ML20071G057
| ML20071G057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GQL-1784, NUDOCS 7812190113 | |
| Download: ML20071G057 (6) | |
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METHOPOLil AN EDISON COMPANY POST OFFICE Box 542 READING. PENNSYLVANI A 19603 TELEPHONE 215 - 929 3601 Dece=ber 13, 1978 GQL 178h Director of !!uelear Reactor Regulation Attn:
R. W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch ITo. k U. S. :Tuclear Regulatory Cen=ission Washington, D. C.
20555 i
.Cear Sir:
i Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (T'4I-1)
Operating License IIo. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Fire Protection Program In response to Question 8 of your letter of August 17, 1978, by letter of Aagust 28, 1978 (GQL 1451), Met-F,d ec=mitted to provide by December 31, 1978, a list of systems served by cables routed through the area between the fuel pool and the Control Building and an analysis demonstrating that a fire.in the area would not affect the ability to safely shut down the reactor.
Attached is a list of systems served by the cables in that area.
The analysis was performed as follows:
1, The F.ngineered Safeguards ('F.S) cable tray sections in the area vere identified.
2.
All circuits for safe reacter shutdown vere determined.
3.
All s'/ stems and equipment served by these cables vere identified.
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"'he analysis was performed on an elevatien-by-elevation basis assuming total loss by fire of all cables of an elevation in the subject area.
This insured that the ability to safely shut devn the reactor veuld not be ec= promised.
~he results of the evaluation indicate that the reactor can be brought to
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the safe shutdown condition for the following reasons:
1.
"he caly safety-related channels in the area are the 3 and C cbnrels.
i Since the A safety-related channel is not routed through the area, this redundant channel would be available to bring the reactor to the safe
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shutdevn condition.
2.
~here is only one area where the 3 and C channels are in close proximity.
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781219016
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Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief December 13, 1978 GQL 178h 1
'"his is the 338' 6" elevation of the Centrol Building. The separation between channels is three (3) feet vertically (between trays 239 and 2h1, B and C channels, respectively) and one (1) foot horizontally (between trays 127 and 141, B and C channels, respectively). However, there is 3
a horizontal fire barrier betveen trays 239 and 2hl and a metal " kick plate" between trays 127 and 2hl.
3 The combustible leading in the area is very low, consisting mostly of cable insulation.
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There are no E3 power cables on the 338' 6" elevation, thus eliminating a possible ignition source.
5 Upon co=pletion of the penetration sealing program, there vill be fire barriers where cable trays penetrate the valls and floors of the subject area to eliminate the possibility of a fire in an adjacent area 1.,ropagating along a cable tray into the subject area.
Based en the above, Met-Bi feels that n,o additional fire protection measures i
are necessary.
i Sincerely, a
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J. G. Herbein i
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Vice President-Generation
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B CHANNEL EQUIPMENT AH-D-37A DH-V-6B AH-D-39A DH-V-7B AH-E-15B DR-P-1B AH-E-18B DR-V-13 AH-E-193 DS-P-1B AH-E-27B EG-P-1B AH-V-IC FW-V-93A BS-V-1B IC-V-2 BS-V-2B MU-P-lc i
BS-V-3B MU-P-3C BS-V-4B MU-V-2A CA-V-1 MU-V-2B CA-V-3 MU-V-14B CA-V-4B MU-V-16C CA-V-13 MU-V-16D CF-V-20A MU-V-37 CF-V-20B NR-P-lC DF-P-IC NR-V-4B DH-P-1B NS-V-35 i
DR-V-4B RR-P-1B i
i DH-V-3 B RR-V-1B
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RR-V-103 l
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C
C CHANNEL EQUIPMENT AH-E-lC NR-V-1B CF-V-19A NS-V-15 CF-V-19B NS-V-32 MU-P-2B NS-V-52C MU-P-3B NS-V-53C MU-V-18 RB-V-2*
MU-V-20 RB-V-7 NR-P-1B RR-V-3C NR-P-lC RR-V-5 RR-V-6 e
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3 Channel Systems Air Handling Make-up and Purification Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Diesel Generator Feedwater Building Spray Decay Heat Removal Intermediate Cooling Chemical Addition Nuclear Services Cooling - River Water I
Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water Gas Waste Liquid Electrical Switchgear Control Decay Heat - River Water Reactor Building Emergency Cooling - River Water Engineered Safeguard Fluid Block Penetration Pressurization Core Flooding
C Channel Svstems Make-up and Purification Nuclear Services Cooling River Water Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Industrial Coolant System Reactor Building Emergency Cooling River Water Air Handling Chemical Addition Building Spray Engineered Safeguard Intermediate Cooling Core Flooding Penetration Pressurization
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