MR. FISKE: I think Dr. Roy's earlier l
24 answer was in terms of the assignment he 25 understood Karrasch had been given.
l
1 1 Roy 69 l 2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 Q Were you at all concerned about the 4 safety implications of the SMUD event?
lh 5 A Well, for that specific event I don't 6 recall a safety issue being raised on it.
- 7 Q So is your answer that you don't recall 8 having any particular safety concerns arising out of 9 that incident?
10 A That's correct. I don't recall any 11 specific concern that came up and we addressed with 12 regard to that transient before Three Mile Island.
() 13 Q Weren't you concerned that the operators 14 had lost a lot of their instruments and their ability s
15 to read the condition of the plant during the SMUD 16 event?
, 17 A We were concerned with that and took some J 18 action, as a matter of fact, in trying to understand i
19 what the nature of this power supply circuitry was.
20 That's not a B&W circuit, but to help preclude that 21 from happening. And as I recall, we formulated come G %'
22 site instructions to address that particular issue, 23 not only for Rancho Seco but others.
24 When I saw a safety implication, I mean l
I 25 something that has come up that must be responded- '
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1 Roy 70 O
,y 2 to as a licensee, you know, to the NRC, to address
,, , 3 it, but the overall implications on that specific l o 4 event, we did address that circuitry that caused that h 5 loss of power supply. -
6 Q I am baffled. In your last answer you-
_, ,q, 7 equated safety with reporting to the NRC. s
- "' s; '
s
- ' 8 A Yes.
( A.
-~.,1 9'
Q Do you recall thal?
10 h A Yes. In the context that I just responded 1,. '
q l 11 there,'but in looking at the overall transient or ,)
- q. N k L'22
' N any specific transient, if'.we did identify an item
'\ 13 . with, you know, safety implications, O.K., and made y [ 14 an observation that wasthought could.. correct or 4'
\
4 15 improve that situation, we would act en it, depending
' u 16 on what the specific insta.nce was. 'f
- .\ \. '
'c 17 For Rancho Seco,'you reminded me we did
\'~[18 'look,at,that circuitry that caused that power loss'. s
\ s.
'% s 19 \ 1 Q An event could have safety implications i c .-
S .
I 20 without being somethingsthat had to be reported to t- -
3 a _
21 the NPC7
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~<
- 22 -A Yes, yes.
t _ .\ . , ,
23 x .
l 'Q In the last sentence of' the first paragraph N
~
l ( ,
i N , ,- x; i e 24 of GPU' Exhibit, 255, Taylortrefers to " operating i
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\ 3 25 procedure recommendations."
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Roy 72 t
~
2 Do you see that?
?
3 A Yea.*
Q Pridr to the Ttireo Mile Island accident, 4
h 5 were you aware of wlather asw's review of plant 6
operating experience ever led to B&W making operating 7
procedure recommendations?
8 A I don't recall any specific instances g with respect to procedures for operating the plant.
10 Q I mean what Taylor is referring to here.
11 A operating procedures recommendations.
12 No, I don't recall any instances where we did that, 13 of my own personal knowledge.
g4 Q Did you think this was a pretty dumb 15 idea of Taylor's?
16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, he just 17 finished tellit.g you three times that he 18 doesn't remember reading this memo, so how can 19 he tell you whether he thought it was a good l 20 idea or dumb idea?
l Fr m any of y ur conversations at the I Q
l g 21 l 22 time, do you have any recollection of thinking that 23 this was a pretty dumb idea of Taylor's?
l 24 MR. FISKE: Not only that, he told you at I C 25 great length the concept that was embodied l
1 Roy 72 2 in Taylor's memo was something that they had 3 been working on for a considerable period of 4 time and tried to sell to the customers and lh 5 it took a long time to.--
6 MR. SELTZER: This isn't very fair. You 7 have been sitting at depositions I have been 8 taking for a year now. Now the questions I 9 asked, you figured out good answers to most of 10 the questions I can ask, and we could probably 11 have a very short deposition if I just asked you 12 the questions and you would give me these
() 13 terrific answers, but the point of a deposition 14 is to bring somebody from Lynchburg who is an 15 experienced manager and had contemporaneous 16 involvement in these events and get his answers.
17 So I would appreciate it if you have an 18 objection, state it and don't give an answer.
19 MR. FISKE: I haven't given a single answer.
20 I was telling you that I thought Dr. Roy had l
21 already answered the question that you had l
k 22 asked about three times and I was simply 23 referring to an answer that he previously l
24 gave you. And I think when he has told you
- ("'N
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,g .
25 two or three times that almost four years after I
u
i 1 noy 73 m
k_) 2 the fact he doesn't remember having received 3 this, a copy of this particular memorandum back 4 in April 1978, it doesn't serve a very useful lhk 5 purpose to ask him now whether he thought a 6 recommendation, the specific words you referred 7 to from that memo, was a dumb idea. He has 8 discussed at great length what he thought of i 9 this concept, but you picked two or three 10 words out of a memo that he doesn't remember 4
l 11 reading and asked whether he thought that was a 12 dumb idea. And I think, with all due respect,
() 13 someone might say that is a dumb question.
14 MR. SELTZER: Well, some people might l
15 say that is a pretty dumb spiel, as long as 16 we are getting personal about it.
17 MR. FISKE: I smiled when I said it.
18 I just thought that since you characterized 19 Mr. Taylor's idea, I didn't think it was 20 improper to characterize your question.
21 9 I am not characterizing the idea. I am )
' G 1 l 22 asking whether people at B&W characterized the idea l
l l 23 as a dumb one. Did you have any discussions before 24 the Three Mile Island accident about whether it would i
l 25 be a good idea for B&W to be reviewing operating g - ~ ~ - - , -
.- . = .- - ._ . .. . .- -- - - ..
l l
)
1 Roy 74
() 2 problems at Bsw plants with an eye toward issuit.g 3 operating procedure recommendations?
4 A I have no knowledge of those kind of llh 5 discussions prior t- the Three Nile Island.
6 Q will you take a look at the next to the 7 last page of Exhibit 255. Do you recognize the 8 handwriting in the lower right-hand corner?
9 MR. FISKE: Under the name Fahland?
10 MR. SELTZER: Right.
11 A No, I don't.
12 Q It is not your handwriting?
() 13 A I don't believe so.
14 Q Do you recall ever discussing the matter 15 of detailed incident review at any staff meetings 16 before the Three Mile Island accident?
17 A No, I don't recall doing that at any 18 staff meeting.
19 Q Let me show you GPU Exhibit 256 and ask 20 you if this is the memorandum that you sent to Taylor 21 and Phinney on or about Ray 46, 4378 relating to the 22 program Bob vosburgh had suggested.
23 (Pause.)
24 Ms. MCDONALD: Is there a pending question?
V 25 Q The question was: Is this a copy of the i
i 1 Roy 75 2 memorandum that you sent to Taylor and Phinney on 3 or about May 16, 1978 regarding an issue raised by i
4 Bob Vosburgh?
k 5 A Yes,'it is. .
- 6 Q Were you endorsing and approving the 7 recommendation made by Vosburgh in his April 11, 1978 8 memo?
, 9 A To the extent that, as I said, I thought 10 it appropriate to ask Mr. Phinney, and I primarily
, 11 had him in mind, to involve the safety analysis, to --
l
- 12 to remind him to remind safety analysis when we 13 thought it was appropriate to do so. It was really 14 in the way of encouraging the customer service people 15 as they are assessing SPR's or other transients
- 16 that we may be involved in to constantly think of 17 safety analysis in terms of conducting their reviews.
18 Q I take it you had read vosburgh's memo 19 before you wrote your memo to Taylor and Phinney?
20 A Yes.
21 I don't recall, you know, sitting g
22 there and reading it and drawing some conclusions.
23 To the extent that I remember writing this note to I 24 encourage again safety analysis involvement in the
( l 25 review of. transients. ,
l 1 Roy 76 2 Q what did you think was the desirable 3 result of having safety analysis involved in the 4 review of transients?
hh 5 A some of them are. captured here. I 6 don't recall arriving at the specific conclusion myself, 7 but certainly the comparison of the event that 8 occurred versus the kind of analysis that we did to 9 support licensing of the plant, benchmarking, 10 appropriateness of site instructions and so forth 11 that went out in response to whatever observations 12 we drew from the transient. Any time that we address
() 13 safety implications in response to, say, a customer 14 task order, I thought they ought to be involved.
15 I am not aware of any knowledge where they were not 16 involved and somehow degraded our response, you know, 17 to a customer request for review, but as to encourage 18 keeping safety analysis in mind when operating 19 transient review work was being performed.
l 20 Q You said in the middle of that, "any 21 time there were safety implications, I thought that 22 safety analysis ought to be involved."
23 What did you mean by safety implications?
(~N 24 A If we identified some basic deviation V' .
from the assumptions we make about the plant for doing --
25 l O
1 R3y 77
() 2 and I am giving you an example --
for doing analyses 3 that the SAR analysis, that differed greatly from the 4 assumptions that had been made in performing the llk 5 analysis which formed the licensing base, would be 6 an example. It may cover something like that.
7 MR. SELTZER: Off the record.
8 (Discussion off the record.)
9 Q On the last page of Exhibit 256, in the 10 next to the last paragraph, Bob Vosburgh says, "The 11 purpose of the examples given in item 3 are to 12 indicate that neither licensing, nuclear services,
() 13 fuels, control analysis, et cetera, are qualified to 14 make safety evaluation judgments."
15 From your understanding of the 16 responsibilities of safety analysis and the areas 17 of expertise of the other units that Bob Vosburgh 18 referred to, was he correct as of 1978 in indicating 19 that safety analysis had an expertise to make safety 20 evaluation judgments that the other groups he mentioned 21 did not?
G i 22 MR. FISKE: Well, Mr. Seltzer, I think Dr.
23 Roy ought to have an opportunity to read, at the 24 very least, all of item 3 and perhaps the entire
(-]
V 25 ,
memorandum.
l
1 Roy 78 n
(_) 2 Secondly, I think you should make clear 3 to Dr. Roy what you mean by safety evaluation 4 judgments.
lh 5 MR. SELTZER: He.is certainly free to read 6 the memo with as much car"e and deliberation as 7 he wants.
8 (Pause.)
9 A And the question is?
10 MR. .FISKE: Have you had a chance to read 11 this (indicating)?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
l () 13 MR. FISKE: 0.K.
14 MR. SELTZER: Please repeat the question.
15 (Question read.)
16 A In terms of my thinking today, giving my 17 opinion today because I don't recall arriving at any 18- opinion along this line when I got the memo --
)
19 MR. FISKE: Well, just a minute. There 20 is no point in having Dr. Roy express an opinion 21 today. I think the question is, what did he 22 believe at the time he was running this section 23 at the time he received the memo.
N 24 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
(b 25 Q That is really the question.
1 Roy 79
) 2 A The opinion in that time period?
3 Q Here is what I am asking yous Based on l
4 your knowledge as the head of the plant design section lh 3 in 1978, did you believe that the safety analysis 6 unit had a particular expertise in making safety 7 evaluation judgments that did not reside in licensing 8 or nuclear services?
9 A I did not make that conclusion at that time 10 and would not have expertise in evaluating safety 11 implications, which resides in many areas. Obviously 12 in making the best assessment of implications requires
() 13 the expertise of a number of disciplines. I am not 14 saying safety analysis couldn't contribute to that, 15 O.K., but there are employees with safety analysis 16 expertise residing in a number of areas, in both my 17 department and in NPGD.
18 Given a specific instance, they might be 19 able to bring some unique perspective, O.K., but 20 I wouldn't rule out that that kind of perspective 21 could not be determined somewhere.else by people who
! 9 have had either previous experience in safety analysis l 22 i
23 or who themselves were involved in elements of safety 24 analysis. Safety analysis was not all done in one 25 unit.
Roy 80 1
( 2 Q A lot of it was done in Bert Dunn's outfit?
A Yes. There, yes, and other units. And 3
4 People with expertise to make observations with respect lll 5 to safety implications resided in lots of organizations.
6 Q You never followed through to see that 7 Taylor or Phinney did anything to implement the 8 recommendations that you were making in your cover 9
memo, GUP Exhibit 256, did you?
10 MR. FISKE: Go ahead. I think he 11 answered this before, but go ahead.
12 A It didn't come up again and I am not
() 13 aware of any -- I did not make any personal follow-up 14 on it as it did not come up again.
15 I should add, to my knowledge it didn't 16 come up again, but I was -- in August I was in another 37 position.
18 Q You were in a position that had not only 19 responsibility for the plant design section but other I
l 20 sections?
A Rignt. And it didn't come up again in l
21 22 that position either.
23 Q I take it you continued to see Taylor f- 24 and Phinney in connection with your new position,
- 'v didn't you?
25 I
l
1 Roy 81
) 2 A Yes. We had dialogue, communication.
3 Q Let me show you a memo which you wrote on 4 May 15, 1979 to Jim Taylor, subject: Procedures for lh 5 identifying and resolving safety concerns, GPU 6 Exhibit 251.
7 Is this a copy of a memorandum which you 8 sent to Jim Taylor on or about May 15, 19797 9 A Yes, it is.
10 Q With whom, if anyone, did you discuss 11 this matter before you sent the memo to Mr. Taylor?
12 A As the first sentence states, this was a memo confirming a recent discussion that I have had
( 13 14 with Jim Taylor. I don't recall today that discussion 15 but obviously that took place.
, 16 Q I notice you copied John MacMillan. Is 17 this something that you and John MacMillan had 18 discussed before you sent the memo?
19 A Not that I recall, no. I don't.think we 20 did.
21 Q Let me get back to the original question.
22 With whom, if anyone, did you discuss this 23 before you sent it to Taylor?
24 A I don't recall today any other discussions 25 with respect to the PSC procedure.
t 1 Roy 82 i
() 2 Q Whose idea was it to conduct the review 3 that you are asking for?
