ML20071G335
| ML20071G335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GQL-2070, NUDOCS 7901030083 | |
| Download: ML20071G335 (2) | |
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i METHOPOLI FAN EDISON COMPANY i
r POST OFFICE box $42 REAclNG. PENNSYLVANI A 196c3 TELEPHONE 215 - 9294601 Dece=ber 28, 1978 GCI 2070 j
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Director of Iluelear Peactor Regulation Attn:
R. W. Reid, Chief
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Operating Reactors Branch ITo. h j
U. S. Iluelear Regulatory Cc==issicn L
k*asningten, DC 20555 Daar Sir:
3ree Mile Island :Tuclear Statien, Unit 1 (TMI-1) f Operating Licens
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50
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a Docket !To. 50-289 3
Fire Protect. n Pr e,. a=
i mis letter addresses the results of several studies ccnducted in respense to l
cc==it=ents s-rized in Table 3.2 of the TMI-l Fire Protectica Safety Evalu-I j
ation Report (FPSER). The responses below am keyed to FFSER item nu=bers.
h 3.2.1 Protection vf E=ergency Feedvater Pu=ps An evaluation of fire protection for the emergency feed pu=p area has been
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performed. The design of this :ene incorporates partial barrier valls and spatial separation of = ore than 35 feet between the =ctor-driven and turbine-r driven pu=ps.
Cc=bustible loading in the areas is lov.
Ccnsidering these
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conditions, the existing protection (hand extinguishers and fire heses), and the proposed detection syste=, Met-Ed believes that additional protection to i
preserve the function of at least one e=ergency feed pu=p is not necessa:7 i
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- 3. 2. 3 Effects of Water Spray r
All areas containing safety related equi;=ent have been reviewed to deter =ine whether both divisions of safety related equipment would be affected by fire vater spray. With the exceptien of two areas, water sprsy frc= fire protection
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l neurces vill not si=ultaneously affect divisions of safety related equip =ent.
I The folleving codifications vill be made in the Fuel Handling Building and Con-I tml Building: Drip shields vill be provided for the C-channel =otor centrol center in the Fuel Handling Building and for cabinets on the 338' 6" elevatica of the Control Building (including the relay roc =) where redundant cabinets
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occupy the same room.
1 32.7 Ala= Circuit Supervisica A review of the installed fire detection signal initiating and alar circuits
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has been perfo: ::ed to ensure that all circuits are supervised to detect circuit breaks, ground faults, and power supply failures, and to annunciate in the con-trol rec =. Ihe presently installed circuits =eet the require =ents for Class B h
supervisien as defined by :TFPA 72 D.
Se proposed detecticn system vill be Wg Q i
790103Cc53 t
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' Fire Protection Progrs= ~'ec e=ter 28, 1978 GQL 2070 l
installed to =eet Class 3 supervision require =ents (per staff positien relayed by Mr. G. 3. Zvet:ig of your staff in a Nove=ber 22, 1978 telecen). Berefore, it is Met-Ed's conclusion that there is no need for further =odifications.
- 3. 2. 8 Re=ote Shutdown Staticas The only location where a fire could si=ultaneously cause less of local centrol and centrol from the control roc = of any safe shutdown syste= is the relay roc =.
21s rco is protected by early warning detectors, an automatic CO2 suppression syste=, and vill also be covered by =anual hoses upon ec=pletien of the hose staticn installation program. Although the fire required to cause less of control vould have to totally engulf the relay roc =, an alternate shut %vn sta-tien independent of cables and equip =ent in the relay rec = vill be provided.
3 2.10 Control Building HVAC Loss a
It has been detemined that the only =ajor ce=ponents that could be si=ultaneously affected by a single fire are ventilating exhaust fans AH-E19A&3 (area CE-5a en Fire Hazards Ana'.ysis D'4G. E-023-016). Accordingly, a test was run with those fans out of service but with doors open to allov =axi== flev. Frc= the test data, it vas estimated that with outside air te=perature at 950F dr/ bulb, 78cy vet bulb, and the chilled water syste= cperating, the centrol rec = ambient te=p-erature could reach 950F to 1000F. The Architect-Engineer's Instrmentation and Controls Depart =ent stated that they would not anticipate any equip =ent operating proble=s because of a 95 F - 100cF ambient te=perature. Therefore, Met-Ed plans no additional =odifications.
3 2.12 E=ergency Lighting A study has been performed to ensure that adequate e=ergency lighting is avail-able to accomplish safe shutdown and to fight fires in safety related areas.
'"he results of the review have indicated some potential =inor weaknesses in the installed syste=, i.e., a fire in the vicinity of the distributien panel or cer-tain =ain lighting circuit feeders. However, a fire in these areas does not affect the ability to bring the plant to safe shutdevn frc= the control roo=.
Also, a fire in these areas does not affect the redundant safe-shutdevn equip-
=ent.
As stated in the DE-1 Fire Hazards Analysis, p. 5-2h, sealed-bea= batter /-
povered portable hand lights are provided for e=ergency use which can provide adequate lighting to fight a postulated fire in the areas =entioned above.
Therefore, it caa be cencluded that the existing e=ergency lighting for T!E-1 is adequate to accc=plish safe shutdevn and to fight fires in safety-related areas.
3.1.21 Alternate Shutdown Capability By letter of June 12,1978 (GQL 1068) Met-Ed comnitted to perfc= a study to de-ter :ine the possibility of installing a shutdown station independent of cables and equip =ent in the relay rec = and sub=it the results by Dece=ber 31, 1978.
It has been deter =ined that it is pessible to install an alternate shutdevn station. A conr'eptual design vill be submitted for NRC review by July 31, 1979 Sincerely.
J. G. Herbein Vice Fresident - Generation I
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