ML20070C493
| ML20070C493 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1994 |
| From: | Broughton T GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| C311-94-2086, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9407060083 | |
| Download: ML20070C493 (10) | |
Text
.
GPU Nuclear Corporation G. U YUClG8r 3.'*4
J Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0480 (717)944 7621 Writer's Direct Dial Nurnber:
(717) 948-8005 June 29, 1994 C311-94-2086 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Generic Letter 89-10 Report
Dear Sirs:
This letter documents the current status of the TMI Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Program.
GL 89-10 item (m) requires licensees to notify the NRC of completed actions for the GL 89-10 program.
GL 89-10, issued June 28, 1989, requested the recommended actions to be completed within five years or three refueling outages, whichever was later.
GL 89-10, Supplement 6, provided further direction on the information requested as part of item (m) i stated above.
GL 89-10 item (k) recognized that refueling outages starting within six months of the issuance of the GL do not need to be counted as one of the three refueling outages.
GPU Nuclear advised the NRC in letter C311-89-2117 dated December 28, 1989, of the initial expectations for the Three Mile Island (TMI)
MOV program as well as the schedule to complete the GL actions.
The stated TMI j
schedule was to essentially complete the MOV program within five years (by June 28, 1994) but with the proviso that some actions may be completed in the llR Refueling outage which is scheduled for September-October 1995, GPU Nuclear believes that the TMI GL 89-10 program is essentially complete for THI-l and that no extension to the schedule is required.
Design reviews and i
static testing are complete for all valves in the GL 89-10 program.
Where practical, dynamic (differential pressure and flow) tests demonstrated operability of the valves under simulated accident conditions.
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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsid,ary of General Pubhc Utdities Corporation
Document Control Desk C311-94-2086 Page 2 of 2 A description of the completion status of the TMI GL 89-10 MOV Program is contained in Enclosure I which also addresses the GL 89-10, Supplement 6 items.
The TMI GL MOV Program consists of 81 MOVs, all of which have been tested with diagnostic apparatus at static plant conditions.
Dynamic full flow tests of 22 MOVs were performed with an additional 21 MOVs tested at a partial differential pressure which was the maximum pressure that could be obtained for test purposes.
The reason for not performing the dynamic flow tests for the remaining MOVs was the valves were part of a grouping (17 valves) or the systems could not be configured to obtain significant differential pressures (21 valves).
Analysis of the grouped valves has concluded these valves meet the GL recommendations and no further testing or analysis is planned.
A discussion of the grouped valves is contained in. addresses the valves that were not dynamic full flow tested due to systems constraints.
It is planned to further analyze these valves utilizing an EPRI developed MOV performance prediction program.
Based on receipt and training of the EPRI program by September 1994, this analysis is scheduled to be completed by January 1, 1995.
This analysis is expected to confirm that the valves and their set-ups are adequate to meet the design basis of the valves.
The TMI GL 89-10 MOV program is an on-going effort and GPU Nuclear will continue to address the industry concerns as well as future issues as they are identified.
Periodic retests of MOVs have been scheduled.
The schedule and the tests results are available for review.
Sincerely,
} & ]k T. G. Brotghton Vice President and Director, TMI DVH/ emf cc:
M. G. Evans - TM1 Senior Resident Inspector R. W. Hernan - TMI-l Senior Project Manager i
T. T. Martin - Region I Administrator i
i
ENCLOSURE 1 9
COMPLETION STATUS OF THE TMI GL 89-10 PROGRAM l
A.
THE TMI GL 89-10 M0V PROGRAM The TMI-l Program Description for NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve Program Revision 3 documents the GL MOV program for TMI.
There are 81 MOVs in the TMI GL 89-10 program. All valves within the program scope have been, at a minimum, tested with diagnostic apparatus at static plant conditions to verify proper switch settings.
In-situ testing of 43 MOVs under full or partial flow / differential pressure has been performed in accordance with approved plant procedures to verify the adequacy of the switch settings selected.
Where full flow differential pressure conditions were determined to be impractical from a plant safety viewpoint, other testing or analytical methods such as extrapolation of data or establishing valve similarity have been employed to verify switch setting adequacy.
The design basis reviews for each valve considered the following for each mode of normal operation and for each accident scenario:
valve function, valve position, position changeable aspectr., system conditions -
including maximum differential pressure, fluid flow-rate and temperature, and external conditions.
The accident scenario which results in the maximum differential pressure across each valve was reviewed.
The design basis reviews considered emergency operating procedure conditions.
The electrical considerations in the design basis reviews included thermal overloads, cable size, degraded grid conditions, and switch settings to ensure both AC and DC MOVs would perform electrically as well as mechanically.
