ML20072H757
| ML20072H757 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1982 |
| From: | Bailey H BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290721 | |
| Download: ML20072H757 (136) | |
Text
.-.
jlk UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,
.,7Q JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and 6
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, l
Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
-against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY MCDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
(:
_x Deposition of The Babcock &_Wilcox Company by HENRY BAILEY, taken by Plaintidfs, pursuant to notice, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Esgs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Tuesday, February 23, 1982, at 9:40 o' clock a.m.,
before Joseph R.
Danyo, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary htblic _within and for the State of New York.
r s
8306290721 820223 PDR ADOCK 05000289 T
PDR S
O DOYLE REPORTING, INC CERTIFIED STENOTYP E REPCRTER:
369 LaxlNGTON AvtNur WALTER SHAP4RO, C.S.R.
Nsw Yong. N.Y.
10017 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.1 R.
TELsPNo N e 212 - 867 822o
i 1
2 2
APPearanc e s :
3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York BY:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.,
6 of Coursel I
8 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
9 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 10 New York, New York E
11 BY:
KAREN E.
WAGNER, ESQ.,
of Counsel lo n%d 13 14 ALSO PRESENT:
David Taylor 15 16 17 18 oOo 19 20
(.
22 23 O,-
24 s
l 25 I
1 3
0-2 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by 3
and between the attorneys for the respective 4
Parties hereto, that all rights provided by the A'(
5 C.P.L.R.,
including the right to object to any 6
question except as to the form, or to move to 7
strike any testimony at this examination, are 8
reserved; in addition, the failure to object to 9
any question or to move to strike testimony at 10 this examination chall not be a bar or waiver 11 to make such motion at, and is reserved, for the 12 trial of this action.
' ITISFURTHERSTIPULATEDANbAGREEDthat 13 14 the within examination may be sworn to by the 15 witness being examined before a Notary Public 16 other than the Notary Public before whom this 17 examination was beSun, but the failure to do so ortoreturntheoriginalofthisexkminationto 18 19 counsel shall not be deemed a waiver of the' rights 20 Provided by Rules 3116 and 3117 of the C.P.L.R.,
21 and shall be controlled thereby.
.L 22 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that 23 the filing and certification of the original of O()
24 this examination are waived.
25
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1 4
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2 HE NRY BA ILEY, having been first duly 3
sworn by Joseph R.
Danyo, a Notary Public within 4
and for the State of New York, was examined and
('
5 testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION BY 7
MR. SELTZER:
8 Q
Please state your name and address for the g
record.
10 A
Henry Bailey, Route 1,
Monroe, Virginia.
11 Q
Can you identify GPU Exhibit 4667 12 A
Yes.
13 Q
What is it?
14 A
It is my resume.
l l
15 (Document entitled " Resume of Henry A.
Bailey" l
16 was marked GPU Exhibit 466 for identification, as 17 of this date.)
18 Q
Who prepared it?
19 A
I did.
20 Q
What were you attempting to set out?
l 21 A
Just a description of my previous work km 22 experience and education.
23 Q
What led you from Auburn University to the
)
24 Navy Nuclear Power School?
25 A
I w as in the Navy ROTC at Auburn, and as a 9
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y p-ew
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ee -
1 Bailey 5
C~')g result of that, I had an obligation to go into the 2
avy, and so in the Navy I went to Nuclear Power School.
3 Q
Had you had any courses in nuclear engineerinc 4
()
5 at Auburn?
A No.
6 Q
What happens at the Navy's Nuclear Power 7
School?
8 MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
What do you mean by 9
what happened?
(
10 Q
Wnat do they do there?
11 A
The first six months is theoretical courses
_d 12 in physics, mathematics, thermohydraulics, and then the 13 i
second six months in the school was spent at a 14 prototype 14aval reactor plant.
15 16 Q
Who taught the courses during the first six mon th s ?
17 18 A
I don't recall.
~
19 Q
Were they professional educators?
A They were, as I recall, Naval officers.
I 20 never saw their resume.
I am not sure what their 21 qualifications were.
no.
Q Y u don't know whether any of them had 23
. /-
doctorates in nuclear engineering?
(s.
9~4 A
No.
25
1 Bailey 6
O Q
Did you get course credits for the half 2
year in classroom instruction?
3 A
No.
4
()
Q Do you have any way to quantitize the amount 5
of study time you spent on thermohydraulics?
6 i
A No.
I don't think so.
7 g
Q Was it a course that was taught in a class that met regularly?
9 A
As I recall, it was onesubgect that was 10 covered under a general engineering course.
As I 11 12 recall, I think the name of the course was reactor 0
13 engineering, r something like that.
14 Q
So within a course on reactor engineering, ne of the topics covered was thermohydraulics?
15 A
Yes.
16 17 Q
What is thermohydraulics?
18 A
I would say thermohydraulics would be the science of the behavior of fluids under ce'rtain 19 conditions.
Of course, our emphasis was on water.
20 Q
Was there any lab work associated with the 91 six-month classroom?
22 A
No.
33 24 Q
Was the section on thermohydraulics treated with specific application to a nuclear reactor?
25 l
1 Bailey 7
(3
- (,
A Nc; really.
The coursea were pretty 2
theoretical.
3 4
Q Was the protetype reactor an operating nu lear-fueled reactor?
5 A
Yes.
6 7
Q Was it a prototype of a reactor used for 8
propulsion?
A Yes.
9 10 Q
In other words, it was not gi prototype of f
11 a reactor intended principally for generation of 12 electricity?
A That's right.
13 1
14 Q
What were your responsibilities at the 15 prototype reactor?
16 A
A student.
I f
17 Q
How was instruction organized.when you were 18 learning at the prototype reactor?
19 MS. WAGNER:
What do you mean, how was it 20
- 9""128d7 "g
Q Did you have classrooms?
Or was it more o
like on-the-job training?
22 23 A
There were some classroom sessions in which O)
(
24 systems were discussed, but I would say most of the time was spent in the plant on the job experience.
25
1 Bailey 8
p G
2 Q
What kinds of training materials did the avy use, written materials, when you were at the 3
prototype?
4 h
A As I recall, most of it was classified, and 5-I don't believe I would be free to discuss it, 6
Q We'are all law-abiding Americans here.
7 g
MS. WAGNER:
I believe the classification applies even though we are law-abiding.
9 10 Q
You are saying you believe (that the materials you used more than two decades ago is so gi 12 top secret that you can' t describe even the nature of O
the materials that were used?
13 A
They were classified at that time.
I don't 14 15 have any direct evidence that they have been declassified; i
so I don't feel free to go into detail.
16 17 Q
Is just about everything you, received in 18 writing classified?
19 A
No, I wouldn't say that.
I t h'as be e n 2 0 20 years ago, but I would have trouble distinguishing what i
was classified and what wasn't at this point.
21 l
22 Q
Did you have any simulator training when I
i 23 you were in the Navy?
A No.
24 l
Q How did the Navy train operators to respond 25
?
I i
1 Bailey 9
s 2
to loss of coolant accidents?
A You studied about the accident.
You were 3
4 told about the accident and were given a procedure
()
5 for the accident, but there certainly wasn't it didn't 6
go beyond that, because we didn't use a simulator.
7 Q
Are you familiar with the types of i
g procedures which B&W was drafting for the operation 9
of its reactors prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
10 MS. WAGNER:
At any time pElor?
11 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
4 12 A
I was involved in procedure s during the 13 Period of '69 through
'71, but I hadn' been involved 14 with procedures since then, i
15 Q
Since 1971, have you seen any B&W drafted e
16 procedures?
i 17 A
I can' t recall seeing them.
18 Q
Since 1971, have you had occasion to see any 19 Procedures that were ever used by a B&W customer for 1
20 the operation of a B&W reactor?
21 A
I can't recall seeing them.
l 22 Q
Was the format of the Navy procedures 23 significantly different from the format of the B&W 24 Procedures that you worked with between 1969 and 19717 i
25 A
I can't recall.
Bailey 10 1
0 2
Q In the Navy procedures, did the operator 3
have listed a profile of symptoms for various transients?
4 A
It has been 20 years.
.I really couldn't
(
5 say.
6 Q
The Navy prototype reactor was a PWR, right?
7 A
Yes.
O Q
Part of its emergency core cooling system I
9 included a high pressure injection system?
10 A
I believe so.
11 Q
Do you have any recollection what the 12 (eg procedures were for when operators should terminate l
\\_)
13 high pressure injection after.it had automatically
~
14 actuated?
IS MS. WAGNER:
If it automatica,lly actuated 16 on a Navy plant; I don't think it has been 17 established.
10 l
A No, I don't recall.
i IO Q
Did you retain any notes or materials from 20 your training to operate Naval reactors?
21 A
For a while, I guess I kept some notes from
-s 22 the fi rs t six months,since the firs t six months was not 23 classified.
It was all theoretical.
somewhere along *
%2 24 one of the moves, I think I dumped those.
I don't 25 think I have anything now.
i
1 Bailey 11 b
's_/
2 Q
What kind of boat is the U.S.S.
Enterprise?
A An aircraft carrier.
3 4
Q Does it have a nuclear reactor?
(
A Yes.
5 6
Q What back-up sources of power does it have?
A Again, you are getting in an area of 7
8 details of a nuclear plant that I believe to be classified.
9 10 Q
How many reactors does it Have?
11 A
I think that is classified.
12 Q
I am sure Jane's published everything that 13 I have been just asking you about even before the 14 Enterprise was launched.
15 MS. WAGNER:
If Jane.'s published it, you 16 can find out about it in Jane's.
If this witness 17 believes it to be classified, there.is no reason
}
18 why he should tes tify about it.
19 Q
Are you familiar with Jane's?
20 A
I have heard the name.
21 Q
Did you receive any decorations or awards 22 for your Naval service?
23 A
I got a vietnam service ribbon, which was 24 after I got off the Enterprise, on the second ship I 25 was on. And there was another ribbon also, and I don't
1 Bailey 12 4
recall what that was.
2 Q
D es the Vietnam service ribbon signify that 3
t 4
y u were n board a ship that was assigned to the t
vietnamese conflict?
5 6
.A
.Yes.
7 Q
Which ship was th a t?
g A
That was the Reeves.
(
Q What kind of boat was that?
g 10 A
That was a guided missile frigate.
gg Q
Did that have any nuclear propulsion?
A No.
12
)
\\#
Q What, if any, duties did you have aboard 13 the Enterprise in connection with its nuclear plant?
14 A
I was assigned in the Engineering Department.
15 The Engineering Department Division I was in was 16 g7 responsible for the secondary side of the, plant, the 18 main engines, and so forth, e
j gg Q
You were not responsible for t'he operation of the nuclear steam supply system?
20 A
I stood watches in the operation of the 91 i
i 22 nuclear supply system.
23 Q
In other words, in addition to your r pponsibilities for the secondary side of the plant, 34 y u stood watches in the control room and had 25 I
1 Bailey 13 O
\\J.
2 responsibility for the primary system also?
A Yes.
3 4
Q What were your responsibilities with th e 5
operation of the nuclear steam' system?
6 A
I was engineering officer of the watch.
7 Q
What is that?
8 A
It involves the supervision and operation 9
of the propulsion plant.
10 Q
What induced you to attend h.I.T.?
11 A
I wanted to get an advanced degree, and 12 M.I.T.
accepted me.
13 Q
Did you write a Mas ter's thesis?
14 A
No, I didn 't write a thesis.
I went to an 15 engineering practice school at Oak Ridge, Oak Ridge 16 National Lab, and stayed one semester there in lieu 17 of writing a thesis.
18 Q
Did-you work on any particular project at 19 Oak Ridge?
20 A
I worked on two different projects.
21 Q
What were they?
22 A
One of them concerned the operation of a
23 molten salt reactor, and the other involved the ope ra tion 24 of a gas-cooled reactor.
25 Q
Is the molten salt the same as the liquid
i 1
Bailey 14 2
sodium cooled reactor?
s A
No.
3 4
Q What.is the salt used in the molten salt
(
reactor?
6 A
I am sure I knew at the time but I have 7
long since forgotten.
8 Q
'Did B&W come up to M.I.T.
to recruit g
engineering graduates?
of f, 10 A
No, not that I am aware 11 Q
What led you to pick B&W as a prospective 12 employer?
13 A
They made me an offer whic was attractive 14 compared to other offers, so I took it.
15 Q
Did B&W describe to you what you could 16 expect your career would be at B&W7 17 A
I don't recall any discussion.of career.
18 They discussed what business they were in and what j ob 4
19 I would have first.
a0 Q
The job you would have firs t would be in the 1
l 21 Nuclear Service Department?
22 A
Ye8-23 Q
Did you go with B&W expecting that you would
)
24 stay in the Nuclear Service or Cu'stomer Service 25 Department?
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1 Bailey 15 2
A I don't think so.
3 Q
What was the. progression o f assignments that 4
you had within the Nuclear Service Department at B&W?
(
5 A
I believe it was a senior engineer and was 6
assigned certain procedures, draft procedures, to write, 7
and then after about nine months at B&W, I was assigned 8
to the Oconee site as a site operations manager, and 9
I stayed there until I left the Nuclear Service and 10 came back to Lynchburg in another job.E 11 Q
Approximately how long were you down at 12 oconee?
13 A
It was, as I recall, less than two years.
14 Q
Were you draf ting procedure s for Duke Power's 15 oconee plant?
16 A
Yes.
i l
17 Q
You said you worked on that for nine months.
18 Were you the original scrivener, or were you revising 19 what other people had drafted?
20 A
I think it is probably some of both.
21 Q
Did you work on the full range of B&W-i 22 drafted procedures for the B&W equipment supplied for 23 Oconee?
(
21 MS. WAGNER:
Do you mean each procedure or 25 one of each type of procedure?
I don't know what
1 Bailey 16 C)
(%J 2
you mean by " full range."
s 3
MR. SELTZER:
Each type.
4 MS. WAGNER:
You mean emergency and operating 1 5
MR. SELTZER:
Right.
6 MS. WAGNER:
Do you understand the question?
7 THE WITNESS:
Yes, but it has been 13 years, 8
and I don't remember the specific procedures I g
worked on.
10 Q
That is why Karen's modifidation was helpful.
11 I wasn' t asking you to recall specific procedures.
I 12 was just asking whether your work on procedures covered 13 the different types of procedures that were being 14 drafted for the Oconee NSS.
A I can't recall.
15 16 Q
What did you use as the basis for drafting 17 procedures?
18 A
B&W has certain documents that are used 19 as sources of information on the system.
20 Q
That is why I was asking you what you used?
21 A
I would say one example would be the 22 reactor coolant system functional specification, as I 23 recall, would be one.
l
)
24 Q
What else?
25 A
I can't remember if I specifically used that i
~.
1 Bailey 17 O
one.
I suspect I did.
I don't remember which ones I 2
s "8*d*
3 4
Q What other things would be consistent with 5
your recollection that you think you used?
I don't 6
want you to speculate.
I want to know what is your 7
best recollection about what you us ed.
8 A
I don't recall anything I specifically 9
used.
I don't recall what documents I used.
10 Q
If one were to retrieve fro,m B&W files 11 procedures for oconee, would they have your name or 12 initials on them?
13 A
I don't remember.
11 Q
What are reactor coolant sys tem f unctional i
15 specifications?
k 16 A
It is a specification that specifies certain 17 things that the reactor coolant sys tem is. required to 18 function within.
19.
Q Like what?
i 20 A
one thing would be a 40-year design life, 21 for instance.
I haven't looked at the functional 22 specification in years.
I really couldn't tell you what 23 else was in them.
}
24 Q
Are functional specifications a document i
25 which B&W releases to customers?
1
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1 Bailey 18
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A I don't know.
Q How did you use functional specifications 3
4 in drafting procedures?
(
A I w uld be. speculating if I told you 5
6 exactly how I went about drafting procedures.
7 Q
Did you spend a lo t o f time talking with 8
design engineers before you drafted procedures or 9
while you were drafting procedures?
10 A
I think it is fair to say t. hat I talked with 11 design engineers.
I don't recall any specific instances 12 or how much time I spent.
13 Q
Do you recall what you talked to them about?
v 14 A
No.
15 Q
Did you ask any design engineer to review 16 or approve any of the procedures that you were draf ting?
17 A
I. don't recall.
18 Q
What did you do with the procedures after 19 you finished drafting them?
20 A
Eventually we sent them to the customer.
21 Q
When you got to Oconee, did you see your 22 draft procedures?
23 MS. WAGNER:
You mean the ones that Mr.
24 Bailey wrote or the ones that B&W sent?
1 MR. SELTZER:
Both.
25
1 Bailey 19 r~%
Y.
2 A
I don't recall any procedures I drafted I a tually saw at oconee.
3 4
Q Did you see B&W draft procedures at oconee?
(
A res.
3 6
Q What was oconee doing with them?
