ML20072D816
| ML20072D816 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1983 |
| From: | Tramm T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 6789N, NUDOCS 8306230412 | |
| Download: ML20072D816 (52) | |
Text
m _ _. _
r A i
[ 'N Commonwealth Edison
/ One First National Plan, Chicago, Illinois
( ss D Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
( / Chicago, Illinois 60690 June 17, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection NRC Docket Nos. 50-454, 50-455, 50-456, and 50-457 Reference (a): April 11, 1983, letter from B. J.
Youngblood to D. L. Farrar.
Dear Mr. Denton:
This is to provide additional information regarding instrumenta-tion which would be used to assure a safe shutdown in the event of a fire at Byron or Braidwood stations. This information was requested by the NRC in reference (a). It will be incorporated into the FSAR and the Fire Protection Report in future amendments.
The two remaining NRC concerns involve source range neutron monitoring after a fire in the control room and safe shutdown instru-mentation operability after a fire in the auxiliary electric room. The new panel will display steam generator pressures and levels, reactor coolant loop hot and cold temperature, and source range neutron flux.
l Appropriate changes to FSAR question 10.57 and Section 2.4 of the Fire Protection Report are included in Attachment A to this letter. Other minor changes are incuded to address minor issues discussed previously with NRC fire protection reviewers.
With the present equipment procurement and construction completion schedules it appears that the new panel will be operational pror to initial fuel load for all units except Byron 1. The Byron 1 panel will be installed as soon as practical but no later than the end of the first refueling outage. We consider interim operation of Byron 1 without this panel to be acceptable based upon: 1) the relatively low likelihood of a damaging fire in either the control room or the auxiliary electric equipment room during the first fuel cycle, 2) the circuits involved serve monitoring functions, not control functions, and 3) satisfactory maintenance of safe , shutdown can be achieved through manual local monitoring of important parameters during the relatively short time it would take to restore remote indication of process variables.
8306230412 830617 PDR ADOCK 05000454 Ylif [
/
F PDR
f H. R. Denton June 17, 1983 Please address further questions regarding this matter to this office.
One signed original and fifteen copies of this letter and the attachment are provided for NRC review.
Very truly yours, I l T. R. Tramm Nuclear Licensing Administrator
-lm Attachments l
6789N i
l I
l 1.
4 L_
4 h
ATTACHMENT A List of Revised Pages FSAR: Question 010.57 Fire-Protection Report: 2.4-6 2.4-7 2.4-10
- 2.4-10a 2.4-12.
2.4-16 2.4-16a 2.4-25 thru -27 2.4-34a thru -341 2.4-38 2.4-54 2.4-228 thru -250 4
6789N l'
i-1 I
r-
' ~
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 43 QUEST. ION 010.57
" Table 2.4-4a of the safe shutdown analysis identifies safe shutdown instrumentation. However, the analysis indicates that following a fire in a number of separate plant fire zones, redundant channels of certain of these instruments which must be available during hot shutdown will be lost. This is unacceptable. It is our position that at least once channel of instrumentation essential
'for -safe ' shutdown be protected 'from ' fire damage in accor-
_ dance.with.Section-III.G.2 of. Appendix R or an alternate be provided which meets'the requirements of Section
.III.L of Appendix R. The backup instrumentation justifi-cation discussion of these fire zones in the safe shutdown analysis does not comply with Section III.L. Instrumen-tation affected includes source range neutron flux mon-itoring, steam generator wide range level indication, reactor coolant hot and cold leg indication and auxiliary feedwater flow indication in the following areas:
- a. Control room
- b. Lower cable spreading room
- c. Auxiliary electrical equipment room
- d. Auxiliary building general Area, elevation 383'-0"
- e. Radwaste and remote shutdown control room, and
,f. Radwaste drumming station and tunnel."
RESPONSE
A discussion of each of the areas listed in the question follows. Note that the lower cable spreading rooms are ,
divided into five fire zones. A discussion is provided for each zone. Table Q10.57-1 lists the number of channels
_of~ instrumentation.affected.in-each. fire zone for-each of the instrumentation types listed in the question. The list in this table does not include new indication for some of these parameters added in response to staff positions.
These are described in the applicable portions of Section 2.4 of the Fire Protection Report. Reference to specific
-subsections which may be applicable are provided under-the discussions for each fire zone which follows,
- a. Control Room (Fire Zone 2.1-0)
Both channels of source range neutron monitoring instru-1 mentation would be affected by a fire in this zone.
This is due to the f act that the neutron monitoring Q10.57-1
, , -s._--, . . - - , - , - . - , , , . __-,%,. __ _ - , _ . _ _ _ _
1 B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 43 4
system panel 1PM07J is located in the control room.
It is the Applicant's position, however, that the source range neutron monitoring instruments are not required to achieve or. maintain the plant in the hot standby or hot shutdown' conditions. In the event of a fire in this zone, the operators would have sufficient time j to scram the reactor prior to evacuating the room.
-Once the control rods are inserted into the core, suf-
~ ficient negative reactivity has been inserted to ensure subcriticality while hot standby'or hot shutdown con-
-ditions are. maintained. :Should 'it ibe :necessary to; deter-mine or verify the.available shutdown-margin, a pr.imary
-coolant system sample can be drawn and analyzed for boron. concentration. This operation can be performed onsite by station personnel. -
Thus, no reliance is placed on the neutron monitoring system. instrumentation until actions are begun to take
- the plant-to cold shutdown.
The Applicant believes this position meets Appendix R requirements. In particular,Section III.L.l.a, which
-states that alternative shutdown capability shall be capable of achieving and maintaining subcriticality, is met by manually scramming the reactor, since'subcrit-icality is assured by inserting the control rods into
, the core and maintaining hot standby conditions,Section III.L.2.d, which states that direct indication of process variables necessary to perform and control the reactivity i
control function shall be provided, is met because once the control rods have been inserted into the core, direct indication of neutron flux is not required to control reactivity while hot standby is maintained. Credit is'taken for repairing' fire damage to neutron moni'toring system cables prior to initiating cold shutdown actions, ,
as-per Appendix R. -
'In. summary, the Applicant's position meets Appendix R and- l protection of neutron monitoring system cables from
- fire damage is not warranted.
Nevertheless, in response to a staff position, the Appli-cant has agreed to provide indication of source range
. neutron flux independent of this zone. Refer to Subsection 2.4.2.4 of the Fire Protection Report for a detailed description of the modifications provided.
b .' Lower Cable Spreading Rooms:
- 1) Fire zone 3.2A This zone does not contain any of the instrumentation cable listed for this question.
l Q10.57-2
, . _ ~ , , - . . . , . .,,, , , . , _ _ _ . _ . -
- , . , ...-,,,,.._..,-__,--_..,_--.-....-,,..-,_m.-...-,...._-,.-.-_,-_4, - , - - . , - - - . . - -
_y -
_ ___ . . _ . . _ _ _ __ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .
B/B-FSAR AMENDMElf1' 43
( i
- 2) Fire Zone 3.2B This zone contains cables f rom ,
both trains of the neutron monitoring system. Refer '
a to part a of this response for the Applicant's position on this system. Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for other parameters listed in this question are routed through this zone.
Thus, additional fire protection features are not requi' red for this zone.
- 3) Fire ~ zone 3.2C This zone contains cables from both trains ofsthe neutron monitoring system. Refer to part a of this response:for the Arplicant's, position on this system. Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for other parameters listed in this question are routed through this zone. ,
s
- 4) Fire Zone 3.2D Cables for not more than one train out of two of instrumentation for parameters listed in this question,are routed through this zone.
Thus, additional- fire protection features are not required for this zone.
- 5) Fire Zone 3.2E-l- Cables for not more than one train out of two of' instrumentation for, parameters listed in this question are' rcuted through this zone.
. Thus, additional fire protection features are not ,
required for this zone. ,
- c. Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (Fire Zone 5.5-1)
Modifications to provide essential instrumentation independent of this zone are described in Subsection 2.4.2.21 of the Fire Protection Report.
- d. Auxiliary Building General Arha - Elevation 383 feet' 0/ inch ire Zone 11.4-0) l only one:out of two channels of the neutron monitoring system are pre.sent in this zone. Four-out-of-four channels of steam generator wide range level and reactor coolant hot and cold. leg temperat.ure. instrumentation are present, l however. Refer to.part c of this question for a descrip-l tion of the resolution for these instruments.
j a- c ,
! All'eight channels of auxiliary feedwater flow are' present.
l ~A .f irca in this zone could render all auxiliary feedwater flow indication here inoperable. The auxiliary feedwater l flow transmitters (located in Fire Zone 11.3-0) are ,
l indicating transmitters, however. Thus, if indication I is lost in this zone, an operator could be sent to read Q10.57-3
- \
, , - , . - _ . ,n , - - . - , - _ ,
e -, - - , -~n -
0 0
B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 43 the local indication at the transmitters. The operator would maintain communication with the control room by portable radio or other plant communications equipment.
Thus, the loss of the auxiliary feedwater flow indication due to a fire in this zone is acceptable.
- e. Radwaste and Remote Shutdown Control Rooms (Fire Zone ll.4C-0).