4 A Mine. I very specifically recall thinking, lll 5 yes, I think I want to do that.
6 Q O.K.
7 And did it occur to you that you wanted 8 to conduct a review of the systems and procedures 9 for resolving safety concerns because of the Three 10 Mile Island accident?
11 A That certainly was a key input in it, 12 as a consequence of that accident. It was a very 13 natural question for me to raise and to call this 14 review to be conducted to see if there was anything 15 that we need to change in those procedures. ;
10 Q What, if any, responsibilities did Jim 17 Taylor have at the time which caused you to send this 18 memo to him?
19 A Mr. Taylor, as manager of licensing, 20 had the assignment of primary responsibility for 21 administration of the PSC procedure. He was the 22 point of contact fe: addressing PSC issues.
! 23 Q You described the purpose of the review in 24 four numbered subparagraphs. Do.you see that?
25 i
[
1 Roy 83 2 A Yes.
3 Q The first purpose was "to assure that 4 engineering personnel are fully aware that safety 5 is everyone's job,' and then.it goes on.
6 Why did you think that that was important?
7 A Engineering personnel working on nuclear 8 power plants ought to be conscious of safety 9 implications in their work and the procedures for 10 making visible any concerns they might have. I didn't 11 have any knowledge or concern that they weren't, but I was asking Jim Taylor, you know, you look into it 12
() 13 and see if you think that needs to be strengthened in any way, but that is obviously important for 14 15 PeoP l e working on nuclear power plants. And I 16 wanted his opinion, you know, "What is your opinion?"
17 Q Why is it important for people working on 18 nuclear power plants?
19 Q They are complex systems and with 20 implications for public health and safety.
21 Q When you say implications for public l
i 22 health and safety --
23 A Not only public health and safety, but i
24 PeoP l e who work on the plant itself. I am not O"
25 excluding other areas.
L
1 Roy 84 I would like to flush out the generality
( 2 Q 3 of implications for public health and safety. What 4 are the implications for public health and safety lh 5 that you were referring to? .
6 A We are dealing with radiation in a nuclear 7 power plant and therefore I think it has an element 8 with respect to safety that differentiates it, say, g from a coal-fired boiler or vacuum cleaneas or washing 10 machines, all of which can hava safety implications, 11 and I am not saying you exclude other disciplines or 12 functional areas where safety is important. I wanted
() 13 to make sure to get Jim's opinion as to whether all 14 of our personnel are fully aware that they should 15 be conscious of safety implications in their job 16 and aware of the procedures for flushing out concerns 17 they might have, making them visible as a part of 18 their normal job function.
r 19 Q How does nuclear radiation differentiate 20 the dangers of a nuclear plant from the dangers of 21 other types of equipment?
22 A Well, radiation has personal health i
23 implications that you don't have, say, on a fuel-fired 24 central station unit.
l l
(~)~\
\.
What are the personal health implications 25 Q l
~ - . . -- .-.
1 Roy 85
() 2 of radiation?
3 A You are getting a little out of my field, 4 but obviously we want to minimize and avoid the lll 5 exposure to the greatest degree possible. For example, 6 occupational hazard is an important thing with respect 7 to maintenance practices and it is an important 8 functional criterion in the design of equipment, more g so than you would have to contend with in something 10 like an oil- or coal-fired piece of equipment.
11 Q Is that because radiation can cause 12 damage to human organs?
A
( 13 I say, you are going to get out of my 14 depth pretty rapidly, but yes, it can.
15 Q You know that radiation can cause 16 genetic mutation?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Is that one of the hazards of exce'ssive 19 exposure to radiation that you were aware of?
20 A I wasn't aware of that and I didn't have 21 these kinds of things going through my mind when I 22 wrote No. 1, but yes, I am aware of that, you know, 23 as you and I are discussing it today.
24 Q It is something that you were aware of C 25 when you were getting a PhD in nuclear engineering,
1 Roy 85 2 isn't it?
3 A Yes.
4 MR. FISKE: What, that radiation could ll 5 cause damage to human organs or genetic damage?
6 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
7 A Yes.
8 Q You were aware of that?
9 A Yes.
10 Q And you were aware of those things when 11 you were getting your PhD in nuclear engineering; 12 right?
() 13 A Yes. Part of our training was in the 14 health physics implications, yes.
15 But here, this is in the context of 16 people's awareness that in the work that they do 17 they should be conscious of the safety implications, l
18 if they are putting functional criteria together, 19 whatever, getting Jim's opinion to evaluate that 20 situation and see if there was anything we ought to 21 do to enhance that.
22 Q Focusing on your statement, because it is 1
ZJ a nuclear plant with the problems of radiation release, r3 24 distinguishing a nuclear plant from a vacuum cleaner, U 25' is it a fact that there are different safety concerns
^- J
1 Roy 87 that arise because this is a nuclear plant with the
) 2 3 possibility of nuclear contamination?
4 MR. FISKE: You mean different than a lh 5 vacuum cleaner? .
6 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
7 A Yes.
8 Q And the engineers who are working on 9 developing a nuclear plant have to be aware of those 10 different dangers; is that right?
11 A They should be aware, and like I say, I 12 have no evidence we did not have adequate awareness 13 when requesting this review, but it is one of the 14 elements that I wanted Mr. Taylor to consider as 15 he conducted the review, with an emphasis on the 16 procedure itself for making those concerns visible.
17 Q You said that you wanted "to assure that 18 the procedures for processing safety issues are 19 adequate to assure timely notification to the NRC 20 and to affected customers."
21 Why was it important to assure timely 22 notification to affected customers?
23 A The principal concern that I had in mind 24 at that time, as best I can-recollect, is that these
\~') 25 issues or concerns are made visible, that we
l l.
l-1 Roy 88
) 2 evaluate them for reportability and nonreportability 3 and that in the cases where these should be referred 4 to the customer for evaluation, that we do that in a lll 5 timely way. It is one of the follow-ons to this 6 kind of thing that we implemented, I think after 7 Three Mile Island -- was to look at the time it 8 takes to process some of these PSC's. But it is --
9 I don't know that I had any specific kind of 10 implications in mind at the time.
11 Q You say that after the Three Mile Island l l
l 12 accident you became aware of the need to look at ;
() 13 the time it was taking to issue notifications to 14 customers?
15 MR. FISKE: Time to process PSC's.
16 A Time to process PSC's.
17 Q You knew that it had taken a long time 18 for Dunn's recommendation to get processed at B&W7 19 A I don't know that I had that specifically 20 in mind in addressing this kind of item,-with or 21 without Bert Dunn's. I hadn't made any judgment 22 whether that was a long time,.a short time or a 23 proper time. This would be a good generic prescription 24 - for review: take a look at the timeliness of getting 25 these issues visible and disposed of.
m- .
1 Roy 89 O 2 Q You got Dunn's menos in February 1978; 3 right?
4 A Yes, they were dated, referring to the ll) 5 February 6th and the -- -
i 6 Q The February 9th and the February 16th 7 mesos?
8 A Yes.
9 Q You got those in February of 1978; right?
10 A Yes.
11 Q f To the best of your knowledge, the -
12 operating guidelines which Dunn proposed in his 13 February 9th and 16th memos were never sent out to ,
14 any B&W operating plants before the Three Mile Island 15 accident; isn't that right?
16 A To my knowledge, that is right.
I 17 Q You know that within a few days after 18 the Three Mile Island accident instructions for the 19 operation of high pressure injection, which were 20 substantially identical to Dunn's February 16, 1978 21 instructions, were sent out to all operating plants?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Did it ever occur to you at or about the
(~T 24 time that Dunn's instructions were finally sent out, V
25 or shortly thereafter, that it had taken too long-for
4 Roy 90 1
2 B&W to get around to sending those out?
A No. I arrived at no conclusion along 3
4 those lines at that time. -
g Did you ever conclude 4.c any time before lhr 5 l
6 today that waiting over a year to send out Dunn's 7
guidelines for the operation of high pressure injection 8 was a timely notification to affected customers?
MR. FISKE: I am going to object to the 9
10 form of that question, Mr. Seltzer. I don't 11 think the evidence supports the conclusion 12 that B&W waited a year to send out the instructions.
( 13 14 MR. SELTZER: Let me rephrase it.
15 MR. FISKE: You are familiar with the 16 evidence.
17 Q Did you ever conclude that the interval 18 of 13 or more months between the time that Dunn sent 19 you his proposed instructions for operation of high 20 pressure injection and the date that B&W ultimately sent those out to customers was timely notification 21 22 to affected customers?
MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I think it might 23 24 be helpful as a prerequisite to this, which is 25 just a suggestion to save time, if you want to 7 - - - , , . - - . ,
l 1 Rey 93 i
ask Dr. Roy whether he ever learned all of the I) 2 3 circumstances which accounted for the intervals 4 then I think he would be in a position to i
) 5 answer that question. .
6 MR. SELTZER: We will get to that.
1 7 MR. FISKE: Why don't you ask him?
8 MR. SELTZER: Because everybody has a 9 different way of conducting examinations. I sat 10 and watched you, and you do a good job, but 11 I don't think that is the only way to conduct 12 a deposition.
() 13 MR. FISKE: It seems to me that he is not 14 in a position to make a judgment if he doesn't I
15 know the facts.
16 MR. SELTZER: He can say that. He seems 17 to be able to handle himself pretty well in 18 a deposition without your suggesting what his 19 answer should be, that he can't answer, Mr.
20 Fiske. I really resent your suggesting how 21 he should answer. My question was a proper 22 question and if he wants to give your answer, 23 now that you have suggested it, I am sure he can.
24 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, the objection I O 25 made to the question is a very obvious objection.
l t
, - y .,
l 1 Roy 92 2 It seems to me that you just go about this 3 asking these conclusory questions without asking ;
4 the predicate questions first. If you asked l 4
ll! 5 the predicate questions, you would know that 6 was the situation and we would save a lot of 7 time. It seems to me the answer is -- well, 8 go ahead. What is the question again?
l 9 THE WITNESS: May I have the question?-
10 Q Let me review what is the predicate to 3
l 11 the question.
12 You said that you got Dunn's memos in
() 13 February 1978, you said you didn't believe that 14 Dunn's instructions were ever sent out before the 15 Three Mile Island accident, you know that instructions 16 substantially identical to Dunn's were sent out within 17 a few days after the Three Mile Island accident.
18 A Yes.
19 Q Have I stated --
20 A To my knowledge, no instructions were
~
21 sent out'between the time of February 1978'and the 22 time we sent instructions out after the accident.
23 The February sequence, to my mind, Bert i l_
24 raised --
v i 25 Q Let me ask you the question. l l
1 Roy 93 Let him ask the question.
( 2 MR. FISKE:
3 You have the background facts; now here is the 4 question.
lh 5 g Did you ever say., in words or substance, 6 to anyone that the period of time between Dunn's 7 stating the guidelines for operator termination of 8 high pressure injection and B&W's issr.ance of 9 substantially identical instructions 13 months 10 later constituted timely notification to affected 11 customers? ,
12 A I don't recall drawing any conclusion
() 13 about timely or untimely with respect to that 14 sequence. In February I got the clear impression 15 that the recommendation had been arrived at between 16 Mr. Dunn and nuclear service. It just didn't come 17 up again with me until after Three Mile Island and 18 at that time -- and then in discussion with counsel, 19 lots of other things unfolded which -- so I had no 20 basis for making that kind of conclusion and I didn't 21 make it.
l 22 Q What types of events did you believe 23 needed to be reported to customers on a timely basis w 24 at the time you wrote GPU Exhibit 251?
l 1
25 A Those for which we would have insufficient
1 Roy 94
~
2 information to make an evaluation of reportability, i
3 which is what the PSC procedure is directed at. That 4 is one very clear one.
h 5 MR. FISKE: I think you misunderstood his 6 question.
7 THE WITNESS: Oh.
8 MR. FISKE: Do you want to read the 9 question back, please.
10 THE WITNESS: I am sorry, maybe I jumped 11 too fast.
12 MR. FISKE: Maybe you didn't hear it right.
13 But read it back, could you, Charlie?
14 (Question read.)
15 A Well, they would have to be -- we would 16 be concerned with events which first of all were a 17 PSC, dealing with the PSC in terms of the procedure 18 now and in which we had arrived at an opinion that 19 we had insufficient information to evaluate that 20 for'reportability; that would clearly be one which 21 would be submitted to the customers for their 22 evaluation and follow-up.
23 Q Were there any other types of events 24 that you felt should be reported to customers on a O 25 timely basis?
i 1 Roy 95
() 2 A Well, I had in mind here the procedures, I don't recall having 3 the PSC procedure specifically.
4 any other thing on my mind when I talked about the lh 5 reporting to affected customers with respect to this 6 procedure review.
7 Q The PSC procedure did not limit the 8 items that get reported to customers merely to items 9 for which asW had insufficient information to do 10 its own evaluation, did it?
11 Q Just speaking in the context that I had 1
12 in mind, as I recall the context in writing this memo
() 13 which asked Mr. Taylor to make a review of that procedure, that is all I can recall I had in my 14 15 mind right then.
16 Q So your idea in the aftermath of Three 17 Mile Island was that the only safety issues that Bsw 18 was required to give timely notice to affected 19 customers on were safety issues where Bsw lacked 20 sufficient information to do an analysis itself?
21 MR. FISKE: He didn't say that.
22 MR. SELTZER: I am asking him.
23 A only in the context ci this procedure 24 review. We are dealing with items which are submitted O 25 and processed through this procedure and I am asking.
. ,_. _ _ _ _ . . , ~ . . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ -- _ _ . . _ __ ._ _
' 1 Roy 96 4
2 him: In your opinion, Mr. Taylor, after you conduct 3 a review, do you believe there are any changes that 4 we need to make in that procedure that lead to timely lh 5 resolution really of the determination of reportability l 6 or nonreportability, but that's not the only two 7 alternatives that the review can lead to. It can also 8 say this should be referred to the customer for 9 evaluation. That is all I had in mind, that I can 10 recall, at that time, j l
11 Q What did you mean when you said you wanted 12 to assure "that closure measurements are in place"?' ,
13 A one of the things I had in mind was that 14 we have adequate assurance that the PSC or the request 15 for evaluation had been transmitted to the customer, 16 and one of the things that I had in mind at that time 17 is obtaining some kind of feedback from the customer 18 that, you know, he was evaluating it and arriving at 19 this judgment of reportability. That wasn't very 20 visible to us.