A oconee would take the draf t procedures and 7
g integrate them into their plant procedures which was 9
a fairly extensive process, as I recall.
10 Q
Did anybody from oconee ever consult with 11 you about the process that they were going through in 12 integrating B&W draft procedures?
13 A
I can't recall.
14 Q
What, if any, preparation did you have for j
15 being site operations manager at oconee?
16 A
Just the nine months at B&W prior to going 17 down to the site.
18 Q
Were you the highest level B&W employee 19 continuously assigned to oconee during the' years that 20 you were site operations manager?
A No.
At th e same time, there was a site ni
(_
~
22 construction manager which was the same level that I i
23 was.
()
24 Q
S n body was higher than you?
A That was initially.
As I recall, after 25
1 Bailey 20 J
2 about one year, there was a site manager assigned who was over the two of us, B&W site manager.
3 4
Q What was the scope of your responsibilities as site oporc tions manager?
5 6
A The plant was still under construction at 7
this time.
The fuel had not been loaded.
Basically we 8
were there to provide oconee with any first-hand 9
instructions that they might need on placing our 10 equipment and service.
Some of the audiliary, small 11 auxiliary pumps were tested at this time.
I believe we 12 got up to hydro in the reactor coolant system, and I O
13 can't recall exactly what step we were in when I left 14 and came back to Lynchburg, but we had not loaded fuel 15
- yet.
16 Q
During the hydro, did you heat up the water 17 using the primary pumps?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Did you develop any steam bubbles outside 20 the pressurizer?
21 MS. WAGNER:
In the reactor cooltnt system?
22 A
I don't recall developing any.
23 Q
Did you discuss with any Oconee personnel 24 the possibility of developing steam bubbles in the 25 reactor coolant system outside the pressurizer?
il
. _,.. ~
1 Bailey 21 2
A Not that I recall.
3 Q
Did you get into discussions with Oconee 4
personnel about operating procedures?
By that, I mean
(
5 procedures for operating the plant once it was cri ti c al.
6 A
I don't recall that we did.
Most of our 7
attention was directed at things like flushing out 8
systems,which systems would be completed when, and so 9
forth.
10 Q
When is the first time you' heard of 11 saturation occurring in a B&W plant reactor coolant 12 system outside the pressurizer?
C'\\
13 MS. WAGNER:
Are you askin him now for a 14 specific event rather than a theorized event?
15 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
16 A
I think it was at some time after the 17 incident at Three Mile Island.
18 Q
You had never heard of saturation occurring 19 outside the pressurizer before?
20 A
No.
21 Q
Had you known before the Three Mile Island 22 accident that saturation occurring in the reactor 23 coolant system outside the pressurizer could force water i
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24 level to rise in a pressurizer?
25 A
I had known prior to the Three Mile Island l
I 1
Bailey 22 O
G' 2
accident that the pressurizer level by itself was not 3
always a reliable indication of inventory in th e 4
reactor.
5 Q
Was your recognition of that triggered 6
by Carlyle Michelson's study?
7 MS. WAGNER:
What do you mean by " triggered 8
by"?
9 Q
Did you recognize that fact as a result of 10 your review of carlyle Michelson's study?
11 A
This recognition was one of the points that 12 we made in our reply to the TVA, which I believe was in g-(_)
13 reply to Mr. Michelson's concern.
14 Q
So your recognition that the pressurizer 4
15 water level was not an accurate indication of reactor 16 coolant system inventory came about as a result of 17 reviewing B&W's reply to Michelson's s tudy ; is that 18 right?
19 MS. WAGNER:
Do you understand that he is e
20
.aski'ng you whether this is the first time you 21 knew that?
22 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
23 Q
The answer to the question is yes?
24 A
My review of the B&W response to th e 25 Michelson concern was when I first recognized that for i
d 1
Bailey 23 A
the B&W reactor the pressurizer level was not an 2
accurate indication of inventory at all times.
3 4
(Discussion off the record.between the
(
5 witness and his counsel) g Q
Had you met Carlyle Michelson before you 7
got.a copy of his report in 19787 g
A No.
9 Q
Have you ever met Mr. Michelson?
10 A
I have seen him.
I have never been 11 introduced to him.
12 Q
Have you ever talked to him?
O 13 A
No.
14 Q
Have you ever talked to him over the 15 telephone?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Have you talked to him over the telephone 18 about his 1978 study?
19 A
Let me amend that.
I have bee'n -- I was with about three or four people that talked with Mr.
20 Michelson and others at TVA over the phone.
I didn't 21 22 participate in the c o nve rs a tio n.
23 Q
Were those who were talking, talking about
()
his 1978 study on small break loss of coolant accide n ts ?
24 A
I believe so.
25
^l 1
Bailey 24
\\/.
2 Q
Was the telephone conversation that you have just referred t ne th at took place before the 3
written response to TVA's letter?
4 A
I believe so.
5 6
Q When is the first time you learned that there had been saturation in the reactor coolant system 7
8 outside the pressurizer at the Davis-Besse plant?
MS. WAGNER:
If you ever learned that.
9 10 A
I am not f amiliar with the gavis-Besse incident.
11 12 Q
You know that B&W has a raised loop 177 13 plant called Davis-Besse?
A Yes.
14 15 Q
When you say you are not familiar with the Davis-Besse incident, what incident are you talking 16 about?
17 18 A
The incident I have heard khere was an 19 incident at Davis-Besse, and that is the extent of my 20 knowledge on it.
21 Q
Y u. gut Dunn's two memos dated February 9 22 and February 16, 1978, didn't you?
A I d n't remember ge tting them.
23
()
24 Q
Did you see those two memos in the preparatior, for y ur deposition?
25 v_. - -., -.
_,y.
.c.,
_..,.c._
1 Bailey 25 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Did you see your name on the c.c.
list?
4 A
Yes.
(l 5
Q And it is your testimony that you have no 6
recollection whatsoever of ever receiving those memos?
7 A
I don't remember getting them.
8 Q
When is the last time prior to your 9
preparation for this deposition that you saw Dunn's 10 memos?
t 11 MS. WAGNER:
I think it would be better 12 if you would separate the memos from each other in
'")
13 your questions.
14 Q
Let me show you Dunn's February 9, 1978 15 memo which has been marked GPU Exhibit 78.
When is the e
16 last time prior to your preparation for this deposition 17 that you saw GPU Exhibit 787 18 A
At some time after the Three Mile Island 19 accident, we were ins tructed to hand in files relating 20 to the accident.
At this time, I had a file about i
21 that thick that I took out, and I leafed through it.
22 At th at time I saw the memo in the file.
23 Q
This was a file which you indicated was 24 approximately an inch or inch and a half thick?
25 A
Yes, maybe an inch.
1 Bailey 26 2
Q That was a file that,was in your personal custody?
3 A
Yes.
4 l
5 Q
The fact that the Dunn February 9 memo was in that file meant that you had received Dunn's memos 6
sometime prior to the time that you discovered it in 7
8 the file, right?
MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
I don't think the 9
10 witness knows what it meant.
t 11 Q
You may answer.
12 MS. WAGNER:
You may answer the question, if (3-k/
you know why it is that the memo was there.
13 MR. SELTZER:
That wasn't my question..
14 15 Q
My question is the fact that it was in 16 that file indicated to you, did it not, that you had 17 received Dunn's February 9 memo at some prior time?
18 MS. WAGNER:
If you remember what you thought 3
19 when you saw the memo in the file, you can testify to that.
20 A
I guess 1I didn't think one way or the other.
21 l
I noted it was in my file, but I didn't remsmber getting l
22 i
it.
23 24 Q
Where had you kept the file?
A It was in a drawer in my desk.
25 i
l
,-...m. _ _.
1 Bailey 27 2
Q What kinds of documents did you put into 3
the file?
4 A
Memos generally that didn't have file numbers k
5 on them, and I couldn't figure where else to put them.
6 Q
I take it that -- and I don't mean to be 7
f acetious -- you also kept a wastebasket in your 8
offics, right?
9 A
Yes.
10 g
some documents that you received you threw 11 into the waste basket, didn' t you?
12 A
I think it is fair to say that some documents 13 I receive I do throw in th e wastebaske t.
I can't 14 remember any particular one.
15 Q
Were~ the documents that you put in the 1
i 16 inch-thick file documents which you thought had some i
17 significance for future action,'and theref o re should 1
f 18 be saved?
19 A
I can't characterize the docmdents, all 20 the documents like that, no.
l 21 Q
Why were you putting documents into the 22 inch-thick file instead of throwing them away?
l 23 MS. WAGNER:
If you can remember, you can 1 ()
24 answer the question.
But don't speculate.
25 A
I have no idea.
i a.,
r i
Bailey 28
(')%
(.
2 Q
Did you from time to time take out the f ider that you referred to and review the documents 3
4 that were in it?
(
5 A
Not really.
In this particular case, I --
6 if I did, I never had recognized or remembered this 7
memo until they actually asked for the file.
8 Q
Was Dunn's February 16, 1978 memo in the g
file?
10 A
No, I don't remember seeing it.
11 Q
Was it in any other file of yours?
12 A
No.
O 13 Q
At the time you reviewed t e inch-thick 14 file, did you read Dunn's memo?
15 A
I scanned it at that time.
I don't remember 16 how much time I spent on it.
17 Q
Ead Dunn's memo already achieved some 18 notoriety before you spotted it in your fkle?
l l
19 A
I believe it had, yes.
20 Q
So when you saw it in your file, you knew 21 exactly what this was and what significance was being 22 attributed to it in light of the Three Mile Island 23 accident?
()
24 MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
The witness 25 hasn't testified to any significance being
1 Bailey 29 r~N 2
attributed to it.
3 A
I don't remember what I thought.
4' Q
I asked you if Dunn's memo had already
(.
5 achieved notoriety before you discovered it in your 6
file, and you said, "Yes."
What was the notoriety I
7 which you were aware Dunn's memo had already achieved?
8 A
I believe I recall reading about it in the 9
paper.
10 Q
In a publicly-sold newspaps,r?
11 A
In a newspaper, I believe.
12 Q
Prior to your finding it in your file, were
(~h 13 you aware that you were indicated for a copy of the
~
14 February 9 memo?
J 15 A
No, I wasn't.
16 Q
Have you ever looked through your files to 17 see if you could find a copy of the February 16 memo 18 on which you are also marked for a copy?
19 A
I have never gone through my complete files.
20 I have looked at at least three files that I thought if 21 I had it, it would be in.
22 Q
Which files were those?
23 A
one was or had to do with the small break
/~N
()
24 ECCS analysis that we did in
'78.
25 Q
That was th e pump discharge line break
i I
i Bailey 30 2
Problem?
A fes.
I d n't recall what the other two 3
4 were at this time.
(
5 g
.At or about the time.that Dunn's February 9 6
memo was written and circulated, what generally was 7
your practice with regard to how you handled memoranda g
that came across your desk?
g MS, WAGNERt I object on the basis that 10 this witness doesn't know when this memorandum 11 was written and circulated.
If you are referring i
12 to the time February of 1978, then he can answer
-13 the question.
14 MR. SELTZER:
I think that is all I 15 indicated in my question.
16 A
Generally, we had a file within Licensing, 17 and most memos if I wanted to keep, I handed it in 18 to a secretary and asked her to file it ir$ the licensing 19 file if it was something I wanted to be ab'l e to retrieve 20 later.
9.1 Q
You would do that af ter y ou had read the 22 memos is that right?
23 A
Yes, I think I would probably have some 24 idea of what was in it, otherwise, I wouldn't ask her 25 to keep it.
.-.,,,--,,:,---,,_.--.,.----.w..--
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..,m,,v,.,,.
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1 Bailey 31 0'
2 Q
Did you generally read the memos that came 3
addressed to you?
4 A
It depended on what my work load was.
If
(
5 it was directed specifically to me, I think I read all 6
of them.
If I was just on a carbon copy, there were 7
lots of memos I didn't read.
8 Q
You were th e cognizant engineer for ECCS 9
within the Licensing Department in 1978, weren't you?
10 A
I was given ECCS ' assignmen ts within the 11 Generic Licensing Unit, which was just one unit of 12 Licensing.
A 13 Q
Was there anybody else in Licensing in 1978 14 whom you now believe had greater expertise in ECCS 15 matters than you did?
l 16 MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
Do you mean t
17 handled more of them or had a better education,
~
18 or what do you mean by " greater expertise"?
19 MR. SELTZER:
Greater practical expertise 20 in dealing with ECCS problems.
21 MS. WAGNER:
I still object.
k 22 If you unders tand the question, you can 23 answer.
24 A
Could I hear it again?
25 Q
I will rephrase it.
1 Bailey 32 A
2 In 1978, was there anybody else in Licensing who had more continuous responsibility for ECCS matters 3
4 than you did?
(
A I am n t aware of any.
That is not to 5
6 say that other people 'didn't have ECCS assignments 7
Q But in terms of continuous responsibility for g
ECCS-related matters, you are the person whom you 9
believe had greatest continuing responsibility?
10 A
I say I am not aware of anybody else that 11 would have had more.
12 (Recess taken)
(3 13 BY MR. SELTZER:
14 Q
Have you ever discussed with Bert Dunn 15 anything about his February 9 or February 16 memos?
16 A
No, I haven't.
17 Q
Is it your understanding that,he sent the 18 February 9 memo to you because you were tEse licensing 19 engineer who had responsibility for ECCS?'
20 A
I can only speculate on why he sent it to 21 22 Q
I am asking you whether you ever developed 23 the understanding that he had sent it to you because 24 you were the ECCS cognizant engineer in Licensing.
25 A
No, I didn't unde rs tand that.
1 Bailey 33 CE)'
2 Q
Didn't you ever feel you had any responsibility to t&ke action in response to GPU 3
Exhibit 78 after~you received it?
4
(
MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question.
5 6
A I don't remember receiving it, so I can't 7
say what thoughts I had.
g Q
Are you suggesting by your testimony that 9
y u think somebody may have slipped Dunn's memo into r
10 y ur folder other than your putting it tin yourself?
MS. WAGNER:
I object to the ques tion and gg 12 direct the witness not to answer.
He testified
(
\\"
he d6esn't know how or when it got into his 13 14 files, and he is not going to speculate about who 15 slipped it into his files.
16 Q
I am asking you whether you have any reason l
to believe that somebody else slipped Dun,n's memo into 17 e
18 your file without your knowing that they were doing it?
gg MS. WAGNER:
You may answe r th'e question, 20 if y u have any reason to believe anyone did such a thing.
l 21
(.
A No, I have no reason to believe anyone did 22 that.
23
(
24 Q
When you found Dunn's memo in your file, i
were there any marginal notes on i t?
25 l
t-Bailcy 34 O
2 A
As I recall, there wasn't a single mark on it' 3
4 Q
In preparation for your deposition, did you
{.
see the copy of the Dunn memo that had come from your 5
6 file?
7
.A I don't know.
g Q
Am I correct that prior to the Three Mile 9
Island accident, you can recall taking no action 10 whatsoever with respect to the Dunn February 9, 1978 11 memo?
12 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question on O
13 the grounds the witness has testified he did not 14 see the memo before the acciden t.
15 You may answer the que s tion.
16 A
could we have the ques tion again?
17 (Question read) 18 A
Prior to the Three Mile Island. accident, 19 I.can't recall seeing the memo.
Th e re f or e',
I don't 20 believe I could have taken any action.
21 Q
Is it correct that prior to the Three Mile 22 Island accident, you have no recollection of taking 23 any action whatsoever with respect to Dunn's February 16,
()
1978 memo?
24 l
MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question on the 25
1 Bailey 35
( O 2
grounds the witness has testified that he has never seen the February 16 memo, but the witness 3
can answer.
4 A
What was your question again?
5 6
(Question read) 7 A
I don't recall seeing the February 16 memo.
8 Therefore, I don't believe I could have taken any action On it-9 10 Q
When is the last time prior to your 11 preparation for this deposition that you saw Dunn's 12 memo, GPU Exhibit 797 e-13 A'
I don't recall seeing it prior to the 14 preparation for the deposition.
15 Q
If you haven't had a chance to read GPU 16 Exhibit 79 during your preparation, I would like to ask 17 you to take a moment'to read it now.
18 Are you aware that subsequent to the Three
~
19 Mile Island accident, B&W issued proposed guidelines for the operation of high pressure injection which were 20 21 substantially identical to the guidelines set forth by 22 Dunn in GPU Exhibit 797 23 A
could you repeat that?
24 (Question read)
MS. WAGNER:
I object on the grounds that I 25
1 Bailey 36 (11 2
don't know if they are substantially similar, 3
but the witness can answer.
4 MR. SELTZER:
That is the question.
k 5
A I recall that there were some guidelines 6
issued, but I can't say that they were substantially 7
the same as in this memo.
8 Q
Do you know that the guidelines had a 9
50 degree subcooling rule?
10 A
I remember the guidelines l'a te r o n h ad a 11 50 degree -- at some point there was a 50 degree l
12 subcooling rule put in, as I recall.
