ML20070R622
| ML20070R622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1991 |
| From: | Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 90-11, NUDOCS 9104010262 | |
| Download: ML20070R622 (4) | |
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MAR 27 B91 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennescoe Valley Authority
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50-328 SEQUOYAH nut'Js2 PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILJTY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - SPECIAL REPORT 90-11, RL'11310N 2 - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN AND 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R
- his special report is being revised to provido t*"
turrent scopo and implementation schedule for modifications to correct conditions identified in this report.
Implementation of the modification to correct a nonconformance with Licenso condition 2.C.13.a of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License (the fire rating of two walls sur~ounding Fire Doors C57 and C63 is indotormina' 3) will be delayed.
The selected aitornative to correct this condition is to replace the walls with Underwriters' Laboratory-approved walls that extend to the concrete ceiling.
This modifiestion involves penetrating an existing asbestos ceiling.
Because of the sensitivity of onhostos removal, the walls will be replaced concurrently with the replacocent of the asbestos colling.
As this coordination significantly increases the work scope, the completion of the modification will be dolayed until October 1, 1991.
TVA considers the delay necessary in light of the hazardo associated with asbestos work.
Hourly, roving fire watch patrols will centinuo.
As a result of further evaluation, a fire hazards analysis of the area around the Appendix R fire barrier located on Elevation 714 has been performed to document the acceptability of the wall without modification. This analysis verified the acceptability of the barrior as currently constructed based on similar Underwriter's Laboratory-approved configurations, low fire load, and the area's automatic suppression and detection.
The changes from TVA's original eg:punst are designated by vertical bars.
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9104010262 910327 PDR ADOCK 03000327 m
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MAR 271991 a
U.. Nuclear Regulatory Comission if you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephono M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8422.
Very truly yours.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (k
- W E. C. Wlitll ce, Ma ger Nuclear Li' ensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorato 11-4 U.S. Nuclear Re6ulatory Comission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockvillo, Maryland 20852 Mr. J. N. Donohow, Project Manager U.S. Nuclaar Regulatory Comission One White Flint, North 11555-Rockvillo Pike Rockvillo, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah NLt' ear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennosceo 37379 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co mission Region II 101 Mariotta Stroot, NW, suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
4 ENCLOSURE 14-Day F ' low-Up Report Special Rer.
90-11, Revi.on 2 Description of Condition This special report addresses the requirements of License Conditions 2.C.13.a and 2.C.13.c of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License regarding the SQN fire protection plan and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.a requires TVA to neintain and implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan which, in part, commits to walls of specified fire-rated durations in certain plant locations.
Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.c requires SQN to comply with certain sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, that stipulate requirements for fire barriers between certain cables and equipment.
On May 31, 1990, during performance of extensive reviews conducted as a result of corrective actions for a previously identified fire protection plan noncompliance (Special Report 90-06 dated April 24, 1990). three noncompliances with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.a and one noncompliance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.c were identified.
1.
A wall panel above Fire Door C53 located on control building, Elevatisn 732 (reference Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR].
Figure 1.2.3-3) has a welded frame that does not have an acceptable relieving mechanism for thermal expansion that could occur during a fire.
The wall support f rame is restrained so that thermal expansion during a fire could result in deflection, which could degrade the wall as a fire barrier. Additionally, the wall contains an exposed steel plate supporting two electrical boxes.
2.
A wall panel above Fire Door C23 (connecting the co.nputer room and corridor on control building, Elevation 685) has exposed structural framing above the corridor ceiling. The wall gypsum board does not cover the ends of channel studs above the doorf rame.
3.
An Appendix R fire barrier with a 1-hour fire rating located at Column Lines A8 between Column Lines Q and R of auxiliary building, Elevation 714 (reference FSAR, Figure 1 2.3-4), is restrained and does not allow for thermal expansion.
4.
Two walls surrounding Fire Doors C57 and C63 located on control building, Elevation 732 (reference FSAR, Figure L 2.3-3), are constructed of wood fiber and gypsum sand mixture. A fire-tested configuration "orresponding to this design could not be identified.
Therefore, the fire rating of the walls is indeterminate.
The walls provide fire separation between the conference room and NRC office in the Technical Support Center and the adjoining relay room.
7 The affected areas are included in the surv^illance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols.
A condition adverse to q"alicy report was also initiated to document the problem and its corrective.. tion.
Telephone notification to NRC and subsequent confirmation by facsimile were made in accordance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.11.
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Cause of Condition The root cause of noncompliance Items 1 and 3 above has been attributed to a design deficiency in the original wall design, in that thermal expaasion during a fire was not addressed.
The root cause of noncompliance Item 2 above has been attributed to an inadequate initial design.
The root cause of noncompliance Item 4 above has been attributed to a design deficiency in the original wall design, in that the design as specified did not correspond to a fire-tested configuration.
Analysis of Condition There are no plant systems or components considered inoperable or incapable of performing their design functions as a result of the condition described in thir report. The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols. The roving fire watch patrols, coupled with the existing fire detection and suppression systems in th se areas, provide assurance that a fire in these areas would be identified so that appropriate response actions coulf be initiated.
Corrective Action The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols.
As a result of evaluation by Nuclear Engineering, corrective actions have been developed to modify the subject walls to bring them into compliance with the applicable Unit 2 License Condition requirements. Those corrective actions include (1) modifying the steel framing in the panel above Fire Door 053 to allow for thermal growth and applying fireproofing insulation on the expased steel, (2) installing additional Type X gypsum board to cover exposed structural framing above the corridor ceiling in the panel above Door 023, and (3) documenting the acceptability of the barrier located at Column Line A8 between Column Lines Q and R of the auxiliary building, Elevation 714; this documentation verified the acceptability of the barrier as currently constructed based on similar UL-approved cenfigurations, low fire load, and the area's automatic suppression and deteccion.
Corrective actions Nos. I and 2 will be completed by June 1, 1991.
The walls at Fire, Doors 057 and C63 Item 4, in the NRC office and conference room in the technical support center, will be replaced with Underwriter's Laboratory-approved material that extends to the concrete colling.
Accomplishing this modification requires penetrating an existing asbestos ceiling.
Becauac of the hazards associated with asbestos, the modification to replace the walls will be done concurrently with a modif' cation to replace the asbestos ceiling. -This scheduling will enable removal of the asbestos ceiling, replacement of the existing walls, and installation of a replacement ceiling if needed.
This coordination significantly increases the scope of work required; therefore, these walls will be replaced by Octobei i, 199t.
Comni tmen t s 1.
Corrective action Nos, 1 and 2 above will be complc u.d by June 1, 1991.
2.
Replacement of the walls at Fire Doors C57 and C63 will be completed by October 1, 1991.
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