The MOV program is an on-going effort. As potential M0V problems are identified, appropriate reviews are performed and corrective actions, if required, are scheduled. is a summary of the valves that were grouped including the criteria for grouaing and the justification developed to determine that the valves meet t1e GL 89-10 recommendations. is a summary of valves requiring analysis utilizing the EPRI MOV performance prediction program.
This includes valves that were partial differential pressure tested and tho;e that had no differential pressure test. This consists of a table of tre valve, valve type, size, safety function, design basis Dp (max), design basis flow, available design margin, and risk factor for each valve.
i
i ENCLOSURE 1 B.
MAINTENANCE and RETESTING ACTIVITIES A Risk Factor was determined for each GL 89-10 MOV by evaluating the PRA risk ranking, available design margin, operational concerns, and maintenance history.
These considerations were combined to provide an overall risk ranking.
Corrective and Preventive maintenance activities are scheduled using a maintenance computer system (GMS-II). Whenever possible, major valve and operator maintenance activities are scheduled to be performed jointly.
This approach permits the required testing to be performed at the completion of these activities versus separately for both operator and valve work activities.
Detailed post-maintenance testing requirements are specifically delineated in the appropriate electrical and mechanical maintenance procedures and in Procedure AP-1071, Post Maintenance Test Guidelines.
These requirements meet or exceed the testing guidance outlined in NUMARC Document 91-01, " Industry Guidance in Responding to NRC GL 89-10."
GMS-II will be used to schedule periodic retesting of those MOVs in the TMI GL 89-10 Program.
The retest frequency initially will not exceed three refueling outages for each M0V within the program scope.
Based on the risk factor for each valve and the performance trending program under development, the retest frequency may be adjusted in the future.
Dynamic retesting of a MOV at design-basis conditions, when practical, will only be repeated at such time that, due to replacement or modification, it is determined by engineering that the existing test results are not representative of the MOV in its modified condition.
Maintenance procedures involving MOVs are periodically reviewed and changed in accordance with Plant Administrative Procedures.
Procedures are modified by both Maintenance and Engineering personnel to incorporate the latest industry concerns and for general improvement.
EPRI/NMAC maintenance guidelines, bulletins, selected INPO good practices, SOERs, etc. are periodically incorporated, as appropriate, into the TMI GL 89-10 MOV Program.
GPU Nuclear is also participating in the EPRI MOV Prediction Program.
This will ensure that valve thrust equations utilized, extrapolation of delta pressure / flow test results and determination of valve similarity are appropriately chosen and justifiable.
The MOV diagnostic systems vendor equipment validation results, as reported by the MOV User's Group (MUG), or the results of a comparable test program, will continue to be reviewed and incorporated into the MOV Program, as appropriate, i
ENCLOSURE 2 GROUPED VALVES The TMI-l Program Description for NRC Generic letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve Program Revision 3, Section 6.4 states the criteria for grouping of identical valves.
This section states:
GPU Nuclear does not intend to test all identical valves in a system.
GPU Nuclear proposes to differential pressure test (if possible) 2 out of 3 or 4 of the identical valves.
If the 2 valves indicate consistent behavior when using diagnostic equipment during static and differential pressure testing then the remaining valve (s) is a candidate for static testing only.
Several factors have been evaluated before differential pressure testing has been waived.
The factors include valve factors consistent with industry test results, predictable valve behavior, thrust margins, load sensitive behavior concerns, instrument inaccuracies and voltage considerations.
The spring pack displacement at Torque Switch Trip generally should be twice the displacement required to overcome differential pressure effects.
Testing of 1 out of 2 valves has been considered only where a large margin exists.
The above factors have been considered, along with the operational practicability associated with performing the test.
A final decision has been made after the AP test of the first of a set of duplicate valves.
When differential pressure testing has been waived, the basis has been documented in an engineering evaluation.
There were 17 valves that were grouped.
These 17 valves along with the justification developed to determine that the valves meet the GL 89-10 recommendations are contained in the table on the next page (Enclosure 2).
ENCLOSURE 2 GROUPED VALVES VALVE GROUPED JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT FULL FLOW AP TESTING WITH VALVES BS-V-2A BS-V-28 Low Dp, open safety function, high margin, and low priority ranking BS-V-3B BS-V-3A low Dp, open safety function and normally open, high margin and low priority ranking.
DH-V-7A DH-V-78 Open safety function, and has high motor capability margin in the open position when the torque switch is bypassed.
CA-V-4A GLOBE GROUP Low priority ranking and Note 1 below.