13 Q'
Based just on what you know, do you have 14 any information that B&W issued procedures for operation 15 of high pressure injection along the lines contained in 16 GPU Exhibit 79 prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
17 A
I am not familiar with the procedures that 18 were in effect prior to the accident.
19 Q
In o ther words, you have no inf o rmation 20 that B&W issued procedures like those contained in 21 GPU Exhibit 79 prior to the Three Mile Island accidents 22 is that right?
23 A
I wasn't familiar with what was in their
(~%)
24 procedures specifically about the accident.
25 Q
Has anybody ever told you that the procedures
1 Bailey 37 O
2 contained in Exhibit 79 were communicated to cus tomers 3
prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
4 A
I don' t believe so.
('
5 Q
Have you ever seen anything in writing that 6
indicated that procedures along the lines of those 7
contained in 'PU Exhibit 79 were communicated to G
8 customers before the Three Mile Island accident?
9 A
I don' t recall s eeing anything on this.
10 Q
When you read Dunn's memo dfter finding it 11 in your files, was there anything in the memo that you 12 didn't understand?
13 MS. WAGNER:
Are you referring to GPU 78 14 now?
15 MR.. SELTZER:
Cprrect.
16 A
I don't recall if there were.
17 Q
The first sentence of GPU Exhibit 78 says, 18 "This memo addresses a serious concern within ECCS l
l 19 analysis about the potential for operator action to I
20 terminate high pressure injection following the initial i
21 stage of a loss of coolant accident."
i
(.
22 Do you see that sentence?
E 23 A
Yes.
24 Q
When you read GPU Exhibit 78, did you 25 understand what the basis of Bert Dunn's serious concern
~..., _. _. _. _ _ _. -.... -. _. _ _ _ _, _. _ - _ _. - _. _.
1 Bailey 38
(~h
('/'
2 was?
MS. WAGNER:
Do you mean did he understand 3
4 what Bert Dunn's basis for writing this was?
([
5 MR. SELTZER:
I am not asking for Henry 6
Bailey to psychoanalyze Bert Dunn.
I am just 7
asking for Mr. Bailey's understanding of the 8
memo.
MS. WAGNER:
I don't understand your question 9
10 then.
e; 11 MR. SELTZER:
I am asking Mr. Bailey 12 whether he understood, whether he had an
( '
k 13 understanding of what the serious concern was.
14 MS. WAGNER:
Mr. Bailey, if you know what 15 the serious concern was in this memorandum 16 because somebody told you about it, then you 17 may testify about it.
I don't wish,you to 18 speculate.
19 MR. SELTZER:
You are misleadihg the 20 witness.
That is not my question.
I am not 21 asking him what somebody told him.
I am asking
(.
22 Mr. Bailey based on the reading of this memo 23 which you did after you found it in your files,
[~T did you understand what the serious concern was g4 Q,)
4 25 that Mr. Dunn has alluded to in the first sentence?
1 Bailey 39 O
2 MS. WAGNER:
I am objecting to your question 3
because I don't think he knows what Mr. Dunn's 4
concerns were.
If you want to ask him what the
(
5 memo indicated to him was a concern, that is a 6
different question.
7 MR. SELTZER:
It is the same question.
You 8
are being unnecessarily obstructive.
9 MS. WAGNER:
You may answer the question.
10 MR. SELTZERt I will state yn the record, 11 I defended Jim Floyd at his deposition, and I 4
12 don't think I ever made an objection of the type 13 that you are interposing now to prevent 1
14 examination of a witness on what he understood 15 a document meant.
16 MS. WAGNER:
I don't think I asked him too 17 much about documents that he testified he never i
18 saw before, but you can answer the question.
19 MR. SELTZER:
You are wrong in saying that 20 the witness never saw it before.
Henry Bailey 21 has given sworn tes timo ny that he saw this 22 memo, took it out of his file, and at the time 23 that he took it out, read it.
()
24 Q
'When you read GPU 78, what did you understand 25 was the serious concern that is referred to in the
~
g Bailey 40 2
opening sentence of the memo?
3 A
I think I understood that Bert was. concerned 4
about a scenario in which the operators might prematurely 5
terminate HPI injection.
6 Q
Did you understand that Bert was concerned 7
that premature termination of high pressure injection 8
could intefere with effective core cooling?
9 A
Ies, I think I understood that effective e
10 core cooling was under these circumstances part of 11 Bert's concern.
12
(~'N Q
Take a look at the last sentence of the U
13 second paragraph.
Bert Dunn says therei "Had th.s 14 event occurred in a reactor at full power with other 15 than insignificant burnup, it is quite possible, 16 perhaps probable, that core uncovery and possible fuel 17 damage would have resulted."
18 Do you see that sentence?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Did you understand that this memo was 21 predicting the possibility of core uncovery and fuel 22 damage if there were premature termination of high 23 pressure injection?
b
\\~
24 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the form of the 25
1 Bailey 41 2
question.
3 You may answer.
4 A
I understood that Bert believed that core
(
5 uncovery and possible fuel damage could result if the 6
operators were to prematurely turn off the HPI and 7
were to leave it off for some extended period of time 8
for some unknown reason.
9 Q
Did you understand from Bert's memo that 10 operators at some B&W-supplied nuclear ' plant had 11 apparently shut off and left off high pressure injection 12 for some period of time?
13 A
No, I didn't really pick up that much about 14 the Toledo incident when I read it, as I recall.
15 Q
Take a look in the middle of the second 16 paragraph, beginning with the word "during," do you see 17 the phrase, "during the 20 to 30 minutes of noninjection 18 f low"?
~
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Did you understand that that referred to 21 a 20 to 30 minute period during which there was no 22 flow
- rom the high pressure injection system?
23 MS. WAGNER:
I advise the witness at this
)
24 point, if you remember, you may testify, but don't 25 speculate based on what you are reading now.
..~
r.
..,,._.-,m
.,-m,
,,,,,-,,,__m,.,
_y
1 Bailey 42
_s A
I don't remember reading the memo in that 2
detail.
i 3
4 Q
As you sit here today, do you now understand
((
5 that there was a period of time during the Davis-Besse 6
September 1977 transient during which the operators 7
had terminated and lef t off the high pressure injection 8
system?
9 A
I am not familiar with the Davis-Besse 10 incident.
t 11 Q
You mean right up to today, you are swearing 12 that you don't know that the operators shut off and
("'
13 left off HPI during the September 1977 event at 14 Davis-Besse?
15 MS. WAGNER:
I object to your tone.
The 16 witness has answered he does not know much about 17 the Davis-Besse event.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Pardon my incredulity.
I 19 can't believe that someone of Henry Bailey's 1
20 educacional background and positions at B&W 21 doesn't know even today that the operators shut 22 off high pressure injection and left it off at 23 Davis-Besse.
[~)
24 MS. WAGNER:
I' continue to object to your
\\_/
25 tone, despite your incredulity.
The witness has
1 1
Bailey 43
(~
V 2
answered your question.
3 Q
Is it your sworn testimony that you don't 4
know even today that the Davis-Besse operatore shut
(
5 off and left off high pressure injection for some 6
discrete period of time?
7 A
I know what I read here in Exhibit 78.
8 Q
Yes, what do you read there?
9 A
It says during the 20 to 30 minutes of 10 noninjection flow, they were continuously losing 11 important fluid inventory even though the pressurizer 12 indicated high level.
13 Q
What did you mean when you said you know 14 what you read here? -
15 A
When you say if I know about the Davis-Besse 16 incident, I know what I have read here now.
17 Q
what does that tell you?
18 MS. WAGNER:
I object to further questions 19 on this point.
I am not going to permit the 20 witness to interpret this document.
He indicated 21 he does not recall the Davis-Besse event and I 22 advise you not to inte rp re t this document.
23 Q
Are you saying that other than reading
()
24 this document today, and I do want you to put that 25 aside -- I am not looking for your interpretation of
Bailey 44 1
this document which you are making today for the first 2
time.
Are you saying that other than reading GPU 78 3
today, you are not aware of learning that the Davis-Besse 4
operators shut of f and lef t off high pressure injection
(
5 for a discrete period of time?
6 A
I am not f amiliar with the Davis-Be sse 7
incident.
8 Q
Answer my question.
I am not asking about 9
the whole incident.
I am just asking about the 10 e
premature termination of high pressure injection at 11 Davis-Besse.
I am asking you prior to today, did you 12 know of premature operator termination,of high pressure injection at an event at the Davis-Besse plant that 14 took place prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
15 A
I am not familiar with the Davis-Besse 16 incident and specifically the extent to which HPI was 17
~
left off.
18
~
Q You say you are not specifically familiar 19 with the extent to which it was left off.
Before today, 20 were you aware that high pressure injection had been 21
(
prematurely terminated during a Davis-Besse transient before the Three Mile Island accident?
23 A
Before today, the only thing I heard was C'A 24 a Davis-Besse incident.
I heard there was a Davis-Besse 25
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1 Bailey 45 2
incident.
I think I read this in the papers also.
3 Q
Let me ask you to respond' to my question.
4 MR. SELTZER:
Would you read it again?
()
5 (Question read) 6 MS. WAGNER:
I be.lieve he has responded:to 7
your question several timesi I will allow you 8
to ask it one more time and then I will direct 9
him not to answer.
He answered it three times.
10 MR. SELTZER:
I think he answered in such 11 a way that makes it a little bit unclear as to 12 whether he is responding to my question or not.
[h
\\/
13 Instead of saying yes, he knew, or no, he didn't 14 know, he responded, "Yes, I knew there was an 15 incident."
16 Q
I want to find out, did you know that the l
l 17 operators shut off high pressure injection prematurely l
l 18 during that incident?
~
19 A
No.
I don ' t b elieve -- I wasn't familiar 20 enough with the Davis-Besse incident to know what they 21 did wrong.
(m l
l 22 Q
Take a look at the last sentence of l
23 GPU Exhibit 78.
[ ')
24 Did you understand when you read this memo N-25 after you found it in your files that the author i
I l
l
1 Bailey 46 2
considered the subject of his memo a very serious 3
matter that deserved B&W's prompt attention and 4
correction?
([
5 A
I don't recall what my, thoughts were when 6
I read it.
I don't recall how much time I spent reading 7
it.
8 Q
Has anyone ever castigated you for failing 9
to take any action in response to GPU Exhibit 787 i
10 A
No.
E 11 Q
Other than attorneys, has anybody ever 12 spoken to you about your response or lack of response O
s 13 to GPU Exhibit 787 14 A
No.
15 Q
Have you ever seen Bert Dunn and talked with 16 him since the Three Mile Island accident?
17 MS. WAGNER:
About anything?
18 A
Yes, I have seen Bert and talked with him.
19 Q
Did you ever discuss with him GPU Exhibit 78?
20 A
No.
21 Q
Did you ever ask him why he sent it to you?
(.
22 A
No.
s 23 Q
Did he ever ask you anything about GPU O
24 Exhibit 78?
V 25 A
No.
1 Bailey 47 2
Q Have you ever talked with anybody aise 3
who is listed as getting a copy of GPU Exhibit 78 to 4
determine what, if anything, they did with respect
()
5 to GPU Exhibit 787 6
A No, I have never discussed this Exhibit 78 7
with anyone.
8 Q
Until 1980 you were in the Licensing 9
Section headed by Jim Taylor, right?
10 A
Yes.
I believe it was January 1980.
l 11 Q
Until January 1980, you were in the Licensing 12 section?
O' 13 A
Yes.
14 Q
And you never discussed with Tayloe, Kane 15 or Agar anything about what any of them had done or e
16 hadn't done after receiving GPU Exhibit 787 4
17 A
No, I did not.
18 Q
Did anybody, not a lawyer, teel you that 1
19 it would be a good idea for you not to tal'k about l
20 Dunn's memo or any related subject with anyone else?
l 21 A
Not that I recall.
('
i 22 Q
Did you just have no curiosity about what 23 anybody else did with respect to Dunn's memo?
(
).
24 A
I don't recall if I didn't have enough 25 curiosity to go over and talk with people.
We were
,,,--..,,--------n,----,.~---.-
-,.-_.n,.
- -, - ~ - - - - -, -.,,,, -. -, - -,, - -. -.. - -, -,, - -,
Bailey 48 1
( ).
busy at the time, analyses after Three Mile Island, 2
and we were really busy.
3 Q
After you returned from the Oconee site, 4
what was your next assignment within B&W7 A
I went into the Marketing Department.
6 Q
Did you spend the entire duration of your 7
time in the Marketing Department as a proposal manager?
'8 A
Yes.
9 Q
What are the principal responsibilities of 10 0-a proposal manager?
11 A
We received bid specifications frosi
()
utilities for nuclear steam supply systems, and I had coordinated the response to that bid specification.
14
~
Q Did you deal just with the hardware portions of the response?
A We made proposals for hardware, and we made 17 some proposals for training.
Q Is what you were.getting requests for bids?
A Yes.
20 Q
And you were preparing B&W's offer in 21
(.
response to the request for bid?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Were you in charge of putting together 24
~
B&W'.s offer?
25
i 1
Bailey 49 O
~
2 A
The offer was put together by people 3
throughout the B&W organization.
I certainly played 4
a part in coordinating putting the various pieces
(
5 together to the extent to see that everything the 6
customer had asked for we had either addressed it o::
7 if we couldn't supply it, we had said there was no 8
bid here or this sort of thing, but the actual ma':erial 9
to go into the pr6posal was prepared by people in the 10 various departments of B&W.
E 11 Q
Were you involved in any negotiations with 12 customers?
(#
3 13 A
I was involved in meetings with chem where 14 we would give them presentations on what our proposal had 15 in'it.
16 Q
Did you discuss with any customers the terms 17 and conditions for sale?
l 18 A
Not to any depth. Generally the terms and l
19 conditions were a matter that was generally discussed 20 between our lawyers and their lawyers.
21 Q
Were your responsibilitias substantially 22 unchanged during the three years th at you were a 23 proposal manager?
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
By October 1974, did you decide you had about
1 Bailey 50 2
as much as you could take of putting together offers?
MS. WAGNER:
I object to the form.
3 4
A In October 1974, I received an offer to go
()
into the Licensing section, which I accepted.
5 6
Q Who made the offer?
7 A
I believe it was Jim Millet.
8 Q
What was the initial position which you 9
were offered in Licensing?
10 A
Principal engineer, principal licensing 11 engineer.
12 Q
In which unit?
\\-
13 A
The Generic Unit.
14 Q
Who was the head of the Generic Unit when 15 you first joined?
16 A
I can't recall his name.
17 Q
Who were the succeeding heads.of the Generic l
18 Unit while you were an engineer in it?
19 A
There was Bill Rhyne, Frank Le'vandowski 20 and George Geissler.
21 Q
What was the area of responsibility of L
22 the Generic Unit?
23 A
We looked at different licensing issues.
(
24 Generally the ones we looked at were the ones that 25 might affect the operating plants as well as the backlog
1 Bailey 51 2
plants.
Q That seems very all encompassing.
What did 3
that leave for the rest of the Licensing Department?
4
(
A There were many issues that were plant 5
6 specific.
7 Q
I see.
You didn't say that you only 8
handled licensing matters that applied across the s
board to a group of plants.
Is that what you are saying?
9 i
10 A
I am saying we handled generic issues,as 11 our name indicatad.
We didn't generally get involved 12 in plant specific issues.
13 Q
In the early years that you were with the 14 Generic Unit, how did generic issues arise which needed 15 to be handled by Licensing?
16 A
They might arise from an*NRC requirement 17 such as a NUREG.
18 Q
How else?
~
19 A
They might arise as a result of a PSC that 20 had been filed in-house.
21 Q
Anything else?
22 A
I don't remember at this time.
23 Q
What was your understanding as to why a 24 unit in the Licensing Section had to deal with these 25 issues rather than just have the matter be resolved by i
k
.----..,..----.-,.-,.,,,,,..,..-.,n--,
1 Bailey 52 cx 2
-people in the Engineering Department 2 3
A The Licensing Section was not the only 4
people that worked on the issues.
We provided an
(,
5 interface with the NRC and arranged meetings with the 6
NRC on issues and discuss them.
We were just the 7
connection between the B&W and the NRC.
8 Q
What did your unit do in interfacing between 9
B&W and the NRC with respect to generic issues?
10 A
We would arrange meetings w.ith the NRC to 11 try to understand what their requirements were, take 12 our people from engineering along with us, reach an
(\\
\\_/
13 agreement from the NRC one what they e pected and 14 then follow through.when we got back to submit this to 15 the NRC in the form of a topical report or some other 16 report.
17 Q
Did the functions of the Generic Unit 18 remain substantially the same from the time you joined l
19 through the time of the Three Mile Island accident?
20 A
The issues,as I recall, didn't remain the l
21 same.
There were
(.
22 9
I said " functions."
l 23 A
The basic concept, yes, I think stayed the
()
24 same.
