Text

Notice of Violation from Investigation on 801006-810114. Noncompliance Noted:Cask NAC-1E,Model NFS-4 Delivered to Carrier for Transport W/Decay Heat Generation in Excess of 2.5 Kw
	ML20069K706
Person / Time
Site:	05000000, Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/09/1981
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20027A615	List: ML20069K702; ML20069K706;
References
	FOIA-82-372 NUDOCS 8211150285
	Download: ML20069K706 (2)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:m f PROPOSED. APPENDIX. A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company License No. DPR-61 Hartford, Connecticut ,e__., , a,. 2, ; ,.,, y,,,, As a result of an investigation c nducted from October 6,1980 to January 14, t 1981 of tiie circumstances surrouncing the transportation and No. NFS-4, Serial No. NAC-lE cask shipped from your facility in Haddam, use of the Model Connecticut on May 1,1980, and in accordance with the " Criteria for Enforce-ment Action -- " we sent to you on December 3, 1979; the following item of noncompliance was identified: 10 CFR 71.12(b)(1)(11) states, in part, that a general license is hereby issued to persons holding a general or specific license'pursu~a'h't Co this-'~~ chapter, to deliver licensed material to a carrier for transport in a package for which a certificate of compliance has been issued by the Commission's Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided that the person using the package complies with the terms and conditions of the certificate. Certificate of Compliance No. 6698, Revision:9, dated December is applicable to the Model No. NFS-4, Serial!Ho..HAC-1E cask 12,1979, which Condition 5(b)(2) that the maximum quantity of material per p,ackage will not states in exceed a decay heat generation of 2.5'Kw. Contrary to the above, on May 1,1980, the Model 'No. NFS-4, Serial No. NAC-lE cask, loaded with failed fuel bundle H07, was deltvered to a carrier for transport with a decay heat generation in excess of 2.5 Kw (2.97 to 3.51) This item is an Infraction. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company is hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further items of noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. of Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954j as amended, this responseUnder shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. consideration will be given to extending your response time.Where good cause is shown 8211150285 820917 PDR FOIA PHILIPS82-372 PDR c

D -] ei, Enclosure.2 Follcwing is a draf t writeup of citations tnat appear to be applicable to Battelle Colur.: bus Laboratories as findinns resulting from investigation of operational shipment dif ficulties with the Model'No. NFS-4, Serial No. NAC-lE cest. The severity levels listed were taken from the Stello letter to all NF.C licensees, " Criteria for Enforcement Action for Failure to Comply with 10 CFP.. 71," dated December 3, 1979. 10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that NRC licensees comply with the applicable 4 packaging and transportation requirements of the Department of Transportation 5 (001) in 49 CFR Parts 170-189. 1. 49 CFR 173.393(j) requires, in part, that packages for which the radiation dose rate exceeds the limits specified in paragraph (1) of this section, but does not exceed at any time during transportation any of the limits specified in paragraphs (j)(1) through (4) of this section may be e transported in a transport vehicle which has been consigned as exclusive use (except aircraft). Paragraph (j)(2) specifies a limit of 200 7 millirem per hour at any point on the external surface of the car or vehicle (closed transport vehicle only). Paragraph (j)(4) specifies a liit.it of 2 millirem per hour in any normally occupied position in the car 4 or vehicle. Contrary to the above, t. W (a) On July 22, 1980, the licensee delivered the Model No. NFS-4, Serial j No. NAC-1E cask to a carrier for exclusive use transport in a closed f transport vehicle and upon arrival at the Jersey Central Power and Light Company factitty in Forked River, New Jersey, on July 23, 1980, the radiation dose rate on the external surface underneath the n transport vehicle exceeded 200 millirem (240 millirem) per hour. Severity Level II W (b) On August 15, 1980, the licensee delivered the Model No. NFS-4, Serial No. NAC-1E cask to a: carrier for exclusive use transshipment in a closed transport vehicle.from the Jersey Central Power and Light Company facility in Forked River, New Jersey, and upon ar. rival at the Southern California Edison Company facility in Fort g Pendleton, California on August 20, 1980 the radiation dose rate in the tractor (a normally occupied position in the vehicle) exceeded 2 millirem (4.4 millirem) per hour.. Y Severity level I 2. 49 CFR 173.393(h) requires that there. must:be no signficiant removable radioactive surface contamination on the exterior of the package (see para graph 173.397). Paragraphs 173.397(a) and (b) define removable f (non-fixed) radioactive contamination as bet'ng significant if the level of contamination on packages consigned as exclusive use exceeds 22,000 r dpm/100 cm. 8 E Contrary to the above, on July 22,.1980, the licensee delivered the Model i No. NFS-4, Serial No. NAC-1E cask to a carrier for exclusive use transport in a closed transport vehicle and upon arrival at the Jersey Central Power and Light Company facility located to Forked River, New Jersey on 'j i July 23, 1980 the level of contamination on the front of the cask collision shield was in excess of 22,000 dpm/100 cm 8 (23,000 dpm/100 cm'). L Severity Level II } . ~

.. -- -.... ---m - mmL ama hame%1eh% fan L.1 **.W .M% s. . E's"e l NUREG-0903 ,/ / i /A a w Mi 4Trf L s g.- (/y LD FL i ~ Survey of Industry and Government Programs To Combat Drug and Alcohol Abuse .i i i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection and Enforce [nent { Drug Abuse Task Force .i l' L W. Altman, W. Brown, L. Bush, L. I. Cobb L s l; D Manuscript Completed: April 1982 g Manuscript Published: May 1982 i, / ri I o ~ ww P J i --....,.x,.,r.-__ -.m.x. r

