ML20071H299

Final Deficiency Rept Re Loose Wire Terminations on AMF-type Relays Used in MSIV Leakage Control Sys Panels,Initially Reported 811104.Ring Lugs Used to Securely Fasten Wires to Relays.Also Reported Per Part 21

ML20071H299
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	02/15/1982
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-82-61, NUDOCS 8203080358
Download: ML20071H299 (5)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi EmiMEMidd5 P. O. 8 O X 16 4 0, J.A C K R O. '"2, g M i S S I S S I P P l 3 9 2 0 5 T

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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.

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RECE!V5D Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9-MAR 05108& ll Region 11 n am pm.m ~

101 Marietta Street, N.W.

thst asu g Suite 3100 D,

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Cs /

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ru Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrato

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-80/68, Final Report,

Potter & Brumfield AMF Type Relay Terminations AECM-82/61

References:

1) AECM 80/302,12/4/80

2) AECM-81/7 5, 2/2 6/81

3) AECM-81/170, 5/19/81

4) AECM-81/382,10/5/81

5) AECM-81/491,12/22/81 On November 4,1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. J.

Rausch, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site.

The deficiency concerns loose wire terminations on Potter & Brumfield AMF type relays used in the Main Steam Isolation Valve-Leakage Control System panels.

We have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21 for Mississippi Power & Light. All details are included in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly, J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT cc:

See page 2 OiTICIAL COPY 8203090358 B20215 a---

PDR ADOCK 05000416

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PDR Member Middle South Utilities System h

m Mr. J. P. O'Reilly AECM-82/ 61 i

NRC Page 2 cc Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner i

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director i

Office of inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Reguiatory Commission i

Washington, D.C. 20555 l

Mr. G..B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 1

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r Attach::nt to AECM-82/61 Paga 1 of 2 JINAL REPORT FOR PRD-80/68 1.

Name and address of the individual... informing the commission:

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Production P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Notification of Part 21 applicability made to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, NRC, Region II by letter AECM-82/61, February 15, '982.

This deficiency was also reported under 10CFR21 by General Electric to the NRC in their letter dated December 10, 1981.

2.

Identification of the facility... which... contains a deficiency:

The defective relays were located in Unit I at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS)

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Unit 2 will be inspected for any additional defective relays.

3.

Identification of the firm... supplying the basic component which...

contains a deficiency:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by the General Electric Company, San Jose, California.

4.

Nature of the deficiency... and the safety hazard which... could be created by such a deficiency...:

A.

Description of the Deficiency The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station uses Potter ! Brumfield AMF type relays in the Main Steam Isolation Valve Lekage Control System Panels. While work was being performed on Panel 1H1}-P655, it was noted that #16 AWG wires connected to the AMF type relays had broken loose f rom their terminations. A washer had been provided at these terminations to hold the wire strands without the use of a lug attached to the wire.

Of all the panels inspected at the site, only two used this type of relay. One panel did not experience the problem due to the use of a positive method of fastening the wires to the relays. The other panel did not have a secure mechanical fastening of the conductor to the termination pin on the relay.

Attachment to AECM-82/61 Paga 2 of 3 i-i B.

Analysis of Safety Implications Preoperational testing of the Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control System should locate any disconnected wires in the panel in question. However, assuming that such testing did not locate disconnected wires or that the wires became disconnected following testing, the capability of the MSIV Leakage Control System to perform its safety function could be degraded.

In the worst case.

failure of the MSIV Leakage Control System, couplad with excussive valve leakage, could result in excessive fl.ow through an isolation valve.

If such a condition exists when isolation is required following a severe accident, e.g., a los s-of-coolant accident, the flow through an isolation valve could conceivably result in release j

of radioactive steam from the reactor system to the envirocment.

The condition of the loose conductors on the relays in the MSIV Leakage Control Panel would be a substantial safety hazard in the case of an unlikely scenario as described above.

4 5.

The date on which the information of such deficiency... was obtained.

I Mississippi Power and Light received information of the deficiency on November 3,1980. We reported the deficiency to Mr. J. Rausch of your office as a Potentially Reportable Deficiency on November 4, 1980.

Since' that date MP&L has filed five (5) Interim Reports to inform the Commission of the progress and status of the evaluation of this deficiency. An evaluation for Part 21 has been completed.

4 6.

In the case of the basic component... the number and location of all such components.

The defective relays were installed in Panel 1H13-P655 in CGNS Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control System. Investigations will be performed to determine if there are any additional defective relays in Unit 2.

We do not have knowledge of the location of defective equipment located other than at GGNS.

7.

The corrective action which has been taken... the name of the individual... reponsible for the action; and the length of time that has.been... taken to complete the action.

l A.

Corrective Actions Taken Ring lugs were used to securely fasten the wires to the relays.

-Approved parts, tools, and procedures were employed to correct the deviation.

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Attachannt to AECM-82/61 Page 3 of 3 I

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Responsible Individual C. B. Rogers, Jr.

Site Manager Mississippi Power and Light Company C.

Length of Time to Complete Actions Mississippi Power & Light received notification of the deficiency on November 3,1980. GE issued Field Disposition Deviation Request (FDDR) # JB1-1147 to correct panel H13-P655 in Unit 1.

All work on this panel has been completed.

FDI-WAUA was issued September 25, 1981, for inspection and any necessary additional corrective actions on Unit 1.

FDI-WBPD was issued September 25, 1981, for inspection and any necessary corrective actions on Unit 2.

All corrective actions will be completed prior to fuel load for the respective units.

8.

Any advice related to the deficiency... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to offer.

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