25 Q
It is a fact, is it not, that you received a l
i 1
Bailey 53 0:
2 copy of Michelson's study on small break loss of coolant i
3 accidents sometime in 19787 4
A I recall seeing his report, yes, sometime
(
5 in
'78.
6 Q
I would like to show you a copy of what 7
has previously been marked as GPU Exhibit 110 for 8
identification.
9
^
Do you see where someone has placed a rubber 10 stamp impression on the front that reads "H.A.
- Bailey, 11 Licensing"?
12 A
Yes.
k_
13 Q
What does that signify?
14 A
I believe I received this document.
15 Q
Did you receive it in or about late April, 16 early May, 1978?
17 A
I don't recall exactly when I. received it.
18 Q
Did you have a file in Licensing T1.1?
19 A
I don't recall.
We could have very well.
20 I don't recall what specific file-numbers were.
21 Q
What file would you have sent this to 22 after you had read it?
23 A
I know we had a filing system, but I don't
()
24 remember how it was broken down to what the headings 25 were or the numbers were in it, so I couldn't tell you
1 Bailey 54 O
2 which one I would have sent it to.
3 Q
I am not looking for a specific number or a 4
specific heading.
I am just trying to find out what
([
5 general file area would you have sent this to.
6 A
I don't know.
7 Q
Do you know who sent it to you?
8 A
No, I do not.
9 Q
Was Frank Levandowski your immediate 10 superior at the time you received this7, 11 A
I believe so, yes.
12 Q
Were you instructed to take any action to O)
~
\\_
13 get a B&W response to this letter and the Michelson 14 study?
15 A
No, I was no t instructed to take action.
16 Q
Let me show you GPU Exhibit 323, which is 17 Michelson's study, and ask you,is this a copy of the 18 report prepared by Michelson which you received with 19 Gpu 1107 20 MS. WAGNER:
Are you excluding from your 21 question reference to any marginalia which are on 22 this basic document, or are you asking if this 23 is his copy that he wrote on?
()
24 MR. SELTZER:
No, I don't care about the 25 marginalia.
,y,
- - ~, -,,
~, - -
1 Bailey 55 O
2 A
What is your question?
3 Q
Is it correct that you got this Michelson 4
study with the TVA letter which is marked GPU Exhibit
(,
5 1107 6
A I don't recall getting the report at the 7
same time I got the letter.
8 Q
Do you believe you got them at different 9
times, or you just don't have a recollection of when 10 you got the report?
11 A
I don't recall when I got the report.
12 Q
In the first paragraph, first sentence of
'-)
13 GPU Exhibit 110, TVA wrote to Babcock & Wilcox and said, 4
14 "An increase of interest and questioning by ACRS in 15 the area of very small break LOCA's has prompted TVA 16 to taka a closer look at this problem. "
17 ACRS was a committee formed by the Atomic 18 Energy Commission to act as an advisory group to the 19 AEC, right?
~
20 A
I believe so.
21 Q
Within the Licensing Section, I take it, 22 B&W personnel responded to questions raised by ACRS?
23 A
As I recall, the ques tions we would respond
()
24 to were quesilons from the NRC staff.
Questions that 25 were asked by the ACRS might very often become an
1 Bailey 56 2
NRC staff question, but generally our responses, as 3
I recall, were to the NRC staff.
i 4
Q Did Licensing assist B&W customers in
(
5 preparing for meetings with the ACRS?
6 A
'a f s.
I think we do assist in preparation.
7 Q
I think it is worth a little detour, and I
~8 am telling you I am holding out my hand to take a 9
detour.
10 What did it mean that you w.ere the 11 cognizant engineer for ECCS?
12 A
I don't believe I ever said I was a O
13 cognizant engineer for ECCS.
14 Q
other people have said that, like Jim 15 Taylor.
What were your responsibilities with respect 16 to ECCS while you were in Licensing?
17 A
I was asked to look at several issues.
My 18 duties included a range of things.
Some were not ECCS
~
19 related at aII, and I was asked to look at'some items i
20 that were ECCS related.
21 Q
I asked you what were your responsibilities 22 with respect to ECCS.
23 MS. WAGNER:
I take it you are asking him 24 what he was supposed to do about ECCS issues 25 rather than a department or a piece of equipment.
1 Bailey 57 V~
2 I assume you are talking of issues relating to 3
the emergency core cooling system; is that right?
4 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
({)
5 A
What were my responsibi.lities?
6 Q
Yes.
7 A
Upon being assigried a licencing issue, I A.
8 would proceed to address the issues.
It depended on 9
what the specific circumstances required.
10 Q
What, if anything, did youtdo to stay on s,
11 top of ECCS matters that affected the licensing of s
12 B&W plants?
\\-
13
'A I pursued the resolution o ECCS matters s
14 that I was assigned.
15 Q
Assigned by whom?
s 16 A
My superviso'r.
17 Qt Frank?
,t
\\-
18 A
Frank or whoever my supervisor was at the N,
i_
19 ti.me.
\\
a:[y 20 3
Q In other word's, you didn 't take 21 initiative to stay current with B&W's work in the ECCS L
22 area?
23 MS. WAGNER:
I object.
That is not what he t
'~
24 testified.
m.,
25 You can answer.
d m,
g
4 1
Bailey 58 O
2 A
I think I had certain initiative for some 3
awareness, but my duties that I concentrated on were 4
the things that were assigned to me specifically to
(!
5 resolve.
6 Q
what did you mean by a "certain initiative 7
for some awareness"?
8 A
I think most licensing engineers triad to 9
keep some awareness of what was happening in the licensing 10 arena and other areas that they were not assigned, to 11 sone extent.
12 Q.
I am no t too much interested in what other t
13 licensing engineers did.
I am interested in what you 14 did.
I would like to know what, if anything, you did 15 to heighten.your awareness of ongoing developments 16 relating to ECCS.
17 MS. WAGNER:
This is other than doing the 18 work that was assigned to him?
j 19 MR. SELTZER:
Other than specific assignments I
20 relating to particular problems.
21 A
I would read the monthly reports of the l
k-22 other unit managers and the monthly report that the 23 manager of Licensing sent to-his supervisor.
l
(
24 Q
When you say other unit managers, you are i
25 talking about Licensing Units?
1 Bailey 59 O
2 A
Other Licensing Unit managers.
3 Q
And that is it?
You took' no other 4
initiatives for establishing awareness of ECCS
(
5 outside working on particular problems that you were 6
assigned to?
7 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the form.
8 A
I don 't recall any specific initiative.
9 Q
Whenever a topical report was prepared by 10 B&W that related to the response of the emergency core 11 cooling system, did you function on it?
12 MS. WAGNER:
What do you mean by " function"?
13 MR. SELTZER:
Work.
14 MS. WAGNER:
Did he actually do some work 15 on the report?
16 MR. SELTZER:
What other kind of work can 17 there be other than actual work?
18 MS, WAGNER:
One can read things.
One can I
l 19 review things.
One can write things.
20 MR. SELTZER:
I mean all of those things.
21 A
There were some ECCS topical reports in 22 which I worked on, yes.
23 Q
During the period 1975 through 1979 when an l )
24 ECCS topical report was prepared, was it assigned to 25 you, to your knowledge, as opposed to other people in
1 Bailey 60 Licensing?
2 3
MS. WAGNER:
Topical report on any topic?
4 MR. SELTZER:
I said ECCS.
([j 5
MS. WAGNER:
No, you didn't.
6 (Question read) 7 MS. WAGNER:
I apologize.
I am getting 8
senile.
9 A
I can't say that every topical report was 10 assigned to me, no.
e 11 Q
You are referring to the ECCS topicals?
12 A
ECCS, yes.
("~)
.c N "'
13 Q
Do you know for a fact that any ECCS topical 14 during that period was assigned to anybody else?
15 A
I can't recall.
16 Q
As a regular matter, did you get the 17 monthly report prepared by the manager of_ ECCS?
18 A
I recall seeing some of his monthly reports.
19 Q
Had you re que s ted them or was 'he just sending 20 them to you?
21 A
As I recall, when we were doing the small k.
22 break analysis on the pump suction, looking at the 23 pump discharge versus the pump suction that I had to
()
24 ask his secretary one month to send me a copy of his
~-
25 monthly report.
That is the only request that I remembera
1 Bailey 61 2
Q Was there some point in time either when i
3 you were assigned to Licensing or during your assignment 4
with Licensing when you were told that you were going to
((
5 he the engineer in Licensing who would have the greatest 6
responsibility for ECCS matters?
7 A
There were as signme nts of responsibilities 8
in groupings within the Generic Unit, and within the D
Generic Unit at least on one occasion I was identifi l
10 as the engineer pursuing ECCS.
E 11 Q
Does that mean that you were the cognizant 4
12 engineer for ECCS?
(~)
~'
13 A
It meant that I could be expected to be 14 assigned certain 2CCS licensing issues.
I didn't take 15 it to mean that I would be the only one assigned.
16 Q
At what time was that assignment made?
17 A
I think that was back probably. earlier when 18 I first came over to Licensing.
i 19 Q
Did you feel that you had any particular 20 qualifications to be the engineer in Licensing who would 21 generally be assigned to work on ECCS problems?
N-22 A
No more than the other guys in the group.
- -._..~
]
23 Q
Taking a look at GPU 110, which is TVA's i
24 letter which you received regarding Michelson's study, 25 were you aware by the spring of 1978 that there was an
. ~.. -
1 Bailey 62 AU 2
" increase in interest in questioning by ACRS in the 3
area of small break loss of coolant accidents"?
4 A
I became aware of it, I believe, when I
('
s 5
read this letter.
6 Q
What, if anything, had Babcock & Wilcox 7
been doing before getting this letter to study very 8
small break loss of coolant accidents?
g A
We had gone through an analysis of which 10 we had topical reports and that had bee.n submitted to 11 the commission which included small b'reaks.
12 Q
Did it include very small breaks?
\\
13 A
I don.'t recall how small t ey were, but they 14 were small breaks.
15 Q
Is this something that had been submitted 16 relatively recently in terms of the spring of 1978 17 date when you received GPU 1107 18 A
They had been submitted-subseq'uent to the
,19 issuance of the final acceptance criteria,'I believe, 20 which was sometime after
'75, I believer '74 or
'75.
21 Q
What was your understanding about why 22 there was any need to study small break loss of 23 coolant accidents if B&W had already analyzed large
()
24 breaks?
! 25 A
As I said earlier, my understanding was that U
N 1
Bailey 63
/ "N
(/
2 we had a customer here that had some questions on small 3
break analyses that he attributed to questions by the 4
ACRS.
(
5 Q
I am no t talking about the response to 6
this letter.
You said that in 1975 you know some topicals.
7 were submitted on B&W's small break loss of coolant 8
analysis, right?
9 A
I believe so, yes.
10 Q
What is your understanding gbout why there 11 was a need for B&W to study small break loss of coolant 12 accidents if B&W had already analyzed large break loss O
13
'of coolant accidents?
14 A
I don' t believe I said there was a need for 15 B&W to analyze small break analyses.
I said we had 16 some questions from customers that were asking about 17 small break.
18 Q
Fascinating.
19 Is it a fact that B&W, to your' understanding, 20 would not have studied small break loss of coolant 21 accidents but for customers asking B&W to study them?
22 MS. WAGNER:
I don't think that was his 23 tectimony, i
24 A
I am saying that we had submitted topical N-25 reports which included small break analysis.
.-,.-,r,-,m--.
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.. - - - - - - - - -. - - - + -. -.-
1 Bailey
~
64 (11
~
2-Q And it is your understanding that B&W
\\/
3 submitted those small break topical reports only 4
because customers had asked B&W to do so?
l 5
A No.
They submitted those topical reports 6
in response to the final acceptance criteria which 7
were publi shed which essentially required a re-analysis 8
of all ECCS analysis.
9 Q
What are the final acceptance criteria?
0 A
It is 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K.
11 Q
You have worked with 10 C RF 5 0. 4 6 7 12 A
I worked with it at the time we were
/~N 13 putting the topical reports in in response to it.
14 Q
Did B&W prepare small break analysis in
_ 15 response to the requirements of 10CFR50.46 and Appendix KT i
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Are you familiar with the concept of bounding 18 in loss of coolant accident analyses?
19 A
I have heard the word, yes.
4 20 Q
Do you have an understanding of what it meanst 1
21 A
My understanding of bounding would be an j
22 analysis which has a certain amount of conservatism in 23 it, meaning that it would bound a less severe accident.
()
24 Q
Did you ever come to know that the properties 25 of a small break loss of coolant accident are different u
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Bailey 65 1
dj 2 in some respects from the properties of a large : break 3
loss of coolant accident?
4 MS. WAGNER:
Could you define what you mean
(
5 by " properties"?
6 MR. SELTZER:
System response, thermodynamic 7
characteristics.
8 A
I believe that we published in our topicals 9
the fact that a small break uas a slower transient and 10 a longer transient whereas a large break was a more 11 violent transient.
12 Q
In terms of the properties of a break, what 13 is your understanding as to whether B&W's analyses 14 of large breaks adequately bounded small break loss of 15 coolant accidents?
16 MS. WAGNER:
Again, I assume you are using 17 the normal English definition of " properties" and 18 no statutory specific definition; ihthat correct?
19 MR. SELTZER:
I am using " properties" as we 20 have used it in the prior questions and answers.
21 A
Could you repeat the question?
22 (Question read) 23 A
The small break analysis which we published
()
24 in our topical reports was in response to Appendix K 25 which required a spectrum of breaks which was used to
1 Bailey 66 Dl:2 bound all small breaks.
3 Q
other than the fact that you think a 4
transient resulting in a small break would take longer,
(
5 were the system responses significantly different, to 6
your knowledge, for a small break as compared to a 7
large break?
8 A
I think that the large break, everything 9
happens much faster.
10 Q
I said other than the time Muration.
11 A
There would be the us e of dif ferent systems.
12 The pressure would be higher with the small break.
The 13 large break you didn't use the HPI,for example.
So there 14 are some differences in the pressure of the system, the s
15 systems that were used.
16 Q
In the third sentence of GPU 110, there is 17 a reference to " question similar to that asked by ACRS I
18 for Pebble Springs (Question 6)."
19
.Do you see that?
j 20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Do you know what ques tion was being referred
(
m 22 to there?
23 A
No, I do not.
I ()
24 Q
You are not. familiar with Pebble Springs 25 Question 67 i
5
i l
1 Bailey 67 2
A In preparation -- not except for in 3
preparation for this deposition.
4 Q
You never worked on preparing B&W's response?
(l 5
A No.
I don't recall doing it.
6 Q
Do you know who was assigned in Licensing, 7
if anyone was, to work on the response to question 67 8
A No, I do not.
9 Q
Do you know who would know?
10 A
No, I do not, t
11 Q
At the start of the second paragraph in 12 GPU 110, it says, "After you reviewed this study, we
[h 13 would like to discuss it with you by telephone."
It 14 goes on to say, "However, we also propose that a meeting 15 be held in Knoxville in the near future to examine the 16 entire question of very small break loss of coolant 17 accidents in sufficient depth to develop pn adequate - :
18 mutual understanding and assure TVA that $&W is working l
l j
19 toward a timely resolution of all concerns'."
'20 To your knowledge, was the meeting which i
21 TVA was asking for in the near future ever held?
22 A
I don't know.
Q Do you know whether anything was done in a
()
f24 the ensuing four or five months after you got this j
25 letter to assure TVA that B&W.was working toward a timely
1 Bailey 68
[D v~
2 resolution of concerns in Michelson's study?
3 A
As I recall, later on that year we did give 4
them a response, so I don't remember specifically what
(
$w 75 was done, but I would have to assume some work was done.
~
6 Q
You can't testify to that from any first-hand 7
knowledge, can you?
8 A
No, I can't.
w 9
Q That would be like assuming that if the 10 Dunn memo was in your file, you mus t ha.ve put it there, kl right?
4 12 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question.
I 13 direct the witness not to answer.'
4 14 Q
Would you read to yourself the third 15 paragraph on page 1.
16 Do you. understand that that paragraph was 17 referring to very small breaks, probably ranging up i
l8 to 1/20 of a square foot?
75q y
w 19 MS. WAGNER:
I take it you are'asking him 20 for his recollection of what he understood when 21 he received it rather than his interpretation
(-
22 today; is that correct?
23 MR. SELTZER:
I am just trying to establish 24 a frame of reference for further questions on 25 the paragraph.
1 Bailey 69 q
..m
\\f 2
A Could I hear the question again?
3
.(Ques tion read) 4 A
That is what the paragraph says, yes.
l 5
Q In May 1978, did you understand that for 6
breaks in that range, the steam generator must remove 7
a significant portion of the decay heat during the 8
initial phase of blowdown?
9 A
I don't recall.