..-.... _ _ w .ca c. 6 ABSTRACT This report describes the results of an NRC Task Force survey of the drug and l alcohol programs of ten licensed nuclear utilities, of two federal agencies, ' and of two large corporations not in the nuclear industry. The Task Force soli- -b' cited, and reports on, utility management views on the extent of the drug.and j alcohol problem, company policies on the work-related use or possession of alcohol or drugs, and utility management views on propos_ed NRC regulatory initiatives which would address the drug and alcohol question. The report also I %s use of background investi-describes utility practice and perceptions on: th gations, psychological tests, supervisory training and behavioral observation, empicyee awareness programs, employee assistance and rehabilitation programs, l and the use of chemical tests and other measures to detect drug and/or alcohol j use. Nonnuclear programs reported on are: Department of Defense, Federal Avia-tion Administration, Kimberly-Clark Corporation and General Motors Corporation. l Based on the results of the Task Force survey of the fourteen drug and alcohol programs and consultations with government and private experts, the Task Force develops and describes a generic Baseline Program for combatting drug and alcohol ~ problems in the nuclear industry. Constituents of the generic Baseline Program i a written drug and alcohol policy, company reso. lie to exercise the policy, are: an employee awareness program, an employee assistance or rehabilitation program, an employee screening program, and a drug and alcohol detection program. The Task Force's survey was limited generally to better drug and alcohol programs and discussions with corporate officials, and the Task Force made no attempt to assess the effectiveness of the programs reported on, or of drug and alcohol programs of the nuclear industry in general. I O G G

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r _ ~ _, n__ n~ n_w. -. _.n. - - 1 } i, 1 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS t Page ABSTRACT............................................................ 'iii AC KN0W LED G EM ENTS.................................................... ' vii I. INTRODUCTION................................................... 1 II., TOPICS COVERED IN SURVEY OF LICENSEES.......................... II-1 i 1. Utility Perception of the Drug and Alcohol Problem............. II-1 2. Company Polir.ies on the Use or Possession of Drugs or Alcohol............................................. II-5 'A. Work Rel ated Use or Possession............................ II-5 B. Of fsi te Use or Possession................................. II-7 3. Utility Use of Background Investigations....................... II-11 A. General Description....................................... II-11 B. Nonavailability of Arrest Records......................... II-12 C. S e nate B i l l S.158 9........................................ II-12 D. Use of Polygraph.......................................... II-13 4. Utility Use of Psychological Tests............................. II-14 A. Breadth of Use................... II-14 B. Utility Attitude on Psychological Tests................... II-15 5. Utility Use of Supervisor Training and Behavioral Observation.................................................. 'II-17 1 3 A. Aberrant Behavior Procedures.............................. II-17 1 B. Training.................................................. II-18 l C. Utility Attitude Toward Behavioral Observation............ II-19 4 6. Employee Awareness........................... 3................ II-20 l 7. Emplo'ee Assistance and Rehabilitation Programs..,............... II-21 y 8. Detection of Drug or Alcohol Use by Chemical Tests............. II-25 j i A. Random' Chemical Tests for Detection....................... II-25 i B. Other Uses of Chemical Tests.............................. II-26 } iv 1 (' i 1l - i ) 'l

Jm A.... .s.., a m m m m. m m.w - m.e w m m - narze m a m esen m a nnu m " - u Page 9. Other Prevention / Detection Methods............................ II-28 A. Searches..................................................- II-28 8. Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs................................ II - C. Monitoring of Absenteeism................................. .II-29 0. Use of Investigators...................................... II-30 III. A SURVEY OF DRUG AND ALCO.HOL PROGRAMS OUTSIDE THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY........................................... III-l 1. Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Personnel j Reliability Program............................................ III-2 ~r. A. Background and Terminology............l................... III-3 B. Guidelines for Determir.ing Reliability.................... III-6 C. Certi fying Individuals for PRP Duty....................... III-9 D. Suspension, Decertification, Review, and Disposition................................................III-11 2. The Drug and Alcohol Program of Another Federal Regulatory Agency, The Federal Aviation Administration........................................ III-14 A. Existing Regulatory Base.................................. III-14 B. Proposed Revisions to the FAA's Rules on Drugs and Alcoho1......................................... III-16 C. FAA Medical Certification................................. III-22 D. Air Traffic Contro11ers................................... III-24 E. The FAA and Rehabilitation................................ III-27 3. Kimberly-Clark's Employee Assistance Program... l............... III-31 A. Health.Manag;aent Program................................. III-31 B. The Employee Assistance Program........................... III-33 C. Other Relevant Information................................ III-36 4. General Motors Drug and Alcohol Program........................ III-38 IV.' TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS......................................... IV-1 1. A Generic Approach to the Alcohol / Drug Abuse Proble'm: A Baseline Program for the Nuclear Industry.................. TV-2 4 A. Written Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy..................... IV-2 B. Resolve To Use the Company Policy......................... IV-3 C. Employee Awareness Program................................ IV-3 D. Employee Assistance or Rehabilitation Program............. IV-4 E. EmpToyee Screening Program................................ IV-5 F. Drug / Alcohol Detection Programs........................... IV-6 2. Su'mmary of the Generic Baseline Program........................ IV-8 REFERENCES.......................................................... R1 1 v t f

_.c .a m m?-., m.wn.s- - - -~ ~,-- ~ w-umnawe.-:s ~n a s 6 Pale APPENDIX A: Utility Views on Access Authorization Rule (Proposed 10 CFR 73.56)................................ A-1 + 1. The Proposed Rule.............................................. , A-1 2. Background Investigations, Psychological Testing, and Continual Behavioral Observation.................. A-3 3. Temporary Workers and Senate Bil l S.1589....................... A-4 4 Appeal Procedures and the Access Program i Director....................................................... A-5, i

5., G ra n d f at h e ri n g.................................................