I -
21 Q Were you at all concerned within B&W that 22 closure measures had to be reassessed?
23 A I didn't have any -- at the time I didn't i 24 have any specific concern. I am asking Mr. Taylor 25 to look into that.
I -
l l-
. .,-.,,,,$., , -,r. , - - . - , . , - - - .,--a,,-e,m, - - - - -, --ea
-+
1 Roy 97 l () 2 Q You knew that Dunn's memo had taken over 3 13 months to get out of Bsw, didn't you?
4 A I didn't arrive at any conclusions that lh! 5 that was timely or untimely..
6 Q That was a closure problem, wasn't it?
7 A I didn't arrive at an opinion whether that 8 was a timely or untimely event.
9 Q That wasn't my question. Now I am asking 10 you, wasn't the fact that Dunn's memo sat around for 11 five or six months before Hallman ever wrote his 12 memo, and then sat around for another eight or nine
() 13 months before Hallman heard back from Karrasc'h a 14 Problem of closure?
15 MR. FISKE:- Are you asking, is that what 16 Mr. Roy thought at the time he wrote his May 17 15th memo?
18 MR. SELTZER: No, I am just'using the
- 19 May 15th memo as a catalyst for this latest
( 20 question, l
21 MR. FISKE: You are asking, today does 22 he understand it was a closure problems is 23 that the question?
, i 24 MR. SELTZER: Yos.
j -3 MR. FISKE: Well, I will object to that r
-,+e.,, -- -,-,- , n-+ , . - +---w- - - .- -,-.----,,evw-. - ,,-. r nmw g- m- .r,, ,-,,,,,,-y,, ,ne, , , ,,
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1 Roy 98
, s 3
s- 'forbthhsamereasonthat I objected to<an
,' 2-l .,
)- 3) earlier question. ,
There is no foundation for
.s.,
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the question. ,
s'
[. ,
5 A This context, I haven't arrived at';a 6 judgNest, O.K.,.on that whole sequence of ever.ts, g O.X. Wnat I kho Febout it I learned through 8 counsel and --
9 Q Let as simplify it. I am not asking yet 10 for a judgment, I may never ask for a judgment. I i 11 am just trying to classify the problem. s 12 You've used the word " closure" here.
13 " Closure" isn't a word that I think I had ever even 14 heard before I sta'sted working on the Three Mile k
15 Island case and reading Bsw d5cuments. It is a D&W 16 catch phrase apparently.
17 What I am asking you is whether it is a 18 fact that the several months delay before Hallman 19 oven thought of writing to Karrasch and the eight-
-20 or nine-month delay before Hallman got sny response 21 from Karrash is in your terminology a closure 22 problem.
23 MR. FISKE: The reason I am objecting to
( 24 the question, Mr. Seltzer, is there is no J showing here that Dr. Roy is aware of all of 23 t
l 1 Roy 99
( 2 the facts that led up to -- what the time period 3 was before Hallman wrote his memo, what the 4 time period was before Karrasch responded.
5 There is no showing that he is aware of all 6 that or the circumstances, so for you tc ask i
7 him whether that is a " closure problem," it 8 assumes he knows all of the underlying facts.
9 MR. SELTZER: All right.
10 Q Can you answer the question?
4 11 A I just haven't -- have not, and in the 12 context of writing this, do not recall having in
() 13 mind any judgment as to whether that was a problem 14 in terms cf what I would say timely response to the --
15 to NRC and to affected customers.
16 One of the things that I did have in mind, 17 and which has been an element of the review, is in 18 the identification of follow-up actions which we 19 included in our PSC evaluation reports now, that they 20 are a means of bringing closura to those follow-up l
21 actions. RIt was a generic "you" I am addressing here 22 with Mr. Taylor.
23 Q You have previously stated -- let me ask 1 24 you today: do you believe that it would have been
~)
l V l
25 appropriate for Dunn's concerns to be handled through
.-- - , . . _ _ - . . .. . - - - - . - - - . . . . , . _ - - - . . . . . - . --. m.
1 Roy 100 l
()
2 the PSC procedures that were in effect in 19787 3 MR. FISKE: I don't think that is a 4 proper question to ask Dr. Roy, what he thinks today.
l() 5 .
6 Q Based on the procedures as you were 7 familiar with them in 1978, do you believe that the 8 PSC procedure would have been an appropriate vehicle 9 for the handling of Dunn's concerns?
10 MR. FISKE: I think I am going to object i
11 to the question in that form also.
12 MR. SELTZER: O.K., the witness may answer.
() 13 A The best way, to my mind, to answer that 14 one is to say it is not inappropriate because in using 15 the PSC procedure to raise safety concerns, there were 16 no limits on what kind of concerns someone might 17 submit through a PSC.
18 Q So you are saying it would not have been
)
19 inappropriate for Dunn's concerns to have been l
l 20 channeled through the preliminary safety concern 21 Procedures as they existed at the time of his memo i
22 being sent to your is that right?
23 A .Yes, that'is right. There were no i
l 24 exclusions of what someone could write up or not 25 write up and proceed through the PSC process.
l 1
- , ~ . , _ _ . . . . . _ , - - ., . ~ _ . - , -. - . . . . . , . - . . .
1 Roy 101
() 2 Q You were familiar with the PSC process in 3 '77 and 19787 4 A Yes.
llh 5 Q Did it ever occur to you to suggest to 6 anyone that Dunn's concerns be handled as a preliminary 7 safety concern?
8 A No, it did not. I don't recall going 9 through any kind of judgment as to yes, this wou2d be 10 a good mechanism, or no. It just did not enter into 11 my thinking, to the best of my recollection.
12 Q All right. Do you want to s?y more? I
() 13 don't mean to interrupt you.
14 A It just did not enter into my thought 15 process at the time.
16 Q When for the first time did you learn that 17 Bruce Karrasch, who was head of plant integration 18 which was a unit that was within your scope of 19 responsibility, had been sitting on Don Hallman's 20 August 3 memo without y.esponding to Hallman for some l
21 eight or nine months?
t 22 MR. FISKE: I am going to object to the 23 form of the question, Mr. Seltzer. I think that 3 24 is an inaccurate characteri=ation of the facts.
%-)
! 25 MR. SELTZER: All right.
l l
r
1 Roy 102
~/ 2 Q You can still answer.
3 A ch. I became aware that Don had 4 transmitted a memo to Mr. Karrasch after Three Mile l) 5 Island. Now, what happened and transpired from that 6 point on, I don't know.
7 Q When is the first time that you learned i
8 Bruce Karrasch had had the memo and did not answer the 9 questions in the memo until February or March 19797 10 MR. FISKE: I will let him answer -- well, 11 let me just back up.
12 I think maybe we should exclude -- I think 13 the question should be: when was the first 14 time apart from discussions with counsel that 15 you learned that fact.
16 MR. SELTZER: Sure. 1 17- MR. FISKE: O.K.
18 Q You understand you are not' supposed to 19 cell me if you learned something only through the 20 vehicle of distinguished counsels right?
21 A That is the only way I learned this one 6 though,-this sequence of events.
22 )
l 23 Q Were you in the hearing room when either i i
1 24 Don Hallman or Bruce Karrasch gave testimony before 25 the Kemeny Commission?
_ , , , - - - - . ~, -.
1 Roy J 03
- j ) 2 MR. FISKE
- You mean the public testimony; 3 right?
4 MR. SELTZER: The real live commissioners, lhI- 5 not just their deputies.
( '
6 A No, I don't believe I was, i.
. 7 Q I~take it without asking you whether l 8 you learnad it from your lawyers, I think you said 9 that you did.
5 10 Did you ever go to Bruce and try and find 3 11 out from him what the story was behind his taking
- 12 so long before he was able to give an answer to Don l (} 13 Hallman to the August 3 questions?
14 A No.
I 15 Q Did you ever see Bruce Karrasch since
- 16 learning that it had taken him so long to respond?
i
! 17 A Yes, I have seen him.
I 18 MR. FISKE: I will just object to the form i
19 of the question.
20 Go ahead.
l i
a 21 A I had not raised that issue with him.
W 22 Q Weren't you curious?
i 23 A Not curious enough to raise the issue.
L 24 I did not broach this issue or that sequence of
!- . 25 events thau I learned from counsel with Bruce.
r Y -- - - - - _ _ _ - - - -+ -- .a. , --,,,,,-+n , --~- - , . ,rw e -, , --- w, , -,e ,,s. ,,- w-v, -
1 Roy 104
() 2 Q Did you ever discuss with Don Hallman 3 why it took him so long to raise the questions that 4 he did raise?
lh 5 MR. FISKE: The same objection to the form.
6 i A I haven't raised that issue in any form 7 with Don.
8 Q Outside of what lawyers have told you, 9 do you have any understanding why it took B&W so 10 long to consider whether to send out Dunn's advice 11 on how to operate high pressure injection?
12 MR. FISKE: The same objection to the form.
13 A No. As I stated, in February with the
(}
14 second memo from Mr. Dunn, and I don't recall sitting 15 there and holding that memo, but I had arrived at 16 the conclusion that there had been dialogue between 17 Mr. Dunn and nuclear service, they had arrived at a 18 position that was acceptable to Mr. Dunn, and it
- 19. just did not come up again with me until discussions 20 with counsel after Three Mile Island./
21 Q I understand that.
22 A That I recall.
23 Q Are you saying that when you got Dunn's 24 second memo, you thought that the issue had been v 25 resolved and that the recommendations wereLgoing to av, -- n r -
s - -y ,-
l f
l 1 Roy 105 i
(. 2 he out to operating utilities?
3 A The conclusion that I distinctly drew, 4 and I don't recall saying this came right from t.his memo but it must have been from the second memo, lh 5 6 was that Mr. Dunn and nuclear service had had 7 dialogue, had arrived at an acceptable transmission i
8 to the customers, or form of an acceptable 9 transmission, and that the issue was resolved, and 10 did not come up again to my view prior to the accident.
11 Q Was it your expectation in or about late 12 February 1978 that instructions along the lines
() 13 contained in Dunn's second memo would be transmitted ,
14 in due course to B&W customers?
15 A After having arrived at the conclusion 16 that Mr. Dunn and nuclear service had reached an 17 accommodation, nothing came up'to my attention or 18 my view and I didn't arrive at any independent 19 assessment that it would not go out; O.K.?
l 20 g Is that the obverse of having a belief 21 or understanding that it would go out?
22 A It assumed that nuclear service would l
I 23 follow through with the prescription that he had --
- l. -
24 that nuclear service and Mr. Dunn had arrived at.- .l l -- s_
! 25 Q In other words, you assumed that nuclear ,
l c
_ __,__..-m__._ . . . . - - . , . . _ _ _ . , , . ,_- , . . . , , . , -. . . , , -
1 Roy 106
, () 2 service would follow thorugh and send out the 3 prescription for operation of high pressure injection 4 which nuclear service and Bert Dunn had arrived at?
lh 5 A That they had reached an accommodation 6 and certainly would have no -- gave rise to no a
7 concerns or obstacles that I knew of that would stop 4
8 that from happening.
9 Q So you assumed or understood that nuclear I
10 service would send out the prescription that was 11 contained in Dunn's second memo?-
12 A Yes, I think I assumed that, and it just
() 13 didn't come up again before Three Mile Island.
14 MR. SELTZER: What was the first word 15 of his answer, "Yes, I think I assumed that..."
16 (Record read.)
17 A I can't remember arriving at that, you
- ~ *18 know, conclusion, you know. But that the accommodation 19 had been reached and there was no obstacle, that I 20 didn't find in what I had read or surmised at that 21 time, that would stop it from going ahead and 22 proceeding with preparing a site instruction and 23 transmitting it to the customer.
24 Q So the assumption or. understanding that l
l 2E you came to, that nuclear service would send out-i
1 ,Roy 107
() 2 these new instructions, was something that you 3 arrived at or that galled in late February or 4 thereabouts 1978.
lh 5 A Yes. Like I say., I can't specifically l
I 6 recognize it from the second memorandum, but I am 7 pretty sure it was from there. But I got the distinct 8 impression that nuclear service and Mr. Du'nn had 9 had dialogue on his recommended reminder and that he 10 and nuclear service had arrived at an accommodation 11 of what the form of that prescription should be, and 12 as far as I was concerned, the issue was resolved,
() 13 and it didn't come up with me until after the accident.
14 Q Have you ever learned from anyone,other 15 than counsel,what was going on at B&W that accounted 16 for the delay between February 3978 when you got 17 Dunn's prescription, and April 1979 when Dunn's i
18 prescription was sent out?
i 19 A My best recollection is that I came into l
l 20 an understanding of follow-on after my conclusion in l'
21 February in discussions wit *a counsel.
l 22 Q Have you never discussed with any of the s
23 actors in the piece, out of the presence of counsel, 24 anything about the delay in sending out Dunn's l .
j 25 prescription?
.. l 1 Roy 108 2 A I don't recall doing so.
3 Q You never chatted even for a minute or j 4 two with Hallman or Karrasch?
h 5 A I don't recall doing it.
6 MR. SELTZER: Shall we break for lunch?
7 (whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. a lunch recess 8 was taken.)
9 10 11 12 ;
13 14 15 16
. 17 18 19 20 i
22 23 l
24 25 m,- -- -- - . . . a- , .-- - , - - , , , - , ,e.., ,- , - . - , -- - - , e- --- -- , , - ~ - -
1 309 l
AFTERNOON SESSION
( 2 3
2:15 p.m.
4 D0NALD HENRY ROY, resumed.
l( 5 EXAM 1HATION (continued) .
