ML20071J269
| ML20071J269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1982 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SNRC-692, NUDOCS 8204270175 | |
| Download: ML20071J269 (7) | |
Text
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY a /LC'O 4@vete.certarsus SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 April 16, 1982 SNRC-692 to,
c' Gb Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director 8
D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g CEIVEg U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission i:
APR26 ISO 2hw 251 Washington, D.C.
20555 Control Room Design Review 9
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322 4>
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Dear Mr. Denton:
Findings have been documented in Supplement Numbers 1 and 2 to Shoreham's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) concerning the Control Room Design Review (SER Issue 57, Item I.D.1).
Supplement No. 1 to the SER (SSER No.
1, September, 1981) contained a listing (Appendix C) of those findings (Priority 1 and 2) which required the implementation of corrective measures by LILCO prior to Fuel Load.
In addition, the NRC Staff has determined that LILCO's corrective measures for five of these findings required further review.
These findings are identified in SSER No. 2 (February, 1982) and relate to the location of the security console, the controls and annunciators for the safety relief valves (3 findings) and the use of flashing yellow "-99.9" on the process computer CRT display to indicate an unknown analog value (point out of scan).
LILCO's reevaluation, corrective actions, and a schedule for implementing these actions is provided for each of these findings as follows:
i A.
Secondary Alarm Station (SAS - Security Console) i NRC concerns are based on physical, audible and visual interference both to security personnel and control i
room operators.
These concerns are alleviated by the l
following:
1.
Physical - a)
The SAS shall be manned by a single member of the Security force on a 24 hr/ day - 7 day / week basis.
The duties and functions of this officer are restricted to the SAS console and do not require his leaving his stationed position at the console.
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April 16, 1982.
SNRC-692 Page 2 b)
The security-officer is not required by procedure-or alarm response action to leave the SAS panel-or utilize other control consoles.
The onlyfother security person who may require access to the security console is a single security' supervisor,-
and a separate headset will be provided for this unlikely event.
c)
As shown in Figurc 7, the SAS is located near the-MXP panel (4 ' clearance).
This panel is utilized primarily for certain " support system" controis-and indication.
Emergency operating procedures do not require the use of the.MXP panel.
During upset conditions the panel might be-utilized by' operating personnel for verification of support system response only.
A specific task action analysis will be per-
. formed during the long term control room design review to further assure that physical interference does not exist between operations personnel and the SAS.
- 2. Audible--
By fuel load, design changes'will have been-made such that the security person at'the SAS will be equipped with a headset for communication with other security personnel.
This should eliminate any conversa-tional source of auditory interference with control room personnel.
In addition, output levels of audible alarms on the SAS are adjustable and will be set to an acceptable level prior to plant operation so as to be essentially audible only to the security person.
- 3. Visual -
The MXP panel is utilized for certain " support system" controls and indication.
It is not necessary nor designed to be viewed from the operator's desk.
Visual interference of the SAS-should not, therefore, be a concern.
LILCO believes that, based on the reevaluation and design changes described above, the possibility of any physical, visual, or auditory interference between the SAS or its operator on control-room operations has'been eliminated, and sufficient justification exists for the SAS to remain in the control room.
Further review of the present SAS location will be accomplished during LILCO's long term control room' design' review which will be done in accordance-j
April 16, 1982 SNRC-692 Page 3 with the guidelines set forth in NUREG 0700.
It is anticipated that this review will be completed within approximately one year after requirements have been finalized by the NRC.
B.
Safety Relief Valves - Controls and Annunicators The NRC concerns involve primarily the separation of indica-tors and annunciators from the SRV control switchec.
This involved three areas as follows:
- 1. Location of Rosemount Pressure Indicators for Safety Relief Valve (SRV) tailpipe pressure relative to SRV Controls -
The Rosemount pressure indicator / LED devices provide direct indication of SRV position, as required by NUREG-0737 Item II.D.l.
Their prime func-tion is indication of a Stuck Open Relief Valve (SORV).
In such an event, an annunciator (Alarm No. 1337, " Safety or Relief Valve Leakage"), located directly above the SRV control panel would. activate as would the red LED on the face of the pressure indicator corresponding to the SRV that is stuck open.
This red LED can be observed by the operator from the SRV controls.
It is not necessary for the operator to read the indicator to dis-corn that a specific relief valve is open.
The operator has the capability to cycle the stuck open relief valve via the SRV controls while viewing the pressure indicator LED to determine if valve closure has occurred.