10 Q
In or by May 1978, did you tunderstand that 11 if the steam generators did not remove a significant 12 portion of the decay heat, reactor coolant system n\\'
13 repressurization would occur since the break is too 14 small to remove all of the decay heat?
15 A
I do,'trrecall what level of understanding.
16 I had.
17 Q
Did you understand before the,Three Mile 18 Island accident that for very small break loss of 19
- ooland accidents, the steam generators mu'st remove a 20 significant portion of the decay heat during the initial 21 phase of blowdown?
22 A
I recall reading our response that we sent 23 to TVA, but I don't recall the particulars of it or
()
24 what my understanding was of it at the time.
25 Q
Did you know before the Threo Mile Island
~ __.
1 Bailey 70 l -
2 accident that repressurization or even prolonged 3
Pressure operation could seriously limit high pressure 4
injection during blowdown?
([
5 A
I don 't recall what level of knowledge I 6
had at the time.
7 Q
Based on your involvement with ECCS matters 8
at that time, is this a subject area in which you believe 9
you were expected to function within the Licensing 10 Section?
e
- 11 MS. WAGNER:
You are referring now to small
- 12 break LOCA analysis?
C) 13 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
14 A
Small break LOCA analysis was certainly one 15 of the areas that I had been assigned previously to
~
1 16 respond to NRC requirements.
L 17 Q
Turn to page 2 and look at the last paragraph 18 on that page.
j.
19 Are those your vertical slashe's in the 1
20 right-hand margin?
21 A
I don 't believe so.
22 Q
You don't make those kinds of marks?
23 A
Not generally.
I don't recall ever making
()
24 any like this.
25 Q
Have you read the paragraph?
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1 Bailey 71 O
^
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Do you see the reference in the middle of 4
it to substantial passage of liquid and/or two phase
(
5 fluid through the pressurizer. safety valves?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
What, if anything, was done by you to examine 8
the question of liquid and/or two phase fluid passage 9
through the pressurizer safety valves?
10 A
I was not involved in any a'nalysis per se.
f 11 Q
Do you know whether any analysis was done 12 of this question af ter receiving this le tter?
O
\\
13 A
I know that we made a response to TVA later 14 on that year.
I am not familiar with the analysis which 15 may have been -' o n o.
16 Q
Did you know in 1978 that the pressurizer l
17 safety valves were not qualified for liquid or two phase l
18 flow?
l 19 A
I don't recall.
20 Q
Have you ever hear'd that prior to today?
21 A
I have heard that as part of the EPRI program
,L 22 that was being done on valve testing.
23 Q
That is a program undertaken since the
()
24 Three Mile Island accident?
25 A
Yes, I believe so.
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Bailey 72 r~g O
2 Q
I take it you weren't concerned when you 3
read GPU 110.and read that apparently the pressurizer 4
safety valves had not been qualified for liquid or
(
5 two phase flow?
6 A
I don't recall what thought processes I had 7
when I read it.
~
8 Q
In the next sentence in the last paragraph
,9 of page 2, it says, "Also associated with operation in 10 each of the above conditions is a conce.rn that the 11 pressurizer level is not a correct indicator of water 4
12 level over the reactor core.
Because of the loop seal b\\l 13 on the pressurizer, it may be possible to have a full 14 pressurizer while the core is partially uncovered."
15 Did you understand before you got TVA's 16 letter that there could be a full pressure while the 17 core is partially uncovered?
18 MS. WAGNER:
Full pressurizeri 19 MR. SELTZER:
That is what I m'eant to s ay.
20 A
I think I came to understand when we put in 21 the response to the TVA letter, I came to understand 99 then that the engineers in the ECCS analysis' response 23 which I came to understand said,that pressurizer level wan
(
24 not an accurate indicator of inventory in the system and 25 it should be coupled with other indications such as 4
1 Bailey 73 P
(~^
\\(
~
d 2
pressure and temperature.
3 Q
Was the occasion of your reading B&W's 4
response to TVA's letter the first time you realized
(
3 that there could be a full pressurizer while the 6
nuclear fuel core is partially uncovered?
7 A
That is when I understood that the B&W 8
reactor pressurizer level in itself was not an accurate 9
indication of inventory in the system.
i 10 Q
I understand that.
Now I would like you to 11 answer my question.
I don't mind hearing what you have 12 just volunteered, but now I would like you to focus
\\
13 on my question, if you can, which related full pressurizer 14 and partially uncovered core.
I am asking you, was the 15 first time that you understood that there could be a 16 full pressurizer while the core is partially uncovered 17 something that you realized for the first; time when you l
18 read B&W's response to TVA's letter?
l 19 A
I am not sure.
20
-Q Do you have any recollection of knowing l.
21 that circumstance could exist before you read B&W's
(.
22 response to TVA's le tte r?
23 A
I am not sure.
[
g4 Q
Do you have any recollection of knowing that V
25 fact before you got TVA's letter th a t states that?
.~
_. _. ~ _.,
1 Bailey 74 2
A I am not sure.
3 Q
Is it consistent with your best recollection 4
that you learned that fact at or about the time that
(
5 you read either B&W's letter or TVA's initial set of 6
questions?
7 A
When I read our letter response, I know that 8
I was aware of it, of the fact that pressurizer level s
was not an accurate indication in itself at that time.
10 What I understood previously, I can't recall at this 11 time.
12 Q
After the sentence that I read about it
\\-
13 is possible to have a full pressurizer while the core I
14 is partially uncovered, there is a final sentence on 15 page 2 of GPU Exhibit 110 which says, "This could lead 16 to incorrect operator actions."
17 Did you understand before May,1978 that 18 the circumstances of a full pressurizer wbile the core 19 is partially uncovered could lead to incor' rect operator 20 actions?
21 A
I don't recall.
/(
22 Q
Is the first time that you do recall someone 23 bringing that possibility to your attention the b) 24 April 27, 1978 letter from TVA?
U 25 A
I recall when that letter was received, I
1 Bailey 75 2
noted that as being one of their concerns.
3 Q
Is that the first time you can recall anyone 4
bringing that concern to your attention?
(
5-A I can't recall any specific time before then.
6 Q
Does that mean that this is the first time 7
that you can recall someone bringing this concern to 8
your attention?
9 A
To the best of my knowledge right, now, yes.
10 Q
Take a look at Michelson's geport., GPU 323, 11 please.
It begins with a summary on th e firs t page,
4 12 right?
\\-
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
If you would take a moment to please read 15 the summary, the last sentence of the summary states, 16 "These uncertainties may reflect on the adequacy of 17 proposed emergency operating procedures and operator 18 training for a very small break LocA."
19 After receiving Michelson's study, what, 20 if any, steps did you take to compare Michelson's 21 concerns with the adequacy of B&W's proposed emergency 22 operating procedures?
23 A
I don't believe the Michelson report was 24 assigned to me, so I don't remember specifically any 25 actions I took.
I remember a supervisor asked me what
1 Bailey 76 C:)
~
2 it was about, and I wrote him a memo describing what 3
I thought it was about, but after that, I don't recall 4
being assigned to take action on the memo.
On the
([
5 letter or the report.
6 Q
Who was the study assigned to, if not to 7
you?
8 A
I can't recall.
I don't know if I ever 9
knew.
10 Q
Do you know that it we; assigned to anybody 11 else other than you?
12 A
I can't recall.
13 Q
Have you ever heard that a yone else in 14 Licensing was assigned to do anything on this report 15 other than Henry Bailey?
16 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the form of the 17 question, because there is no testimony that 18 Henry Bailey was assigned to do anything.
19 MR. SELTZER:
Levandowski aske'd him for a 20 summary of what it was all about.
21 MS. WAGNER: That is not the same as doing 22 anything.
23 A
What was the question?
24 (Question read) 25 A
I am not aware of anyone.
O e
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1 Bailey 77 2
Q So you didn't do anything to compare 3
Michelson's concerns with the adequacy of B&W's 4
proposed emergency operating procedures; is that right?
's)
](
5 A
I can't recall doing anything.
6 6
Q Do you know if anybody else made such a 1,
Y7 comparison?
8 A
The phone call that I sat in on, as I 9
recall, the ECCS Analysis Unit indicated that they were
,L 10 going to look into the Michelson concerns.
11 Q
Did they say they were going to compare 12 his concerns with the adequacy of B&W proposed emergency O
13 operating procedures?
14 A
I don't recall.
Most of the phone t
15 conversation th at I recall had to do with the 16 repressurization and loss of natural circulation.
I l
17 don't recall hearing anything about operating procedures l
18 in the phone call.
~
19 Q
Did you pipe up and say, " Wait a minute, 20 guys, they are concerned about the adequacy of our 21 proposed eme-rgency operating procedures.
What should 22 we do about that"?
l 23 A
I didn' t participate in the phone call
(
24 except to monitor.
25 Q
You were monitoring on behalf of the I
I
1 Bailey 78
('M
()
2 Licensing Section?
3 A
At th a t time we were working on the small
'4 break analyses wherein we went from the suction to (i
5 the discharge break, and the TVA project manager, I 6
believe it was Mr. McFarland, requested that I come 7
over to sit in on the phone call.
8 Q
Whether during the phone call or after, did 9
you ever pipe up and tell the B&W peoole even if you 10 didn't tell the TVA people, did you ever tell the B&W 11 people, " Hey, you are forgetting about this question 12 on whether our proposed emergency operating procedures Ou) 13 are adequate"?
14 MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
The question has 15 been asked and answered.
16 A
No, I didn't take any action on the memo 17 except to explain to my supervisor what I, thought the 18 memo was about.
1, W
~
. }19 Q
So on the day of the phone call, when you 6
20 heard about B&W engineers describing what they were 21 doing to respond to Michelson's report, you didn't L
22 remind anybody that Michelson had raised a ques tion 23 about the adequacy of proposed emergency operating
-( )
24 procedures?
25 A
Michelson was on the end of the phone call,
1 Bailey 79
()
2 and he pretty much led the conversation.
We were 3
just getting.his concerns, and he led the conversaticn, 4
and the direction he led it had more to do with the
({
5 natural circulation and other aspects of the system.
6 Q
Was there any discussion in that phone 7
conversation about a full pressurizer leading to 8
operator termination of high pressure injection?
9 A
I don't recall anything about operator 10 action in the phone call.
t 11 Q
Was there any dis'cussion about 12 repressurization causing pressurizer water level to rise?
('
13 A
I don't remember.
I remember we talked 14 about loss of natural circulation.
15 Q
Was there any discussion in the phone 16 conversation about a full pressurizer being or not 17 being a good indication of water level in,the reactor 18 coolant system?
19 A
I don't recall.
~
20 Q
Was Bert Dunn participating in the phone 21 call?
L 22 A
My recollection is that Bob Jones was on 23 the phone call.
j l ()
24 Q
Bob Jones was the representative from ECCS 25 who was participating in the phone call?
1 Bailey 80 2
A Yea, that is my recollection.
3 Q
Who else from 3&W participated in the phone 4
call?
(
5 A
There was Jim McFarland, who was a TVA 6
project manager.
7 Q
And you said there were about three people 8
from B&W besides yourseif.
Who else from B&W participated 9
in the phona call?
10 A
I don't recall who else
'who the other 11 people were.
I recall it being about three or four l
12
- people, O
13 (Luncheon recess taken at 12:45 p.m.)
14 15 e
16 4
17 1
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18 19
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20
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1 81 s
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2 Afternoon Session s
3 2:05 o' clock p.m.
4
(
5 HENRY B AILEY, resumed:
6 BY MR. SELTZER:
7 Q
You know that your testimony this afternoon 8
is under oath?
9 A
I do.
10 Q
Did there come a time during 1978 when 11 you reviewed Michelson's report, GPU Exhibit 323?
12 A
I saw it at some point.
I got the letter, 13 but I don't remember if I got this with the letter or 14 not.._-
<--d 7
~
15 Q
We covered that, and ;you said at some 16 point you did get GPU 323.
Did you review it when you 17 got it?
i 18 A
I am sure I read it.
I don't know how much 19 time I spent on it.
20 Q
Would fou turn to page 26.
Would you look 21 at the paragraph that begins five lines down with the 22 words "A full pressurizer."
i 23 A
Yes.
()
24 Q
It states there, "A full pressurizer may 25 convince the operator to trip the HPI pump and watch
i Bailey 82
~
2 for a subsequent loss of level."
3 Did you know before you got Michelson's 4
study that a full pressurizer had convinced the operators
(
5 at one B&W plant to trip the high pressure injection 6
P umps?
Y 7
A No, I did not.
o L
1~8 Q
You didn't have any difficulty understanding 9
how it was that a full pressurizer might convince an:
10 operator to trip the high pressure injection pumps, did 11 you?
12 A
I don't recall how much of this report I O
13 understood when I read it.
I noted that when we sent 14 our response to this report to the TVA that we noted 15 in there thg pressurizer level.in itself was not a
)
16 reliable indication of inventory.
V
=
17 Q
How do you know that?
18 MS. WAGNER:
How do you know w' hat the 19 response said?
20 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
21 MS. WAGNER:
He already testified that he km 22 reviewed it several times.
23 A
Yes.
(
24 Q
In preparation for your deposition?
i 25 A
No.
I read it before I read it at the
1 Bailey 83 G
2 time it was sent to TVA.
3 Q
Is the testimony you have just given me 4
about what the report said with respect to pressurizer
(
5 level something that you recall from three years ago, 6
or is it something that is in your mind because Karen 7
Wagner or somebody else from B&W's law firm showed you 8
that document recently?
9 MS. WAGNER: You can. testify if your memory 10 was refreshed by having seen it. t 11 A
certainly my memory was refreshed, but I 12 recall reading the response that we s ent to TVA, and 13 I recall, at least my perception was I understood it.
14 I don't recall that I was not -- that I didn't understand 15 it.
16 Q
Is your recollection that the report says 17 pressurizer level is not a reliable indication of 18 inventory 19 A
Not in itself, yes.
20 Q
Is that something --
21 A
Under certain conditions, as I recall.
22 Q
Is that something that you recalled was 23 in the letter even before the letter was shown to you b
24 again during preparation for this deposition?
d 25 A
Before the letter was shown to me in p.
-a 7
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1 Bailey 84
~
2 preparation for the deposition, I didn't recall 3
specifically.what was in the response.
I recall that 4
I had read the response and that I was not confused by
({
5 it or at least I didn't think I was confused by it.
_M w
6 Q
You understood it as well as you understood f 7
Bert Dunn's memo when you read Bert Dunn's memo shortly 8
after the Three Mile Island accident; is that right?
9 MS. WAGNER:
You mean he understood it 10 equally well?
t 11 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
{
12 A
I couldn ' t characterize which one I O
\\
t 13 understood the best or the worst or the least.
14 Q
You understood them both well, didn' t you?
j 15 A
I think I do, yes./
A 16 Q.
In, February 1978, you were the person in 17 Licensing who had the most continuous responsibility 18 for ECCS matters, to the bes t of you knowledge, right?
19 A
I believe I said I wasn' t aware of anyone
~
20 that had he'en assigned the ECCS topicals during this 21 time.
22 Q
Did you know from your responsibilities at 23 or about that time that Bert Dunn was one of B&W's e
24 leading experts in the area of ECCS analysis?
25 A
I understood th a t Bert Dunn was unit' manager i
Aw
.x 1
Bailey 85 2
for-the,ECCS analysis unit.
3 Q
Did you know of anybody at B&W who had 4
greatrar expertise in ECCS analysis than Bert Dunn in
('
5 or about 1978Y 6
A My job as the licensing engineer, I wasn't 7
in a position to judge the technical expertise of any
~
8 of the people that might have been doing the ECCS 9
analysis.
10 Q
In 1978, did you have any reason to 11 question the technical expertise of Bert Dunn in 12 ECCS analysis matters?
~
13 A
I don't think I questioned Bert any mo*!e 14 than I questioned the other people that worked fo : him.
15 I don't remember questioning Bert.
16 Q
Had you f ormed a judgment by Februrary 1978 17 that Bert Dunn was some kind of crackpot?,
18 MS. WAGNER:
I object to th e q'ue stion. The 19 witness has testified that he didn't' question Bert.
20 A
No.
21 Q
Had you formed a judgment by February 1978 L
22 that Bert Dunn put things in writing th at were of so 23 little importance that they didn't merut your attention?
(
24 A
I think I try very hard not to make that 25 judgment about anybody.
., _ _ _ - - _ ~
1 Bailey 86
[
\\~'
2 Q
In other words, you had not made that 3
judgment about Bert Dunn?
4 A
I don't think so.
((,
5 Q
Had anybody ever advised you before 6
February 1978 that you should disregard memoranda that 7
you got from people outside Licensing?
8 A
No.
~
9 Q
Had you ever reached the conclusion befoue 10 February 1978 that Dunn seemed to eleva.te ECCS matters 11 to higher levels of importance than you thought they 12 were worth?
A)
(_
13 A
I don't think I had drawn any conclusions 14 in that regard at all.