The discussion under 'Part d of this question ifor Fire Zone'11.4-0 is also. applicable for this fire zone.
- f. Radwaste Drumming Station and Tunnel (Fire Zone 14.1-0)
The fire zone boundary of this zone is redefined in the revised Fire Protection Report. The original boundary was arbitrary and did not conform to plant structural features. The new boundary follows a structural concrete wall. As a result of this change, the area on elevation 383 feet 0 inch roughly between column-rows 21 and 25 and P to Q was deleted from Fire Zone 14.1-0 and added to Fire Zone 11.4-0. This area included the cables from the safe shutdown instrumentation-. listed in this question.
-Fire Zone 14.1-0 now'contains no cafe shutdown cables.
Refer to part d of this question for a resolution of this question for Fire Zone 11.4-0.
9 l
\ .
s Q10.57-4 l
~
TABLE Q10.57-1 i INSTRUMENTATION CHANNELS ROUTED THROUGH FIRE ZONES INSTRUMENTATION RC HOT &
FIRE NEUTRON SG WIDE COLD LEG AUXILIARY AREA ZONE MONITORING RANGE LEVEL TEMPERATURE FEEDWATER FLOW
~
- a. Control Room 2.1-0 SR: 2/2 --- --- ---
- b. Lower Cable 3.2A-1 --- --- --- ---
l Spreading -
Rooms 3.2B-1 SR: 2/2 2/4 Cold Leg: 4/4 4/8 (One Train) :
o 3.2C-1 SR: 2/2 ---
Cold Leg: 4/4 4/8 (One Train) E to
,o 3.2D-1 ---
2/4 Cold Leg: 4/4 4/8 (One Train) w h
y 3.2E-1 SR: 1/2 2/4 Hot Leg: 4/4 4/8 (One Train) W m ,
- c. AEER 5.5-1 SR: 2/2 4/4 Hot Leg: 4/4 ---
(Power Sources) Cold Leg: 4/4 *
- d. Aux. Bldg. 11.4-0 SR: 1/2 4/4 Hot Leg: 4/4 El. 383 ft 0 in. Cold Leg: 4/4 8/8
- e. RSP ll.4C-0 SR: 1/2 4/4 Hot Leg: 4/4 Cold Leg: 4/4 8/8
- f. Radwaste 14.1-0 (1/2) * (4/4)* ---
(8/8)* g IE N
- Due to redefinition of fire zone boundaries, Fire Zone 14.1-0 now has no safe O shutdown cables routed through it.
w .~
k
D/B .AM.END.
. . MENT 1 .
1
- c. In the. case of associated cables sharing a common encloaure, the . cables used on Byron /Braidwood meet the flame test of IEEE 383-1974 which demon-
, strates that the cable does not propagate fire
- even if its outer covering and insulation have ,
i been destroyed in the area of flame inpingement.
In addition to the above, Byron /Braidwood cables are sparated in eight separate divisions as follows:
- 1. ESF. Division.11.
1 2. ESF' Division 12.
l 3. Non-Safety-Related Division 11. ,
- 4. .Non-Safety-Related Division 12.
- 5. RPS Reactor Protection / Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 1.
- 6. RPS Reactor Protection / Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 2.
[ 7. RPS Reactor Protection / Nuclear Instrumentation
- Channel 3.
j 8. RPS Reactor Protection / Nuclear Instrumentation Channel 4.
Therefore, associated cables of different-divisions do not share a cotamon cable tray, conduit or race-
. way.
j -- - -
/ . 2.4.1.6 Repairs ~~
~
i .
For many of the fire zones, credit is taken for making repairs
- to equipment in order to perform one or more of the safe shut-e.
down functions. In all cases, such credit is taken only to .
accomplish a function required for cold shutdown. The ability
- to achieve and maintain hot shutdown independent of each fire '
l- zone, without taking credit for repairs, is demonstrated in l Subsection 2.4.2.
l- Table 2.4-4B lists each fire zone for which credit for affect-ing. repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> was taken in the Safe Shutdown l Analysis. Also listed in the table are the affected equipment, I
a description of the repair for which credit is taken, and a list of major materials required. As can be seen from this table, most repairs identified consist of installing temporary l cable to replace cables assumed to be damaged by a fire. .The only exceptions are in fire zone 2.1-0, where control switches i
must be replaced, and in fire zone 11.5-0, where^ credit is-l~
taken for installing-a pump. In this case, the pump involved is a small pump with a small electric motor.
. . r l-i
. 4 I
f!
2.4 l i
.___-,____._,u,_-_.- - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
, . B/D For.each of the fire zones listed in Table 2.4-4b, where credit is taken for making repairs, a procedure will be written and be available to cov'er the repair needed. The procedures will, however, be general for each type of re-pair. For example, one procedure will be written for " Install temporary cable," and this one procedure will be applicable for all zones where this repair is referenced. The repair procedure will be referenced in the Pre-Fire Plan for each
. fire zone where it is required.
The-nature and scope of these repairs are such.that.they wouldche' performed by the plant's normal maintenance staff, who possess adequate training to complete these tasks.
Neither. additional nor specially trained personnel would be required.
e e
+
0 1
2.4-7
a B/B AMENDMENT 2 i
Cable separation for the PORV and block valve power and control cables were checked throughout the' remainder of this zone.
4 Except for the immediate area around the pressurizer coffin, i the separation between'the Division 11 PORV and block valve l I
cables and the Division 12 PORV and block valve. cables. exceeds i 20 ft. As previously stated', the present arrangement in the area of the pressurizer coffin is considered acceptable due l to the--low combustible loading in this zone and'the fact that
- the. cables of : concern are : routed in conduit.
- Additional channels are available .for .all . instruments . lost i
! -except pressurizer temperature. This parameter.is not essential however, since it can be inferred from pressurizer-pressure, two channels of which remain available.
Thus, a credible fire in this zone will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
2.4.2.4 Control Room (Fire Zone 2.1-0)
Safe shutdown equipment located in this zone and safe shutdown
, power and control cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-14. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-15. ,
In the event of a fire in this zone, the reactor would be tripped and control rod insertion would be verified prior to control room evacuation, thus placing the plant in hot standby.
, Both normal channels of source range neutron monitoring instru-mentation could be affected by a fire in this zone. This
, is-due to the fact that the neutron monitoring system panel
- 1PM07J is located 1n the control room. In response to a staff
- position on this subject, the applicant agreed to provide
- indication of source range neutron flux independent of this zone. The general scheme to be implemented involves taking
, a signal from an existing detector and using it-with a new l indicator on a new " Fire Hazards. Panel" to be provided (refer
- to subsection 2.4.2.21 for more details on the new panel).
- Should this prove to be impractical, a new detector will be provided in a spare well, making this new source range flux instrument completely independent of the existing system.
Also present in this zone are the controls for the pressurizer PORV's.and block valves. Refer to Subsection 2.4.3.2.2 for a discussion of the effects of fire on this system. Following evacuation of the' control room, overpressure protection for
~
- the primary system would be provided by the pressurizer safety 2.4-10
---=r-i -,m , y , y<,.- .,y--w-..---w, --,.+m-w,,,ye +e- -- - - -.. w- = ---y- -
ae - - , -.-- ,-=,as- em.---,--w-. .,-.--,.g.,7
B/B Amendment 2 ,,
valves. The plant would be maintained in hot standby until repairs could be implemented to the PORV and block valves control switches and cables, thus allowing depressurization of the primary system. This would certainly be accomplished within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Under these circumstances, the plant can be maintained in both hot standby and cold shutdown from the Remote Shutdown Panel, (lPLO4J, lPLO5J and~1PLO6J), and other local instrumentation and controls.
Thus, a fire in this zone will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
2.4.2.5 Record Storage Room (Fire Zone 2.1-1)
No safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. No safe shutdown power or control cables are routed through this zone.
Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-16.
l 2.4-10a L
D/D AMENDMENT 2 This fire zone is a controlled l access area. It is provided with an automatic fire detection and suppression system.
Thus, a fire in'this zone will not now impare the capability to safely shutdown the plant.
2.4.2.8 Lower Cable Spreading Area (Fire Zone 3.2B-1)
No safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Safe shutdown power and control cables routed through this zone are 711sted in Table 2.4-21. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone :are listed in Table 2.4-22.
Power, control and non-nuclear instrumentation cables from only one electrical division are located in this zone. A fire in this zone could result in the loss of both channels of intermediate and source range neutron detectors. A new ,
indicator of source range neutron flux is provided independent of this zone. Refer to Subsection 2.4.2.4 for details. Thus, a fire in this zone would not affect the ability to safely shutdown the plant.
2.4.2.9 Lower Cable Spreading Area (Fire Zone 3.2C-1)
No safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Safe shutdown power and control cables routed through this zone
, , are listed in Table 2.4-23. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-24.
Power, control, and non-nuclear instrumentation cables from only one electrical division are located in this zone. A fire in this zone could result in the loss of both channels of intermediate and source range neutron detectors. A new indicator of source range neutron flux is provided independent
, of this zone. Refer to Subsection 2.4.2.4 for details. Thus, l
a fire in this zone would not affect the ability to safely shutdown the plant.
