ML20071E892
| ML20071E892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1983 |
| From: | Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20071E870 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8303150380 | |
| Download: ML20071E892 (4) | |
Text
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GPU Nuclear
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QQQf P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
February 17, 1983 Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Pntssia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Starostecki:
Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docke t No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Inspection Report No. 50-219/82-29 This letter is submitted in response to your letter dated January 18, 1983 regarding the findings of the routine resident safety inspection conducted by Messrs. C. Cowgill and J. Thomas on November 12 - December 31, 1982.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, attached are our responses to the violations cited in Appendix A of your correspondence.
If there are any questions regarding the enclosed information, please contact me or Mr. Michael Laggart of my staf f at (609) 971-4643.
Very truly yours, l' ^ ^ '
'A '
-i Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:jal Attachment cc:
Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 NRC Resident Inspect or Oyster Creek Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8303150380 830308 PDR ADOCK 05000219 ear is a part of the General Public Utihties System G
s
' Attachment The following information provides a response to the Notice of Violation cited in Appendix A of the US NRC letter dated J nuary 18, 1983.
a Violation A:
' A.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements of Appendix "A"'of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972.
- Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972 requires that shif t and relief turnover be covered by written procedures.
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- Administrative Procedure 106, Revision 21, June 1,1982, " Conduct of Operations," requires that proper and conservative turnover of shif t responsibilities be conducted. Pertinent information shall be transferred between parties and turnover checklists shall be used as guides and signed prior to the oncoming personnel assuming the shif t duties.
- Contrary to _ the above, on November 16, 1982, shif t turnover was not properly conducted in that the of fgoing midnight to 8:00 a.m. shif t did not inform the relieving shif t that a normally closed containment isolation valve had been lef t open, nor had all required personnel signed the turnover checklist prior to oncoming personnel assuming shif t duties.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
Re sponse :
We concur with the violation as stated.
- As immediate corrective action, a memorandum was issued November 16, 1982 by the Manager-Plant Operations to all operating shif ts directing them to perform all shif t turnovers in strict accordance with Procedure 106,
" Conduct of Operations". In addition, the shif ts were directed to specifically walk down the control panels with their respective reliefs and review the Shif t Turnover Check-Of f item by item. The Control Room Log Book was also required to be reviewed and signed prior to assuming shif t duties. Completeness of logs and accuracy of entries made were also stressed in the memorandum.
To prevent recurrence, revisions to the Shif t Turnover sections of
.l Procedure 106, " Conduct of Operations" and Procedure 106.4, " Conduct of i
Operations, Radwaste and Augmented Of f-Gas Facility", have been submitted for review and approval. The revised procedures reflect the guidelines j
presented in INPO's Good Practice Procedure OP-201, "Shif t Relief and J
Turnover". The revisions made to the procedures and associated " Control Room Turnover Checklist" give more specific direction as to what should be covered in shif t turnover and how it should be accomplished. These revisions are expected to be issued by March 31, 1983.
1 Furthennore, Operations Management conduct periodic observations of shif t turnovers in the Control Room on a random basis.
As a result of the immediate corrective action, full compliance has been achieved.
11 Violation B:
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements of Appendix "A" of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972.
Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972 requires that appropriate procedures for the Rod Worth Minimizer be prepared for reactor startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation.
Contrary to the above, as of December 14, 1982, appropriate procedures were not established and implemented for the Rod Worth Minimizer in that no verification of the Rod Withdrawal Sequence entered in the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) was required prior to reactor startup. The failure to have an appropriate procedure contributed to conducting a Reactor Startup on December 14, 1982 with the wrong rod withdrawal sequence entered in the RWM.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
Re sponse :
We concur with the violation as stated.
As cited in the Notice of Violation, a reactor startup was conducted on December 14, 1982 with an incorrect Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) sequence input to the RWM. Investigation of this event disclosed that an incorrect RWM sequence tape was inserted during an extensive preventative maintenance testing program performed on the RWM during October and November 1982.
During the December 14, 1982 reactor startup, an "Out-of-Sequence" alarm was initiated by the RWM indicating that a control rod selected for withdrawal, as determined by the then-current and approved rod withdrawal sequence, was not the same rod programmed into the RWM.
Control room operators immediately terminated the startup and contacted the Manager -
Core Engineering and Manager - Plant Operations. The rod withdrawal sequence was reviewed and verified to be correct.
Since the RWM would not allow withdrawal according to the correct sequence the RWM was bypassed, as permitted by the Technical Specifications. The sequence programmed into the RWM was reviewed and found to be incorrect.
It should be noted that the first eight (8) rod groups (68 control rods) programmed into the RWM were identical to those indicated on the correct rod withdrawal sequence.
No incorrect rods were withdrawn. The RWM performed its function by initiating an alarm when the correct withdrawal sequence became incompatible with the sequence programmed into the RWM.
The discrepancy was quickly discovered by control room personnel and corrective action was immediately taken.
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5 iii In order to prevent recurrence of this event, Procedure 1001.5 " Rod Worth Minimizer" will be revised to provide additional guidance and strict control of the preparation, programming and subsequent storage of the RWM sequence tape. RWM program verification will be required just prior to plant startups. In addition, all outdated RWM sequence tapes have been destroyed to ensure that an incorrect tape cannot be programmed into the RWM.. Storage and control of the RWM sequence tape will be the responsibility of the Core Engineering group.
Full compliance will be achieved with the review, approval and issuance of the procedure revision, which is expected by March 30, 1983.
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