ML20072G334

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Forwards General Physics Corp Evaluation Results of Items in Corporate Scope of Review.Info Should Be Sufficient to Close SER Open Items
ML20072G334
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/1983
From: James Smith
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0420, RTR-NUREG-420 SNRC-912, NUDOCS 8306280445
Download: ML20072G334 (6)


Text

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I LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY M!

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION wac%w www=mur-w, P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER N.Y.11792 Dkut Dbl NumWr June 23, 1983 SNRC-912 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Control Room Design Review Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

On February 3, 1983, Supplement three to NUREG 0420 was issued.

Appendix D of that document identified those human engineering deficiency (HED) commitments for which implementation was incomplete at that time.

Of the twenty-two (22) HED's identified, seven (7) required review and evaluation by LILCO's human factors consultant, General Physics Corporation.

Enclosed are 40 copies of General Physics evaluation results l

(Enclosure 1) for those items in the General Physics scope of review.

It is our understanding that this information is sufficient to close those items.

Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.

I i

Very truly yours, i

L.

Smith Manager, Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station DWD:bc Enclosure cc:

J. Higgins All Parties Listed in Attachment 1 i

8306280445 830623 PDR ADOCK 05000322 E

PDR O

FC-8935.1 i

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ATTACHMENT 1 Lawrence Brenner, Esq.

Herbert H. Brown, Esq.

Administrative Judge Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J.

Letsche, Esq.

Board Panel Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christoper & Phillips Washington, D.C.

20555 8th Floor 1900 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 Dr. Peter A. Morris Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith Board Panel Energy Research Group U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4001 Totten Pond Road Wasnington, D.C.

20555 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 4:

Dr. James H. Carpenter MHB Technical Associates Administrative Judge 1723 Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite K Board Panel San Jose, California 95125 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Stephen D.

Latham, Esq.

Twomey, Latham & Shea Daniel F.

Brown, Esq.

33 West Second Street Attorney P.O. Box 398 Atomic Safety and Licensing Riverhead, New York 11901 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Ralph Shapiro, Esq.

Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.

9 East 40th Street Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.

New York, New York 10016 David A.

Repka, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.

State of New York Department of Public Service James Dougherty Three Empire State Plaza 3045 Porter Street Albany, New York 12223

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Washington, D.C.

20008 i

ENCLOSURE 1 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION i 19650 filCKOR Y RIDGE ROAD --- --

COLUMBL1, MAR YLAND 21044 301 964-6000-301-932-1240

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June 20, 1983 GP-L-221317 Mr. Ernie Papadoulias Long Island Lighting Company NOSD 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, NY 11801

Dear Ernie:

Enclosed please find, as Attachment 1, a description of General Physics' evaluation of NRC items 2.1, 3.9, 3.11 (3.15), 3.13 (3.17),

4.1 (4.4), 8.1 and 8.2.

This attachment should provide the support-ing documentation for the closcout of these items.

Should you have any questions or co:::ments, please give me a call.

Sincerely, GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION Robert J. Liddle Project Manager RJL/amg Enclosure i

cc:

D. Dodson l

l l

I

4 ATTACHMENT 1 4

GENERAL PHYSICS' EVALUATION OF NRC ITEMS

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NRC Finding 2.1 Permanent control room ventilation system could not be evaluated since it is not operational. The temporary ventilation system has excessive air flow.

Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) 6.1.5.la, b 6.1.5.2a, b General Physics Evaluation.

Temperature, humidity, temperature differential, air quantity and air velocity were evaluated. Humidity and air quantity were evaluated by comparing the specifications of the ventilation system with the guidelines noted above. Air velocity measurements were taken with an Alnor velometer at eight key locations in the control room. Temperature and temperature differential were measured with a Bristol-Babcock Thermo-Humidigraph.

The results of these evaluations showed that all variables were in compliance with the guidelines.

NRC Finding 3.9 (SSER 43.14)

It is difficult to distinguish whether dark red colored tiles, amber colored tiles, backlit red tiles, and backlit green tiles of annunciator displays are ON or OFF.

Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) 6.3.3.2d t

General Physics Evaluation As a result of the above finding, lens caps for the subjec'. annunciators were replaced with a less opaque model obtained from the vendor. Luminance measures were made using a Minolta Luminance Meter, with the affected annunciators both energized and unenergized. With the exception of the back-lit green annunciator tiles, which registered a luminance ratio in excess of 2:1, all annunciators met the acceptance criteria stated above.

In the case of the back-lit green annunciators, the degree of improvement makes it easily visually discriminable as to the condition of the annunciator (either lit or unlit). Based on this considerable degree of improvement, General Physics finds the condition to be acceptable.

O ~

NRC Finding 3.15 (SSER W3.11)

Localizing quality of audible alarms is not adequate. While the frequencies of the annunciator alarms at the RCC benchboard and at the RWC and RCIC benchboard are different, their separation is not sufficient to provide a clear localizing quality.

It is difficult to determine which annunciator panel is alarming when only one alarm is sounding.

Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) 6.3.2.lf General Physics Evaluation The three annunciator alarms were activated separately and simultaneously. A listener stationed at the operator's desk could easily discriminate between and amongst the three different alarm locations by their individual sonic qualities. General Physics finds this condition to be acceptable.

NRC Finding 3.17 (SSER #3.13)

Annunciator alarms on the Feedwater and Electrical areas of Panel MCB are not loud enough. They are barely audible above the 64 dB(A) ambient background noise level.

Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) 6.3.2.la General Physics Evaluation Annunciator alarm levels were measured using a Bruel and Kjaer Precision l

Integrating Sound Level Meter and all were found to be at least 10 dB(A) above ambient noise levels, which is in compliance with the guidelines.

NRC Findings 8.1 and 8.2 Some labels are located below the controls they identify. Example l

Panel ACH-Primary Containment Gas Analyzer Control. Throughout the control room, display labels are not consistently located either above or below the displays.

l Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) l l

6.6.2.la General Physics Evaluation LILCO has developed a revised labeling scheme for panels lHll*PNL ACl&2 and lHil*PNL ACH.

The proposed configuration has been reviewed and found to be acceptable with regard to human factors standards and consistent with the Shoreham control room labeling convention.

t

.o NRC Finding 4.4 (SSER $4.1)

J handle controls are too close to the front edge of the Panel 602 benchboard and are vulnerable to accidental actuation.

Acceptance Criteria (NUREG-0700) 6.4.1.2a General Physics Evaluation A test was performed to ascertain the susceptibility of accidental activation of subject switches. A high-fidelity mock-up was prepared and subjects representing a 5th%ile female, a 50th%ile male and 95th%ile male were outfitted with a belt-worn walkie-talkie, a belt-worn flashlight holder, and a tool holster. Each subject walked down the board with each piece of equipment 10 times (5 times with a piece of equipment on the lef t side, 5 times with a piece of equipment on the right side) for a total of 90 passes. The failure criteria were as follows:

1.

Failure is defined as a switch contact changing state.

a.

Failure occurrence in any one 10-trial cell shall not exceed one, b.

Failure occurrence in any one Test Subject percentile now will not exceed two.

c.

Failure occurrence in the entire test will not exceed three.

The failure criteria were exceeded in all three cases.

It is recommended that a guard rail be installed to ensure the avoidance of accidental actuation.

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