A-6 6. Licensee Messages to NRC....................................... A-7 APPENDIX B: Ut.ility Views on Fitness for Duty Rule (Propos.ed Amendment to 10 CFR 50.54)................... B-1 1. .The Proposed Rule.............................................. B-1 2. Utility Views.................................................. B-2 s I =* 1 .t e 'I \\ l, e 4 i n e 4 1. vi

-. ~, i 4 ~ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The' Task Force would like to acknowledge the support and guidance provided to " it by Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforce-l ment (IE), and Mr. James H. Sniezek, Deputy Director, IE. The Task Force,also I wishes to thank the following' individuals who made presentations to the NRC { staff in conjunction with the Task Force's efforts: Mr., John Montgomery, NRC j Office of Policy Evaluation; Dr. Joseph Chambers, Medical Director; Seneca House; j and Dr. N. T. Lappas, Associate Professer of Foren~ sic Science, George Washington University. The Task Force acknowledges Mr. J. W. " Reds" Fanning, Manager of j NRC's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program, for arranging the presentations of Dr. j Chambers and Detective Alan Rodbell, Montgomery County (MD) Police Department, j and Mr. Roger Lindsay, NRC Publications, for taping and distributing videotapes of these drug and alcohol presentations. We thank Mr. Paul MacMurdy and Ms. Sally Mullen of NRC's Division of Safeguards for their trend analysis of Safeguards Summary Event List data and their careful review of a draft of this report. The Task Force also thanks those members of the NRC staff who typed the manuscript for this report: Ms. Joyce C. Douglas, Ms. Virletta Johnson, and Ms. Catherine C. Yates, and the technical editor, Ms. Ray Sanders. We are indebted to the staffs of the ten utilities who assented to requests, mostly on short notice, for discussions about their drug-related policies and programs. The Task Force very much appreciates the time and attention given to it by the staffs of each of the following utilities: q Virginia Electric and Power Company Florida Power and Light

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' Northeast Utilities Sacramento Municipal Utility District lI Duke Power Company Pacific Gas and Electric Company y Portland General Electric Company Baltimore Gas and E1ectric Company General Public Utilities Northern States Power Company I 'l vii ~ l

__.n. ... - ~. ~. :. - ~ ^ .-.~. w D The Task Forca wishes to thank the following nonnuclear officials and/or organi-zations for the information on drug and alcohol programs they shared with the Task Force: Dr. H. L. Reigh'ard, Federal Air Surgeon, FAA, and Drs. Jordan, t j~ Paku11, and Watkins of his staff and Mr. John Collins of the Pasco, Washington Air Traffic Control Tower, FAA;'Mr. P. Podonsky of the 000 Nuclear Surety g Policy Staff; Dr. R. E. Dedmon, Staff Vice President - Medical Affairs ar/J j Mr.. N. Eggebraaten, Manager, Employee Assistance Program, Kimberly-Clark Cor-i poration; Mr. Donald Godwin, Chief, Occupational Programs Branch, National a Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA); Mr. Jim O' Hair,. National a Clearinghouse for Alcohol Information, NIAAA; and Dr. Barry Brown, Chief,' Treat-ment Research and Assessment Branch, National Institute on Drug Abuse. .i 'f a h Ii i ./ ii 1. i i ) \\ l f' l. f G W e viii li hy . ~ n - - a. - s w. .- _ ~.w a _. _..

.. _._ E ---s-SURVEY OF INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO COMBAT ORUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE I. INTRODUCTION The abuse of drugs and alcohol is a problem of national (and international) scope, and it affects or has the potential to affect people in almost'any-industry or occupational group. Given a problem so pervasive in our society as drug and alcohol abuse, it would be unrealistic to think it does not touch the nuclear industry. Indeed, as indicated in In, formation Notice No. 82-05, issued on March 10, 1982, by NRC's Office of Insp'ection and Enforcement, there have been a number of reported drug related incidents involving the nuclear industry over the past several years, and they seem to be occurring with increasing frequency. Moreover, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement I (IE) has received information which suggests that some utilities in the nuclear industry may not have in place effective programs to address the problem of drug or alcohol abuse among their employees. Licensee programs in this area largely have been voluntary and many have been modeled, with various degrees of rigor, after a program described in an industrial standard. Although two rules have been proposed by the NRC staff, there is presently no NRC. regulation that. explicitly prohibits drug or alcohol ute at a nuclear plant or that explicitly prohibits working in a nuclear plant while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Given the situation of (1) an increasing frequency of drug-related reports, (2) allegations implying that some licensed utilities may not have effective programs, and (3) the lack of an established regulatory basis (NRC rule) for dealing with the drug / alcohol problem, Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director of NRC's-Office of Inspection and Enforcement, established a Drug Abuse Task Forc'e on February 1, 1982,'to assess the extent of the problem and to develop a generic .i approach for addressing it. Mr. DeYoung an'dIMr. James H. Sniezek, Deputy Director of IE, appointed four members of their staff to serve on the Task Force: Dr. Willard D. Altman, 46