6 BY MR. SELTZER:
7 Q Did Taylor conduct the review of systems 8 and procedures for resolving safety concerns which 9 you were asking him to do when you wrote GPU Exhibit 10 2517 11 A Yes, he was personally handling the review 12 of the PSC procedure review.
() 13 Q Did you come up with any better procedures 14 for resolving safety concerns as a result of the 15 review?
16 A We made some revisions in the existing 17 procedures sometime after the accident. As a matter 18 of fact, it may have been in the last one- or two-year 19 time frame that we culminated the revisions. I 20 don't recall specifically how many revisions we made al since Three Mile Island. So there have been 22 some revisions of the procedures for PSC.
23 Q What, if any, were the principal 24 improvements in the procedures for resolving safety 25 concerns?
11
1 Roy 110 2 A I was just trying to think of what they 3 were, casting them in the light of fine tuning.
4 We specifically -- I believe in at least one of the procedures revisions called out the use l() 5 6 of the MCP to capture follow-on actions even after 7 reportability or nonreportability has been determined, 8 I believe that we made a tie, a coupling, a connection 9 between the procedure, PSC procedure and the MCP 10 procedure. That is one that comes to mind.
11 Q Just for people who are not really 12 cognoscente,what is the MCP procedure?
13 A MCP, multiple contract applicability 14 report procedure.
15 Oh, another change is the formal 16 documentation of evaluation conclusions regarding 17 reportability and nonreportability. We called for 18 the sign-off by the manager of engineering department 19 for concurrence or nonconcurrence with whatever the 20 determination made by licensing was of reportability 21 or nonreportability, as well as.the sign-off for 22 concurrence or nonconcurrence by the manager of the 1
23 QA department. I am pretty sure that was a revision 24 made sometime in this time frame.
(
25 Q Did you feel that these revisions would s , - , , , ,
e n -- ,- - - ,
1 111 Roy 2 provide additional assurance that any safety concerns
(}
3 raised by B&W employees will be reported and ,
1 4
processed in accordance with Part 21 requirements?
llh 5 A No, I didn't. It didn't occur to me then 0 or now that those kinds of revisions would raise up 7 the visibility or of these concerns getting identified 8 It dealt more on the part of individual employees.
0 with how we processed that concern ascer a PSC had been filed.
II Were there any revisions made that would Q
12 assure the processing, regardless of the form in which 13 the concerns originally arose?
4 MR. FISKE: I don't understand that question.
MR. SELTZER: What did I say?
MR. FISKE: Will you read it back.
18 (Question read.)
MR. FISKE: You mean once they were put d 0 in as.PSC's?
21 MR. SELTZER: No. I think what I was 22 driving at is that it didn't matter whether 23 it was put in as a PSC or not.
24 Was there any revision made, regardless Q
' 25 of the form in which the concern arosc, so it would i
._._ . _ _ _ _ _ + . , , - __ - .. - ,_, , - - . , - . . _-_-_,.
1 Roy JJ2 1
l ) 2 get processed as a safety concern?
3 A No. If I understand the context of the 4 question, no. The procedure revisions didn't address items that might arise and somehow, you know, force
(): 5 6 their being cast into an PSC. It addressed what happens 7 when a PSC is filed. To the best of my knowledge.
8 Q What did B&W mean when they wrote to 9 victor Stello on May 20, 1980 in reply to the NRC's ;
10 notice of noncompliance and said, referring to 11 revisions to the PSC procedure, "These revisions 12 will provide additional assurance that any safety
() 13 concerns raised by B&W omployees will be reported and 14 processed in accordance with B&W's Part 21 procedures 15 regardless of the form in which these concerns 16 originally arose"?
17 MR. FISKE: Well --
18 Q First let me ask you, have you seen this 19 response of B&W to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20 before?
21 MR. SELTZER: This is GPU 252.
(Br l
22 A No. ,
l 23 MR. FISKE: You can answer that question.- )
24 A Yes. I don't recall right now seeing this v.) 25 particular document.
S
1 Roy 113
- h Are you aware that the NRC did cite B&W
\_/ 2 Q )
3 for noncompliance with NRC regulations in the j
4 aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident?
I recall we did get a citation after l(l 5 A Yes.
6 the accident.
7 Q You were fined by the NRC; right?
8 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I don't have any 9 objection to your asking these questions, but 10 I guess I would just note on the record that 11 we reserve the right or preserve all our 12 objections that we may later assert to questions 13 based on this proceeding.
14 A I don't recall the specific form that 15 took, whether it was a fine or attempt to fine or 16 what, but I am aware of and recollect we got a citation 17 and the letter addressed the fining or attempt to 18 fine B&W for that finding.
19 MR. SELTZER: Off the record.
~
20 (Discussion off the record.)
21 (Recess taken.)
22 MR. FISKE: Will you please repeat the 23 last question and answer.
24 (Record read.)
25
1 Roy 114 2 BY MR. SELT3ER:
3 g B&W made a representation to the NRC in 4 May 1980 about revisions to its PSC procedure.
lh 5 Are you aware of any way in which revisions 6 to the PSC procedure after the Three Mile Irland 7 accident provided additional assurance that any safety 8 concerns raised by B&W employees would be reported 9 and processed in accordance with B&W's Part 21 10 procedures?
11 A No, I am not aware of any revision that 12 would address that specific item.
() 13 Q Do you know of any revisions that were 14 made so that regardless of the form in which the 15 concerns originally arose, they would be reported 16 and processed in accordance with Part 21 obligations?
17 A I don't recall addressing that or that 18 that was addressed in the revisions that we made to i
19 the procedure.
20 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark this 21 as GPU Exhibit 448.
22 (Memorandum to J. H. Taylor from D. H.
23 Roy, dated July 5, 1979, with attachments,.was 24 marked GPU Exhibit 448 for identification, as O. 25 of this date.)
--___.____2 .___s - . ____. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . , , - , . . . - -.
_,, , . , , - , . , ,_,,__-.,,.,,m , , , . ,
l 1 Roy 115 l
\ 2 Q Will you take a look at GPU Exhibit 448.
3 Will you tell me if this is a copy of a memorandum 4 which you sent to Jim Taylor on or about July 5, 19797 lh 5 A Yes, it is. -
6 Q Does it have attached to it Jim Taylor's 7 memorandum which you received from him on or about 8 June 26, 19797 9 A Yes, it does.
10 Q When is the last time that you reviewed 11 this exhibit?
12 MR. FISKE: That excludes anything that 13 happened with counsel present; right?
14 MR. SELTZER: All right, I will ask it that 15 way first.
16 A When I recall reviewing it since I sent 17 it out, you mean? I don't recall reviewing it 18 since I sent it out.
19 Q Did you review it in preparation for your 20 deposition?
, 21 MR. FISKE: Other.than in the presence of 22 counsel?
23 MR. SELTZER: No, including with counsel.
24 MR. FISKE: Well, I will object to that.
~}
s l
25 This is the same question we have had
1 Roy 116 2 before.
3 MR. SELTZER: All right. Are you 4 instructing the witness not to answer?
l() 5 MR. FISKE: Yes.- Consistent with our 6 prior position.
7 Q Is Taylor's response of June 26th his 8 assessment of what revisions to the procedures for 9 resolving safety concerns would be appropriate?
10 A Yes, I believe it is.
11 Q Turning to the page that is headed " Draft" 12 and which is the third page of Exhibit 448, Taylor 13 says in the second sentence: "It has been concluded 14 that changes are in order. The suggested changes are 15 summarized as follows:"
16 The first change that Taylor thought was 17 in order was expanded use of LER's.
18 Do you see that?
19 A Yes.
20 Q LER's, you understood, referred to 21 licensee event reports?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Taylor advised you that "There is not now 24 a systematic review of LER's."
(
25 Did you understand that Jim Taylor was
1 Roy 117 2 saying that to his knowledge within B&W there was not 3 a practice of systematic review of licensee event 4 reports?
A Yes, that would be surmised fron Mr. Taylor's lh 5 6 comment here.
7 Q Priot to the Three Mile Island accident, 8 were you aware of any practice within D&W for 9 systematically reviewing licensee event reports?
10 A No, I wasn't aware of any system for doing 11 that, i
12 Q Did you think that that would be a good l 13 revision to make in the procedures at B&W, namely, 14 to commence systematic review of licensee event 15 reports?
16 MR. FISKE: Does this question deal with 17 a time frame, June of '797 18 MR. SELTZER: Right.
19 Q Not with respect to procedures. The 20 context of th,is, at least as I understood it and I 21 think as Mr. Taylor presented it, was that this would 22 not necessarily affect procedures, processing of 23 safety concerns, but that it was again an item in.
assessing operating concerns, whatever lessons to
( 24 25 he learned from operating experience, and the approach
3 1 Roy 118 1
i 2 that we ultimately took here was to enter into a 3 task arrangement with EPRI to conduct, as it really 4 was a service for them, and it gave us a systematic way of reviewing LER's for operating experiences lh 5
. 6 which might or might not be applicable to Bsw plants. l
' i I
7 So it wasn' t in the context that we would write a i
8 procedure for doing this in the LER, at least that's
, 9 not thn conclusion I came to, but it was desirable to
- 10 try to enter into an arrangement whereby we would j 11 receive these LER's and systematically review them.
1 12 Is that --
13 Q That doesn't make much sense to me.
14 MR. FISKE: It makes perfect sense to me.
.4 15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
16 Q Take a look at your item 1 on the first i
17 page of GPU Exhibit 448. Do you see where you said, I 18 " Establish procedure and related funding for expanded i.
'19 use of LER's."?
f 20 A Right. That doesn't ring a bell in terms i
r 21 of --
f
' 22 Q I didn't ask you a question.
23 A oh, excuse me. Sorry.
24 Q Do you want to say something nevertheless?
( )
25 A No, I will wait for the question.
P
-- + , -%, - , , , , , , . . ~ , . - - - - ,. -
c w ,y.. , , . , ,, ,-e -
l 1 Roy 119 2 Q You said that you didn't understand that 3 Taylor was discussing establishing a new procedure, 4 but in your own words --
( 5 A Yes. .
6 Q -- you said to Taylor Establish a 7 procedure. Right? Do you see uhat?
8 A Yes.
9 Q All right. Now, what did you mean, 10 establish procedure?
11 A I can only view it from the context of the 12 way I am thinking about it today because I don't
() 13 recall my logic process that led me to this memo here.
14 Q Doesn't that --
15 A Perhaps at that time I had in mind we 16 would establish a procedure. The way I view this thing 17 today was that we would systematically screen those 18 LER's for, you know, operating experience information, 19 but it's there, but I don't recall exactly what I 20 had in mind.
I 21 Q So you are saying that you thought that 22 there should be a procedure established for 23 systematically screening LER's?
l 24 A I gussa maybe a better way would be a
(~s l \_)
! 25 methodology, a technique, a system, you know, for doing 1
1 i
1 1 Roy 120 0 2 that.
l 3 Q Fine. !
l 4 MR. FISKE: I think we are getting hung l- 5 up on the word " procedure." I don't think 6 substantively there is any problem. .
7 A That is what we ultimately evolved to, 4
8 whereby we would do that on a systematic basis, but 9 it is not a procedure in a manual.
10 Q All right, that is obviously what the 11 semantic problem was. There can be a lot of procedures 12 that don't have to get inscribed in stone or written O 13 in the B&W manual, which is probably even more 14 difficult than the incription in stone.
15 Is that your handwriting next to the LER 16 item on the third page?
17 A Yes, I believe.
18 Q What does it say in your handwriting?
19 A "How do you propose we do this - need l 20 specifics,"
l 21 Q What did you say in the margin on the next 22 page, next to " Expanded use of LER's"?
23 A "Need procedure, who does what, how l
j) 24 followup is implemented."
l 25 Q It really says " define who does what";
t
-+.-,--r - . . , . -
l 1 Roy 322 2 right?
3 A Yes, sir.
4 Q Were procedures of the type that you were calling for in your marginal note developed?
lh' 5 1
6 A No, we didn't develop written procedures.
7 We did, as I indicated, enter into an arrangement 8 with EPRI whereby as part of their overall program 9 of screening LER's and getting a data base of operating 10 experience and data that we would screen and review 11 the LER's applicable to B&W plants for them, and that 12 was the culmination of this whole exercise of making
( 13 greater use of LER's in a systematic way.
14 Q The LER*s that you were proposing to do 15 more screening on and evaluating were LER's for B&W 16 plants?
17 A I don't think we specifically excluded 18 those. They would be of the most interest to us and i
19 I believe our arrangement with EPRI is with respect 20 to B&W plants. I am not absolutely sure of that, but l 21 I think it is. Our screening --
22 Q What is your understanding of why it made l
23 sense for B&W to rely on EPRI to tell it what's in an i
24 LER instead of B&W reading the LER's themselves?
25 A They are a central source for gathering l .
, - , - - , , - , , . ,--.-.w.-, -w.- ,, , , . , m ,, ,
l 1 Roy 322 O' 2 these LER's, they also screen out the noninteresting 3 ones, they do some screening process at EPRI itself 4 and they gather LER's from all over, all plants. And llI) 5 it is a conduit then for them to submit certain LER's 6 for our review, some that had had some prior screening 7 as to interest, they were nontrivia events, and I am 8 not saying they didn't send us LER's for all plants.
9 .They may well have. I am not sure on that point.
10 Q You have read LER's from time to time, 11 haven't you?
12 A Yes.
13 Q You know that Psw has input into some of 14 the LER's for its plants; right?
15 A Part of these analyses that we might do in 16 support of a customer task to help him get his plant 17 back on line would be filed by the licensee or made 18 in instances as part of his LER.