CA-V-4B GLOBE GROUP Low priority ranking and Note 1 below.
MU-V-2A GLOBE GROUP See Note 1 below.
MU-V-28 GLOBEGRlVP See Note 1 below.
MU-V-168 GLOBE GROUP See Note 1 below.
MU-V-160 GLOBE GROUP See Note 1 below.
MU-V-25 GLOBE GROUP See Note 1 below.
RC-V-3 GLOBE GROUP See Note 1 below.
CO-V-14A GATE GROUP Low Dp, high margin and low priority ranking.
RR-V-3B GATE GROUP Open safety function and normally open, low priority ranking.
. "' V-4A bAff GROUP Open safety function, and low priority ranking.
ud-V-4B GATE GROUP Open safety function, and low priority ranking.
RR-V-4C GATE GROUP Open safety function, and low priority ranking.
RR-V-4D GATE GROUP Open safety function, and low priority ranking.
The GLOBE GROUP consists of valves CA-V-3, CA-V-13, CF-V 2A/B, MU-V-16A, MU-V-160, and RC-V-4 which were dynamically full flow tested.
The GATE GROUP consists of valves C0-V-148, RR-V-3A, and RR-V-3C which were dynamically full flow tested.
NOTES 1.
Used 1.1 valve factor and guide bore diameter to determine the required thrust. All valves are Edward Y-Pattern globe valves ranging in size 1" to 4" and are simile to the EPRI test valve 48.
ENCLOSURE 3 VALVES R91UIRING ANALYSIS UTILIZING THE EPRI MOV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION PROGRAM The valves that were not dynamic full flow tested because the systems could not be configured to obtain the design differential pressures are tabled below.
TABLE
SUMMARY
The stated Risk Factor was determined by evaluating the PRA risk ranking, available design margin, operational concerns, and maintenance history which provided an overall risk ranking. All valves were tested with diagnostic apparatus at static plant conditions to verify proper switch settings.
The valves in this table will be further analyzed utilizing the EPRI developed MOV Performance Prediction Program.
VALVF No.
'vE S17E SAFETY FUNCTION DESIGN DESIGN AVAIL RISK BASIS BASIS DESIGN FACTOR DP FLOW MARGIN (MAX)
(GPM)
(SEE NOTE 1)
AH-V-1B BFLY 48 REACTOR BUILL JG PURGE ISOLATION 25 14000 1.14 MEDIUM SCFM SEE NOTE 2 AH-V-lC BFLY 48 REACTOR BUILDING PURGE ISOLATION 25 14000 1.03 MEDIUM SCFM SEE NOTE 2 BS-V-1A GLOBE 8
REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY DISCHARGE 270 1500 1.63 LOW ISOLATION VALVES (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION)
BS-V-18 GLOBE 8
REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY DISCHARGE 270 1500 1.56 LOW ISOLATION VALVES (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION)
CF-V-1A GATE 14 CORE FLOOD TANK DISCHARGE ISOLATION 633 0
3.23 LOW CF-V-1B GATE 14 CORE FLOOD TANK DISCHARGE ISOLATION 633 0
2.94 LOW C0-V-111A GATE 4
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS CROSS-CONNECT 26 0
3.99 LOW C0-V-111B GATE 4
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS CROSS-CONNECT 26 0
1.73 LOW DH-V-1 GATE 12 DECAY HEAT SUCTION VALVES FROM THE 507 3300 2.82 MEDIUM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
ENCLOSURE 3 VALVES REQUIRING ANALYSIS UTILIZING THE EPRI MOV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION PROGRAM
~
VALVE No.