u,.,., a ... n mance m m.wa.2 m.am-a..ar.d;r Laa.MM T f M 'J I i I ) Chairman; Dr. Willard B. Brown, Chief, Safecuards Branch; Mr. Loren L. Bush', j Technical Assi; tant to the Director, Division of' Fuel Facilities, Materials ~ j and Safeguards; and Mr. Leonard I. Cobb, Director, Division of Fuel Facilities, Materials and Safeguards. The following excerpts from IE Information Notice No. 82-05 explain more about the genesis of the Task Force and its mission: ~ March 10, 1982 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 82-05: INCREASING FREQUENCY OF DRUG-RELATED i INCIDENTS Description of Circumstances: Based on data reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and either published or to be published in the Safeguards Summary Event List j (NUREG-0525), the number of drug related incidents in which lic.ensee or contractor employees were arrested or terminated has increased dramatically in the past year. During the last 5 years, the increasing trend is as follows: two in 1977; none in 1978; one in 1979; five in 1980; and twelve in 1981. Thus far in 1982, Regional Preliminary Notifications dealing with at least four new drug-related incidents have been issued. The reported incidents implicate a range of licensee or contractor personnel, including personnel in construction, operations, and security. The reported in,cidents are widespread geographically, and involve power reactor sites in each of~ the five NRC regions. Reported incidents have involvecL both onsite use or possession of drugs and personnel reporting to york ~under the influence of cantrolled sub-stances. Marijuana was the most frequently reported controlled sub' stance involved in these events; however, incidents involving amphetamines, cocaine, hashish, phencyclidine and, methaqualone have also been reported. Given the alarming increase in reported drug related incidents, the wide range of personnel implicated, and the pervasiveness of the reports on a national basis, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) has estab-lished a Drug Abuse Task Force to address the problem on a generic basis. IE has given top priority to the prompt and effective development of a generic approach to the problem of possible drug (including alcohol) abuse by licensee or contractor personnel. As such, IE solicits relevant licensee experience in this undertaking. Teams from the Task Force are presently gathering information in a series of visits to selected licensees to discuss the drug problem and possible generic approaches that would best addr'ess the problem. The Task Force is also collaborating with other member.s of the NRC staff to explore several regulatory approaches to the drug problem. The information obtained from the series of. utility visits will be factored into the results of the inter-office efforts. t

..2w t, w 12.ntu2samammaae--mmms=asemesenze msnen.1%mr# Mea 2malli ~ ' ses nt o e e t of the d ug/a1 hol r 1 ad ok n c I approach to the problem, it was imperative first to solicit relevant licensee = experience. He directed the Task Force to visit a number of utilities to gauge the licensees' perceptions of the problem, to determine programs in place to address it, and to determine which approaches they have coraluded to be effective. Section II of this report describes what the Task Force learned about utility .j program's for addressing drug and alcohol abuse from a series of interviews with utility corporate officers. The survey was conducted by visits to corporate offices between February 23 and March 12, 1982. Most licensees visited were chosen for this early activity because the Task Force had reason to believe that those utilities had in place effective programs for dealing with drugs and alcohol and that visits to them would provide information useful for developing recommendations for a generic approach to the drug / alcohol problem. A number of relevant topics was discussed with corporate officials during the Task Force visits with ten licensees, including the corporate perception of the drug and alcohol problem and company policies for dealing with it. The Task Force solicited information and licensee views on other relevant topics such as back. ground investigations, psychological testing, behavioral observation, employee assistance programs, chemical tests, and the proposed " Access Authorization Rule"* and " Fitness for. Duty Rule.""* Section III of this report describes what the Task Force learned about the drug and alcohol programs and policies of two other federal agencies responsible for' ensuring the safe exercise of high technology: the Department of Defense

The proposed 10 CFR 73.56, " Access Authorization Rule," is an outgrowth of a 1979 NRC rulemaking action on access authorizations.

The Access Authoriza-tion Rule is NRC's response to the recommendation of an NRC Hearing Board that NRC promulgate a screening rule for people working at civilian ' nuclear power plants'. -(See Appendix A.)

- A proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.54, the " Fitness for Duty Rule" was origi-nally' conceived as a regulatory approach to operator fitness in response to an NRC Action Plan developed as a result of the accident at Three Mi.le Island.

(See Appendix B.) t

i i (Nuclear Weapons Program) and the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, i Section III of the report discusses the drug and' alcohol program of two major private companies not in the nuclear industry, Kimberly-Clark Corporation and' General Motors. Section IV of this report contains preliminary Task Force conclusions, including a description of a proposed Generic Baselina Program for the nuclear industry for addressing the drug and alcohol problem. At the present time the NRC staff is working on two proposed rules which, if j implemented, would provide a regulatory framework around which a generic approach to the threat of a drug and alcohol abuse problem in the nuclear indus'ry can be fashioned. One of these rules, the proposed 10 CFR 73.56, t Ac~ cess Authorization Rule, is discussed in this report in Appendix A. The I other, the proposed Fitness for Duty Rule, an amendment to 10 CFR 50 54, is discussed in this report in Appendix 8. The Task Force's sample of ten licensees was not chosen to be representative of the industry as a whole, and the reader should be careful about inferring con-clusions about industrywide practices based solely on the information in this report. Further Task Force work may include visiti to a larger, more represen-tative sample of licensee,s and discussions with a wider range of personnel. The findings and the opinions in this report are those of the Task Force and do not necessarily represent the position of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.., L \\ 4 9 e 4 i X We, ,A v u ,m- .wTg 7 ,*C 7; 'w "-7.-"F=. .sh ' b'- T* ' ~ ' '