-~
15 Q-Is there any reason that you can think of 6
16 why you would have takenamemoonwhichhouwere 17 marked for a copy relating to operator interruption 18 of high pressure injection and put it in a' file without
( 19 giving it any serious consideration?
~
20 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question.
21 There is no evidence in the record that the 22 witness did any such thing, so any answer would 23 be speculation on his part.
24 I direct you not to answer.
25 MR. SELTZER:
It wouldn't be speculation I
i 1
Bailey 87
~
2 because the witness has testified that the memo 3
was addressed to him, that it was in his file, 4
and he knows of nobody else who was putting
,({
5 memos into his file.
So I think there is 6
foundation.
I think that your objection is 7
properly noted on the re co rd and a judge can rule 8
on whether the testimony taken subject to 9
objection should be admissible.
But I think that 10 on this particular memo when I am trying to find 11 out why Mr. Bailey did nothing in response to it, t
12 I am entitled to get an answer.
i 13 MS. WAGNER:
The first time Mr. Bailey is 14 aware of this memo is after the accident, and I 15 am sure it is obvious why people were not doing 16 much about this memo after the accident.
Therefore; 17 I don't think there has been any foundation laid 18 for this question.
t'at there is 19 MR. SELTZER:
Let me suggest h
20 ample foundation.
The author of the memo has 21 testified that he sent it to all of the people 22 who were marked for copies of the memo.
Mr. Bailey 23 is marked for a copy.
Mr. Bailey had a copy in
()
24 his file.
And Mr. Bailey has testified that he 25 knows of nobody else who was putting these memos
1 Bailey 88 (D
\\-
~
2 into his file.
Therefore, there is a certain 3
logic which I think some would find compelling 4
that Mr. Bailey received GPU 78 from Mr. Dunn,
({
5 that he probably received it at or about the 6
time that it was sent to him, and my question is 7
directed not at why you didn't do anything about 8
it when you read it af ter the accident.
My 9
question is directed at why you would not have 10 done anything about this memo before the Three 11 Mile Island accident.
12 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the ques tion, but C\\
13 I will permit the witness to answer, if he can 14 think right now of a reason why he would not have 15 responded to a memo such as this.
16 A
Since I don't remember receiving the memo, l 17 I don't recall what thought process I might have had l 18 not to do anything with it.
%s 19 Q
You have no recollection of talking with 20 Kane, Agar or Taylor about this memo prior to the 21 Three Mile Island accident?
l j
22 A
No, I do not.
23 Q
You have no recollection of seeing if l
24 anybody else who was an addressee or copyee of this 25 memo was giving it prompt attention or trying to obtain i
1 Bailey 89 0' -
2 prompt corrections is that right?
3 MS. WAGNER:
I object to ' the ques tion.
He 4
doesn't remember receiving it.
How could he have 5
spoken to anybody about it, if he didn't receive
(
6 it?
7 A
No, I do not.
8 Q
In light of Michelson's concern that a 9
full pressurizer might convince the operator to trip 10 the high pressure injection pumps, what, if any, steps 11 did you take to review the adequacy of B&W's training 12 o f operators?
~
13 A
I don't recall being assigned anything 14 in this area or taking any steps in this area.
15 0
And you didn't exercise any initiative to 16 take any steps that you weren't asked to take in this 17 areat is that right?
18 A
I don't remember taking any steps in this 19 area.
~
\\
20 Q
Did yoit feel in 1978 that your job consisted i
21 by and large of doing what you were told and not taking L
22 initiative for doing other things?
23 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the form.
1
(~)T 24 A
As I indicated earlier, I had a certain 25 initiative to keep abreast of what the rest of the I
L 1
Bailey 90
(")
\\J.
2 section was doing by reading the monthly reports of the 3
other unit managers, bur generally I was busy enough 4
with the jobs that I have been assigned that that kept
(;
5 me pretty well occupied.
6 Q
You didn't talk about any of Michelson's.
7 concerns with anyone in the Training Department, did you?
8 A
No, I did not.
9 Q
Is it correct to say that you did nothing 10 with respect to Michelson's concerns aBout the adequacy 11 of operators' training?
12 A
I don't recall doing anything.
13 Q
I would like to show you GPU Exhibit 111, 14 which is your holographic memorandum to L'evandowski 15 dated May 25, 1978, subject, small break report.
16 Is GPU 111 a copy of a memorandum which 17 you wrote to Levandowski on or about May. 25, 19787 18 A
Yes, it is.
19 Q
At whose request was this prepared?
20 A
I believe'Mr. Levandowski had as'ked me to 21 brief him on what the TVA letter was about.
22 Q
The TVA le tter, you mean GPU Exhibit 1107 23 A
I believe so.
()
24 Q
Do you see the sentence of yours that 25 begins five lines from the bottom with, "A more valid
1 Bailey 91
(~h
\\_).
2 concern"?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Could you read that sentence and the next
([
5 sentence into the record, please.
6 A
"A more valid concern may be the subject 7
of operator action and the potential for erroneous 8
pressurizer level.
This matter is discussed also at some 9
length."
10 Q
When you say "this matter L.s discussed also 4
11 at some length," you meant discussed in the TVA letter 12 and in Michelson's report?
O 13 A
I believe it to be the letter.
As I
(
o 14 indicated earlier, I am not sure when I got thereport.}
C 15 Q
You referred to the potential for erroneous 16 pressurizer level.
In what way was the pressurizer 17 level,in your words, erroneous?
18 A
As I recall, it was words that I had read 19 or seen in theletter.
I am no t sure what ' erroneous 20 I am not sure what specifically I had in mind at 21 that point.
22 Q
Take a look at the TVA letter, if you need 23 to refresh your recollection.
My question is, isn't it
(
24 a fact that by the phrase " erroneous pressurizer level,"
25 you were referring to the fact that the pressurizer w
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1 Bailey 92 2
level could read full when, in fact, the core could be 3
uncovered?
4 A
I don't really remember that.
I don't
(
5 remember that being the source of my sentence here.
6 Q
Take a look at th e last paragraph of page 2 7
of G.P U 110.
Do you see where it says something about 8
"a concern that the pressurizer level is not a correct 9
indicator of water level over the reactor core. "
10 A
Yes, I see that, e
11 Q
Do you see anywhere else in GPU Exhibit 110 12 where it talks about pressurizer level being erroneous?
13 MS. WAGNER:
I object to this line of 14 questioning insofar as you are asking Mr. Bailey 15 to now speculate based on GPU 110 as to what he 16 meant in GPU 111.
17 Mr. Bailey, if you have a recollection which 18 is refreshed by GPU 110, fine, but don't attempt 19 to analyze this document at this tim'e.
20 Q
What I have asked is, is there anywhere 21 else that you see in GPU 110 where there is discussion L
22 about erroneous pressurizer level?
23 A
No, I haven't seen anything here.
24 Q
And you believe you were referring to the 25 TVA letter, GPU Exhibit 110,~when you wrote about
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Bailey 93 O-2 erroneous pressurizer level in your letter to 3
Levandowski,,right?
4 A
Yes.
((
5 Q
Why did you believe that operator action 6
and the potential for erroneous. pressurizer level was 7
"a more valid concern"?
8 A
I didn' t draw any conclusion or attempt to 9
draw any conclusions at this time.
I offered it up as 10 a subject that possibly might have more validity than 11 the first concern,which was the loss of heat removal, 12 I'believe I said, from the RCS.
O
~~
(_/-
13 Q
Why did you.think it was a more valid 14 concern?
15 Let me ask you more pointedly.
Was it based 16 on your prior experience with ECCS subjects that you 17 thought the subject of operator action and the 18 potential for erroneous pressurizer level ~ indication i
19 was a more valid concern?
20 A
I don't recall why I would have thought 21 that would be a more valid concern.
(-
c --
l 22 Q
Had you discussed the TVA cover memo or
(
23 Michelson's report with anyone else before writing 24 GPU 111?
05 A
I don't remember if this was before or i
1 Bailey 94
/~\\
%)
2 after the phone call with TVA.
If it were after the 3
phone call, then I would have heard it discussed over 4
the phone call.
('
5 Q
on the next page of GPU Exhibit 111, you 6
say, "Bert Dunn plans to start looking at the report 7
next week to see what is there and to consider what 8
action or investigation should be pursued (if any)."
9 How did you know that Bert Dunn planned 10 to start looking at the report sometime_around the 11 beginning of June?
12 A
The time of the telephone conversation, at O
\\-
13 least one of the phone conversations, in the 14 conversation it was left tha t B&W, the ECCS Analysis 15 Unit,would look at the TVA concern.
16 Q
Was there more than one telephone 17 conversation?
( 18 A
I remember two.
~
19 Q
How many people participated in each of 20 them?
21 A
I think it was about four peopl's.
I can't L
22 recall who.
I know there was Mr. McFarland and myself, 23 and I thought Bob Jones was in at least one.
I don't
(
24 remember who else.
25 Q
When, approximately, did the two phone calls
-__ _ = -
1 Bailey 95 2
take place?
3 A
After we received the letter was the only 4
date I know.
i
({
5 Q
You don't remember whether one took place 6
in No'? amber?
7 A
No, I don't remember.
8 Q
In the phone conversations that you recall 9
listening in on, did anyone mention to Michelson that 10 B&W had already been examining the prob.lem of operator 11 termination of high pressure injection in response to 12 rising pressurizer water level?
O.
13 A
I don' t recall operator action being 14 discussed in the phone conversation.
15 Q
Did anybody from B&W tell Michelson that l
16 B&W would send them some operating procedures that had 17 already been draf ted for the operation of,high pressure 18 injection?
~
19 A
I don't recall that.
~
l 20 Q
Are you aware that B&W had draf ted procedures 21 for the operation of high pressure injection which 22 included the 50 degrees subcooling rule and that such i
23 procedures had been drafted in 1978?
24 A
I was not aware of that.
25 Q
Even today, nobody has informed you that
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1 Bailey 96 2
B&W had drafted procedures for a particular 205 plant 3
that included the 50 degree subcooling rule?
4 A
No, even today.
f 5
Q Even prior to today?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Let me show you something else that will 8
bring back pangs of recollection.
This is GPU Exhibit 9
112, Jones to Lightle, January 19, 1979.
10 Is GPU Exhibit 112 a copy of a memorandum 11 which you received on or about January 19, 1979, in 12 the regular course of business?
13 A
I believe so.
14 Q
Is this the B&W response to the Michelson 15 study that you have referred to at several points in 16 your testimony today?
i i
17 A
I believe so.
18 Q
G.O.G.
is Geissler, right?
19 A
Yes.
~
20 Q
By early 1979, had he replaced Levandowski 21 as your superior?
22 A
I think so.
23 Q
Do you see the note that Geissler sent to
}
24 you?
25 A
Yes.
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1 Bailey 97 C\\.
2 Q
Geissler asked you, "What is TVA going to 3
do with A) t,his letter and B) the TVA report?"
4 Did you ever get back to George and give
({
5 him answers to those questions?
\\,
6 A
I don't recall if I did or not.
-. i 7
Q What, to the best of your understanding, 8
was TVA going to do with, A) this letter from B&W, and 9
B) the TVA report?
10 A
I don't think I had an unde,rstanding of what 11 they were going to do with it.
12 Q
Did you ever ask Bob Jones in ECCS analysis As/
13 how this relates to concern for the wo[st case 14 evaluation, assuming non IE equipment failures have 15 a " benign" effect on safety analysis?
16 MS. WAGNER:
The record should reflect 17 that Mr. Seltzer is reading somethi.7g from GPU 18 112, because I don't think it is necessarily clear 19 with the "this" is.
20 A
I don't recall asking Bob Jones this question.
-~-,
21 Q
To the be st of your knowledge, is the 22 two-page attachment to GPU 112 the respons e which B&W 23 eventually sent to TVA7 1
24 A
I believe it is.
_j 25 Q
Did Bob Jones ever tell you that he had
-w
,w m
1 Bailey 98 2
viewed Michelson's report as bullshit?
3 A
UO-4 Q
Did you ever hear that anybody in ECCS
( '.
5 Analysis had labeled parts of Michelson's report as 6
crap?
7 A
Not prior to preparation for this deposition.
8 Q
Do you have any understanding why people 9
in the ECCS Analysis unit were labeling Michelson's 1
l 10 report bullshit and crap?
t; 11 MS. WAGNER:
Since the witness does not 12 recall that they were doing so, I don't think he "N
13 should speculate as to why they did so.
14 MR. SELTZER:
He may have heard.
15 MS. WAGNER:
If you heard, you may answer.
16 A
No, I do not.
17 Q
Do you recall any other technical reports 18 circulated at B&W that had marginal inscriptions 19 indicating that ECCS Analysis members had thought 20 the ideas expressed were bullshit or crap?
21 A
I don't think so.
22 Q
Did anybody seek you out for advice or 23 consultation with respect to the Three Mile Island I~D 24 accident on the day that it was occurring?
V n
25 A
No.
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Bailey 99 O
\\-
2 Q-When is the first time you heard that one 3
of your plants was going down?
4 A
I heard that someone in the hall mentioned
({
5 there was a problem at Three Mile Island along about 4
6 ten o' clock.
7 Q
When is the first time you heard they had 8
a loss of coolant accident at TMI?
9 A
Sometime in the afternoon.
It was 10 characterized as a severe transient over sometime in 11 the afternoon.
12 Q
The afternoon of the day of the accident?
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
When is the first time you heard it was a 15 loss of coolant accident?
16 A
I don't remember when I would have heard 17 for the first time that characterization.
18 (Recess taken)
~
19 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark as
\\'
20 GPU Exhibit 467, a two-page document from Mr.
21 Bailey to Mr. Taylor dated April 3, 1979 relating 22 to the effect of the loop seal on the level of 23 the pressurizer.
()
24 (Two-page document from Mr. Bailey to Mr.
25 Taylor dated April 3,
1979 relating to the effect
1 Bailey 100 2
of the loop seal on the level of the pressurizer 3
was marked GPU Exhibit 467 for ' identification, 4
as of this date.)
({
5 Q
Is GPU 467 a copy of some notes which you 6
prepared and circulated on or about April 3, 19797 7
A I prepared these notes.
I don't recall who, 8
if anybody, I sent them to specifically.
9 Q
Is that your handwriting in the upper right-10 hand corner of the first page?
u 11 A
I am not sure if that is my handwriting or 12 not.
The handwriting on the left is not mine, I don't O
13 believe.
14 Q
Could I ask you just on the sheet that is 15 in front of you if you can write B. Karrasch, the 16 yellow pad?
17 A
(Writing) 18 Q
How would you write B.M.
Dunn?'
19 A
(Writing) 20 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark as 21 GPU Exhibit 468, the handwriting sample of Mr.
22 Bailey.
23 (Handwriting sample of Mr. Bailey was 24 marked GPU Exhibit 468 for identification, as of 25 this date.)
1 Bailey 101 2
Q Is that your handwriting a': the bottom of the first page and the second page?
3 4
A Yes.
5 Q
Is the diagram, a diagram which you
(( ',
6 prepared?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Could you read the text of your memorandum, g
GPU 4677
.i 10 A
"The pressurizer did not drain because of 11 the loop s. sal which exists.
If the steam pressurizer 12 were to increase in the above situation and press the 13 water up into the pressurizer, then the" water would 14 back up only to point A, at which time it'would bubble 15 up through the pressurizer.
If the pressurizer surge 16 line had a downward slope on it from the pressurizer 17 to the hot leg, it would have completely drained when 18 the water level dropped below point B.
If the 19 pressurizer had drained, the HPI pumps would have 20 probably been left on."
21 Q
In your las t sentence where you said, "If
~
22 the pressurizer had drained, the HPI pumps would have 23 probably been left on," you were referring to the 24 Three Mile Island accident, right?
(
25 A
I believe I vis, yes.
_-, _ = _ _ - _. - _ _ _ - - - -. _ -.,.
l 1
Bailey 102 O
U-Q II w did you figure out the material that 2
y u wr te in the sentence prior to the last sentence?
3 A
I don't remember what thought process I 4
5 used other than just basic physics of the isothermal
(
6 system.
7 Q
Did you understand these concepts before 8
the Three Mile Island accident?
g MS. WAGNER:
Can we just say what concepts 10 you are talking about?
The physi s concepts 11 he was talking about?
12 MR. SELTZER:
The concepts that are 13 embodied in all of the sentences prior to the g4 last sentence of GPU 467.
15 A
I didn' t have any additional input af ter 16 the Three Mile Island accident before I drew this.
e 17 Q
Do you see the location which you labeled 18 point B?
~
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Point B is the place where the surge line 21 to the pressurizer is connected to the hot leg, right?
L 22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Point B is above the top of the core, right?
A 94 A
Yes.
4 U
~
25 Q
what you were saying, you are hypothesizing l
i
1 Bailey 103 2
what the system response would have been if the line 3
connecting the pressurizer to point B had simply had a 4
downward slope is that so?