2.4.2.10 Lower Cable Spreading Area (Fire Zone 3.2D-1) l No. safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Safe shutdown power and control cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-25. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-26.
Cables from only one electrical division are located in this zone, therefore, a fire in this zone would not affect the ability to safely shut down the plant.
2.4.2.11 Division 11 Cable Riser (Fire Zone 3.2E-1) l No safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Safe i shutdown-power and control cables routed through this zone l
2.4-12 l
r
,g, w- .,. .,=. .-,m . . - - - - - y y, - --
,.w- -
,- w- - - y-+ a 9
B/B AMENDMENT 2 The only " combustible" material in this zone is the cable insulation / jacketing materials as listed in Table ~ 2.2-2.
l The Byron /Braidwood cables have passed the IEEE 383-1974 flame test and thus can be considered to be self-extinguishing and i i non-flame propagating. Although they may burn in the presence of a fire of non-related origin, no other combustible materials have been identified as being present in the zone. Transient
- combustibles are thus the only possible source of fire which l could affect the cables. While transient combustibles may
. tHt present .at , times, a large -enough quantity to af fect more than a small part of this room would not ever be introduced.
, In the event a credible fire were to start in this. room, the arrangement of-cabinets and separation of cables are such that the rapid spread of the fire would be severely hampered.
The metal enclosures of the cabinets would act effectively
! to contain the fire within a single cabinet, or perhaps several adjacent cabinets. The spread of a fire from one row of cabinets to the next row is extremely unlikely due to the shielding effect of the cabinet enclosures to the cables inside from radiant energy. Divisional separation helps to limit the effects of any credible fire also. All division 12 cables enter the cabinets through the floor. These cables are not
. exposed to the general room environment. Division 11 cables
. leave the cabinets at their top, and then penetrate the ceiling to the cable spreading area above. Thus a general exposure
. fire that affected Division 11 cable trays near the ceiling
- would not affect redundant Division 12 cables.
This room is provided with ionization detectors which would quickly detect any fire. Since it is adjacent to the control i room, which is continously manned, fire fighting personnel would quickly respond to-any alarm, and would have easy and c unobstructed access to the room to conduct fire fighting activities.
Numerous extinguishers are located in this zone and in the adjacent control room, as shown on Figure 2.3-8 (sheet 1) .
For the reasons outlined above, a credible fire in this zone would not seriously affect the ability to safely shutdown the unit.
i Nevertheless, indication for several key safe shutdown para-
- meters will be provided independent of this zone. These para-meters will be displayed on a new " Fire Hazards Panel" which will be located in an area independent of this zone. Two l areas under consideration for locating this new panel are the electrical cable penetration areas on elevations 414'-0" and 426'-0". A final location has not been chosen at this time, however.
2.4-16
,,,-,,n..v,,-,, ,, , - .,--r,,,-,,.,,-,,..,m, .
nw.-,-+,,,--nn. ----em-,..,., ,n. ,-,_,,,n.., ..,c.,--- . - - , - ,
B/B AMENDMENT 2 t
Parameters to be displayed are the following: 1) two channels
- (one for each of two steam generators) of steam generator wide range level; 2) two channels (one for each of two steam generators) of steam generator pressure; 3) one channel of pressurizer level; 4) one channel of pressurizer pressure; 5) four channels each of reactor coolant hot and cold leg tempera-ture, and'6) one channel of source range neutron monitoring.
4 Note that the two channels of steam generator pressure and the two channels of steam generator wide range level will be
.provided for the same two steam generators.
._ a ..
The~ general scheme to be implemented for the new indication
'is'as follows. The signal -from one of the existing transmitters will be intercepted with a local transfer switch located between the containment penetration and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Raxa. A new indicator will be provided. New equipment consists
! of the transfer switch, any required signal conditioning / processing circuitry, the indicator and associated cabling. In accordance
- with -Section III.L.b of Appendix R, the new equipment and 1
components will not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria,-the single failure criteria, or other design basis l . accident criteria. 'Only the interface needs to be designed so as not to degrade the performance or reliability of the i existing equipment.
In addition to the parameters listed above, reactor coolant
!, hot and cold leg temperature instrumentation _is also present in this zone. The applicant has conducted a thorough review l and found eleven-fire zones where all four channels of hot l leg temperature instrumentation could be lost due to a fire, and eight fire zones where all four-channels of cold leg temperature j could be lost. The following modification will be implemented to resolve this problem. All eight existing RTD's (four hot leg and'four cold leg)'will be replaced.with qualified dual element RID's. One element for each RTD will be connected to'the existing cables, so that the existing system functions will not.be changed in any way. The second element from each RTD will be wired to the new indicators at the new " Fire Hazards Panel." The new cable routing will be accomplished in such a way that no single fire could disable either all eight hot leg or all eight-cold leg temperature indicators.
The new " Fire Hazards Panel" and the modifications to the reactor coolant temperature RTD's are presently being designed.
Upon completion of the design process, further details will.
be reported.
Should use of this panel be required by a fire in this zone, an operator would be dispatched to the zone. He would maintain communication with the control room using a portable radio or other plant. communications equipment.
2.4-16a I
e
.= _. - _ _. - _ . . . . . . .
B/B ,
AMENDMENT 2 0
2.4.2.43 Auxiliary Building General Area, Elevation 383 feet 0 inch (Fire Zone 11.4-0)
Safe shutdown equipment located in this zone and safe shutdown power-and control cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-70. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed'in Table 2.4-71.
.All of.the equipment. located in this zone..and.alloof~the, power
<end icontrol~ cables : routed"through :this . zone;are Jf rom . electrical Division 11 with only one exception. Cable.lCC020 is the Division 12 power cable.to'the shared component cooling pump.
However, it is separated from 1CC001, the power cable to the i Division 11 pump,'by more than 20 feet.
l At one point in this zone, cables for all of the auxiliary feedwater pump flow channels and all four steam generator wide range level channels are within 20 feet of each other.
Cables for the reactor coolant hot and cold leg wide' range
, temperature indication are also within 20 feet of each other.
However, if these were lost, AFW flow would be read at the
-transmitters. As a result of modifications made in response i to a staff position, indication for the other parameters would still be available at the Fire Hazards Panel (refer to Subsection 2.4.2.21-for a description of the Fire Hazards Panel and the modifications made in response to the staff position) .
.Other instrumentation present is redundant, or is not needed for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />,. leaving time available to effect repairs.
This general area has a low combustible loading which consists mostly of cable jacket and -insulation materials $ and automatic fire detection is provided. Since redundant or equivalent i essential equipment and . instrumentation is1available independent of this-zon'e, a fire in this zone will not prevent the safe shutdown of the~pl' ant.
2.4.2.44 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Diesel Room
. (Fire lone ll.4A-1)
! Safe shutdown equipment located in this zone and safe. shutdown power.and control cables routed through this zone are listed on Table 2,4-72.
With the exception of valve 1AF006A (essential service water to auxillary feedwater pump suction); all equipment and cables
.are -associated with one -electrical division. While a fire
.in-this-zone could~ affect the ability to supply essential service water to both auxiliary feedwater pumps, this source of water is not normally used. -The normal source is the condensate astorage. . tank, ,.which 'is sti'll available. Therefore, a fire
'in"th'is^ zone *wou'1d'not' affect the ability to' safely shut down ,
the plant.
2.4-25
4 B/B AMENDMENT 2 2.4.2.45 Radwaste and Remote Shutdown Control Room *
(Fire Zone ll.4C-0)
Safe shutdown equipment located in this zone and safe shut-down power and control cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-73. Safe shutdown instrumentation cables routed through this zone are listed in Table 2.4-74.
A number of -essential functions are monitored or controlled fromsthe, remote. shutdown: panels. The cables routed through this zone cannot be isolated from the control room. In other words, while this zone can be isolated so that a fire in the control room cannot affect the controls and instruments in this zone, the reverso is not true. A fire in this zone will render both these panels and the corresponding instruments and controls in the control room inoperable. This is an acceptable situation, however, since all of the instruments and controls have additional redundant channels or diverse equipment located in the control room or elsewhere that can perform the safe shutdown function independent of this zone. A detailed analysis follows.
Instrumentation provided on remote shutdown panels 1PLO4J, 1PLO5J and 1PLO6J is listed on Tables 2.4-74a, b and c respectively.
Panel 1PLO4J has auxiliary feedwater pump 1A flow.to steam generators A through D (four channels), steam generator level (A through D, four channels), and essential service water temperature (two channels) as listed in Table 2.4-74a. The auxiliary feedwater flow can be read from local indicators at the transmitters, independent of this fire zone. Steam generator wide range level remains available at the Fire Hazards Panel (refer to Subsection 2.4.2.21) . The essential service water temperature indication was not identified as required for safe shutdown, and thus its loss has no affect on the i ability to safety shutdown the unit.
l l
l l
2.4-26 l
p ,
B/B AMENDMENT 2 Panel 1PLO5J has auxiliary feedwater pump 1B flow to steam generators A through D (4 channels), reactor coolant loop A through D hot and cold leg temperatures (4 channels each),
and essential service water temperature (two channels). As stated above, the auxiliary feedwater flow indication is available elsewhere independent of this fire zone. Reactor coolant hot and cold leg temperature indication remains available at the " Fire' Hazards Panel" (refer to Subsection 2.4.2.21 for a detail-ed discussion of this instrumentation). The essential service water temperatures.are.not required.formsafe, shutdown of the unit.