,..w ..~.w. ,.,, a., y y,-a w. , n n.m?w.- l*. - {, II. TOPICS COVERED IN SURVEY OF LICENSEES i f = Topic 1: Utility Perception of the Drug and Alcohol Problem The Task Force solicited the views of utility ranagement on the problem of drug and alcohol use or abuse by pe.rsonnel working at nuclear power plants 'and the impact this problem might have on public health and safety. These questions were generally addressed by the senior licensee management official present, usually a Corporate Vice President or General Manager responsible for nuclear operations or a Vice President for Personnel or Administration. The'following paragraphs paraphrase the general licensee consensus, based on the limited sample (10) of utilities surveyed by the Task Force. The utilities recognized that drugs and alcohol are a problem on a national level, and that it would be unrealistic to expect that such a pervasive problem would somehow leave the nucie.ar industry untouched. Indeed, each utility surveyed had experienced some instances of drug and alcohol abuse among its personnel and each had terminated employees in the past because of alcohol or drug problems. Each utility employs a range of occupational specialists including laborers, groundsmen, janitor:, electrical servicemen, welders, linemen, security officers, boiler operators, pipefitters, health physicists, auxiliary operators, engineers, and reactor operators. For several utilities, the personnel terminated for drug-or alcohol related reasons were engaged entirely in nonnuclear activities. The 'ruclear related personnel can be broken down roughly into three categories: . construction and contractor personnel, security personnel, and operating per-sonnel. The utilities surveyed generally viewed construction and contra'ctor l personnel as being most likely to evidence drug / alcohol problems (possession, use, or sale) at a nuclear power p-lant site; operating personnel (health physi-cists, auxiliary operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators) were least likely t'o evidence such problems. The reasons given for this are: several thousands of people may be onsite at once during construction, or a plant obtage, and the prescreening, searching, scrutiny, and supervisory obser-vation they receive is less intense than that for permanent operating plant .e .g

maar.:=sm:a-pa2 m-r;c w o r em er s s= w u w znm j i personnel. Moreover, plant operating personnel are required to satisfy sub-stantial training and competency requirements. These requirements and De rigors of day-to-day duties which require a high level of mental alertness and agility, would, in the words of one corporate official, cause an operator who was seriously addicted to drugs' or alcohol to "get weeded out." That is, such a person would not be able to aerform his expected duties and he would be eli-ainated either during the training program or due to obvious nonperformance l on the job. Several utilities expressed the feeling that people with signi-fic' ant untreated drug or alcohol problems just would not last on the regular 9 operating force. ] Several licensees pointed to a statistical relationship between age arid drug j use: they felt that drugs were more likely to be used by the younger age group 1 (itnEr'30 or 35) and less likely to be used by those over 35 (although alcohol use would be a greater problem with this older age group). No actual statis-tics were examined, but some licensees' argued that the average age of construc-tion and security personnel was lower trian operating personnel, and that the perceived national trend of less drug use among the over-35 age group held true in the nuclear industry, as well, and helped to explain why utilities do not see a significant drug problem with operating personnel. Other licensee perceptions offered without supporting data, in support of the general feeling among utility ma,nagement that drugs and alcoho.1 were not a serious problem among operating personnel included: (1) operations personnel are more familiar than the rest of the. work force with.the potential radiolog-feal dangers associated with misuse of nuclear power so they are more cognizant of " peer pressure in a safety sensitive situation," and (2) the perception that since a number of operating personnel were 'ormerly with the Navy nuclear pro-f gram they might bring to the civilian program a strong antidrug attitude in-stilled in them by a rigorous Navy environment. Several utilities cautioned the NRC not to overreact to tte recent rise in reported drug'related incidents. They focused particularly on the extent to which operating personnel have or have not been involved in past incidents. They felt that NRC should be careful not to impose restrici.ive new rules on operating personnel based on incidents primarily involving construction and ~ 11 2 I

., _ _... n ._ a.,g,,-ng. m,_g security personnel. Several emphasized that to their knowledge there had been no confirmed incident in which an NRC-licensed operator was found to be u'nfit for duty as a result of drug or alcohol use. Several utilities emphasized the' effect that some NRC regulations are already having on operating staff morale. They felt the search and access limitation requirements of the new physic.al security rule (10 CFR 73.55) conveyed to the operating staff a message that the utility and the government did not trust them. One licensee f ndicated that some NRC rules and inspections to which operators were subject not only increased their'recordkeeping requirements, but also seemed to reflect a philosophy of " guilt'y until proven innocent." An example offered to support this contention was recordkeeping requirements for operators: the licensees contended that NRC's attitude is that a certain ] required act has not been performed unless a record exists to confirm it, and i the operators find this both burdensome and demoralizing. As a corollary to the NRC-caused problem perceived by management to exist among operating personnel, several utilities argued that NRC should not impose any more' requirements restrictive of individual freedom that may be construed to suggest that the NRC doesn't trust licensee personnel. In particular, all licensees interviewed strongly condemned the use of random blood, breath, or urine tests as part of a drug and alcohol detection program. They felt: (1) it has not been demonstrated that the drug and alcohol problem at nuclear plants is serious enough to warrant such a strong action; (2) such a program would be devastating on worker morale, and that it would become even harder than it is now to hire and retain the high quality people needed for their nuclear opera-tions; and (3) it might cause more harm than good - by driving capable people away to be replaced by less capable people, and by fostering such resentment among employees that some reliable employees might become emotionally di'straught and try to compromise some plant system out of rage or spite. One utility in-dicated that such a program would be interpreted by plant personnel as, a state-ment that "they don't trust me" and might well "become a self-fulfilling l prophecy." All utilities surveyed felt that drug and alcohol use during working hours (in-cluding being under the influence of a drug or alcohol during working ' hours) ~~ II-3 9