(
5 A
I believe so.
6 Q
In order for that to have existed, the 7
pressurizer would have to have been moved upward in the 8
plant, right?
g A
Yes.
10 Q
The surge line still would ave been 11 connected to the bottom of the pressurizer, righ t?
12 A
Yes.
s_/
13 Q
If the surge line had been connected in 14 that fashion, all the water in the pressurizer would 15 have drained down into the hot leg, right?
16 A
Are you asking me that ques tion now?
17 Q
I am asking you whether that was what you 18 were saying at the t%me you wrote GPU 4 6 7.'
19 A
That is what I was saying when'I wrote 20 this, yes.
21 Q
If the pressurizer had drained and if high L'
22 pressure injection had been on full when the pressurizer 23 drained into the hot leg at point B, then the core 24 would not have uncovered; isn't that right?
25 MS. WAGNER:
Based on what facts?
1
Based on what Mr. Bailey was 3
saying in GPU 467.
4 MS. WAGNER:
I don't think GPU 467 mentions
({
5 the core.
6 A
I don't think I can draw any other 7
conclusions about what I was thinking other than what 8
I have written here.
9 Q
You said point B is above the core?
10 A
Yes.
E 11 Q
And at th1 point at which you were 12 hypothesizing that the pressurizer would completely
(~
13 drain into the hot leg, there would not have been core
'I 14 uncovery, would there?
15 A
Would you repeat that?
16 Q
At the point at which you were hypothesizing 17 that the pressurizer would completely drain into the 18 hot leg, there would not have been core uncovery, would 19 there?
~
20 MS. WAGNER:
I don' t understand what 21 conditions it is that Mr. Seltzer is positing, 22 but you can answer.
23 A
I guess I don't understand the question.
()
f 24 Q
You refer to the fact that, "If the 25 pressurizer surge line had a downward slope on it, from I
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1 Bailey 105 0(~%
2 the pressurizer to the hot leg, it would have completely 3
drained when the water level dropped below point B."
4 A
Yes.
((
5 Q
The time at which it would have drained is 6
when the water level just began to be below point B, 7
right?
8 A
I believe so.
9 Q
At that point the pressurizer would have 10 completely drained into the hot leg, right?
11 A
I believe so.
12 Q
At that point, the core has not uncovered, O
13 has it?
7 p
'" y /
'w 14 A
I don't believe s I
1 15 Q
If high pressure injection were on full at i
=
16 that point and all that existed were a stuck-open 17 pilot operated relief valve, there would not have been 18 core uncovery, would there?
19 MS. WAGNER:
Objection.
The me'mo doesn't 20 refer to any stuck-open pilot operated relief 21 valve.
L 22 A
I can't draw any further conclusions about 23 what I wrote here, because I later came to believe that O)
(
24 came to realize that I didn ' t have-- I didn't have I 25 sufficient data when I drew this.
1 Bailey 106
~'T lJ ~
2 Q
Who has called to your attention the fact 3
that you didn' t have suf ficient data?
4 A
I don't recall that anyone called it to my
({
5 attention.
6 Q
When for the first time did you realize that 7
you had had purportedly insufficient data?
8 A
Later on after the Three Mile Island 9
accident, B&W started to perform some analysis to try 10 to simulate the Three Mile Island acciqent, and only at 11 that time did I see enough data to understand that the 12 plant had been in a severe transient that it had been O
(_/
13 in, what pumps had been off,and that t$e pressurizer 14 at this point was still quite hot.
I don' t recall what 15 temperature.
16 At that point I re alized with a ho,-
17 pressurizer that the steam would have forced the water 18 right out of the pressurizer.
19 Q
Under what circumstances would'the steam i
20 have forced the water out of the pressurizer?
21 A
If the vapor pressure of the water in the
~
22 pressurizer were higher than the pressure in the surge
%3 line.
('T 24 Q
Why didn't that happen during the Three U
25 Mile Island accident?
1 Bailey 107
/~%U 2
A During ths Three Mile Island accident, as 3
I recall now from doit:g the simulation, there was a 4
relief valve that was failed open which I didn't even
((
5 draw-- I didn't even model here at the time because I 6
was working with no doubt at all.
I was postulating
{7
_ something I didn't know anything about.
8 Q
You know that at some point the operators 9
closed the block valve during the Three Mile Island 10 accident, don't you?
i 11 A
I believe they did at some point, yes.
12 Q
Why didn't the water in the pressurizer 13 drain back into the reactor coolant spstem then?
14 A
As I recall, the analysis that we did after 15 the Three Mile Island incident involved predictions 16 of steam bubbles in the loops which would have kept l
17 the level of the pressurizer up.
18 Q
Isn't it a fact that there wai a surge 19 line on the Three Mile Island pressurizer ' hat was t
20' configured as a loop seal?
l l
21 A
I -believe it is, yes.
,k 22 Q
Wasn't it your conclusion that without any 23 break at the top of the pressurizer as long as there
()
24 was a loop seal on the pressurizer and steam in the hot 25 leg, there would not be draining of the pressurizer
1 Bailey 108 2
water into the hot leg?
3 A
I don't believe I mentioned what was in the 4
loop.
([
5 Q
If the steam prescure were to increase in 6
the above situation, you say, and press the water up 7
into the pressurizer, you said.
8 A
What is your question again?
9 (Question read) 10 MS, WAGNER:
I object to th_e question 11 insofar as it assumes this witness knows anything 12 about the specific elements of the accident at (N-13 Three Mile Island and has analyzed those incidents.
14 If you are asking him in the context of what he 15 knew when he wrote this and what he intended to 16 say, you are welcome to get an answbr.
17 A
That'was my conclusion based on the day that 18 I wrote this memo with the data that I had at hand.
19 Q
Have you subsequently obtained'any data 20 which has caused you to question the validity of that 21 conclusion, and if so, what data have you received?
L 22 A
As I pointed out earlier, we did some 23 analysis to try to simulate the Three Mile Island I~D) 24 incident, and at that time as I recall, the pressurizer 25 temperatures were such that I had concluded that this l
1 Bailey 109 2
conclusion would be an error and that the pressurizer 3
temperature under these conditions would have forced 4
the water out of the pressurizer.
({
5 Q
Has anybody ever told you that at Three 6
Mile Island the pressure and temperatures in the 7
pressurizer did not force the water out of the 8
pressurizer when the block valve was closed?
9 A
I remember going through some of the 10 scenario on Three Mile Island.
I wasn'tt involved in 11 the analysis.
At this point, I don?t remember the 12 specifics of the accident.
13 Q
It sounds to me like your calculations were i
14 a more accurate reflection of real life at Three Mile 15 island than the B&W s'imulations.
16 MS. WAGNER:
I object to that statement.
17 I move to strike it.
18 Q
Did B&W ever do analyses of wh'at would have 19 happened if there had been a downward sloping surge 20 line?
21 A
I don't know.
22 Q
Has anyone ever told you that they had l
23 concluded that your analysis in GPU 467 was wrong?
24 A
No, no one ever told me.
25 Q
Do you know why you prepared this analysis?
1 Bailey 110 Ygs 2
A No, I do not.
3 Q
At the time you wrote the last sentence, 4
did you know that the operators had terminated high
(
5 pressure injection in response to high pressurizer 6
water level?
7 MS. WAGNER:
At Three Mile Island?
8 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
9 A
Yes, I did understand at that time that 10 HPI pumps had been turned off for an ex. tended period 11 of time for some reason.
12 Q
When you said that the HPI pumps would
(~
~.
\\-
13 probably have been left on if the pressurizer had 14 drained, were you saying that because you understood 15 when you wrote this that the Three Mile Island operators 16 had shut off HPI because they saw a full pressurizer?
17 A
I don't recall why.
18 Q
I take it you did learn sometime after the 19 Three Mile Island accident that the operators had shut 20 off high pressure injection in response to rising 21 pressurizer water level?
22 A
I believe that came out during our analysis 23 of the accident or at least the ECCS analysis of the
(
21 accident which I was at least somewhat aware of.
25 g
When,1f ever, did it occur to you that what
1 Bailey III O
2 the operators had done in terminating high pressure 3
injection at Three Mile Island was substantially 4
similar to what Michelson and TVA had predicted in
.('
5 documents that you had seen and read in 19787 6
A I don't recall ever trying to compare 7
directly Michelson's concerns with the Three Mile 8
Island incident.
9 Q
Michelson said, "A full pressurizer may 10 convince the operator to trip the HPI pump."
11 Do you recall that?
12 A
I don't recall what is in Michelson's
,/~}
N_/
13 report.
14 Q
Take a look at pages 26 and 27.
Do you 15 see the sentence on page 26, line 5, "A full pressurizer 16 may convince the operator to trip the HPI pump"?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Do you see on 27, the second s'entence, "A
19 full pressurizer may convince the operator to trip the 20 HPI pump"?
21 A
Yes.
L 22 Q
And you did learn after the Three Mile 23 Island accident that a full pressurizer had apparently
(
24 convinced the Three Mile Island operators to trip the 25 HPI pumps, right?
I 1
sailey 112 O
2 A
I learned after the Three Mile Island 3
accident that the HPI pumps had been tripped for an 4
extended period of time.
5 Q
Did you ever hear even from reading the
((,
6 newspapers or anything else that apparently the reason 7
that the oparators had tripped the HPI pumps was because 8
of rising pressurizer water level?
9 A
I don't recall that I ever saw the reasons 10 that they tripped.
g 11 Q
You never have heard that before today?
12 I am telling you something for the first time, as far 13 as you know.
14 A
When we did the analysis, I recall that 15 after the accident, that was certainly one consideration, 16 but I guess we were a little bit surprise'd that they 17 would trip the HPI pumps based on one single indication 18 of the pressurizer level.
We thought they would 19 compare pressure and temperatures also.
20 Q
When you had as one consideration that the 21 operators had tripped IIPI because of rising pressurizer 22 level, did you remember that this had been exactly 23 what Michelson had predicted in his 1978 report that 24 you received?
(
}
25 A
I don't recall comparing the two!
n----
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Bailey 113 O
2 Q
After you saw the B&W response to TVA, 3
did it ever occur to you that perhaps B&W should 4
warn other operators of its plants of not relying on
((
5 pressurizer level as an indication of reactor coolant 6
system inventory?
7 A
As I recall, this was a case of a specific 8
customer asking us a specific question on his plant, 9
on his 205 fuel assembly plant, and I don't recall 10 feeling the need to notify the other utilities of his 11 concern or confusion in this matter.
12 Q
What was the name of your unit?
13 A
The Generic Unit.
~
14 Q
" Generic" means applicable to more than 15 one plant, right?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Didn't you und'er, stand that'the filling of l
18 a pressurizer in response to voiding in the primary 19 loop was a phenomenon that had generic imp'11 cations?
20 MS, WAGNER:
Do you mean it could happen 21 in other plants?
22 MR. SELTZER:
You bet.
x 23 A
We were involved in answering a specific s
24 question that a customer asked, and.we didn't feel 25 that it was a need to t'e ll the odher owners about x
s
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Bailey 114 n
2 this specific customer's concerns.
3 Q
Did you have any reason to believe in 1978 4
that TVA's concern about pressurizer water level not
((
5 being a reliable indication of reactor coolant system 6
inventory was not a concern that had generic 7
applicability?
8 A
Would you read it again?
9 Q
Was there any reason why the problem that 10 TVA was concerned about was not a problem that would 11 be just as applicable to any other B&W-designed nuclear 12 steam supply system sold in the United States?
13 A
We viewed this as a matter of operator 14 understanding of the hardware that was available, and 15 we explained to TVA that the pressurizer level in 16 itself was not an accurate indication of the inventory 17 in the pressurizer.
If this had been a matter that 18 was clearly a hardware problem, then of co'urse I think 19 we would have had a case to tell o ther utilities.
20 Q
The pressurizer is a piece of hardware, 21 isn't it?
L 22 A
Yes.
23 Q
The pilot operated relief valve is a piece
("T 24 of hardware, isn't it?
O 25 A
Yes.
1 sailey 115 O
~
2 Q
The surge line is hardware, isn ' t it?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
It is the operation of those pieces of
(
5 hardware that produced the rising pressurizer water 6
level effect, isn't it?
7 A
The hardware is operated by the operators.
8 Certainly the hardware is involved, yes.
9 Q
The phenomenon of saturation in the 10 reactor coolant system forcing the pressurizer water 11 level up was not a phenomenon that was unique to the 12 plants being sold to Tennessee Valley Authority, was O's 13 it?
no, I don't believe it was.
14 A
No, but 15 Q
In fact, based on your knowledge in 1978, 16 you had no reason to believe that that phenomenon would 17 not be equally applicable to all B&W plants; isn't that 18 right?
19 A
No.
However, our understandin'g of the 20 concern was mostly operator confusion, and we felt 21 that we had addressed the TVA confusion and we had
(-
22 settled it and we felt no need to contact other owners 23 about this confusion.
Os-24 Q
You began your answer with the word "No,"
25 and I think that might be confusing.
The phenomenon
1 Bailey 116
(~'N,
-)-
2 would be equally applicable to all B&W plants, wouldn't 3
it?
,4 MS. WAGNER:
This is the phenomenon of 5
high pressurizer level because of saturation?
{
6 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
7 A
I !,elieve so under the same operator actions.
8 Q
When you got TVA's letter and Michelson's 9
report, did you have any glimmer of recollection about 10 having received one or more memos from Bert Dunn that 11 described the potential for operator termination of 12 high pressure injection in response to rising pressurizer
(/ '
s
~.
13 level?
s_
14 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the que s tio n.- Asked 15 and answered.
~
16 A
No, I do not remember.
17 Q
You said that the phenomenon would apply 18 to all the 177 plants under the same operator actions.
19 What operator actions were you referring to?
20 A
If the HPI pumps were turned off for an 21 extended period of time as they were at Three Mile 22 Island, I believe the same characteristics would be 23 seen under the same circumstances as Three Mile Island.
24 Q
Isn't it a fact that if the high pressure 25 injection pumps are left on, there would still be
1 l
i 1
Bailey 117 2
depressurization through an open pilot operated relief valve that would lead to voiding in the primary system?
3 4
MS. WAGNER:
Just so we don't get confused, 5
a while ago we were talking about Michelson and 6
now we are talking of the Three Mile Island 7
accidents isn't that right?
8 MR. SELTZER:
We are talking of Michelson 9
and the phenomenon that Michelson describes of 10 rising pressurizer water level in response to 11 saturation.
12 MS. WAGNER:
The only thing I want to get O)
\\~
13 straight is, and I could be wrond about this, I 14 don't think Michelson refers to an open PORV.
15 He is just referring to a break someplace.
16 MR. SELTZER:
On page 27, Michelson does 17 talk about venting by actuation of the pressurizer 18 vent valve.
19 MS. WAGNER:
I understand that', but all I 20 am saying is I am not sure that his focus is 21 that which resulted in the Three Mile Island L
22 accident, and I don't want this record to get 23 confused as to what phenomenon we are talking of FT
~4 here.
9 N-]
25 MR. SELTZER:
The phenomenon that I am
.. ~.
1 Bailey 118
/i\\
2 talking ab out is saturation in the reactor coolant 3
system outside the pressurizer' forcing water level 4
up in the pressurizer.
5 Q
Did you have some understanding before today
(
6 that it required operator termination of high pressure 7
injection in order to produce saturation in the reactor 8
coolant system outside the pressurizer?
9 A
No.
I believe I was answering your question 10 about the similarity between the Three ile Island and 11 the other plants, and I said the same -- I would suspect 12 the same, phenomenon to occur at the other plants as 13 Three Mile Island.
14 Q
I think Karen Wagner has done' us a great 15 service by spotting the difficulty in communication.
16 Michelson is writing about a 205 fnel asshmbly plant 17 that B&W was building for TVA, right?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
It was with respect to that B&W plant
?0 that he said a full pressurizer may convince the operator 21 to trip the HPI pumps, right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
The phenomenon that might lead them to see full pressurizer was' saturation in the reactor coolant O
24 a
v 25 sys tem pushing pressurizer water level up, right?
s
1 Bailey 119
(~s 2
A Yes.
3 Q
And that is a phenomenon that he had spotted 4
in a 205 fuel assembly plant, right?
5 A
Yes.
(
6 Q
Using that as our base, didn ' t you 7
understand in 1978 that that phenomenon identified by 8
Michelson with respect to TVA's plant was a phenomenon 9
that had generic applicability to all of the B&W 10 plants that had been designed and built in the United 11 States?
12 A
I understood what was in the response that 13 we made to TVA, which was that pressuri'zer level in 14 i tself was not a reliable indication of inventory in 15 the primary system.
~
16 MR. SELTZER:
I move to s trike that as i
l 17 non-responsive, and I would like to ask the 18 reporter to reread the question.
19 MS. WAGNER:
I think the answer was 20 perfectly responsive.
l 21 (Record read)
Ci 22 MS. WAGNER:
The witness has answered l
23 this question several times.