Panel 1PLO6J has steam generator A through D steam pressure (4 channels) , pressurizer level (2 channels) , pressurizer pressure (one channel) , source range detector count rate (one channel) , boron injection flow (one channel) , volume control tank level (one channel) , charging header pressure (one channel) l and charging header flow (one channel) as listed in Table 2.4-74c. Two channels per steam generator of steam generator steam pressure indication remain available in the control
. room independent of this' zone. One channel of pressurizer level and three channels of pressurizer pressure indication remain available in the control room independent of this zone.
. ,One channel of source range detector count rate remains available in the. control room independent of this zone. Emergency boron injection flow is only required for cold shutdown, thus, time
.is available to repair the cable prior to its use. Volume control tank level and charging header pressure are not required for safe shutdown of the unit. Charging header flow is not redundant, but pressurizer level and pressurizer pressure indication are still available. Since the primary system conditions are those in which the operators are most interested, loss of the charging header flow indication will not prevent
~
safe shutdown of the u'n'it.
Controls provided on remote shutdown panels IPLO4J, 1PLO5J and 1PLO6J are listed on Table 2.4-74d, e, and f respectively.
Controls on panel 1PLO5J are identical to those on panel 1PLO/J ,
except-they are for Division 12 equipment, while controls on 1PLO4J are for Division 11 equipment. The following discussion of panel 1PLO4J controls therefore applies equally to panel 1PL O 5J .
(
Among the safe shutdown equipment controlled from panel 1PLO4J are the auxiliary feedwater regulating valves and steam generator isolation valves. The steam generator isolation valves are l
2.4-27 l
l
B/B 2.4.3 Identification and Analysis of High-Low Pressure Interfaces 2.4.3.1 Identification of High-Low Pressure Interfaces A thorough review of all interf aces of the RCS with other plant systems has identified four high-low pressure interfaces that utilize redundant electrically controlled devices for isolation of the primary coolant pressure boundary. Two of the-interfaces consist of the two motor-operated valves in series in each of the.RHR; pump. suction lines. Thesezare dis-cussed in detail in Subsection 2.4.3.2.1. The other two inter-f aces consist of the two power-operated relief valves (PORV' s) and their associated motor-operated block valves. These are discussed in detail in Subsection 2.4.3.2.2. ,
2.4.3.2 Evaluation of High-Low Pressure Interfaces 2.4.3.2.1 RHR ~ Pump Suction Lines 2.4.3.2.1.1 Interface Description The two RHR pump suction lines are as follows:
( RC loop C.
i
- These valves are interlocked by diverse pressure instruments
! as described in FSAR Subsection 7.6.4 and are shown in FSAR Figure 6.3-2 (P&ID M-62) .
Power and control cables for valves 1RH8701A, 1RH8701B, 1RH8702A, and 1RH8702B are listed in Table 2.4-101.
1 Table 2.4-102 gives the control cable by fire zone for 1RH8701A l and 1RH8701B and their function. The cables that are associated with the control logic of 1RH8701B are in parenthesis. Table
! 2.4-103 gives this information for 1RH8702 A and B. The cables associated with 1RH8702B are in parenthesis.
2.4.3.2.1.2 Failure Modes Failure of a power cable either by ground open or hot short l would not affect the valve actuation logic. Therefore, no further analysis will be performed for power cable since the valve will f ail in the as is condition if these cables are l
disabled.
2.4-34a
B/B -
For these normally closed valves to open, five conditions must be met:
- 1. Control switch on main control room panel in open position
- 2. Reactor pressure less than 382 psig
- 3. Valve CV8804A/SI8804B closed - Limit Switch
- 4. Valve SI8811A/B closed - Limit Switch
- 5. Valve-SI8812A/B closed - Limit Switch Failure Modes The following modes are postulated:
- 1. If cable from limit switches on valves CV8804A/
SI8804B , SI8811A/B , and SI8812A/B short, the permissives for opening the valves 1RH8701A and 1RH8701B (lRH8702A and 1RH8702B) are satisfied.
The valves could open if the other two conditions are met.
ii. An open in the cable from the limit switches above will open the permissive contact and prevent the valves from opening. This is a fail safe position.
iii. A short or open in the instrument, cable or
. logic associated with the reactor precsure per-missive will deenergize the pressure interlock relay and permit the valve to open, if the other four conditions are met.
iv. A ground in all control cable will blow a fuse in the MCC. The valve will remain in the as is condition.
- v. A short in the cable from the control switch will open the valve if all other permissives are met.
l vi. An open in the cable from the control switch will cause the valve to remain in the as is condition.
Acceptance Criteria The f ailure being considered is the spurious opening of both valves in series in the high-low pressure interfaces while the reactor pressure is above the pressure permissive set point. As indicated above, 2.4-34b
BB five conditions must be met for the valve to open.
Adequate protection is assured if within a specific fire zone, a postulated fire related failu're cannot cause all five conditions to be met for both valves concurrently. If a control or interlock cable is present in a fire zone, it is assumed to fail in the.most detrimental manner, (i.e., provide a signal to the valve logic that would permit the valve to open if all other signals were also present) . Since valves CV8804A/SI8004B and SI8811A/B are normally closed (see FSAR Figure 6.3-1 (Sheets 1 and 4) and FSAR Figure 9.3-4 (Sheet 1)) , the permissives associated with these valves are satisfied. Therefore, for the.pur-pose of this analysis, the valve is considered capable of spuriously opening if cable serving the following three contacts in the logic circuitry are present
, in the fire zone:
1 control switch 11 reactor pressure interlock i
T 111 interlock for SI8812A/B closed.
. 2.4.3.2.1.3 Evaluation and Results
, Evaluation Results~for 1RH870]A'and lRH8701B l Cable l In the. following fire zones, the spurious opening of one valve 1RH8701A or 1RH8701B can be-postulated due to fire related damage to cable. However, at least one of the per-missives associated with other ' valves is independent of l these fire zones assuring that the integrity of the high-low pressure interf ace is maintained (see Table 2.4-102 for listing of cable by fire zone).
FIRE ZONE FOR WHICH FIRE ZONE FOR WHICH
- 1RH8701A COULD OPEN 1RH8701B COULD OPEN t
l ll.5A-1 3.1-1 11.6-0 3.2A-1 11.6-1 Cables associated with all the permissives for both 1RH8701A and 1RH8701B are routed through Fire. Zone 11.5-0. However,
- using"20~ feet as the minimum allowable cable separation, j
both valves cannot open spuriously as the result of a single fire.
l 2.4-34c l
- - . ~ . . . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
B/B Panels Valve 1RH8701A is powered from MCC 131x2 which is located in Fire Zone ll.5A-1. Valve 1RH8701B is powered from MCC 132x2 which is located in Fire Zone 11.6-1. A single pos-tulated fire could only cause the failure in one of these motor control centers.
'A -fire in the main control room (Fire Zone 2.1-0) affecting
- pane l 1PM06J could ~not result in a' failure by spurious opening of either valve at high reactor pressure because the reactor pressure interlock for each valve is independent of the control room.
The unit 1 auxiliary electrical equipment room (Fire Zone 5.5-1) contains panels 1PA0lJ, IPA 09J, IPA 27J, IPA 0 4J , IPA 10J ,
and IPA 28J through which the reactor pressure permissive signal is routed. A fire in this fire zone could result in the spurious opening of 1RH8701B because the cable asso-cla'ted with the control switch located in the main control room is~also routed of this area. However, the control cable associated with the control switch for 1RH8701A is routed independent of this area.
. Evaluation Results for 1RH8702A and 1RH8702B Cable - - - - ~-
In the following fire zones, the spurious opening of one valve 1RH8702A or 1RH8702B can be postulated due to fire related damage to cable. However, at least one of the per-missives associated with the other valve is independent of these fire zones assuring that the integrity of the high-low pressure interface is maintained. See Table 2.4-103 for listing of cable by fire zone.
FIRE ZONES FOR WHICH FIRE ZONES FOR WHICH 1RH8702A COULD OPEN 1RH8702B COULD OPEN 11.5-0 11.6-1 ll.5A-1 11.6-0 In the following fire zones, the spurious opening of both 1RH8702A and 1RH8702B can be postulated:
None 2.4-34d y-- . . , .
. . _ -_ ..y _ . - _..y ,.
.. . .=
i.
~
l k
! B/B
- Panels Valve 1RH8702A is powered from MCC 131x2 which is located in Fire Zone ll.5A-1. Valve 1RH87023'is powered from MCC 131x2 which is located in Fire Zone 11.6-1. A single pos-tulated fire could only cause the. failure of one of these motor control centers.