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.w.~ n-r:wwe,,e mvn+:ngxx.m.wemmwsemmw - .=mcr w-r+a. -n could not be condoned, and for most, was automatic cause for disciplinary a' tion, c up to and including terminatfon. A number of corporate officials felt that the keys to a successful program to combat drug and alcohol use during working hours included the following: (1) a strong company policy prohibiting " work-related" use or possession, that is, use'or possession of drugs or alcohol on the work site, or onduty or offduty use of drugs or alcohol that affects an employee's onduty performance; (2) a company resolve to use the policy firmly if a drug.or alcohol incident occurred; (3) an awareness on the part of supervisors and man'agement of the potential for alcohol and drug problems; and (4) an easily accessible and confidential employee assistance program available on a voluntary basis. j 1 .More'than one utility felt that there was no stronger deterrent to drug and i arcchol abuse than full exercise of company policy, f rcluding termination, for l violations of company policy. Word of such disciplinary action is thought to spread fast, and in at least one case it was communicated to all employees by i the president of the utility. / a = 6 O i e t 1 } .II-4

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j Topic 2: Company Policies on the Use or Possession of Druas or Alcohol a

q A. Work-Relate'd Use or Pos' session U. Almost all of the utilities surveyed had a clearly defined policy regarding. ji work-related use or possession of drugs or alcohol. ' Only one of the utilities

j surveyed had no written policy,on the subject.

Various methods were used to ensure that employees were aware of a utility's drug-and alcohol-abuse policy, ti including sending letters to employees, providing statements to.be signed by applicants and employees, providing information at time of employment, training, i ensuring that supervisors are familiar with compa'ny policy, and posting work i j rules in prominent places. The following policy statements are typical of what the Task Force found among 3 the ten licensees surveyed regarding work-related use or possession of drugs j or alcohol: ij. Statement 1 Discharge from the Company will normally result from commission of the following acts... Working under the influence' of, or drinking of alcoholic beverages during working time, or possession of alcoholic" beverages during work time or on Company property except at Company ruthorized functions. Illegal possession, use, or distribution of drugs or narcotics during work time or on Company property. ] Statement 2 4 Intoxicants j (a) Use of intoxicants by any employee during working hours is pro'- hibited, and.any violation will be sufficient cause for dismissal. ] (b) Any employee reporting for duty while under the influence of intoxi- ] cants shall not be allowed to assume his/her duties." 1 a j 1 II-5 1 MNt OM e 9 e-k ^~

^ ~~ 1: .. L :~ L xw - o 1 i i .l It is fur.ther the policy of this Company that employees shall not at any time while at work use or be under the influence of any alcoholic d beverage. Employees shall not at any time while at work or on Company business use, have in their possession or be under the

1 influence of any narcotic,' marijuana, drug, or any other substance j

the possession or use of which is unlawful.

i Statement 3 1

(Utility) employees shall not use any alcohol or other mood-altering a chemicals during normal working hours. For the purpose of this policy, " normal working hours" includes breaks and the meal periods. A doctor's prescription used as prescribed is excluded from th.is policy. .u; ('Jtility) employees shall not report to work unable to perform their duties as a result of consuming alt.oholic and/or mood-altering . chemicals. Alcoholic or nonprescribed mood-altering chemicals shall not be permitted on or in Company property. I Statement 4 To (All) Nuclear Personnel: To discharge our responsibilities relative to safely operating and maintaining our nuclear stations, it is vital that we take action to protect against the potential adverse influence of any substances which alter mental or physical capacity including, but not limited to, alcoholic beverages or a non prescribed drug, narcotic, marijuana or other " controlled substance" or " controlled dangerous substance" (as defined by criminal statutes). Accordingly, any (Utility) employee: ?; 1 1. Found to be using, possessing or under the influence of such substances on the nuclear station site shall be immediately terminated from employment and thereafter denied access to all (Utility) nuclear stations. Provided, however, based upon the .i circumstances the Company in its sole discretion may reduce the foregoing disciplinary action to not less than two (2) weeks q suspension without pay for an employee's 'first violation of mere

j possession.

g i 2. . Reasonably suspected of using, possessing or being under the influence of such substances on the nuclear station site shall ] be: J a. subject to an immediate and full investigation by Company ) . security personnel, and b. denied access to the Station pending the out'come of the Company's investigation. t J II-6 1 k a m m s a w ra a s s m a r q n - - =w wue==prameyy 7y===,

.s.~;a.w m w m ~mm n m m.w w m nw mem w m m. w m &. m g g In all instances if there is potential criminal violation, the matter shall be reported to the proper law enforcement authorities for thei.r further action. For most of the utilities surveyed, reporting to work under the influence of i I drugs or alcohol, or their possession or use, was in itself sufficient reason for dismissal on the first offense. Some utility policies allowed for a pro-gression of increasingly severe actions to be taken for violations of.the, company's drug and alcohol policy, resulting in termination on the third or fourth occurrence. For all utilities surveyed, including the one with no written drug and alcohol policy, employees had been discharged in the past for alcohol-or drug-related incidents and the same 'al: tion would be taken in the { future if circumstances warranted. It should be noted that although the utilities generally had firm policies [ regarding work-related use or possession of drugs or alcohol, all companies surveyed also had some form of a rehabilitation or employee assistance program in which employees could participate voluntarily or be referred to by their i supervisors. Employee assistance programs are described later in this report. B. Offsite Use or Possession Although company policies were generally clear on the unacceptability of work-related or onsite use of drugs or alcohol, most were silent about or tolerated offsite use, so long as such use did not affect an employee's ability to do his job. One utility official expressed succinctly the sample's consensus as follows: "What he does on his off time is his own business." 1 1 The following statement by one utility about their company policy is representa-tive of the utilities surveyed regarding offsite use: ~ There may be some uncertainty regarding off-hour use of alcohol. Whether an employee drinks at times other than working hours is generally the employee's personal business, but there may be times when it is the Company's business. If drinking or use of other mood-altering chemicals leads to unsatisfactory job performance, excess absenteeism, a poor safety record, or misconduct, then the Company is directly concerned and will act. Alsc, if employees are I ~ l-II-7 ^