19 Q You do do some analysis and he would 20 incorporate it in his LER?
21 A- Yes, sir.
22 Q Are you saying that one of the reasons 23 for having EPRI do a screening is that there is a lot (j 24 of information that is not pertinent to B&W in the 25 LER's?
l 1 Roy 123 2 A Yes, that could be true. For example, 3 General Electric plants, you know, might or probably 4 would not be as applicable or fruitful in terms of some lessons learned as, let! s say, Westinghouse ll) 5 6 or a combustion plant. Also we did not receive as a 7 matter of course LER's from our customers when they 8 filed them, but EPRI, and I don't know whether that 9 was by arrangement with its supporters or whether that's 10 an arrangement with the NRC, received all of them.
, 11 Q LER's are sent to the Nuclear Regulatory 12 Commission; right?
13 A Yes.
14 Q And they are on public file at the NRC; i
15 right?
16 A Right, yes.
17 Q Yet you say before the Three Mile Island 18 accident B&W had no program for routinely asking its 19 customers to send along a copy of this publicly filed 20 LER?
i 21 MR. FISKE: To whom? To B&W7
! 22 MR. SELTZER: Right.
I 23 A I don't recall any instance where we asked them to do that. That may very well have occurred, l l
) 24 25 but they didn't - we did not get them as a matter i
I V i
\
[
I 1 Roy 124 2 of course from the customer.
3 Q Was it your experience from looking at J 4 LER's that they contain a lot of chaff that has to be 5 sorted out in order to get to the interesting material?
lh!
6 MR. FISKE: I object to the question. It 7 is a little vague. If you are asking him, 8 do some LER's do that, that is one question.
9 If you are asking, are all LER's that way --
10 MR. SELTZER: No, not all LER's.
11 - A My --
12 MR. FISKE: Can you answer that, Dr. Roy?
13 THE WITNESS: I think so.
14 A In my experience, it runs the gamut of 15 addressing events that may have very little contribution 16 to lessons learned or helping to improve overall 17 performance.
18 Another thing is the categorization of the 19 events. It is helpful to hatre these LER's screened 20 in terms of perhaps an equipment problem or something 21 like that, get some categorization, which I am pretty 22 sure EPRI does, so they run the gamut. There would 23 be a lot of testimony that.would be extraneous and 24 not used, and it goes the other way. They might not 25 contain enough material, they might cause us to request
1 Roy 125 2 more data about a specific event on it, so they could 3 run both sides.
4 Q Have you ever looked at the LER and LER l() 5 supplement for the Davis-Basse September 24, 1977 4
6 event?
7 A I don't recall seeing an LER for that 8 transient. ,
9 Q Do you know that the operators shut off 10 high pressure injection manually during the early 11 stages of the Davis-Besse event?
s 12 A Yes, sir.
() 13 Q Based on what you learned from Bert Dunn 14 subsequent to the Davis-Besse event, did you believe 15 that manual termination was improper?
16 A In the conversation with Mr. Dunn, which 17 to the best of my recollection preceded the writing of 18 his first memorandum, I don't recall the specifics of l 19 that conversation. The important points that did l
20 come out were that HPI -- premature HPI termination l
21 had occurred. '
k 22 Q Let's focus on that, if you don't mind.
23 .A O.K.
i 24 '
Q You characterized it as premature HPI
( 25 - termination.
t-1
_ , _ _ - _ . _ . . _ . . _ . - - - - - _ , _ _ _ - -_ _ . . . _ _ _ . - ..,m, . _ , _ . . . _ - _ .
g Roy 326 A Right.
Q My question was, did you understand that the manual termination was improper. Isn't it a fair g statement to say that you understood it was improper?
A Yes. Mr. Dunn's specific concern was that it was improper, inappropriate termination of high pressure injection.
8 Q Do you know as you sit here today, other g than from intelligent counsel telling you, that the i
g LER or LER supplement for the Davis-Besse event stated 12 flat out that the operator actions were timely and g proper throughout the sequence of events?
A No, I wasn't aware of that.
g Q Would you consider that a misleading statement?
g MR. FISKE: I will object to that. I 18 don't think Dr. Roy has to characterize that.
g He hasn't seen it, he has never even read it.
MR. SELTZER: Why don't you just --
21 MR. SELTZER: Object. Yes. We wil'1 see where it goes.
MR. SELTZER: We won't finish tomorrow if you are going to do this to me every time you have an objection.
1 Roy 127 s
' 2 Q Could you answer the question, please?
3 MR. FISKE: Well, I will state my objection 4 again.
The record already reflects l(f 5 MR. SELTZER:
6 your objection. Now I am asking for an answer, 7 notwithstanding the objection.
8 MR. FIS KE : I don't think Dr. Roy should 9 be called upon to answer that question when he 10 hasn't read the LER, he doesn't know anything 11 about the Davis-Besse transient other than 12 simply the one conversation that he had with 13 Bert Dunn. It is just like asking him what he 14 thinks of a comment by Taylor in a meno that he 15 doesn't remember reading.
16 We could really finish this deposition 17 today if we didn't have to go through this kind 18 of questioning. I don't see that an answer to 19 this does anybody any good one way or the other 20 when he did --
l 21 MR. SELTZER: I am not the judge, Mr.
22 Fiske, so all the argument with me really 23 doesn't --
() 24 MR. FISKE: You are also asking him today 25 to sit here and characterize a statement in an
1 Roy 128 O 2 LER that he has never seen. I don't think that 3 Dr. Roy has to do that.
4 MR. SELTZER: To state our position just so you understand why we press the question, we ll) 5 6 anticipate that at a trial in this action a 7 witness like Dr. Roy could be put on the stand 8 by you and you will ask him to draw conclusions 9 and to give authoritative testimony. I think 10 that if that is the kind of testimony that you 11 are allowed to ask your witnesses, you can't 12 preclude us from finding out what their views 13 are on subjects before trial, discover their 14 views.
4 15 MR. FISKE: Fine. I will make this very 16 simple. Number one, we will not ask Dr. Roy 17 that question at trial, and number two, we will 18 not ask that kind of a question of any witness 19 unless we are satisfied that he has a totally 20 adequate factual background against which to 21 answer it. This is just asking Dr. Roy to 22 speculate, for all practical purposes, sitting 23 here today not knowing what's in the LER and not j
() 24 knowing all the facts about the Davis-Besse j 25 transient.
- , - , ,-,,n n ,-a-- ,,,-.n--, . . , , . , , , , ~ . , ,..-...,-,,--.,--..,,,-n.,,-.c - , . . ,..+,,-,,n-,,-,.
l 1 Roy 129 2 MR. SELTZER: All I want to find out is, 3 are you instructing the witness not to answer?
- 4 MR. FISKE: Yes, I think I will.
ll' y 5 MR. SELTZER: You could have done that 6 ten minutes ago.
7 MR. FISKE: 0.K. I was hoping that you 8 would withdraw the question and I wouldn't have 9 to.
10 Q I take it from your prior testimony that 4
11 to your knowledge no one ever came up to you before the 12 Three Mile Island accident and told you that the 13 Davis-Besse LER had described the operator actions
, 14 during the Davis-Besse event as timely and proper?
15 A No, not that I recall, any discussion on 16 the Davis-Besse LER.
17 Q While we are on Davis-Besse, did it ever 18 occur to you to suggest to anyone that the Davis-Besse 19 event should be discussed at a Users Group, owners Group 20 or B&W Operating Experience seminar?
I 21 A No. I made no. suggestion along those lines.
- 22. Q Did you ever suggest that Bert Dunn's 23 concerns about premature termination of high pressure fT J
24 injection should be discussed at an owners Group, 25 Users Group or Operating Experience seminar?
~
e-ee - , - - - - ~ , -. me-.,,cn,,--*n-vs - w -r --n , , - - - , + - - - - - ~ , --,.-----,m- . --~w- .e --n---,e-ev ,7 .w -m~,--- - - -
1 Roy 130
(,/ 2 A No, I made no suggestion along those lines
+
3 personally.
4 Q You yourself have spoken at meetings like those of utility personnel, haven't you?
lh 5 6 A Yes.
7 Q When you were the head of the plant design 8 section, did you convene regular meetings of your unit 9 managers?
10 A If by " regular" you mean like once a month 11 on Monday, no. I wouldn't say they were regular, but 12 we had --
() 13 Q I wasn't insisting on military regularity.
14 A We had staff meetings, it might be one a 15 month or two a month at different times during the
, 16 month.
17 Q In addition to unit managers, who else 18 attended, if anyone?
19 A That's all I recall right now. I might 20 have my secretary join uss I think we did for a while.
21 Q If a unit manager didn't attend, could 22 he send a deputy?
23 A Send a substitute. If we were going to I
L 24 address some specific topic, we might have a l
25 presentation on that topic. If it were some topic on l
1 Roy 131 s- 2 the agenda and we wanted to call for a presentation 3 on it, we would have others that would join us for 4 that portion of the presentation.
lh 5 Q And you say these were held usually once 6 or twice a month? l l
7 A That would be a good average.
8 Q Where did you hold them?
9 A well, there would be various conference 10 rooms, depending upon their availability, in the 11 building.
12 Q How long did the nestings generally last?
13 A one hour, two houras that time frame.
14 Q Did you usually prepare an agenda ahead 1
15 of time? l 16 A Sometimes we would have an agenda, sometimes 17 not. Occasionally.or perhaps even frequently -- I 18 don't recall now how often -- I might ask for topics 19 for discussion at the staff meeting, and in which case 20 I would more than likely publish an agenda of those 21 topics we were going to cover at the staff meeting, and 22 I do that today.
23 Q If you wanted to locate copies of those
() 24 agendas for meetings, where would you look?
25 A I don't know that they were ever filed,
t 1 Roy 132 l'
) 2 or where. I have produced all the documents I had.
3 Q Did your secretary --
4 A They might be in correspondence files, yes. l l
g You kept a chronological file of your j ll) 5 i
6 memos and correspondence?
7 A Yes, the correspondence files.
8 Q When you moved from section manager to 9 department manager, did you take your chronological 10 file with you of correspondence and memos?
11 A I believe I did.
12 MR. SELTZER: Ms. Mcdonald, we haven't seen We have seen subject O)
(_ 13 his chronological file.
14 files but not chronological files. Do you know 15 why?
16 MS. MCDONALD: I believe there were files 17 produced which I believe to be his chronological 18 files. It may be a semantic problem. I know i
19 there were many, many, many files produced of 20 that nature.
21 MR. SELTZER: If it's not too much trouble, l 22 since we would like to try and finish this l i
I 23 deposition tomorrow, do you suppose you could 24 let us know after we suspend today what the 25 number range is of what you think his l
1 Roy 133 O' 2 chronological file is so that we could bring it 3 into the room and ask the witness if it is what 4 he says is his chronological file?
l() 5 MR. FISKE: We will take that under 6 advisement.
7 MR. SELTZER: Off the record.
8 (Discussion off the record.)
9 BY MR. SELTZER:
10 Q Was your chronological file divided into 11 subject areas?
12 A No, I don't think sos just time.
13 MR. FISKE: Off the record.
14 (Discussion off the record.)
15 A I don't recall that being the case for 16 my files.
17 Q Did you prepare monthly reports as the 18 head of the design section?
19 A If you are referring to the activities 20 reports, yes.
21 Q Did you prepare monthly reports as manager 22 of engineering?
23 A Yes.
l 24 Q In the monthly or twice a month meetings 25 of the plant design section, was there an opportunity v -
1 Roy 334 O 2 for unit managers to raise subjects which they 3 thought would be appropriate for discussion?
4 A Yes, they had two avenues. One, of course, lh' 5 they could file an agenda item, those times that I 1
6 requested, "Give me your suggestions for agenda 7 items," and they could bring it up during the course 8 of the meeting. There would be nothing to preclude 9 them from doing that.
10 Q At any of the staff meetings that you held i 11 in the plant design section, did anybo'dy ever raise 12 the concerns that Dunn had about premature termination O 13 of high pressure injection?
14 A Not to my recollection.
15 Q Is there any reason why that would not 16 have been an appropriate subject to discuss at one 17 of the plant design section meetings?
18 MR. FISKE: Wait a minute.
19 I am going to object to that question.
20 If you are asking him, was there anything in the )
21 procedures governing these meetings that would 22 have made raising that inappropriate, I don't 23 have any objection to that, i 24 MR. SELTZER: Well, except that they I
25 probably didn't have a procedure governing what i
- -. - - - . - -, _ _ _ .,- -- , , . __ - . . _ . , - . ~
1 Roy 335 o
V 2 could be raised at these meetings. These meetings 3 don't sound nearly that formal.
4 MR. FISKE: You are basically asking him --
, lh 5 MR. SELTZER: Let me be clear. I don't
- 6 mean to get into a hassle with you.
7 MR. FISKE: I agree.
4 8 Q It is a simple question. You had the 9 meetings, you said engineers could raise subjects by 1
10 putting them on the agenda or raising them in the 11 midst of the meeting. Dunn spoke to you about his 12 concern about premature termination, Dunn sent you f 13 copies of his February memoranda in which he i
14 articulated the concern in some detail, and I take it 15 you are familiar with what basically Dunn's concerns 16 were about operator premature termination of high 4
17 pressure injections isn't that right?
18 A Yes.
4 19 Q And you understand why that is a subject 20 that the manager of ECCS analysis would find of l
21 particular concerns isn't that right?
! 22 A Yes, it would certainly be no surprise 23 that he would raise that kind of issue.
() 24 Q In fact it is very germane to his area of 25 responsibility at asW isn't it?
l l
1 Roy 336 A
N_ A Yes.
2 3 Q Shutting off the high pressure injection 4 means terminating one of the principal means of 5 emergency cooling right? -
6 A Yes.
7 Q Would it have been appropriate within the 8 way that you ran the plant design section meetings 9 for Dunn to have discussed his concerns about 10 termination of high pressure injection at one of the 11 plant design section meetings?
l 12 A Again, they could raise whatever subjects O 13 they wanted. It wouldn't have been inappropriate. If l 14 he had some reason that he wanted to share this with 15 the staff, he could have done so.
16 Q Bruce Karrasch was on your staff; right?
17 A Yes.
18 Q You know that there came a point in time 19 when the Dunn concerns were something that Bruce 20 Karrasch was asked to function on?