A . fire in .the main . control room (Fire Zone 2.1-0) affecting l
panel IPM065 could result in the spurious opening of 1RH8702A.
However, the reactor pressure interlock cable for 1RH8702B is routed independent of this fire zone.
The unit 1 auxiliary electrical equipment room (AEER) (Fire zone 5.5-1) contains panels 1PA0lJ, IPA 09J, IPA 27J , IPA 0 4J ,
IPA 10J , and lPA28J through which the reactor pressure per-
. missive signal is routed. A fire in this fire zone could not result in a failure by spurious opening of either valve because the cable from the main control room control switch
, is independent of the AEER.
2.4.3.2.2 Pressurizer PORV's 2.4.3.2.2.1 Interface Description
- The two PORV's and block valves are as follows:
- 1. PORV 1RY455A in series with block valve 1RY8000 A (Train A) .
- 2. PORV 1RY456 in series with block valve 1RY8000B (Train B) .
~The PORV's are solenoid air-operated . valves. FSAR Figure 7.2-1, sheet 11, shows the control logic for the PORV's.
Each valve is controlled by a 4 position switch at the main control board (LPM 0 5J) . During at-power conditions, the switch is placed in the " auto" position. In this mode, HPORV A will open upon closure of contacts PY455EX and PY458EX due to 2/4 high pressurizer pressure signals (channels 1 and 4). PORV B will open upon closure of contacts PY456EX and PY457EX due to 2/4 high pressurizer pressure signals (channels 2 and 3). The contacts are located in panels in the auxiliary electric equipment room.
The," arm" switch. position is selected in order to activate the cold overpressure control system. This system protects the-IWV'from overpressurization during low temperature operational modes (RCS temperature at or below RNDT). (See FSAR Subsection 7.6.9 :for a description of this system.)
2.4-34e
B/B l Placing the switch in the *open" position directly energizes the operator and opens the valve.
The "close" position overrides all other switch positions.
'The PORV . block valves 1RY8000A and 1RY8000B are normally open motor-operated valves and are controlled by handswitches at 1PM05J.
. Table 2.4-104 . lists the -power and control cables .for 'the PORV's and block valves.
2.4.3.2.2.2 Failure Modes Four fire-induced failure modes are postulated.
Failure Mode 1 - Spurious High Pressurizer Pressure Signals A Train (lRY455A and 1RY8000A):
. a. PORV handswitch in " auto" position.
- b. Fire generates spurious high pressurizer
. pressure signal in pressure channels 1 and 4
-(PORV opens).
. c. Fire causes loss of control and power to. block valve (valve fails open).
1 B Train (lRY456 and 1RY8000B):
- a. PORV handswitch in " auto" position.
- b. Fire generates spurious high pressurizer pressure signal in pressure channels 2 and'3 (PORV opens) .
I
- c. Fire causes loss of control and power to block
- valve (valve fails open).
Failure Mode 2 - Spurious Cold Overpressurization Signals A Train:
- a. PORV handswitch in " arm" position.
- b. Fire generates a spurious cold overpressurization signal (opens PORV) .
- c. Fire causes loss of control nr.d power to block valve (valve f ails open.)
2.4-34f
.B/B B Train:
- a. PORV handswitch in " arm" position.
- b. Fire generates a spurious cold overpressurization signal (opens PORV) .
- c. Fire causes loss of control and power to block valve (valve f ails open) .
Failure Mode 3 - PORV Handswitch Contact Closure A Train:
- b. Fire causes loss of block valve control at MCB 1PM05J. _
B Train:
- b. Fire causes loss of block valve control at MCB 1PM0 5J .
Failure Mode 4 - Shorts in PORV Control Cables A Train:
- a. PORV handswitch in any position.
- b. Fire causes shorts in either cable 1RY398 or 1RY246 which causes PORV solenoids to energize.
- c. Fire causes loss of power and control to block valve.
B Train:
- a. . PORV handswitch in any position.
- b. Fire causes shorts in either cable 1RY251 or 1RY252 which causes PORV solenoids to energize.
- c. Fire causes loss of power and control to block valve.
l l
2.4-34g I
- .. . ~ . , . - . . . -
.B/B AMENDMERP 2 2.4.3.2.2.3 Evaluation and Results Analysis and Results of Failure Mode 1 Table 2.4-105 lists the power and control cables associated with the PORV's'and block valves by fire zone. From the table, it is seen that failure mode 1 could occur in the following zone:
Fire Zone 1.2-1: PORV A opens
~
Block Valve A cannot be closed 1
PORV B opens Block Valve B available For the A train failure, placing the PORV A handswitch in the "close" position will override the " auto" mode and close the PORV. For the B train failure, both the block valve and the PORV can be closed.
Analysis and Results of Failure Mode 2
. Occurrence of this type of failure during power operation would first require operator error; a failure to disarm the
, cold overpressurization system during power ascension would
. be a violation of station operating procedures. Therefore, this type of failure is only postulated for low temperature, low pressure operational modes.
A review of Table 2,4-105 reveals that both PORV's could open as a result of a fire in Fire Zone 5.5-1. The PORV's can be closed by placing both PORV handswitches in the "close" position. Both block valves could be closed since block valve cables are routed independent of this zone.
Analysis and Results of Failure Mode 3 This failure could only occur during a fire in the control room (Fire Zone 2.1-0) , and would prevent immediate control of PORV's or block valves.
Should a PORV open inadvertently at this time due to a spurious signal, the operators would have no direct indication of this, since the instruments which the operators would use to detect this condition (PORV position indication, PORV discharge piping
-temperature, and pressurizer relief tank level, temperature and . pressure) .are .all located in the control room. Because of this lack of direct. indication of PORV status following 2.4-34h
B/B AMENDMENT 2 fire-induced control room evacuation, a procedure will be written to require closure of both of the PORV block valves (1RY8000A and B) following control room evacuation. Block valve lRY8000A can be closed from motor control center 131X2, which is located on elevation 414 feet 0 inch at column-row 11/S (Fire Zone ll.5A-1) . Closure is accomplished by jumpering the respective terminal points. Likewise, block valve 1RY8000B can be closed using. jumpers at motor control center 132X2 located on elevation 426. feet 0 inch at column-row 12/S (Fire Zone 11.6-1).
This procedure will prevent the spurious operation of a .PORV from having detrimental effects on plant safety.
Analysis and Results of Failure Mode 4 For this failure mode to occur, the following events must take place:
- 1. The fire must damage the control power cable to the PORV, the control ~ cable to the block valve limit switch, and the power cable to the block valve. The PORV control power cable and the block valve control cable
. are assigned a control segregation while the block a valve power cable is assigned a power segregation.
The control.and power cables are routed in separate
. cable tray / conduit systems.
l 2. The cable failure must be such that:
i-
- a. The-block valve control cable either shorts or opens and,
~b. The PORV control power. cable has a sustained short to another cable such that the solenoid power conductor shorts to a positive DC source conductor and, l
l c. The block valve power cable either shorts or opens.
L Due to the number of events that must occur simultaneously,
. this failure is not considered' credible.
L i
t i
2.4-341-
TABLE 2.4-2 (Cont'd) .
EQUIPMENT FIRE COMPONENT NUMBER AREA / ZONE ELEVATION COLUMN / ROW C099 TENTS Reg. HX Line Containment Isolation Valve MOV-1CV 8105-2 11.3-1 379'-0" 12-13/V-W Reg. HX Line Containment Isolation Valve MOV-1CV 8106-1 11.3-1 379'-0" 12-13/V-W Cold Leg Injection Valve MOV-1SI 8801A-1 ' 11.3-1 383'-0" 12-13/V-W l Cold Leg Injection Valve MOV-ISI 8801B-2 11.3-1 383'-0" 12-13/V-W y Volume Control Tank to . .
(
' +
, Charging Pump Suction ,
(
Valve MOV-1CV LCV112B-1 11.6A-1 427'-1" 16-17/Q-S to w
co Volume Control Tank to Charging Pump Suction
, Valve MOV-1CV LCV112C-2 11.6A-1 427'-1" 16-17/Q-S 3 Atmospheric Relief Valves IMSOA8A, D 18.3-1 404'-6" 6-7.7/Q-S Atmospheric Relief Valves IMS018B, C 18.3-1 404'-6" 6-7.7/Y-AA i
PORV 1RY PCV455A 1.3-1 451'-0" 11-12/U-V PORV 1RY PCV456 1.3-1 451'-0" 11-12/U-v i
-l 1
TABLE 2.414b .
FIRE ZONE REPAIR DESCRIPTION
~
Zone No. Affec'ted Equipment Repair Description Required Material ;
1.1-1 RHR pump suction valves either: a) provide temporary cable power cable for valve operator, or b) manually open valve none when required ,
1.2-1 RHR pump suction valves either: a) provide temporary cable power cable for valve operator, or b) manually open valve none when required 2.1-0 PORV's and block valves Install temporary cables and cable (
control switches control switches m s
3.2E-1 Boric acid transfer Install temporary cables cable pumps 3.3C-1 Boric acid transfer Install temporary cables cable pumps 3.3D-1 Boric acid transfer Install temporary cables cable pumps 3.4A-1 Boric acid transfer Install temporary cables cable Pumps
=
5.5-1 Boric acid transfer Install temporary cables cable g Pumps g e
M
o .