m -3.- m _. u, m4.- m.m. -m - %.n. m m,-m ~ m ---y, w m. s m m e m. 1 under treatment for chemical dependency, they may, as part of their treatment program, be required to abstain. We will help chemically addicted employees help,themselves. At least three utilities took a different approach to offsite use of drugs. One utility distinguished betwe'en drug use and alcohol use both in its ' policy on offsite use and in the availability of the company rehabilitation program. The key to the distinction made between the way they treat drug offenders and alcohol offenders was expressed to the Task Force as follows: " Drugs are ilfegal, and alcohol is not." This utility draws at least an indir.ect con-nection between a person's illegal use or possession of drugs, his general. ~ trustworthiness, and.his ability to represent the company. The drug policy of this company is as follows: (UTILITY) POLICY CONCERNING DRUG USE The illegal use, possession of or sale of narcotics, hallucinog' ens, depressants, stimulants or marijuana on company business or company property can result in suspension or termination. The use of narcotics, hallucinogens, depressants, stimulants or marijuana off company premises which affects an employee's ability to perform his/her job, or which generates publicity or circumstances which adversely affect the company or its employees, can result in discipline, including possible suspension or. termination. Four Points to Remember 1. On duty use of illegal, drug's is cause for termination or suspension.

2. > Off duty use of illegal drugs is cause for termination or other penalties when it adversely,affects the company by impairing the worker!s performance, or by. undermining government or public confidence in the ability of (Utility) to carry out its public service responsibilities.

.g. 3. All employees are responsible for preventin,g and reporting actions that threaten harm to the company. This responsibility .often will require mature judgement, but common sense and a knowledge of the law expected of all citizens are sufficient to make such judgements. 1 4. EmpToyees in certain positions - security personnel and supervisors - are responsible for enforcing these policies. Illegal use of drugs by a security officer or supervisor offduty in itself impairs his or her work performance by ' l impairing his or her ability to enforce (Utility) policies. h ~ II-8 u '1

1.- ~ ,, ~ ' 1 ;.ic. L..L._.i.i.v....L..... ~^ '~Z~ ~ ~ ~ i m. All employees have a copy of this policy sent by the utility president. All . l new employees are required to sign a statement saying they have read the policy i ~ and agree to comply with its provisions. This company has terminated employees for offsite use of illegal drugsr. The safety sensitivity of nucl' ear power and the importance of maintaining kl public confidence in it was also reflected in the policies of two other utilities: ,E i Utility 1 l' Because of the particular sensitivity in working at a nuclear station, employees are strongly encouraged to seriously consider the need to avoid all activities which would create an apparent conflict with the 3 :: intent of the above (such as consumption of alcoholic beverages prior to normal work periods and during meal breaks). The immediate bene-fits of adherina to this practice are the public's perception of the faithful discharge of the responsibilities entrusy.d to us at nuclear r. stations and the avoidance of suspicion of beina ander the influence of such substances. (Emphasis added by utility.) Utility 2 Employees of the Company are visible and active' members of the communi-ties where they live and work. They are inescapably identifi.d with the Company and are expected to represent the firm in a responsible i and creditable fashion. The vast majority of our employees reflect credit upon themselves and the Company they represent. The use of non-medically authorized drugs is illegal under State and Federal law. Their use, therefore, quite naturally does not conform to creditable ' behavior.... While the Company does not pretend to be judge of individual life styles, employees who use or traffic in any sort of illegal drugs o'ff Company premises are also behaving unacceptably and serious consequences may result. Certain employees perform critical functions in complex and sensitive work assignments in plant or office where alertness and mature i judgement are essential. Any such employee known to be using illegal drugs off Company premises will be subject to appropriate action, including possible removal from his or her critical assignment. i 1 t' II-9 d - ~ -

J- - - - - -. ~, In order.to protect the best interests of employees and the Company, the Company will take whatever measures are necessary to ascertain if illegal drugs are located on or are being used on its premises.. Illegal drug use and its physiological and psychological effects represent a threat to the well being and security of employees and could cause extensive damage to the Company's reputation and community standing. Drug abuse could also instigate the shutdown'of vital Company installations were the public authorities to conclude that operation of these facilities cannot be continued responsibly by Company personnel. Measures used to determine the presence of illegal drugs. and/or alcohol, therefore, could include searches or whatever other means are most effective. These measures may appear harsh, but the Company believes them to be completely justified and necessary. In a time of searching public. and governmental vigilance concerning the safe operation of critical utility facilities we must adhere to strict standards of conduct.on .and off the job if we are to continue to fulfill our responsibility to provide reliable energy services to our customers. 1 F 6 Y e e t p \\ O ~~ II-10 (

