ML20070T026
| ML20070T026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1983 |
| From: | Kemper J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8302080156 | |
| Download: ML20070T026 (5) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 1881 -1981 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 JOHNS.KEMPER V IC E f R ESI D E N T E NG49eE E RONG AfeD prESE AfrC04 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Recufstions U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Reference:
Limerick Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos 50-352 and 50-353
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
The enclosed report is befng submitted to satisfy a request for information relative to heavy loads analysis for Limerick Generating Station.
On January 6, 1983, a conference call was conducted between representatives of Philadelphia Electric Company, EG&G Idaho Inc. and the NRC concerning the Draft Technical Evaluation Report (TER) on the control of heavy loads which you forwarded on November 24, 1982.
We believe that this additional information will be useful in closing out open items in the Technical Evaluation Review.
If there are any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, 2 c. Ida ety %19 J. 5 lb-W IGO2000156 830131 PDR ADOCK 05000352 PDR
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Philadelphie Electric Comptny Limerick Generating Station Response to Technical Evaluation Report on Control of Heavy Loads In order to respond to the Draft TER, the summary of recommendations which require further information are restated below followed by our responses.
1 Summary / Conclusions Section page has been revised to reflect NRC comments concerning the inclusion of Unit 2.
A copy of the revised page is attached.
2.3.1.3 - Safe Load Paths In order to fully comply with the criteria of guideline 1, " Safe Load paths", the applicant should perform the following prior to fuel 17ad:
a)
Incorporation of safe load paths into procedures.
Response
i A Station Administrative (A) procedure will be developed which governa " heavy load" handling systems. This procedure will include, either directly or by specific reference, a safe load path drawing and will be used to control the load handling operations which have been defined as having the potential to do damage as described in NUREG-0612.
b)
Provide substantiation that alternatives proposed to marking of safe load paths on floors, etc. are equivalent.
Response
The following steps will be taken to assure that load paths are followed:
1.
Crane controls, or control areas of the appropriate cranes, will be marked to indicate that the crane is involved with " heavy load" handling operations which are governed by procedures.
2.
The pertinent procedures will either describe ar reference the recommended lead path.
3.
The A procedure (see 2.3.1.3a) will require a review of the load path prior to load handling operations.
4.
Where applicable, load handling operations are conducted utilizing two trained personnel. The first individual (operator) will be operating the crane whereas the second individual (rigger) will be directing the operations.
Both individuals will be familiar with the procedures.
This will provide verification that load paths are being followed and are clear. i
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5.
Crane operator training includes instructioa regarding " heavy load" handling operations.
c.
Incorporate approval by Plant Safety Review Committee to deviations from defined load paths using alternate procedures.
Response
The administrative procedure discussed above requires the approval
~of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). By approving this procedure, which includes permission for deviation from load path upon review by appropriate individual (s) the PORC delegates its authority concerning deviations from load paths.
2.3.2.3 - Load Handling Procedures The applicant will comply with the criteria of Guideline 2, " Load Handling Procedures", upon issuance of written Load handling procedures prior to fuel load. These procedures should be available for possible NRC review.
Response
Appropriate load handling procedures will be developed prior to fuel load.
Tais procedure will be available for NRC review.
2.3.3.3 - Crane Operator Training The applicant has not complied with the criteria of Guidelines 3 of NUREG-0612. This should be done prior to fuel load.
Response
Crane o:arators will be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with ANSI-B30.2-1976.
2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI-B30.2-1976.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..3.5.3 - Lifting Devices (Not specially designed)
The applicant has not provided any information on compliance with the criteria of Guideline 5, Slings. This should be completed prior to fuel load.
Response
The " heavy load" slings that will be used at Limerick will meet ANSI B30.9-1971.
In addition, a dynamic load factor of 25% will be applied to these slings. By using this load factor, which is conservative for the fastest hook speed, (Maximum hoisting speed is 27 Ft./ Min, for the Reactor Feed Pump Area Bridge Crane, Equipment No.10H101), it is not necessary to associate slings with specific cranes.
2.3.6. - Cranes (Inspection, Testing and Maintenance)
The Limerick Plant will comply with Guideline 6 when the applicant submits information on their crane inspection, testing and msintenance program prior to fuel load.
Response
The inspection testing and maintenance programs will meet ANSI B30.2-1976.
These programs will be available for inspection prior to fuel load.
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E 1.
SUMMARY
/ CONCLUSIONS
'This report on overhead heavy load handling systems at Limerick was prepared in response to Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Reference 1 (Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter to all licenses dated December 22, 1980).
It also includes minor revisions to data previously transmitted to the NRC by Referer ce 2.
The format of Section 2 of this report follows that of Reference 1.
Detailed information on each crane and hoist, including hazard evaluations, statistics, load / impact area matricies etc. are included in the Tables and Appendicies.
This review focused on cranes and hoists in Unit 1 and the common areas of the Limerick facility and included monorails and lifting beams for which no hoists have been purchased but which may be used occasionally for equipment replacement or repair.
Since the Unit 2 design will be similar to Unit 1 the conclusions of this report apply to Unit 2.
An as-built review will be performed for both Units to verify that differences in layout for Unit 2 and modifications made subsequent to this report do not affect its conclusions.
The reactor enclosure crane is the only load handling system capable of carrying heavy loads which could damage irradiated fuel if dropped.
Though the crane itself generally complies with the NUREG 0612 quide-lines, its special lifting devices and associated load attachment points do not.
This is particularly true for critical loads, where NUREG 0612 recommends twice the normal lesign safety factor.
Since these items have already been fabricated it is proposed to substitute proof load testing in lieu of full compliance with NUREG 0612.
l All cranes and hoists were evaluated to determine whether a dropped load could affect the ability to safely shut down the plant and continue to remove decay heat from the reactor and fuel pool.
Systems required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal are listed in Appendix A and hazard evaluations are provided in Appendix B.
In most cases it was possible to show that, based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems or other plant-specific considerations, no real hazard l
l P-24/6
-ii-Revised January, 1983 l
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