<I .
B/B TABLE 2. 4-101 POWER AND CONTROL CABLE FOR RHR PUMP SUCTION VALVES
- 1. RC Loop A Isolation (lRH8701A/B) .
Valve 1RH8701A Power Cable RH023 Power from MCC RH024 131x2 to valve APl44 AP081 AP414 Ap415 AP416 Auxiliary power to MCC 131x2 AP417 AP418 AP419 AP428 AP429 Control or In,terlock Cable
! . RH030 In'terlock f rom PA28J-Reactor Pressure PT-0405 CV413 Interlock Valve CV8804A Closed RH029 Interlock Valve SI8811A Closed l
SIl68 Interlock Valve SI8812A Closed RH025 02 2 Limit Switch (:LS) on 8701A l RH028 1
RH031 Control Switch (CS) from MCR PM06J SI-142 Interlock Valve SI-143 CV8811A Closed SI-166 Interlock Valve SI-167 SI8812A Closed l CV-408 Interlock Valve CV-410 CV8804A Closed 2.4-228 l
B/B TABLE 2.4-101 (Cont'd)
Valve 8701B Power
.RH032 Power from-MCC RH033 132x2 to valve AP252 AP150 APil7 AP420 AP421 Auxiliary Power to MCC 132x2 AP422 AP423
.AP424 AP425 AP426 AP427 Control or Interlock Cable RH043 Control Switch (CS) from PM06J RH038 Interlock Valve SI8812A Closed RH039 Interlock Valve CV8804A Closed Interlock Valve SI8811A Closed
. RH040 l
RH042 Interlock f rom PA28J - Reactor Pressure FT-0403 s i
H Limit Switch (LS) on 8701B l '
j 2. RC Loop C Isolation (lRH8702A/B) .
Valve IRH8702A
. Power Cable -
RH044 Power from MCC RH045 131x2 to valve AP144 AP081 AP414 l AP415
( 'AP416 Auxiliary Power to MCC 131x2 l AP417
! -AP418 l <AP419 AP428 AP429 l
2.4-229
[
D/B TABLE 2.4-101 (Con t ' d)
Control or Interlock Cable H 6 Limit Switch (LS) on 8702A ,
RH051 Interlock SI8804B RH052 Interlock SI8811B ,
RH050 Interlock S18812B RH054 Interlock f rom PA27J Reactor Pressure PT-405 RH055 Control Switch (CS) from PM06J Valve IRH8702B '
Power Cable RH056 Power ~from MCC RH057 131x2 to valve AP252 AP150
. AP227 ,
AP420 AP421
. AP422 Auxiliary Power to MCC 131x2 AP423 AP424 AP425 AP426 AP427 Control or Interlock Cable RH065 Control Switch (CS) f rom PM06J RH060 06 Limit Switch (LS) on 8702B RH059 RH064 Interlock from .lPA28J - Reactor Pressure PT-0403 SIO61 RH063 Interlock SI8804B SIO62 2.4-230
6 .
B/B l
TABLE 2.4-101 (Cont ' d)
. i L
SI174 SI172 Interlock SI8812B SI173 :
-RH062 SI155 Interlock SI8811B
.S1156 i
i, h
I I
i t
1
- I i
i
(
4 2.4-231 C
. - . -_ - - - ----. ,,_ - . _ . - . . . _ . _ . _ ~ - . _ - _ . . - . _ , _ , . , , _ .
.,~.,m-r-,,.,-,--,,
. . . C/B /
i ,
TABLE 2.4-102 CABLE LISTING BY FIRE ZONE FOR 1RH8701A (lRH8701B) 1.1-1 3.3B-1 (RH037 LS) RH30 Interlock PT-405 RH31 CS
. 1.2-1 RH027 LS
, 3.3C-1 RH028 LS I , RH31 (RH037 LS) ,
3.3D-1 1.3-1 "
RH30 Interlock PT-405 (RH037 LS) ,
3.4A-1 2.1-0 RH30 Interlock PT-405 RH031 CS
- 5.2-1 3.1-1 (8701B could open) CV413 Interlock CV8804A (RH043' CS) . RH029 Interlock SI8811A (RHO 38 Interlock 8812A) SIl68 Interlock SI8812A (RH042 Interlock PT-403). ,
RH031 CS 3.2A-1 (8701B could open) 5.4-1 (RH043 CS) .
~'
RH031 CS (RH038 Interlock 8812A)
(RH042. Interlock PT-403) 5.5-1 RH30 Interlock PT-405 3.2B-1 (RH043 CS)
(RH043,CS) (RH042 Interlock PT-403)
(RH042 Interlock PT-dcd 5.6-1 l 3.2C-1 RH031 CS
, (RH043 CS) r (RH042 Interlock PI-403) 11.2-0 SI166 Interlock 8812A 3.2D-1 SIl67 Interlock 8812A (RH043 CS) .
(RH038 Interlock 8812A)
(RH042 Interlock PT-403)
-11.2A-1 3.'2E-1 SIl66 Interlock.SI8812A RH30 Interlock PT-405 SI167 Interlock SI8812A 4
2.4-232 l
-\.
. . 'D/B 1
, TABLE 2.4-102 (Cont ' d) 11.23-1 11.5-1 SI166 Interlock 8812A RH025 LS SIl67 Interlock 8812A RH026 LS (RHC38 Interlock 8812A)
, (RH039 Interlock CV08804A)
(RH040 Interlock SI8811A) 11.2C-1
-(RH038 Interlock 8812A) ll.5A-1 (8701A could open)
RH30 Interlock FT-405 CV413 Interlock CV8804A 11.3-0 RH029 Interlock 8811A CV413 Interlock CV8804A SIl68 Interlock 8812A RH029 Interlock SI8811A RH025 Interlock .LS ,
5 SIl68 Interlock SI8812A RH026 Interlock LS
'(RH038 Interlock 8812A) RH031 CS 11.3-1 11.6-0 (8701A could'open)
RH029. Interlock SI8811A RH030 Interlock PT-405
- -SIl68' Interlock SI8812A CV413 Interlock 8804A eSI142 Interlock 8811A RH029 Interlock 8811A
) SIl43 Interlock 8811A SIl68 Interlock 8812A SIl66 Interlock 8812A RH031 CS i
.SIl67, Interlock.8812A (RH043 CS) 2
/ CV413 Interlock:CV8804A (RH042 Interlock PT0403)
, ~ CV408 Interlock CV8804A CV410 Interlock CV8804A (RH039: Interlock CV8804A) 11.6-1 (8701B could open)
(RH040' Interlock SI8811A) (RH038 Interlock 8812A)
(RH039 Interlock 8804A)
(RH040 Interlock 8811A) 11.4-0 (RH034 LS)
CV413 Interlock CV8804A (RH043 CS)
RH029 Interlock SI8811A (RH042 Interlock Fr0403)
SIl68 Interlock SI8812A
- (RH038 Interlock 8812A)
!s . 11.5-0 (Both 8701A & 8701B could open)
,3
, RH30 Interlock PT-405
^ CV413 Interlock CV8804A RH029 Interlock SI8811A SIl68. Interlock SI8812A RH031 CS (RH038 Interlock SI8812A)
(RH043 CS)
(RH042 Interlock PT403)
I 2.4-233
.re, -y g - - - - , - , - - - - - -., . - -
-, - . - - - - - .-- -,-,,--,,r--,-, ,
,.-.-w q ,, ,, e. - -
.-n. - . - ., -
n -- - _ ..
, . B/B TABLE 2.4-103 CABLE LISTING BY FIRE ZONE FOR 1RH8702A (lRH8702B) 1.1-1 3.3B-1 (RH060 LS) RH054 Interlock PT-405 (RH061 LS) RH055 CS 1.2-1 3.3C-1
.RH049 LS -
RH054 Interlock PT-405 (RH060~LS) 'RH055 CS (RH061 LS) 5.2-1 (8702A could open) 1.3 RH051 Interlock SI8804B (RH060 LS) RH050 Interlock SI8812B (RH061 LS) RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH055 CS 2 .'l- 0 RH054 Interlock PT-405 5.4-1 RH055 CS RH054 Interlock PT-405 (RH065 CS) RH055 CS 3.1-1 5.5-1 (RH065 CS)
(RH064 Interlock PT-403)
(RH064 Interlock PT-403) 5.6-1 t
3.2A-1 RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH055 CS RH055 CS (RH065 CS)
(RH064 Interlock PT-403) 11.2D-1 RH050 Interlock SI8812B l 3.2B-1 l (RH064 Interlock PT-403) 11.3-1 RH051 Interlock SI8804B RH052 Interlock SI8811B 3.2C-1 RH050 Interlock SI8812B (RH065 CS) (SIl55 Interlock SI8811B)
(RH064 Interlock PT-403) (SIl56 Interlock SI8811B)
(SIl72 Interlock SI8812B)
(SI173 Interlock SI8812B) 3.2D-1 (SIO61 Interlock SI8804B)
'(RH065 'CS) (SIO62 Interlock SI8804B)
(RH0'64 Interlock PT-403) 11.3F-1 RH051 Interlock SI8804B 2.4-234
- * ~
B/B TABLE 2.4-103 (Cont ' d) 11.5-1 11.6-1 (8702B could open)
RH051 Interlock SI8804B (RH058 LS)
RH052 Interlock SI8811B (RH059 LS)
RH050 Interlock SI88128 (RH064 Interlock PT-403)
(SL155 Interlock SI8811E) (RH062' Interlock SI8811B)
(SIl56 Interlock SI8SilB) (RH063 Interlock SI8804B)
(SI172. Interlock SI88128) (SIl74 Interlock SI88123)
(SIl73 ' Interlock SI8812B) (SIl55 Interlock SI8811B)
. (SIO61 Interlock SI8804B) (SIl56 Interlock SI8811B)
(SIO62 Interlock SI8804B) (SIl72 Interlock SI8812B)
(SIl73 Interlock SI8812B)
(SIO61 Interlock SI8804B) 11.5-0 (8702A could open) (SIO62 ' Interlock SI8804B)
RH051 Interlock SI8804B.
