ML20070H400
| ML20070H400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070H398 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9407210262 | |
| Download: ML20070H400 (3) | |
Text
f* *%q UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINoToN, D.C. 20566-0001 gs aj SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 64 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLVMINATING COMPANY. ET AL.
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. I DOCKET NO. 50-440 1.0 JNTRODUCTION By letter dated March 12, 1993, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al. (licensees), proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1.
The change requested clarification of TS Table 3.3.7.1-1, Action 72 for an inoperable Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor (Noble Gas).
The change requires actions consistent with TS 3.7.2 for the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System. This clarification will reduce the possibility of TS misinterpretations.
2.0 EVALVATION The change evaluated is modifying TS Table 3.3.7.1-1, " Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation" Action 72.
This action statement applies to the Control Room Radiation Monitor (Noble Gas) which provides one of two diverse input signals, (LOCA signal provides the second input) for control room isolation and actuation of both subsystems of the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System.
If the monitor cannot be restored to operability within 7 days, the change allows either initiating and maintaining operation of at least one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem or performing actions to minimize potential causes of high radiation.
The operability of the radiation monitor supports the operation of both subsystems but, if inoperable, does not necessarily cause subsystem inoperability.
However, its inoperability reduces the diversity of signals that can initiate control room isolation and actuation of the Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystems during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3.
Initiating and maintaining operation of at least one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem ensures that radioactivity resulting from a design basis accident will not exceed design assumptions. This fulfills the safety function.
If a design basis accident occurs with failure of the operating subsystem, the LOCA signal will actuate the other subsystem. The LOCA signal is itself a redundant and diverse signal and is a reliable indicator of potential radioactivity releases during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3.
Therefore, the proposed action allows placing one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem in operation if the radiation monitor cannot be restored to operability within 7 days.
This is less restrictive than TS 3.7.2.a which requires being in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in 9407210262 940718 PDR ADOCK 05000440 P
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COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3.
However, the staff concludes that the actions are appropriate for a support function.
Alternately, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, and 3, the proposed action allows placing the unit in at least HDT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
This proposed action is consistent with the action specified in TS 3.7.2a for OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3, if one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem is inoperable and not restored within 7 days.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5 or *** (when irradiated fuel is being handled in the f uel Handling Building or primary containment), the proposed action requires initiating and maintaining operation of one Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystem which is consistent with TS 3.7.2.b.1 for the same OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS if one control room emergency recirculation subsystem cannot be restored within 7 days. Alternatively, the proposed action requires suspending CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Huilding and the primary containment, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
These proposed actions are consistent with the action specified in TS 3.7.2.b.2 for the same OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS, if both Control Room Emergency Recirculation subsystems are inoperable.
The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed changes to the TS regarding actions to take if the control room ventilation radiation monitor becomes inoperable.
t Based on the above, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to be acceptable.
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3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 [NVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement.
The staff has
-determined that-the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or-cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 22013).
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for
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categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, I
and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
Linda Gundrum Date:
July 18,1994
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