21 A Yes, after Three Mile Island I became 22 aware of it in discussions with counsel.
23 Q Is there anything about the nature of plant
( 24 design section staff meetings that would have made it 25 inappropriate for Mr. Karrasch to discuss the issues
_____.._.___m_ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - - _ - _
4
- 1 Roy 337
_/ 2 he was supposed to be considering with regard to 3 termination of high pressure injection?
4 A It wouldn't have been inappropriate for him to have brought that up if he felt some compelling llh 5 6 reason to do so.
)
7 Q What had Allen Womack's responsibility 8 been immediately before becoming manager of plant 9 esign?
10 A He was a project manager in an organization 11 called international project management.
12 Q Was there any period of transition when 13 Allen sat at your elbow while you ran the plant design 14 section?
15 A No, I don't recall any. I think I moved 16 to the engineering department manager position and he 17 moved to the plant design manager position pretty 18 much in sequence.
19 Q Did you give him a briefing on what were l 20 .the pending matters in your section when you turned
. 21 the section over to him?
l 22 A Yes, I did.
23 Q Did you mention anything to him about Dunn's 24 concern over premature termination of high pressure
(
25 injection?
t
1 Roy 138 O 2 A No, I don't recall doing that. As I 3 stated, after the February 16th memo'when it looked 4 like Mr. Dunn and nuclear service had arrived at an h 5 accommodation, it just didn't come up for me again.
6 Q Would it be fair to say you thought there
< 7 had been closure on Dunn's concern by the end of 8 February 19787 9 A I think it is more fair to say it was n@
in nuclear service's hands to' proceed with their 10 i 11 normal process of preparing their site instructions 12 and sending them out to the customers.
O ,
13 Q So because you thought the matter was on 14 its way out the door to customers as of February '78, i 15 you didn't think it was a matter to be raised with 16 Dr. Womack when he was succeeding you as head of the 1
17 plant design section?
18 A I don't --
19 MR. FISKE: I object to the form of the 20 question.
21 Q You may answer.
22 MR. FISKE: You can answer.
I 23 A I don't thirk about -- I don't recall 24 thinking about it at all at the turnover time.
25 Q Do you believe that any of your monthly l
1 Roy 139 O 2 activity reports noted anything about Dunn's concern 3 over premature termination of high pressure injection?
4 A I don't believe they did.
5 g Do you think you ever whispered anything 6 'to anyone about the concern which Dunn had expressed 7 to you over premature termination of high pressure 8 injection?
9 MR. FISKE: I think that question should be 10 recast in terms of asking for his recollection.
11 MR. SELTZER: 0.K.
. 12 g Understand me, I don't want you to give me O 13 anything that is not something you recall. I don't 14 want you making up things today.
15 MR. SELTZER: Could you repeat the question, 16 please.
j 17 (Record read.)
18 A After, around February 16th, that time 19 frame, I don't recall thinking about it, whispering 20 it, writing it or anything else until after the g 21 accident and in discussions of this issue with counsel.
22 g What about before February 16th? It is 23 a fact, isn't it, that Dunn came to you to discuss
,/ 24 his concerns sometime before he wrote his February 25 menos isn't that right?
I 1 Roy 140
(~5 To the best of my recollection, at A- 2 A Yes.
3 one point, I didn't recall whether he had done it 4' before or after the memo, but after the Davis-Besse 5 transient Bert and -- Mr. Dunn and I had a conversation 6 where he raised his concern about the inappropriate 7 Premature termination of high pressure injection 8 during the September 1977 transient.
9 Q You started your answer with the word "yes."
10 were you saying yes, the conversation j
11 was after the Davis-Besse event and before Bert wrote 12 the February memoranda?
13 Q To the best of my recollection, yes, now 14 that is the way it occurred.
15 Q I would like you to take a look at the 16 testimony which you gave to the Rogovin people on 17 October 15, 1979, page 102.
18 Do you recall that you were deposed by 19 attorneys for the NRC special inquiry?
I 20 A Yes.
21 Q At the bottom of page 101 they asked you, ggg 22 "Do you recall any discussions that you had with any l
23 Persons regarding the circumstances under which you l () 24 would make a recommendation for throttling high 25 Pressure injection from full flow?"
(
1 Roy J 4J O 2 And at page 102 there is the answer that 3 I would like you to take a look at.
4 MR. FISKE: Just one second.
5 Q were you asked the question that appears 6 at the bottom of page 101 and did you give the answer 7 that is reprinted at page 102 and the first line of l
8 1037 9 A Yes.
10 Q was that your best recollection of the 11 matters you were being asked about when you gave that 12 testimony in October of 19797 13 A At that time, yes.
14 Q At line 19 of page 102 you said, "Mr. Dunn 15 expressed that concern to me and asked my opinion 16 about getting -- getting some warning or caution out 17 and getting it to the customers and raising the issue.
18 I said yes, that is certainly a legitimate concern'and 19 we ought to write that up and get it out."
, 20 In the context of the question and the 21 answer you were given, is the concern that you were (gg 22 referring to in that answer the Dunn concern about 23 premature termination of high pressure injection?
() 24 A Yes, about the inappropriate termination i 25 of a safety system before the operator determined that I
1 Roy 142 O
\/ whatever condition called the safety system into 2
3 actuation was not a concern or a problem, and in the 4 context of getting it out, you know, get it out of 5 plant design, let's get it to the appropriate people 6 and get it reviewed and sue what additional guidance 7 or reminders ought to be sent out to the customers.
8 Q Where was the meeting that you and Dunn 9 had?
10 A As best as I can recall, in my office as 11 plant design manager.
12 Q How long did it last?"
13 A ch, ten minutes, something along that 14 range, as best I can recall.
15 Q Do you recall discussing anything other 16 than the Davis-Besse incident and Dunn's concerns 17 arising out of it?
18 A I recall very little about the specifics 19 of that conversation. So, no, I don't recall any other
. 20 subject coming up.
i 21 Q Did Dunn explain to you why he was concerned 22 about operator termination of high pressure injection?
23 A Again, I don't recall the specifics of
[) 24 the conversation at. that time. A couple of things V
25 stick in my mind, the premature -- he was concerned f
L
1 Roy 343 2 about the premature turning off of the safety system 3 and I do recall part of the discussion dealing with 4 that. If it is left off long enough, that even if it g
5 comes back on, you may not have sufficient inventory 6 to keep the core covered or preclude an unacceptable 7 cladding temperature excursion. I remember those things 8 about the conversation. That is all that sticks in 9 my mind right now.
10 Q In other words, it is the accumulated 11 flow of replacement coolant that was significant, ,
12 not just the instantaneous flow?
That, and just that the overall context 13 A 14 of, you know, an operator turning off a safety system 15 before, you know, he has adequate understanding that 16 that safety system was needed to mitigate the transient 17 which caused it to be initiated. There were two things 18 that stick out foremost in my mind.
19 Q Did you attend the briefing that Kelly and 20 Faist gave in Training" Room B shortly after the q 21 September 24 transient?
22 A I don't recall being at that meeting.
1 l 23 Q Have you ever discussed with Dunn, since r
l
() 24 the Three Mile Island accident, the conversation that 25 you and he had had about his concern over premature l
I
l l
l l
1 Roy 344 2 termination?
3 A Not that I recall, no.
4 Q Have you talked with Dunn at all since the 5 Three Mile Island accident?
6 A Oh, yes.
7 Q You say, "Oh, yes." You have done it a 8 lot of times?
9 A Yes, I have talked with Mr. Dunn since the 10 Three Mile Island accident on frequent occasions.
11 Associated with business.
12 Q Has the subject of Three Mile Island's 13 famous accident come up in any of your conversations?
14 A Not that I recall, no.
15 Q Maybe this is too obvious a question.
16 Have you been studiously avoiding discussing the Three 17 Mile Island accident with Bert Dunn?
18 A No. I haven't gone-out of my way to 19 bring it up. Normally when I am dealing with Mr.
i 20 Dunn, Three Mile Island or any other time, we have l
21 got some immediate issues we are focusing on and I 22 don't bring it up, and I would say I don't studiously 23 avoid it, but in the context it just doesn't come up.
I l
) 24 I don't recall discussing it in any of these kinds l 25 of conversations with Mr. Dunn.
i
-,, - , ,,, , , . - , . - - , . , , - - - , . , , - , , - - . g
1 Roy 145 ,
I
\ 'l Other than in the presence of lawyers, 2 Q 3 have you discussed the Dunn concerns and how those 4 concerns were processed at B&W with anybody?
5 A Not that I recall.
6 Q Have you studiously avoided discussing it 7 with other people?
8 A No, I haven't consciously kept it in front 9 of me. I just don't bring it up. It is fairly easy 10 to avoid it. We have a lot of things going on. You 11 know, we've got enough to handle right now.
12 Q What about in the first few months after 13 the accident? Three Mile Island was probably the most 14 important thing affecting work in NPGD for several 15 months after the accident, wasn't it?
i l
16 MR. FISKE: Well --
17 Q That is the question. Wasn't it?
18 MR. FISKE: What aspect of it?
19 Q The repercussions of Three Mile Island 20 were the highest priority for NPGD for several months 21 after the Three Mile Island accident, weren't they?
qg
- g. 22 A That covers a broad context of issues.
23 The continuing servicing of that disabled plant, the
() 24 effect of bulletins and orders and short-term lessons 25 learned coming from the NRC as it affected operating
1 Roy 146 i /~%
2 plants, later as it affected backlog plants, so yes, 3 a great number of items which caused us to direct our 4 attention to the follow-on actions after Three Mile
$f 5 Island took up a lot of our time, and those spheres 6 and others as well, areas of activities.
7 Q with all the attention being given to the 4
8 Three Mile Island plant and the repercussions of 9 Three Mile Island during the months immediately after 10 the accident, are you saying that you never spoke 11 to Dunn, Hallman or Karrasch about their role in 12 handling Dunn's concern over premature termination of
' 13 high pressure injection?
14 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, he told you that.
15 MR. SELTZER: Well, it sounds so incredible 16 that I just want to give him a chance to 17 reconsider whether --
I 18 MR. FISKE: We don't have to accept your J
19 characterization.
7
! 20 MR. SELTZER: You are the only one that 21 is making an issue over it.
gg 22 MR. FISKE: He already answered it.
23 A I recall no such conversations.
j Is Don Hallman somebody that you were i
( 24 Q L 25 seeing from time to time for business purposes after
!/#
4 I
E _-__ _ _ ___ _ ____ _ ___ ~ , _ . , . _ . , _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ , _ - - .____ ,
1 Roy 147 2 the Three Mile Island accident?
3 A Not frequently. Not with Mr. Hallman.
4 Q Bruce --- did you see Bruce Karrasch from l ll; 5 time to time for business purposes after the accident?
i
- 6 A From time to time, but not frequently.
7 Q Was Karrasch somebody that you had 8 difficulty communicating with?
9 A No. I don't recall any instance where we 10 were having any communication problem between us.
11 Q Had you ever had any problems getting Bruce i 12 Karrasch to respond to questions that you had put to 13 him when you were his section head?
14 A No. I recall no problems along those lines 15 with Mr. Karrasch.
4 16 Q Do you recall ever sending him a. memo and i
i 17 not getting a response from him for months and months?
18 A I don't recall such an incident.
i 19 Q Did you ever have to ask him repeatedly 20 to answer something?
21 A No. I have no recollection of that kind 22 of interaction or difficulty in communication with 4
23 Mr. Karrasch or response from him.
1
() 24 Q Did you have to prepara personnel 25 evaluations for your unit managers when you were the
~
- , , -._----_._,._--..._..._..-....._.-.-_.__.-._,_.._,m. -- .. . . _ . . , . - . _
1 Roy 348 O 2 plant design section manager?
t 3 A Yes, we had a personnel appraisal program 4 at NPGD. I don't recall specifically doing it, but !
we had a program and I most likely did.
ll[: 5 I
6 Q what kinds of things did you have to rate 7 your managers for?
8 A Oh, job knowledge, innovativeness, 9 creativity, communication, management skills, 10 leadership skills, interpersonnel communication skills, 11 we would look at the results and goals we had set for 12 budget performances a wide variety of items.
13 Q What was your understanding about why 14 communication was an attribute on which managers
- 15 should be rated?
16 A communication, to me, would cover a broad 4
17 range of skills: the ability to express yourself 18 both in writing and 7erbally clearly, to be able to 19 listen to others, understand what you are listening 20 to. It covered a broad range of skills.
21 Q Why was skill in communication something 22 that was an important facet of a manager?
23 A He is dealing with people. He is getting 24 things done through people, so he is going to be
(
25 involved in a substantial amount of communication
-. -- - - . . , . - . - . , , . . , . . , , . . . , ,e,, . _ , . . , -m . , ,.,,._.# - _ , . , , , _ . , . . ~ , .
I s Roy 149 2 with people.
3 Q Effective communication was an important 4 facet of dealing with people?
h 5 A Yes. -
6 Q To whom did you send the personnel 7 evaluation?
8 A The personnel department would normally 9 receive a copy of the evaluation.
10 Q Let me show you Bert Dunn's February 9, 4 11 1978 memo, GPU Exhibit 78, and also GPU Exhibit 79, 12 which is the sequel dated February 16.
13 You got these on or about the dates they 14 were written; right?
15 A I believe so. -
- 16 Q What did you do with your copies?
17 A I don't recall.
18 Q When the Three Mile Island accident was 19 hot news, did you go back to your files and make any 20 attempt to retrieve Dunn's memos?
21 A No.
22 Q How soon after the accident did it come to 23 your attention that Dunn had in many ways anticipated l (): 24 the Three Mile Island accident'with his memos?
25 MR. FISKE: Well, I will object to the r , w .m --,-e- e ---m , ~ , - .e--,., --,e.--,,-- ,--e, ,e--- -- ,-na, .-en, , -- , , ~ , , . - , ,o a.,--w--n-eev,,,e.n-,n n,---w
1 Roy 150
~('_A) 2 form of the question.