RH052-Interlock SI8811B
'RH050 Interlock'SI8812B 12.1-0 RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH051 Interlock SI8804B
. RH055 CS RH052 Interlock SI8811B (RH065 CS) RH050 Interlock SI8812B (RH064 Interlock PT-403) ll.=5A-1 (8702 could open)
. RH046 LS .
- RH051 Interlock SI8804B RH052 Interlock SI8811B RH050 Interlock SI8812B RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH055 CS -
11.6-0 (8702A could open) l RH051 Interlock SI8804B l
RH050 Interlock SI8812B
! RH054 Interlock PT-405 RH055 CS (RH065 CS)
(RH064 Interlock PT-403) 2.4-235 l
t
s B/B TABLE 2.4-104 POWER AND CONTROL CABLE FOR PRESSURIZER PORV AND BLOCK VALVES -
TRAIN A PORV 1RY455A Power Cables:
1DC005 125-Vdc Distribution Center 111 to DC Battery Charger 111
~ 1DC006 1DC193 ,
1DC194 ,
, 1DC021 Battery Charger 111 to 480-V Switchgear Bus 131X 1AP081 4160-V ESF ' Bus 141 to Transformer lAPllE LAP 414 Auxiliary Power From 1APllE to ESF Switchgear 1AP415 131X 1AP416 1AP417 i
- LAP 419
~
1AP428
. 1AP429 Control Cables:
1DC095 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 111 to DC Fuse Panel 1DC10J 1DC100- DC Fuse Panel 1DC10J to MCB 1PM05J 1RY248 Valve limit switch open
. 1RY249 Valve limit switch close .
1RY247 Solenoid to Junction Box 1RY388 Solenoid to Junction Box 1RY246 Junction Box to Penetration 1RY398 Penetration to MCB Handswitch 2.4-236
, .. .,. . . . . .. - . - - . - . - . . - . . _ _ - - - - . - . - - . - - - . . - - - - - . = . - - - . - - . . - .
~
B/B TABLE 2. 4-104 (Cont ' d)
Additional Cables Required for PORV A Operation on High Pressurizer Pressure:
1RY418 Relay Panel IPA 27J to MCB Handswitch 1RY417 Auxiliary Relay Cabinet IPA 24J to 1PA27J 1CC153 480-V MCC 132V2 to 1PA27J 1RY199 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 1PT-0455 to Penetration 1RY198 Penetration to I&C Rack 1PA0lJ 1RY211 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 1FF-0458 to Penetration 1RY210 Penetration to I&C Rack 1PA04J 1RY303 1PA0lJ to Rack 1PA06J
, 1RY310 1PA06J to Rack 1PA05J
~
1CV419 1PA05J to Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA24J 1RC513 1PA04J. to Rack 1PA08J 1RY320 1 PAO BJ to Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA24J l Additional Cables Required for PORV A Operation on RCS Cold i
Overpressure: .
1RY418 Relay Panel IPA 27J to MCB Handswitch 1RY417 Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA24J to 1PA27J 1CC153 480-V MCC 132V2 to 1PA27J 1RC351 Loop 1A Hot Leg RTD to Penetration IRC352 1RC350 Penetration to I&C Rack 1PA0lJ 1RC356 Loop 1B Hot Leg RfD to Penetration
.lRC 357 1RC355 Penetration to 1PA0lJ 2.4-237
B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Cont ' d) 1RC361 Loop 1C Hot Leg RTD to Penetration IRC362 1RC360 Penetration to 1PA0lJ 1RC566 Loop 1D Hot Leg RTD to Penetration IRC367
'lRC 365 Penetration to 1PA01J Plug IPA 0lJ to 1PA05J 1RC373 Loop 1A Cold Leg RID to Penetration
- 1RC374 1RC372 Penetration to 1PA02J 1RC372 Loop 1B Cold Leg RfD to Penetration IRC393 1RC391 Penetration to 1PA02J 1RC397 Loop 1C Cold Leg RTD to Penetration IRC398 1RC396 Penetration to 1PA02J l 1RC402 Loop 1D Cold Leg RTD to Penetration IRC403 1RC401 Penetration to 1PA02J
! 'lRC500 1PA02J to 1PA083 1CV419 1PA05J to 1PA24J l 1RY320 1PA08J to 1PA24J 1RC226 Loop 1B Hot Leg Pressure to Penetration IRC225 Penetration to 1PA0lJ 1MS034 1PA0lJ to 1PA05J l
2.4-238 e-- .e~ - - - --
~~
B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Con t ' d)
BLOCK VALVE 1RY8000 A Power Cables:
1RY393 MCC 131X2 to Penetration 1RY002 Penetration to Motor LAP 144 MCC 131X2 to Switchgear 131X (LAP 10E) 1AP081 4160-V ESF Bus 141 to Transformer lAPllE 1AP414 Auxiliary Power From lAPilE to ESF Switchgear 131X 1AP415 1AP416 1AP417
, LAP 418 1AP419 1AP428 1AP429 Control Cables:
lRY394 MCC 131X2 to MCB 1PM05J 1RY392 MCC 131X2 to Penetration 1RY004 Penetration to Valve Limit Switch s
I 2.4-239
, _ _ . , , , . . - . . - . . . . . - - + - - w,-- -
B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Cont ' d)
TRAIN B PORV 1RY456 Power Cables:
1DC012 125-Vdc Distribution Center 112 to DC Battery 1DC013 Charger 112 1DC195 1DC196 1DC023 Battery Charger 112 to 480-V Switchgear Bus 132X J
lAPil7 4160-V ESF Bus 142 to Transformer LAP 13E 1AP420 Auxiliary Power From 1AP13E to ESF Switchgear 132X 1AP421
. LAP 422 1AP423
. LAP 424 1AP425 1AP426 LAP 427 i
, Control Cables:
1DC096 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 112 to DC Fuse Panel 1DCllJ 1DC102 DC Fuse Panel 1DC10J to MCB 1PM05J 1RY254 Valve limit switch open 1RY255 Valve limit switch close 1RY253 Solenoid to Junction Box 1RY389 Solenoid to Junction Box l
l l
lRY252 Junction Box to Penetration l 1RY251 Penetration to 1PM05J Handswitch l
Additional Cables Required For PORV B Operation on Pressurizer High Pressure:
1RY420 Relay Panel IPA 28J to MCB Handswitch 1RY419 Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA25J to 1PA28J 1CC154 480-V MCC 134V4 to 1PA28J 2.3-240 l
9' B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Cont ' d) 1RY203 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 1Fr-0456 to Penetration 1RY202 Penetration to I&C Rack IPA 02J 1RY207 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 1FP-0457 to Penetration 1RY206 Penetration to I&C Rack 1PA03J 1MSO44 1PA02J to Rack 1PA06J 1MS067 1PA06J to Relay . Cabinet 1PA25J 1RY304 1PA03J to Rack 1PA07J '
1RY329 1PA07J to Relay Cabinet 1PA25J 1
Cables Required For PORV B Operation On RCS Cold Overpressure:
1RY420 Relay Panel IPA 28J to MCB Handswitch
. 1RY419 Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA25J to 1PA28J ,
ICC154 480-V MCC 134V4 to IPA 28J 1RC373 Loop 1A Cold Leg RTD to Penetration IRC374 1RC372 Penetration to I&C Rack IPA 02J
< 1RC392 Loop 1B Cold Leg RfD to Penetration
-lRC 39 3
, 1RC391 Penetration to 1PA02J 1RC397 Loop 1C Cold Leg RfD to Penetration IRC398 1RC396 Penetration to 1PA02J l 1RC402 Loop 1D Cold Leg RfD to Penetration IRC403 ,
IRC401 Penetration to 1PA02J 1RC500 1PA02J to 1PA08J 2.4-241
B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Cont ' d) 1RC351- Loop 1A Hot Leg RTD to Penetration '
IRC352 1RC350 Penetration to lPA0lJ 1RC356 Loop 1B Hot Leg to Penetration IRC357 1RC355 Penetration to 1PA0lJ 1RC361 Loop 1C Hot Leg to Penetration IRC362 1RC360 Penetration to lPA0lJ 1RC366 Loop 1D Hot Leg to Penetration IRC367 1RC365 Penetration to 1PA0lJ Plug IPA 0lJ to 1PA05J -
1MS063 1PA05J to Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA25J 1RY383 1PA08J to Auxiliary Relay Cabinet 1PA25J IRC224 Loop 1A Hot Leg Pressure to Penetration IRC223 Penetration to 1PA04J 1RC513 1PA04J to 1PA08J BLOCK VALVE 1RY8000 B Power Cables:
1RY396 MCC' 132X2 to Penetration .