TYPE SIZE SAFETY FUNCTION DESIGN DESIGN AVAIL RISK BASIS BASIS DESIGN FACTOR DP FLOW MARGIN (MAX)
(GPM)
(SEE NOTE 1)
DH-V-2 GATE 12 DECAY HEAT SUCTION VALVES FROM THE 507 3300 3.01 MEDIUM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DH-V-3 GATE 12 DECAY HEAT SUCTION VALVES FROM THE 343 3300 1.03 MEDIUM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DH-V-4A GATE 10 DECAY HEAT SYSTEM DISCHARGE TO REACTOR 508 3300 6.48 MEDIUM COOLANT SYSTEM DH-V-4B GATE 10 DECAY HEAT SYSTEM DISCHARGE TO REACTOR 508 3300 6.22 MEDIUM COOLANT SYSTEM DH-V-5A GATE 14 BWST TO DECAY HEAT PUMP SUCTION 35 3300 2.96 LOW DH-V-5B GATE 14 BWST TO DECAY HEAT PUMP SUCTION 35 3300 2.91 LOW DR-V-1A BFLY 20 DECAY RIVER PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 53 8000 1.76 HIGH DR-V-1B BFLY 20 DECAY RIVER PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 53 8000 1.76 HIGH EF-V-2A GATE 6
EFW PUMP DISCHARGE CROSS-CONNECT 1437 550 1.10 LOW EF-V-28 GATE 6
EFW PUMP DISCHARGE CROSS-CONNECT 1437 550 1.10 LOW FW-V-5A GATE 20 MAIN FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE 580 13000 1.39 MEDIUM TO LOW FW-V-5B GATE 20 MAIN FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE 580 13000 1.37 MEDIUM TO LOW FW-V-92A GATE 6
LOW LOAD FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE 580 3100 1.20 MEDIUM TO LOW FW-V-92B GATE 6
LOW LOAD FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE 580 3100 1.03 MEDIUM TO LOW MS-V-2A GATE 12 STEAM DUMP HEADER SUPPLY 51 750 3.30 LOW
- /HR STEAM
ENCLOSURE 3 VALVES REQUIRING ANALYSIS UTILIZING THE EPRI MOV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION PROGRAM VALVE No.
TYPE SIZE SAFETY FUNCTION DESIGN DESIGN AVAIL RISK BASIS BASIS DESIGN FACTOR DP FLOW MARGIN (MAX)
(GPM)
(SEE NOTE 1)
MS-V-2B GATE 12 STEAM DUMP HEADER SUPPLY 51 750 3.15 LOW
- /HR STEAM MS-V-10A GATE 6
MAIN STEAM TO EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP 605 68700 1.94 MEDIUM TURBINE
- /HR TO LOW STEAM MS-V-10B GATE 6
MAIN STEAM TO EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP 605 68700 1.98 MEDIUM TURBINE
- /HR TO LOW STEAM MU-V-14A STOP 6
MAKE-UP PUMP SUCTION FROM BWST 35 824 8.81 HIGH CHECK MU-V-14B STOP 6
MAKE-UP PUMP SUCTION FROM BWST 35 824 8.92 HIGH CHECK NR-V-1A BFLY 16 NUCLEAR RIVER WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE VALVE 54 6000 2.50 MEDIUM NR-V-1B BFLY 16 NUCLEAR RIVER WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE VALVE 54 6000 2.32 MEDIUM NR-V-lC BFLY 16 NUCLEAR RIVER WATER PUMPS DISCHARGE VALVE 54 6000 2.50 MEDIUM NR-V-4A BFLY 30 SUPPLY CIRC WATER SYSTEM DE-ICE MAKEUP 57 6000 2.51 LOW NR-V-4B BFLY 30 SUPPLY CIRC WATER SYSTEM DE-ICE MAKEUP 57 6000 2.50 LOW NS-V-4 GATE 8
NUCLEAR SERVICES CLOSED COOLING WATER 80 832 1.08 LOW REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR COOLING RETURN (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION OUTSIDE REACTOR BUILDING)
NS-V-15 GATE 8
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY 138 832 1.27 LOW (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION) m 2
ENCLOSURE 3 VALVES REQUIRING ANALYSIS UTILIZING THE EPRI MOV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION PROGRAM VALVE No.
TYPE SIZE SAFETY FUNCTION DESIGN DESIGN AVAIL RISK BASIS BASIS DESIGN FACTOR DP FLOW MARGIN (MAX)
(GPM)
(SEE NOTE 1)
NS-V-35 GATE 8
NUCLEAR SERVICES CLOSED COOLING WATER 80 832 1.88 LOW REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR COOLING RETURN (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSIDE REACTOR BUILDING)
RC-V-2 GATE 8
PORV BLOCK VALVE 1600 111000 1.58 MEDIUM
- /HR TO LOW STEAM RR-V-1A BFLY 16 REACTOR RIVER PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 131 6900 3.26 LOW RR-V-1B BFLY 16 REACTOR RIVER PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 131 6900 3.26 LOW WDG-V-3 GLOBE 2
REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK VENT HEADER 55 0
2.02 MEDIUM INSIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SEE NOTE 2 WDL-V-303 GATE 3
REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK OUTLET FLOW TO 103 30 1,15 MEDIUM REACTOR COOLANT BLEED TANKS - CONTAINMENT SEE ISOLATION NOTE 2 NOTE 1: The Available Design Margin includes the Limitorque temperature effects and is based on motor torque required compared to the motor torque available at calculated undervoltage conditions.
NOTE 2: These valves have a medium ranking rather than low because they perform a containment isolation function.
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