ML20070E142
| ML20070E142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1991 |
| From: | J. J. Barton GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| C321-91-2046, NUDOCS 9103040332 | |
| Download: ML20070E142 (3) | |
Text
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e GPU Nuclear Corporation
- !3 Nuclear
- =n:ra88 Forked R!ver. New Jersey 087310388 609 971 4000 Writer's Direct Dial Numt,er:
February 25, 1991 C321-91-2046 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desh Washington, D.C.
20o55 Dear Sirs
Subject:
Oynter Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Inspection Report 90-23 Reply to Notice of Violation In accordance with 10 CPR 2.201, the enclosed provideo GPU Nuclear's response to the violation identified in NRC's Inspection Report 50-219/90-23.
If further information in required, please contact Brenda DeMerchant, OC Licensing Engineer at (609) 971-4642.
Very truly yours, f
John J.
a ton Director, Oyster Creek JJD/BDeM/jc Enclosure cc:
Administrator, Region 1 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager 9103040332 910225 PDR ADOCK 05000219
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a C323-91-2046 Page 2; violation:
10 CFR 50.54,(m)(2)(iii) requires when a nuclear power unit is in an operational mode other than cold shutdown or refueling that each licensee shall have a person holding a senior operator license for the nuclear power unit in the control room at all times.
Technical Specification Section 6.2.2.C requires that at all times when there is fuel in the vessel, except when the reactor is in cold shutdown or refuel, at least one licensed senior reactor operator shall be in the control room.
Contrary to the above, on December 20, 1990, the reactor was in power operation, but no licensed senior reactor operator was in the control room for about four minutes.
This is a severity level V violation (Supplement I).
Response
1.
GPU Nuclear concurs with the violation as stated.
2.
The reason for the violation was personnel error on the part of the Group Operating Supervisor (GC1) who failed to properly verify that the Group Shift Supervisor (CSS) had returned to the control room after informing the GOS of a brief absence.
The GOS also f ailed to follow administr ative direction in that he did not attempt a face to face turnover with the GSS upon leaving the Control Room. A contributing cause was the failure to ensure that the guidance provided in the administrative directive issued as a result of a previous occurrence was incorporated into plant administrative procedures.
The COS invo'.ed in this incident had been in training for his SRO license when the first incident of this nature occurred more than a year earlier (10/5/89).
As a result, he was not included in the required reading list for LER 89-022 and the directive from the Plant Operations Director which stated a GSS or GOS shall communicate directly with the other individual clearly stating his intentions to leave the control Room.
I 3.
Corrective actions taken are as follows:
a.
The GOS and GSS immediately returned to the control. room when informed there was no SRO in the control room.
i b.
The Plant Operations Director discussed the occurrence with the individuals involved, reinforcing the above mentioned plant administrative directive.
c.
LER 90-16 was assigned as required reading to all licensed personnel and all personnel presently in licensed training to ensure it is
-understood that direct communication between SROs is necessary when one will be leaving the control room.
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s C321-91-2046 Page 3 4.
Corrective actions that will be taken to avoid further violationes a.
The guidance contained in the administrative directive will be incorporated into the Control of Operations Procedure (Procedure Number 106).
b.
A Human Factore study will be made to determine the feasibility of devising a means of preventing both SROs from leaving the Control Room at the same time.
5.
Full compliance will be achieved prior to plant restart from the current refueling outage (but no later than 6/1/91) when control of Operatione Procedure (106) is revised to include the administrative directive requiring a f ace to f ace turnover between SRoo before leaving the control room.
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