1RYOO7 Penetration to Motor 1AP150 MCC 132X2 to Switchgear 132X 1AP252 1APil7 4160-V ESF' Bus 142 to Transformer LAP 13E 2.4-242
e*
B/B TABLE 2.4-104 (Con t ' d) 1AP420 Auxiliary Power From 1AP13E to ESF Switchgear 132X 1AP421 1AP422 1AP423 1AP424 '
. LAP 425 1AP426 1AP427 Control Cables:
1RY397 MCC 132X2 to MCB ' LPM 05J 1RY395 MCC 132X2 to Penetration 1RY009 Penetration to Motor S
O i
l l
~~
l l
l 1
2.4-243 i
. - -- . - . . , - - - . . - . . - - - , . - . - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - , ~ - - - - - - - - -
s
. B/B TABLE 2.4-105 CABLE LISTING BY FIRE ZONE FOR PORV'S AND BLOCK VALVES FIRE ZONE 1.1-1 1RC224 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B 1RC226 Loop 1B hot leg pressure - PORV A L P 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B fRR 5 fRR Loop IB hot leg RTD - PORV A and B RC3 62 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1R Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 7R 67 Loop 1A cold leg RTD - PORV A and B fR RC lR '
L P 1B cold leg RTD - PORV A and B yR 93 1R 9 Loop 1C cold leg RTD - PORV A and B R 9 Loop 1D cold leg RTD - PORV A and B fRC0 p 3 1.2-1 (Failure mode 1 could occur; Train A) 1RY246 PORV A - control 1RY002 Block valve A - power .
1RY004 Block valve A - control 1RC226 Loop lB hot leg pressure - PORV A 1RC224 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B 1RC351 Loop 1A hot leg.RTD - PORV A and B 1RC356 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC361 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B i 1RC366 Loop.lD hot leg RTD - PORV A and B j 1RC373 Loop 1A cold log RTD - PORV A and B l
.lRC392 ~ Loop 1B cold leg .RTD - PORV A and ,B l 1RC397 Loop 1C cold leg RTD - PORV A and B l
l 2.4-244
o .,
J B/B TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont'd) 1RC402 Loop 1D cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY199. Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455 - PORV A 1RY203 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0456 - PORV B 1RY207 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0457 - PORV B 1RY211 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0458 - PORV A 1.3-1 i
1RY002 Block valve A - power 1RY004 Block valve A - control c 1RY007 Block valve B - power 1RY009 Block valve B - control 1RY246 PORV A - control 1RY247 PORV A - control.
1RY248 PORV A - control 1RY249 PORV A - control 1RY252. PORV B - control 1RY253 PORV B - control 1RY254 PORV B - control 1RY255 PORV B - control 1RY388 PORV A - control 1RY389 PORV B - control
.lRC224 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B 1RC373- Loop 1A cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC392 Loop 1B cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY203 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0456 - PORV B l 1RY211 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0458 - PORV A l
l2.1-0 (Failure mode 3 could occur; Trains A and B) 1DC100 PORV A - control 1DC102 PORV B - control 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY394 Block valve A - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control 1RY398 PORV A - control -
1RY418 PORV A - control 1RY420 PORV B - control Panel: 1PM05J - All PORV's and block valves
~
3.1-1 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control fAP Block valve B - power i
2.4-245 l
B/B TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont'd) 3.2A-1 1DC021 PORV A - power 1DC023 PORV B - power 1DC102 PORV B - control 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY394. Block valve A - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control fAl0 gp Block valve B - power 3.2B-1 1DC102 PORV B - control 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY397 ' Block valve B - control IRC223 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B 1RC372 Loop 1A cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC391 Loop 1B cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC396 Loop 1C cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC401 Loop 1D cold leg RTD - PORV A and B
'lRY202 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0456 - PORV B 1RY210 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0458 - PORV A
~
3.2C-1 1DC102 PORV B - control 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control 3.2E-1 1RY398 PORV A - control 1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC360 Loop-lc hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455 - PORV A 3.3A-1 1DC100 PORV A - control 2.4-246 y ,- --,yv -
O O .
B/B TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont'd) 3.3B-1 1DC100 PORV A - control lRY394 Block valve A - control 1RY206 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0457 - PORV B 1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC360 Loop lc hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455-PORV A 3.3C-1 1DC100 PORV A - control 1RY394 Block valve A - control 1RY398 PORV A - control 3.3D-1 l
- 1RY398 PORV A - control '
1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B l '
1RC360 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B l
1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455-PORV A i
! 3.4A-1 1RY398 PORV A - control
! 5.1-1 1DC023 PORV B - power 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control 1AP150 l 1AP252 B1 ck valve B - power lAPll7 1AP420 l 1AP421 1AP422 1AP423 PORV B - power
! 1AP424 l ' LAP 425
' LAP 426 1AP427 2.4-247
o 6 .
~B/B 1
TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont'd) 5.2-1 1DC021 PORV A . power lRY394 Block valve A - control
- LAP 144 1AP081
.. LAP 414 1AP415 1AP416 Block valve A - power LAP 417 1AP418 1AP419 1AP428 1AP429 5.4-1 1DC096 PORV B - control 1DC102 PORV B - control '
Panel 1DCllJ: PORV B - control
'~
. 5.5-1 Cables 1RC223 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B 1RC225 Loop 1B hot leg' pressure - PORV A 1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg-RTD - PORV A and B 1RC360 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B .
IRC372 Loop 1A cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC391 Loop 1B cold leg RTD - PORV A and B l 1RC396 Loop 1C cold leg RTD - PORV A and B l 'lRC401 Loop 1D cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455 - PORV A 1RY202 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0456 - PORV B 1RY206 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0457 - PORV B l 1RY210 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0458 - PORV A
~1RY418 1PA27J to 1PM05J - PORV A 1RY420 1PA28J to 1PM05J - PORV B Panels
! ^1PA0lJ 1PA05J 1PA24J l
lPA02J 'lPA06J 1PA25J l IPA 03J 1PA07J 1PA27J 1PA04J IPA 08J 1PA28J 2.4-248
0-
. B/B TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont'd)
Panel Interconnecting Cables 1MS034 1RY304 1RY419 1MS044 1RY305 1CV419 1MS063 1RY320 1MS067 1RY329 1RC500 1RY383 1RC513 1RY310 1RY303 1RY417 5.6-1 1DC021 PORV A - power 1DC095 PORV A - control 1DC100 PORV A - control 1RY394 Block valve A - control Panel 1DC10J: PORV A - control
. 11.5-0
~
1RY394 Block valve A - control 1RY398 PORV A - control IRC350 Loop 1A-hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC360 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B-1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1AP144 Block valve A - power 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455 - PORV A 11.5-1
{.
1RY392 Block valve A - control -
1RY393 Block valve A - power 1RY398 PORV A - control 11.5A-1 '
l 1RY392 Block valve A - control 1RY393 Block valve A - power l Block valve A - control
! 1RY394
( .lRY398 PORV A - control 1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD - PORV A and B
.IRC360 . Loop.lc hot leg RTD - PORV.A..and B 1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure lPT-0455 - PORV A 1RY206 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0457 - PORV B 1AP144 Block valve A - power l
L 2.4-249 ,
D 0 ,o e .
B/B TABLE 2.4-105 (Cont ' d) 11.6-0 1RY398 PORV A - control 1RY394 Block valve A - control 1RC350 Loop 1A hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC355 Loop 1B hot leg RTD PORV A and B
.lRC360 Loop 1C hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC365 Loop 1D hot leg RTD - PORV A and B 1AP144 Block valve A - power 1RY198 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0455 - POR7 A .
11.6-1 1RY251 PORV B - control 1RY395 Block valve B - control 1RY396 PORV B - control 1RY397 Block valve B - control LAP 150 Block valve B - power 1RC372 Loop 1A cold leg RTD - PORV A and B ,
. IRC391 Loop 1B cold leg RTD - PORV A and B ,
1RC396 Loop 1C cold leg RTD - PORV A and B 1RC401 Loop 1D cold leg RTD - PORV A and B
~
1RY202 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0456 - PORV B 1RY210 Pressurizer pressure 1PT-0458 - PORV A 1RC223 Loop 1A hot leg pressure - PORV B l
I I
l l
l I
l
~
I
! 2.4-250
. - _ _ _ _a