3 A After the accident?
4 Q Yes.
h 5 A I don't recall when that sequence of events 6 which these memos were part of came to my attention 7 after the accident. Maybe a week or something like 8 that. I don't recall. But it was in the presence 9 of counsel that it had come up.
10 Q It was, you say?
11 A Yes.
12 Q Did you get a copy of the instructions
() 13 that B&W sent out on April 4, 1979 telling operators 14 how to handle high pressure injection, and did you get 15 that at or about the time it was initially sent out? 4 16 A Yes, I believe so.
17 Q And did it strike you that these 18 instructions were substantially identical to 19 instructions that you knew Mr. Dunn had drafted more 20 than a year earlier?
21 A Not that I recall. My recollection of O l 22 this relative to the resurrection of these memoc is 23 awfully vague. We were dealing with this specific l 24 issue and I don't recall that coming up. I just don't f-]
%)
25 have a relationship of that to the time that this issue
4 1 Roy 353 2 resurfaced.
3 MR. FISKE: Tho last "this , issue" in 4 that answer, Dr. Roy was indicating the Dunn 5 memos.
6 MR. SELTZER: That leaves two other 7 "this's" in his answer that are going to be 8 indefinite.
9 Q You were looking at one paper when you 10 said one "this" and you looked at another paper when 11 you said another "this," and the answer will not reflect 12 which paper refers to which "this."
O 13 MR. FISKE: I think you can make sense out 14 of it as long as the last "this" is identified.
15 MR. SELTZER: That's all right, I don't 16 care.
17 Q What was your reaction when you first 18 realized that the instructions that B&W was sending 19 out after the accident were substantially the same as 20 the instructions that you had gotten from Dunn more 21 than a year before the accident?
22 A Today,I don't recall drawing any conclusions 23 or having any reaction about it in the time frame O
( ,j 24 that we were framing these and transmitting them to 25 our customers.
. y- . , , ,-,,__,-,,5,v, -, - - . - , _ . - .-- ,, , _ _ , -
1 Roy 352 0 2 Q That is why I am asking you now. At 3 a later time when you realized that the instructions 4 being transmitted to customers after the accident were substantially the same as the instructions you l[I 5 6 had gotten from Dunn more than a year before the 7 accident, what was your reaction?
8 A I can't even recall when all of it dawned 9 on me, much less remember what my reaction was.
10 MR. FISKE: That is the answer.
11 A At that time.
12 MR. FISKE: That is the answer.
13 A Again, I put this in the context of the 14 magnitude of the activity that was going on for many 15 months after that accident. A tremendous flow of 16- tasks and items and considerations.
17 Q All right, O.K. I am not trying to get 18 blood from a stone. If you don't have a recollection 19 of a reaction, that is an answer.
i 20 A 1 don't.
21 Q When you got Dunn's February memoranda, 22 did you read them?
23 A I don't recall'them making an impression
() 24 on me other than the February 16th, which even though 25 I don't recall sitting in a room, you know, reading it i
l I
e 1 Roy 153
() 2 and deriving this conclusion from-it, namely the 3
conclusion that Bert and nuclear service had had some 4 negotiation, dialogue with respect to the form of this reminder and had evidently come to a conclusion, h 5 1
6 as I said before, almost certainly derivable from this 7 memo. But I don't recall specifically receiving them, 8 drawing any conclusions or remembrances from them 9 today.
10 Q was it your normal practice in February 11 1978 or thereabouts to read memoranda that came 12 addressed to you?
A I received a lot of memoranda and many
( 13 14 I read, many I scanned, and many I probably didn't 15 read past the subject.
16 Q I take it you don't have any recollection 17 of not understanding what Dunn had said to you in his 18 February 9 memorandum; is that true?
19 A Like I said, I don't recall any conclusion 20 drawn at all from reading it. I don't even recall 21 reading it, but I mean I got it. I don't recall 22 reading it, drawing any kind of conclusions.
23 Q Before you testified at the Kameny hearings 24 or Kemeny deposition or Rogovin or before you gave
\
25 ACRS testimony, did you reread Dunn's memos?
-g -, , - - _ . , - -
-~ - , , - . - , _ . y-. -,
I Roy 154 2 A Yes, I believe in the presence of counsel.
3 Q You didn't take it home at night?
4 A No.
1' g 5 Q Did you understand either from the l 6 conversation that you had had with Bert Dunn or from 7 his February memoranda that Dunn was concerned that 8 a recurrence of the Davis-Besse sequence of events could
)
9 lead to possible core uncovery and fuel damage?
10 A Since I don't recall the specifics of the 11 conversation, I don't have a recollection of that 12 coming up in the conversation.
13 The two things that did stick out in my 14 mind I have already summarized for you. I don't 15 recall that sticking in my mind. Certainly it is 16 addressed in the memorandum, but I don't recall what 17 the specifics of the conversation were that we had.
18 Q Looking at the memorandum where you say 19 it is stated, the end of the second paragraph, do you 20 recall that Dunn's memorandum did alert you to the, 21 possibility of core uncovery and fuel damage?
9 22 A I don't recall any specific conclusions 23 or results that I drew from reading the meno. I ,
24 don't recall reading the memo so I don't recall 25 at this time what my reaction might have been, or N
~
~
< . s
1 Roy 355 2 conclusions or -- at that time.
3 Q You were the manager of plant design for 4 how many years?
, ll 5 A Four years, approximately four years.
6 Q Was Dunn your only manager of ECCS 7 analysis?
8 A No, there were others.
9 Q Who preceded Bert Dunn?
, 10 A When I came aboard in '74 I believe our 11 manager was Mr. C. E. Parks, and then for a short
~{ ,
12 time, Mr. J. D. Carlson, then Mr. Dunn.
7 O. 13 Q Had you selected Dunn for the position of 14 unit manager?
~
L 15 A Yes.
is
~ \ 16 Q Did you think he was well qualified to be 17 a unit manager?
18 -
A Yes, I did.
k '-s .._
19 Q Have you ever changed that opinion of Mr.
20 Dunn? x 21 A No, I have not.
22 Q In 1978 was he B&W's leading expert on 23 emergency core' cooling system analysis?
() 24 A. Yes, I would say he was our -- had the
- 25 top knowledgex in that particular system. He had s
1 % '
i
- h. . ,, ., _ . . . - - . . _.,._.,.__m. . _ . . , _ ~ . . . _ _ , , . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ . _ . _ _ . __
. . _ . . _ .- = . - - -- __ - ____
i 1 , Roy 356 l 2 some very knowledgeable individuals working for him, 3 and of course Mr. Parks was very knowledgeable, but 4 I'd say Bert was our top expert in that area.
! 5 Q I take it you did not argue with Dunn or 6 try to dissuade him when he told you that he had a 7 serious concern about the premature termination of 8 high pressure injections is that right?
9 A I have no recollection of doing that.
f 10 Like I said, I don't recall the specifics of that 11 conversation and I don't have any recollection of 12 doing that.
7~
U 13 Q You didn't think he was crying wolf, did 14 you?
15 A No, I don't recall deriving any kind of 16 conclusion from the discussion we had along those 17 lines.
18 Q Has anybody ever told you since the Three 19 Mile Island accident that they got Dunn's memo but i 20 they thought that the matter just wasn't as serious 21 as Dunn had portrayed it to be7 i 22 A No, I don't recall any disclosure along 23 that line to me after Three Mile Island.
(
(O
_j 24 Q I take it at no time has anybody ever said 25 to you that they got Dunn's memo but just didn't
. _ _ . . _ . - _ . ~ - . -. .-. , ._.,_.-__ __ _ _ .-_.-.. --.. _ .-.
1 Roy J57 i
l t
() 2 believe the matter was as serious as Dunn portrayed 3 it to be; is that right?
4 A No, I don't recall any such conversation.
Has anybody ever told you that -- do you lh 5 Q 6 want to --
7 A You mean other than counsel?
8 Q If you are implying that counsel have told 9 you that they thought Dunn's memo was way off base 10 and that the concerns weren't as serious as Dunn 11 portrayed them, I would be interested to hear that.
12 MR. FISKE: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
( 13 14 Q So you took Dunn seriously and you don't 15 know of anybody else who learned of Dunn's concerns 16 who did not take them seriously; is that correct?
17 A I think that is correct. I, as I have 18 testified, after the conversation I encouraged Bert, 19 supported him and the recommendation to proceed, to 20 have that thing reviewed by appropriate people and 21 see what the right kind of guidance or reminder would be ,
22 to be sent out to the customers, and I didn't hear.
23 about it any more until after the accident.
24- Q What would have been your practice in 1978, O 25 if any, for filing Dunn's memos after you had read them?
1
. _ _ _ ___....__....__,,_,..,.l
1 Roy 158
/~
(_)/ 2 A I didn't have a systematic filing system ,
l 3 for documents that I received. of course I had my l l
4 correspondence files which my secretary would just automatically put such copies in, but generally I lh 5 6 would file something if I had -- there was an ongoing 7 project or task that we were working on and I was 8 keeping up with it to a certain point, but I had no 9 systematic filing system for a memo like this.
10 Q How early on March 28, 1979 did you hear 11 about the Three Mile Island transient?
12 A Excuse me, March 28th, the morning of 13 March 28th?
14 Q Yes.
15 A About eight a.m.
16 Q Did Bill Spangler tell you about it?
17 A Yes. That was my first notification of 18 it, from Mr. Spangler.
19 Q Did he tell you about the phone call that 20 he had had with Lee Rogers, your man at the site? ,
1 21 A I don't recall the specifics of that 22 conversation with Mr. spangler that morning.
23 Q Did you get reports during the morning
) 24 of what information Bsw had received from the site?
,,_/
25 A We were getting --
1 1
i i 1
. 1 Roy 159
' No, did you, I am asking.
2 Q 1
3 A Personally?
! 4 Q Did you receive any reports regarding the f lh 5 information which B&W Lynchburg was getting from the 6 site?
i 7 A well, I was involved in activities that I
8 morning and there were a number of us. Data would 4l i come in and we would share that among each other, 9
i i
10 and I can't even recall now whether we wrote on the i
11 board, but information was coming in in bits and i, 12 pieces and I would become aware of that, some of that 13 information.
, 14 Q Did you ever walk into the room where the i
- 15 speaker phone was broadcasting the information?
. 16 A Referring to the project control center 17 where we had a communications line, yes. In and out 18 of that during the day.
19 Q Do you remember that there was a blackboard 20 at one end of the room that was getting filled with 21 the data that was coming over the wires?
22 A Yes. I recall writing that down on the 23 blackboard now. We may even have put it on flip
() 24 charts, but we were writing that down.
when is the first time that you recall 25 Q
, - , ~ . - - - +, e ,wer
, , c
1 Roy 360
-( ) 2 anybody saying that they believed that there was or 3 had been a loss-of-coolant accident in progress at i
l 4 Three Mile Island?
5 A I don't know -- recall when I came to such l{+
6 or somebody communicated that possible scenario to me.
7 I just don't recall it.
I 8 Q Do you think that it did not occur during
[ 9 the morning of March 28th?
i 10 A I don't recall if it did.
11 Q Were you in the room when Bert Dunn 4
12 explained to people in the afternoon that the
() 13 indications of superheat in the candy canes could be 14 an indication of serious problems?
15 A I recall that afternoon -- as a matter i
16 of fact in looking across the whole day, that probably l
l 17 the piece the information that sticks out foremost I
18 in my mind is when information was received on the i
19 hot leg temperatures. I don't recall whether Mr.
i
! 20 Dunn or some others came to the conclusion that i superheat condition or whatever, but I became' aware 21 22 of the status of that temperature information that was
- . 23 indicating superheat for the given pressure that we 24 had. I do recall that coming up in like midafternoon 25 time frame.
It !
+
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f 1
Roy 161
_ 2 Q Do you remember Dunn and Lou Cartin 3 addressing the' people who were in the room and t
4 explaining what the implications of superheat in the hot leg were for the condition of the reactor coolant lh 5 6 system?
7 A I don't recall that conversation.
8 Q Do you recall that some people in the room ,
9 felt that there could not be any danger of core 10 uncovery since the pressurizer was still indicating 11 full?
12 A I don't recall any such conclusion or
( 13 conversation that day.
14 Q What about in the afternoon and at about 15 the time that Dunn was explaining the implications 16 of superheat in the lot leg?
17 A I don't recall-the specific conversations 18 and conclusions that day. Again the things that stick 19 out is that superheat indication for the given 20 pressure that led to the recommendation that we get 21 some guidance up to GPU to turn the high pressure t 22 injection on. They are the key points that I 23 remember, so I don't remember the specific conversations
~'
24 that went on that afternoon.
i (\
l 25 Q Why did you recommend that they only turn L
1 Roy 162 O. 2 it on to 450 gpm instead of turn it on full throttle?
3 MR. FISKE: Why did Dunn do that?
4 MR. SELTZER: No, this man made the phone 5 call. .
l(h 6 A As I recall the recommendation --
7 Q Didn't you make the phone call?
8 A -- at least -- I made a phone call with 9 Mr. Deddens to Bob Arnold.
10 Q And told them to turn it on to 450 gpm; 11 right?
12 A My reco11ation, at least 450 gpm.
13 Q Why didn't you make the recommendation to 14 turn it on full throttle?
15 A Well, that wouldn't preclude them from 16 doing that.
17 Q I understand, but you didn't tell him to.
18 You said 450 or at least 450. That's like saying 19 throw half a bucket of water on the fire instead of 20 the full bucket on.
21 A I have no recollection --
22 MR. FISKE: I object to the form of the 23 question.
24 THE WITNESS: Oh.
25 MR. FISKE: You can answer why you didn't
i 1 Roy '
163 O 2 tell them to turn it on full.
3 MR. SELTZER: Let me build it up a little 4 bit.
g 450 is less than. half the capacity of the lh 5 6 high pressure injection system at Three Mile Island; 7 right? '
8 A I believe that's right, yes.
9 Q In saying that you recommended injecting 10 450 gallons per minutes or at least 450 gallons per 11 minute, it is like recommending throwing on half a 12 bucket of water or at least half a bucket instead of 13 the full buckets isn't that right?