(See photographs Nos. 1 and 2).
No action is required at the pressure indicator station.
The controls and pressure indicators are located in relative proximity and their separation does not constitute a safety concern.
The main control board configuration is such that the proxi-mity of the LRV controls to the pressure indicator station has already been maximized.
This can be seen by comparing photograph No. 3, which shows the back of the pressure indicator / LED assembly with photographs Nos. 4 and 5 which are typical internal layouts of the panels between the pressure indicator / LED assembly and the SRV controls.
Photograph No. 6 shows the back of the panel housing the SRV controls.
- 2. SRV Temperature Indicator / Recorder - This recorder is utilized to facilitate detection of a leaking (as opposed to open SRV).
Upon temperature in the SRV tail pipe reaching a preset value, the annunicator (Alarm No. 1337
" Safety or Relief Valve Leakage"), located directly above
April 16, 1982 SNRC-692 Page 4 the SRV control panel, will activate..This annunciator is the same annunciator that is-triggered by high SRV discharge line pressure.
Lack of indication on the Rosemount pressure indicators described in 1 above indi-cates a leaking SRV, and obviates the need for immediate operator response.
Since the information provided by this recorder is not required for immediate action and to avoid congestion of non-essential information on the main control board, this recorder has been located on a back panel.
This is consistent with the NRC Staff con-clusion in SSER No. 1 that_the temperature indicator is for backup indication only.
- 3. Annunciators on Boards G & H - Although these alarms are presently labeled "SRV Air System Degraded" and "SRV Air Header Trouble", they are not directly related to SRV function.
The SRVs can be pneumatically operated and these alarms are for the pneumatic " support systems" consisting of N2 gas piping and associated equipment.
The alarm response procedure for SRV Air System Degraded is provided as Attachment 1.
As can be seen, there is absolutely no need to approach and/or manipulate.SRV controls on Panel lHil*PNL-602 during response to this ARP.
The alarm response procedure for SRV air header trouble is being rewritten to reflect an inerted contain-ment'and is not available.. As with the previous ARP, there will be absolutely no need for the operator to approach and/or manipulate SRV controls in response to this ala'rm.
Although relocation of these annunicators is not required, LILCO will re-title these windows to eliminate any possibility of confusion and/or' association j
with the actual SRV system, i
These findings will also be further addressed in our 3.ong term control room design review.
C.
Use of Flashing Yellow "-99.9" A flashing yellow "-99.9" appears on the process computer CRT to indicate an' unknown analog value for a particular-l parameter.
LILCO has re-examined this finding and will l
replace "-99.9" with "*****" to accomplish this function.
It was determined that "*****" was more desirable than
"?????", due to the possibility of mistaking a
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for a "7" or a "9".
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SNRC-692 Page 5 a_
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LILCO is proceeding with the, modifications committed tg in this letter, and all such modifichtions 'are scheduled to be completed prior to fuel load.
LILCO~ feels thatsthese1modificatio~ns, in combination with the commitmentifor a 'long heLF. control room S,#
design review, provide accep,tabli colutions to4the staff findings..
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on the SAS, the SRV controls,-and the process comp ~ater'CRT dis-play, thus serving to reduce'to sufficiently lo'w levels the potential for operator error leading to serious conse'quences as a result of human factors considerations in the control room.
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+Y Please advise if you have any q'uesti'on's or' require kdditional
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information.
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Very truly yours, f' ~
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Smith 4:
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Manager, Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
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WATCH EN Gl!4EER'S OFFICE F 1 i
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REACTOR WATER REACTOR CORE CLEAN-UP AND COOLING BOARD RECIRC. BO AR D FI G.' 7 SPDS LOCATION-MAIN CONTROL ROOM SHOREHAM NUCLEAR PCWER STATION - UNIT 1
Submit 2ed:
ARP 0239
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(Windov :luncer)
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(Panel Number)
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SRV AIR SYSTEM A DEGRADED Instr. No. 49X relay from Set Point: Trip DE ENERGIZED
- MOV's-103-) 113d, 105$1140 Reset ENERGIZED POSSIBLE CAUSE IMMEDIATE ACTICN
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SUBSEQUENT ACTICN 1.1 if breaker is tripping submit Maintenance Uork Request 2.1 if overloads are tripping cubmit Maintenance Work Request 2
3.1 if system is in a degraded mode refer to
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATICMS for cperability requirements s
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.p REFERENCES
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