I will allow him 24 to answer one more time and then direct him not to l
25 answer.
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Bailey 120 (O) t\\--
2 Q
Do you understand the question?
3 A
I am saying the thing that I understood --
4 Q
First, do you understand the question?
That 5
is the question on the table.
{
6 A
Yes, I believe I do.
7 Q
Do you understand th at the phenomenon I am 8
referring to is saturation in the reactor coolan.
9 system outside the pressurizer forcing water lev 61 up 10 in the pressurizer?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Do you understand that that is a phenomenon I~ 6
(_)
13 that Michelson has identified?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
The only remaining question is, did you 16 understand in 1978 that that limited phenomenon of 17 saturation outside the pressurizer forcing water level 18 up in the pressurizer was a phenomenon that was 19 generally applicable to all of the B&W-designed nuclear 20 plants in the United States?
21 MS. WAGNER:
I think what Mr. Seltzer is L
22 asking is if whatever Michelson assumed happened 23 to cause this, also happened at another plant,
('}
24 another B&W plant, would the same thing happen?
\\s 25 Is that what your question is?
---,-r
,w--
1 sailey 121 O
2 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
3 A
Yes, I know of no reason why not.
4 Q
So you understand that the phenomenon, the 5
physical phenomenon had generic applicability?
[
6 A
Yes, I'think so.
7 Q
You never suggested to anybody before the 8
Three Mile Island accident that the response which B&W 9
had drafted relating to operator reliance on a
'.0 pressurizer level be sent to other owners of B&W e
11 plants, did you?
12 MS. WAGNER:
The witness has testified 13 several times that he didn't think other plants 14 had to be told about TVA's confusion.
What more 15 do you want from him?
16 MR. SELTZER:
The answer to this next 17 question.
18 MS. WAGNER:
It is the same question you 19 asked him already eight times.
20 A
No, I didn't recommend it be sent to any 21 o th e r.
22 Q
Have you ever been a teacher or an 23 instructor?
24 A
Not in any official role.
25 g
In connection with any of your
1 Bailey 122
(~~
k_)
)
2 responsibilities at B&W, did it ever occur to you that if ne perating utility was confused about how to 3
i 4
interpret a response of the B&W system that other 5
utilities might have a similar confusion?
{
6 A
I never evaluated that.
7 Q
Have you ever given any sworn te s timo ny 8
in connection with the Three Mile Island accident before g
today?
10 A
No, I haven't.
11 Q
Have you ever had a transcript of any 12 statements you have made about the Three Mile Island
\\
13 accident?
A No, I haven't.
14 15 Q
Have you ever been interviewed by anybody 16 outside B&W with respect to the Three Mile Island 17 accident?
18 A
No, I have not.
19 Q
Isn't it a fact that representatives of l
20 I&E interviewed you in the aftermath of Three Mile Island?
21 22' A
Yes, I believe you are right.
I think there I think the NRC did send some people down 23 was some 24 that I talked to at least on one occasion.
q 25 Q
Had you forgotten about tha t?
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1 Bailey 123
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2 A
Yes, I had.
3 Q
Do you remember telling the NRC that you 4
felt that the prospect of a PSC ending up in the NRC 5
public document room has had a chilling effect upon
(
6 the use of the PSC system?
7 A
I don't remember telling them.
I don't 8
remember any of our conversation with the NRC.
i 9
Q Do you remember concluding at any point 10 prior to or within a year after the Thriae Mile Island 11 accident that the prospect of a preliminary s af e ty 12 concern ending up in the NRC public document room has a
(
13 had a chilling effect upon the use of the PSC system 14 at B&W7 15 MS. WAGNER:
Are you referring to the 16 document which B&W calls preliminary safety 17 concern?
18 MR. SELTZER:
I am referring to those 19 documents.
20 A
I don't remember telling them that, no.
21 Q
I am not asking whether you told it to 22 anybody.
Now I am asking whether that is a conclusion 23 that you had come to.
(
I 24 A
I don't remember.
25 Q
Are you aware that since the Three Mile
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1 Bailey 124 O
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2 Island accident, B&W has initiated new procedures to
'3 comply with.Part 217 4
A In preparation for the deposition, I became
((
5 aware that there were later revisions to the procedure, 6
Q You don't remember that you told the NRC 7
about that on November 7, 19797 8
A No, I don't remember any part of the 9
conversation.
10 Q
Didn't you participate in graining sessions 11 in 1979 where people explained to you the new procedures 12 to comply with Part 21?
13 A
I don't recall any sessions'.
14 Q
So the sessions you had with Karen was the 15 first time you recall being advised of the new B&W e
16 procedures to comply with Part 2.17 17 A
I believe so, yes.
18 Q
You have referred several timss during 19 your testimony to the analysis that B&W did with 20 respect to a break in the pump discharge line.
That 21 analysis resulted in a preliminary safety concern and 22 in a Part 21 report, didn't it?
23 A
I believe so.
24 Q
Both of those documents were generated in 25 1978, weren't they, the spring?
1 Bailey 125 0'-
2 A
I believe so.
3 Q
Were you f amiliar with th'e preliminary 4
safety concern procedures that were in effect before 5
the Three Mile Island accident?
(
6 A
I believe so.
7 Q
once somebody spotted something that was 8
a matter of significant concern, how quickly did the 9
procedures for preliminary safety concern require that 10 the matter be documented as a PSC?
11 A
once a concern had been concluded to be 12 a substantial safety hazard, we notified the NRC within
(~
A 13 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, I believe.
14 Q
I asked how quickly did the concern have 15 to be turned into a preliminary safety concern, not how 16 quickly did it have to be turned into a Pkrt 21 report.
17 MS. WAGNER:
I take it you are asking him 18 potential concern.
I think that might be the 19 source of the confusion, not one which has already 20 been decided to be a concern.
21 Q
If an engineer has a concern that something 22 is a significant deficiency, what did the procedures 23 say about how quickly he should write it up as a PSC7
^T 24 A
I don't recall any specific time.
(d l
25 Q
Would it be consistent with your recollection r
l
1 Bailey 126
(~N k-2 of those procedures for somebody to have waited a year 3
before writing it. up as a preliminary safety concern?
4 A
I can't make any judgment on it.
As I 5
recall, the procedures said if you have a concern, you
[
6 write a PSC.
7 Q
Did you understand you could wait a year 8
before you could write it up?
9 A
I don't think I ever thought about it in 10 te rms of how long you had.
11 Q
Do you know that the pump discharge line 12 break problem was perceived as a matter for a safety 13 concern more than a year before a prlidinary saf ety 1-4 concern memo was written?
15 A
I didn't know how long it had been thpught
~
16 about.
At least I don't remember how long it had been i
17 thought about.
I 18 Q
Don't you remember getting Dunn's monthly i
19 report for April 1977 telling you that the concern was l
20 already being thought about?
21 A
I don't remember getting any specific Dunn
(.
23 report.
1 23 Q
I show you GPU Exhibit 104 and see if this 24 refreshes your recollection.
This is a top secret, 25 confidential counsel-only document, so I would like to I
_.. _ ~.. -. _ _,. - - _ _
l 1
Bailey 127 f(#
2 request that you don't discuss this outside this room.
3
.Have you been cleared for confidential 4
counsel-only documents?
5 MS. WAGNER:
I don't know if the. witness
{
6 will be allowed to see this document.
7 It is O.K.
The witness can see this 8
document.
9 Q
Is that your name on the first page?
10 A
Yes, it is.
11 Q
Is this a copy of Dunns monthly activities 12 report for the month of April which you received in the 13 regular course of business in or about' late April 19777 14 A
I believe it is.
15 Q
Take a look at page 3 of the document, item 16 E.
Do you recognize the description of the problem there 17 as being the problem which became a preliminary safety 18 concern and a Part 21 in the spring of 19787 19 A
I believe it is the same one. -
20 Q
You were aware, weren't you, in 1977 and 21 1978 that there was a reluctance to raise a safety 22 concern to the level of a PSC without doing an 23 evaluation firsts isn't that right?
24 MS. WAGNER:
I object to th e ques tion.
25 You may answer.
1 Bailey 128
(]'
\\-
2 A
I don't recall that I had that conclusion.
3 Q
Let me show you notes of~an interview of 4
Henry A.
- Bailey, Jr.,
and see if showing you all these 5
statements in black and white as transcribed by the
(
6 NRC refreshes your recollection.
What I am showing is 7
the report of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled 8
" Babcock & Wilcox NPG/Possible Violation of 10CFR Part 21' 9
dated January 24, 1980.
10 would you take a look at page 11, please.
11 You do recall now that you were interviewed by NRC 12 personnel in or about early November 19797 O)
(
13 A
Yes, I recall being interviewed by them.
14 Q
Do you see the third paragraph on page 117 15 A
Yes.
j 16 Q
Do you see the statements there about the l
17 chilling effect upon the use of the PSC system and the
~
18 reluctance to raise an issue to the level of a PSC 19 without doing some sort of evaluation first?
l 20 A
Yes, I see the words.
21 Q
Does that refresh your recollection that you
(_
l 22 communicated these thoughts either in words or substance 23 to the NRC in an interview of you in or about early f~}
24 November 19797 v
25 A
I can't verify that I did or didn't.
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1 Bailey 129
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2 Q
Do you deny that you said it?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Have you ever heard any explanation as to 5
why the safety concern regarding a pump discharge line 6
break which Dunn is referring to in April 1977 didn't 7
rise to the level.of a PSC and a Part 21 report until 8
April 19787 9
A No, I don't believe so.
10 Q
Did you ever hear of a chap named Duerson?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Is he somebody that controls the funding for 13 projects at B&W7 14 A
He is no longer with B&W.
He.has had 15 several jobs around B&W.
He may have been in that 16 position.
17 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark as GPU 18 Exhibit 469, a memo from H.A.
Bailep to 19 Distribution, subject, minutes of meeting with the 20 NRC on 177 fuel assembly lower loop small break 21 analysis, dated April 28, 1978.
These notes of 22 a meeting attended by GPU, Duke, the NRC, Arkansas 23 Power, and about everybody else that wanted to
{}
24 attend are stamped " Confidential, counsel only."
v 25 (Document from H.A.
Bailey to Distribution,
1 Bailey 130
[)
G' 2
subject, minutes of meeting with the NRC on 177 fuel assembly lower loop small ' break analysis,
3 4
dated April 28, 1978 was marked GPU Exhibit 469
(
5 for identification, as of this date.)
6 MS. WAGNER:
I think Met Ed should be 7
pleased we regard their activities and those of 8
other customers as confidential.
9 Q
Are-these notes which you prepared in or 10 about late April, 19787 t
11 MS. WAGNER:
You are talking about every 12 page in this document?
j 13 A
Yes, I believe it is.
14 Q
You attended the meeting, right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Was anything said at this meeting about any 17 lessons learned by B&W as a result of the,Michelson 18 report?
a 19 A
I don't recall any.
I don't recall what 20 is in these minutes.
21 Q
Take a minute to refresh your recollection.
22 Did anybody from B&W mention any concern 23 at this meeting about pressurizer level going up in
()
24 response to a small break loss of coolant accident?
25 A
I d n't recall that they did.
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1 Bailey 131
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2 Q
Did anybody mention at this meeting the 3
potential for operators to be misled by pressurizer 4
water level during a small break loss of coolant (i
5 accident?
6 A
I don't recall that they did.
7 Q
Was there any discussion about the need for 8
different procedures for the regulation of high pressure 9
injection during loss of coolant accidents?
In other 10 words, different from the procedures B&W had previously 11 recommended.
12 A
Yes, I believe we discussed operator action r
13 to open some cross-connect valves as a short-term 14 solution to the problem.
15 Q
That was a solution to the pump discharge 16 line break problem, right?
17 A
Yes.
~
18 Q
Did anybody mention Dunn's proposed guidelines i l
19 for operator termination of high pressure injection l
20 contained in his February 16, 1978 memorandum?
21 A
Not that I recall.
Your witness.
23 MS. WAGNER:
May I have five minutes?
24 (Recess taken) 25 EXAMINATION BY
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V-2 Q
Did anybody mention at this meeting the 3
potential for operators to be misled by pressurizer 4
water level during a small break loss of coolant
( 'i 5
accident?
6 A
I don't recall that they did.
7 Q
Was there any discussion about the need for 8
different procedures for the regulation of high pressure 9
injection during loss of coolant accidents?
In other 10 words, different from the procedures B&W had previously 11 recommended.
12 A
Yes, I believe we discussed operator action 13 to open some cross-connect valves as a short-term 14 solution to the problem.
15 Q
That was a solution to the pump discharge 16 line break problem, right?
l 17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Did anybody mention Dunn's proposed guidelines 19 for operator termination of high pressure injection 20 contained in his February 16, 1978 memorandum?
21 A
Not that I recall.
MR. SELTZER:
Your witness.
22 23 MS. WAGNER:
May I have five minutes?
24 (Recess taken) 25 EXAMINATION BY l
i
1 Bailey 132
^h (O
2 MS. WAGNER:
3 Q
You testified that you did not believe that 4
the_ conclusion expressed in GPU 112 that there were
(
5 circumstances under which pressurizer level indication 6
alone was not an accurate indication of system inventory 7
was transmitted to plants other than TVA.
8 can you explain why you didn't transmit 9
this conclusion to plants other than TVA?
10 MR. SELTZER:
Objection.
No foundation 11 that this witness was even consulted on to whom 12 it should be sent or has any knowledge why it
[
\\~~/
13 was sent to the company it was sent to.
14 MS. WAGNER:
I believe you asked him why he i
15 didn't pass it along to other plants, so I am r
16 asking why he didn't.
17 MR. SELTZER:
I asked him why.he didn't l
l 18 recommend it.
19 Q
Why did you not recommend that'tnis 20 conclusion be transmitted to other plants?
21 A
It was my impression that after reading l
22 the response that we made to TVA, it was my impression 23 that this sort.of thing was included in the training
()
24 program for the operators and that they should not 25 rely on pressurizer level indication by itself as an
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1 Bailey 133 O
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accurate indication of inventory.
3 Q
Did you think at or about the time that 4
GPU 112 was prepared that other plants shared the 5
confusion th at you thought TVA had with respect to
(
6 what pressurizer level indicated?
7 MR. SELTZER:
Are you including in that 8
question Davis-Besse plant about which he had 9
been advised by Dunn that the operators had already 10 terminated high pressure injection in response 11 to rising pressurizer water level?
12 MS. WAGNER:
The witness doesn't recall OG 13 receiving Mr. Dunn's memo.
I am asking for his 14 understanding as to whether or not other plants i
15 shared the confusion of TVA with respect to the i
l 16 significance of pressurizer level.
17 MR. SELTZER:
That is not a pertinent i
I 18 question to a witness who doesn't even read his 19 mail.
20 A
Could you say the question over again?
21 (Question read) 22 A
No, I had no basis to think that the other 23 plants shared this confusion.
()
24 MS. WAGNER:
I have no further questions.
l 25 BY MR. SELTZER:
l
__.._____.__.~._._., _ _ _ _-_... ___ _,,
1 Bailey 134 f"%
k) 2 Q
If you had read Dunn's memo before January 19; 3
1 979, you would have had a basis for knowing that there 4
was confusion at other plants, would't you?
(
5 MS. WAGNER:
I object to the question and 6
direct the witness not to answer.
Speculation.
7 He testified he didn't read it before the accident.
8 MR. SELTZER:
If you are not going to let g
him answer my question, all I can do is protest.
10 (Time noted:
4:35 p.m.)
t 11 coo 12
()
Henry Bailey l
14 Subscribed and sworn to 15 before me this 16 day of 1982.
17 18 19 l
20
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22 23
()
24 25
1 135
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STATE OF NEW YORK
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- ss.:
4 COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
5 6
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Notary Public within and for the State of New York, 8
do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition 9
of Henry sailev was taken before 10 me on February 23, 1982 11 That the said witness was duly sworn 12 before the commencement of his testimony and O
13 that the within transcript iis a true record of said 14 testimony; l
15 That I am not connected by blood or 16 marriage with any of the parties herein nor 17 interested directly or indirectly in the matter in 18 controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the 19 counsel.
~
l 20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 21 my hand this Y
day of 44C
/788,
22 i
W
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/
/
J eph R.
Danyo 25
136 I NDEX Witness Page Henry Bailey 4
h=
EXHI B I TS GPU For Ident.
466 Document entitled " Resume of Jenry A.
Bailey" 4
I.i 467 Two-page document from Mr.
Bailey to Mr. Taylor dated April 3, 1979 relating to the effect of the loop seal on the level of the pressurizer 99 g-V 468 Handwriting sample of Mr.
Bailey
~
100 i
469 Document from H.A. Bailey to Distribution, subject, minutes of meeting with the NRC on 177 fuel assembly lower loop small break analysis, dated April 28, 1978
~
130 oOo O