14 A well, it is certainly recommending a 15 minimum which is not the full capacity that is 16 available on the high pressure injuction system, 17 assuming all the pumps work.
18 Q You didn't have any information that the 19 pumps were not working?
20 A Not that I recall.
21 Q Why did you recommend only half a bucket G 22 instead of the full bucket?
23 A I-don't recall the process or logic or
() 24 bservations that were being made from that data that 25 led up to the specific' prescription of at least l
1 Roy 364
( 2 450 gpm. I don't know the logic process that led 3
us t that or whatever conclusions we were drawing 4 from our observations of the parameters available to us, so I can't reconstruct why it led up to a minimum gg 5 6 of 450 gpm.
j 7 Q With the background that you had up to 8 March 28, 1979, is there any transient scenario that 9 you were familiar with that would have called for a 10 recommendation of less than full throttle on high 11 pressure injection if high pressure injection was 12 warranted at all?
() 13 A I am not aware of and I have no 14 recollection of what kind of prescriptions and so 15 forth were out there.
4 16 The one observation is that the ECCS 17 analysis that is done in qualifying the system for I
gg loss-of-coolant accident assumes that one'high pressure i
19 injection system is available. It is an observation. l 20 Again, the thought process that led us up to this -
21 rec amendation to GPU for 450 gpm, I can't recollect t 22 or reconstruct that sequence on.
23 Q Dunn had already explained to you a year earlier that the important thing is accumulated l
O 24 25 inventory, not instantaneous flow; isn't that right?
i
1 Roy 165 2 MR. FISKE: I object to the form of the l
3 question.
4 Q You said one of the things that stood out 5 in your mind from Dunn's conversation with you was g{}
6 the importance of accumulated inventory; isn't that 7 right?
8 A After the Davis-Besse transient in the 9 conversation I had with Mr. Dunn that did stick out 10 in my mind. I don't recollect resurrecting that 11 conversation at the time of the Three Mile Island 12 accident.
( 13 Q And as you sit here today, you can't
, 14 recall any condition which prior experience or 15 training would have taught you justifying less than 16 full throttle if high pressure injection were needed 17 is.that right?
18 A I don't recall any data or assumptions
- 19 that we made at that time that led to the construction 20 of the specific recommendation. The recommendation 21 was for at least or a minimum of 450 gpm, but how we 9 22 got to that -- I can't reconstruct that thought 23 process.
24 Q Now I am putting a different question.
- 25 I am not asking how you got to 450 on that day. Now i
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1 Roy 166 O
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2 I am asking based on anything that you had learned 3 before that day, operatingexperience, work in the 4 simulator, study for a PhD in nuclear engineering, (h 5 anything, were you aware of any transient that called 6 for high pressure injection operation where if you l 7 needed HPI it would be appropriate just to turn it 8 on halfway instead of turning it on full way?
9 MR. FISKE: I think he has given you an 10 answer to that already.
11 MR. SELTZER: I didn't hear it.
12 Q Let's get an answer.
13 MR. FISKE: Yes.
14 A No, nothing comes to my mind now that would 15 preclude that or where we make an assumption that 16 that would occur with the exception of the analysis 17 basis for qualification of the safety system.
18 Q Nothing would preclude what would occur?
19 A I couldn't think of anything right now that 20 would say: don't turn it on full throttle or if 21 it all comes on, shut off one pump. Nothing occurs 22 to me now that would say to do that.
23 Q Did you think at the time you made that phone call to Bob Arnold that perhaps Three Mile Island J) 24 25 was having or had had a loss-of-coolant. accident that
1 Roy 367 2 day?
3 A I don't recollect that being a conclusion 4 in my mind at the time we made the call.
5 Q What else do you.use high pressure gg"
) 6 injection for other than a loss-of-coolant accident?
t 7 A That is its primary function. It is going 8 to -- it will come on under other circumstances, 9 but that is its primary function. But I am not saying 10 I didn't, I am saying I don't recall drawing what 11 kind of conclusions or what kind of scenarios that 12 we might have constructed based on the information
() 13 that was available to us during the day or during 14 that afternoon, drawing that specific conclusion.
15 The data coming in at that time during 16 the day was quite spotty. You have to be careful in 17 piecing information together and creating a scenario l
18 in your mind and then going out and prescribing 19 courses of action at a plant based on that. That 20 is -- it takes a while to construct the pieces of 21 that when you are far away and getting a piece here and I
k '
a piece there on it. That was one of the reasons why 22 23 in the morning we put together this team to get up to 24 the site and hopefully we would be able to work with
.O 25 'the customer to get the data and construct a sequence 1
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1 Roy 168 2 of events and that sort of thing, which was fairly
, 3 standard operating practice for us.
4 MR. SELTZER: 0.K., I have to suspend for h 5 today. Whall we start at 9:30 tomorrow morning?
6 MR. FISKE: Yes. Fine.
7 (Time noted: 4:00 p.m.)
8 9
Donald Henry Roy 10 11 Subscribed and sworn to before me 12 this day of 1982.
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, 169 2 CERTIFICATE 3 STATE OF NEW YORK ) . '
- ss.: i!
4 COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
/
5 6 cnAnus snap 1Ro 1, ,
7 Notary Public within and for the State of New York, 8 do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition 9 of DONALD HENRY ROY was taken Defore 10 me on February 2, 1982 ;
11 That the said witness was duly sworn 12
- before the commencement of his testimony and 13 that the within transcript is a true record of said 14 testimony; 15 That I am not connected by blood or 16 marriage with any of the parties herein nor 17 interested directly or indirectly in the matter in 18 controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the 19 counsel.
20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 21 my hand this II day of fEhMW (pl 22 r
m 1 charles Shapiro, CSR 25 e - , -. ,. . , . . a . , . , . . . ----,.,w -,a . , , , . . . - , . , , , - .-w... . e , , . . , , . ,
370 INDEZ WITNESS PAGE Donald Henry Roy 3 0
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EZHIBITS 4
GPU FOR IDENTIFICATION 448 Memorandum to J. R. Taylor from D. H. Roy, dated July 5, 1979, with attachments 114 9
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O BABCOCK & WILCOX L
i.YNCHBURG, VA.
J. H.. Taylor July 5, 1979 'D. H. Roy (2375)
Jim, Thank you for your review and response to my memo of May 15, 1979, on " Procedures for Identifying and Resolving Safety Concerns".
I concur with the recomendations which proceed youashave forwarded in your note of June 26 and believe that we should now follows:
- 1) Establish procedure and related funding for expanded use of LER's.
- 2) Forward to me your recommendations for Sefeb 6.
membership. Oc-- 4ttee-I believe that the coanittee should have 4 rotating chaimanship assignment among the corzittee members and that they should have considerable latitude in establishing their charter and organizing their way of doing business. You should, however, i
prepare a brief purpose for the comittee to assist them in getting started.
3)
D Assure that the revised SPR procedure properly highlights safety V significance determination and its connection with NPGD-1707-01.
Please encourage the Procedures Task Force to emphasize the safety review aspects of the procedure during the SPR retraining program.
- 4) Please propose procedural changes as necessary to assure that closure is obtained on safety concerns however they may arise.
9 Please July provide me with a statement of your progress on these items on or before 31,1979.
Thanks, 1
DHR:nw
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Charles Shapiro CSR -
Doyle Repor6nglac, Y
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D. m LYNCHBURG,VA*
E. R. KAN-c BABCOCE & WILCOX E. A. WOMACK T. H. ROY JUNE 26, 1979 J. H. TAYLOR I
Attached is a draft response to D. H. Roy's letter of May 15, 1979. Prior to finalizing the letter and giving it wider distribution, I would appreciate
~ a brief review by each of you prior to 5 PM. June 28.
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TO: D. H. ROY In response to your letter of May 15, 1979, and your note of May 3,1979 (copies attached), a review has been made to determine whether changes are appropriate to enhance the identification and processing of potential or actual safety issues. It has been concluded that changes are in order. The suggested changes are sumarized as follows:
- 1. Expanded Use of LER's There is not now a systematic review of LER's. Increased attention should be given to LER's with the objective of screening out items having safety or availability implications for B&W plants. h J Q. b[g vu d g.s-
- 2. Formation of NPGD Safety Review Grouc Y A Safety Review Comittee should be appointed. The group should have both permanent and temporary members. .The permanent members should be O <r= 4 dei e #PPer # se #t- The =*==id t r s#i rix 4t* :"e primary objective being to confirm that dafety significant issues are being handled adequately or to identify actions needed to assure proper handling in the future. -
- 3. SPR Safety Sicnificance Greater emphasis should be placed on assessing the safety significance of SPR for both plant specific and generic implications.
- 4. SPR and SIP Followun SPR and SIP followup to confirm appropriate action should be formalized on a contract-by-contract basis to assure the matter has been satisfac-torily resolved.
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2-In addition, it is recommended management emphasis should be given to the importance of safety, to publically state that safety really is everyone's I job, bulletin board announcements of operating experience, the relationship between safety and availability, the charter of the SRG, etc. I Suocortino Information i The assessment you requested has been made and the above recommendations resul ted. To provide further background, the following information is presented.
- 1. Exoanded Use of LER's We have recently been requested to be put on distribution for all LER's.
These will have to be screened, evaluated for applicability, and acted 9 '
T upon. The screening and evaluation will require man-hours. It is assumed that in most cases any significant actions would be preceded by a proposal
- Y [ to one or more customers. The first two steps will require B&W funding ,
\s at least%tially but should lead to income-producing work in addition '
V,&l g to bearing safety and availability benefits.
\[~ 2. Formation of an NPGD Safety Review Grouc The formation of a Safety Review Group 'is considered a highly desirable action to focus increased attention on safety matters. While it is recognized that safety is everyone's job, it would be specifically defined as the sole objective of the SRG. They would represent the real safety conscience of the NpGD. Their role would be to evaluate the actions taken by various organizations within NpGD in regard to safety and to either determine that actions ~were appropriate or suggest specific or procedural changes to further enhance the proper andling of similar issues in the future. " "
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d T14633
There are a total of six procedures which directly spell out the manner for handling safety concerrs. These are summarized as follows:
- 1. NPG 1707-01, " Processing of Safety Concerns", is the principal procedure, applicable to all NPGD personnel, on identifying, and reporting safety concerns.
- 2. Policy 1716-A1, A Corporate policy, " Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliance Concerning Safety (10 CFR 21)".
- 3. NPG 0405-05, " Contract Variation Approval Request," defines the acticns and responsibilities for dispositioning non-conformance to specifications by our suppliers. The procedure requires the Task Engineer to initiate a PSC per NPG 1707-01 when a safety concern is raised by a non-conformance report.
- 4. NPG 0504-04, " Site Problem Report" requires the Nuclear Service Technical Support person to follow NPG 1707-01 if the Site Problem Report is a safety concem.
- 5. NPG 0902-06, " Computer Program Development and Certification" requires that applicable Unit Managers follow NPG 1707-01 if a safety concern exists based on the discovery of an error in a computer program.
- 6. NPG 1703-01, " Prep. and Processing of Internal Deficiency Report and Restraint Order," advises QA personnel that IDR's shall not be used to report safety deficiencies, but that they should use NPG-1707-01.
As stated above, there is frequent reference to NPGD 1707-01 dealing with processing of safety concerns. This procedure was written to meet the legal requirements of the regulations and its complexity may inhibit its use. This should not be the case. It would seem that increased emphasis on safety by management and perhaps additional training in the use of the above procedures -
will lead to increased but proper implementation.
O 714633
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In addition to the cross referencing in the above proced'u res, it may also be appropriate to reference NPGD 1707-01 in the following procedures.
- 1. 0405 CI/A -
- 2. 0405 Design Review
- 3. 0405 Change in Plant Computer Software
- 4. 0408 Resolution of B&W Manufactured Components Materials Problems
- 5. 0408 Materials Review and Consultation Procedure NPG 1707-01.is adequate to assure timely notification to the NRC and affected customers. The procedure does not address closure, however,
- in that only the reporting of the concern is covered. Corrective and followup action is not addressed, and requires a revision to this procedure.
The procedure requires that the person initially raising a concern (i.e.,
initiating a PSC) is ' maintained on the distribution list for ali documentation.
It is envisioned that the primary responsibility of the SRG would be to O aer4cdicsi,x review t8e imaiementation ef 18ese procedures. it is cons 4eered important that the SRG actions be such that there is no tendency on the part of the line organization to relax on safety matters but rather just the opposite - to increase the attention to safety matters in a prompt and practical manner.
It is suggested that the SRG be a small group of permanent middle-manage-ment personnel which obtains periodic support from other parts of the j organization on an as-needed basis. It is suggested that the pennanent members l Ln= =- om )
be Messrs. '.h.'.s, Ball, Womack, Meegen, and Taylor.
SPR Safety Significance Procedure 0503-04 should be revised to place increased emphasis on safety significance. This should be done both in the words and on fann 21091. As it -
is now written, there is very minor reference to safety. The words "signifi- l cant deficiency" should be replaced by a space entitled, " safety {gp f n e".
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_ , , . -b-Engineering Department concurrence with the safety significance statement O sa==id 6 rar= 117 reauir d by the Prac eur -
SPR and SIP Followuo Formalized steps are recon = ended via procedure changes to require that the SPR and SIP closure be by signoff on a contract-by-contract basis. Too 4
often we put out good reconrnendations only to find out they have been either ignored, redirected or partially implemented by the customers.
Consnents are requested from both you and those receiving copies on the above reconinendations and findings by 7/6/79.
cc: R. E. Kosiba E. A. Womack T. M. Schuler E. R. Kane
() D. Mars R. E. Wascher C. D. Morgan i
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