=....... ~.w., . -~~:,..,. ~m~y.n. a., e -m e.. w., r ~.< ~ = i i Topic 3: Utility use of Background Investigations A. General Description i Every utility surveyed used background investigations as a screening mechani.sm. for new employees. For proprietary and contract security personnel a background investigation program covering felony convictions and drug or alcohol addiction is implicit in the requirements of 10 CFR 73, Appendix B. " General Criteria for. Security Personnel." In addition to this NRC-required background check for security personnel, all utilities surveyed perform a background check of other applicants'as well, although it may not be as' ext'ensive as for security personnel. ~ As a general rule, based on the utilities surveyed by the Task Force, nuclear plant employees and others requiring unescorted access to a nuclear plant are subject to a tighter background investigation and screening process than are nonnuclear employees of the company, and nuclear security personnel are sub-jected to at least as stringent (and often more stringent) a background screening process as are other nuclear personnel. There are several reasons for stricter checks on security applicants: (1) NRC has more requirements for checks of security officers than for other personnel; (2) in some states the security officer must obtain a state license to carry a weapon, and this entail.s additional investigation; and (3) to paraphrase the sentiments of several licensees, " Security people carry guns." Most companies' background investigations cover the immediately preceding three to five years (one goes back seven) and includes a check for crirainal convictions, an educational check, a check of past employers, a check of references provided by the applicant, and sometimes checks of references ,. developed by the utility. Some review credit histories. Utilities may have their own staff of investigators who conduct background investigations (in 1981 one utility spent 13 manyears conducting background investigations on 1073 applications), or may contract out the investigations (but not the final-decision on who is hired and who is not) to a company that specializes in such services. In some-companies, the security department is responsible for administering the background investigation for all employees; in others, the D ~~ II-11

1 m.c --mwaw ww.m mo~n-wn:mwe-msnm.www : = -,,.wam- .l security depar.tment is responsible for security personnel background investi-gations and the personnel department is responsible for background investi-gations for other employees.' Most utilities have "grandfathering" provisions' for long-term employees who have satisfactory performance records. B. Nonavailability of Arrest Records i One major area highlighted by licensees during the survey concerns the back-gro'und information available to licensees. In some cases, availability of felony information is limited to conviction records ac local courts. Such conviction information is a matter of public record and is available to anyone. It does not contain information on arrests. Arrest records are generally viewe'd by security professionals as being much more useful a screening tool than conviction records are because, as a result of heavy court caseloads or plea bargains, arrests for which strong evidence exists may not result in trial. Moreover, checks of county court records may not determine all convictions because the applicant may not give sufficient information to ensure that all germane counties are queried. Some utilities are able to perform better background investigations because they are aided by state laws or other arrangements'that grant nuclear utilities access to state police. arrest records. This check is usually not sufficient to determine out-of-state arrest,s. Some licensees pointed out that several states refuse to share their criminal history information with other st'ates. C. Senate. Bill,S.1589 Presently before the Congress is Senate Bill S.1589. which would permit nuclear facilities to have access to FBI and other identification and criminal records under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of the United States. The util-ities surveyed unanimously support this bill, some very pointedly. They believe this bill is important for establishing a high level of company and industry credibility regard-ing the quality and thoroughness of. background investigations. They strongly urged the NRC to support this bill. They see its pas' sage as an ~ II-12

c.-...:._-- s..... ::.. :.-. -..: .= important tool'that would enhance the effectiveness of the proposed 10 CFR 73.56 (discussed later) or the revised ANSI N18.17 (ANS 3.3), " Standard o~n i Security for Nuclear Power Plants," which is nearing p'ublication. D. Use of Polygraph At least four of the utilities. surveyed use the polygraph or psychological .I stress evaluator (PSE) as a tool to verify applicant data and to otherwise help with background investigations in screening applicants for security officer positions. At these utilities the appiicant is asked questions designed to determine whether he is or has been i user of controlled sub-stances (drugs). At one of these utilities, the corporate management was l very pleased with the polygraph results. ' Citing a 30% to 40% rejection rate based on the polygraph (and another 10%-15% that fail to show up for the test) this utility felt the polygraph was a more effective screening mechanism than psychological testing (or training supervisors for behavioral observation). Views on psychological testing and behavioral observation will be discussed later. Another utility said guard applicants are informed that they will be tested on. i the polygraph and that they will be asked questions about criminal records and i the use of drugs and alcohol. The utility estimated that this notice plus the actual test have. eliminated from 50% to 75% of the applicants. At this utility, guards are also subject to periodic polygraphic examination. l The favorable attitude of some licensees toward the polygraph is not unanimous l; amon'g the utilities. One utility with a strong drug and alcohol program and a highly competent security management staff was opposed to the polygraph because (1) utility personnel said the use of polygraph for employment-screening *vio-lated state law, and (2) utility personnel felt the polygraph was unreliable, highly subjective, and had the potential to screen out qualified candidates. It should be noted-that at none of the ten utilities surveyed was the polygraph used as a screening tool for nonsecurity (nonguard) applicants. Moreover, a number bf states have laws that prohibit the use of the polygraph for employment l. screening purposes. II-13 =b ) 7 E N" A t g h*(( gg J' d@[ gg Qe f e.~p,-g' b *_\\,g yM .-,---_'17-

m,... .,,_%mymyg.g,,3,,

g.. 7,y. g.,.ym,p.g Topic 4:

Util.ity Use of Psychological Tests A. Breadth of Use Every utility surveyed had a pr' gram of psychological testing for nucle'ar o employees. There was extremely wide use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Per-sonality Inventory (MMPI), especially for security applicants. Nine of the ten utilities surveyed used the MMPI as part of their screening process for sec'urity personnel, and the tenth, which was using the Thurstone Temperament Survey, is switching'to the MMPI. The MMPI is a true-false inventory of approximately 550 questions, intended to provide an objective evaluation of some of the major parsonality traits that influence individual and int'erper-sonal behavior. It is a widely used personality inventory, both.in clinical serttings and in personnel selection settings. jl As was the case with background investigations and for the same reasons, secu-rity personnel were subjected to the mos't intense screening for psychological I traits, followed by other nuclear plant personnel and nonnucl' ear personnel, I respectively. Only one of the ten utilities did not administer a psycholog-ical test to nonsecurity nuclear personnel, but it is considering using MMPI i j for these personnel. (This utility does administer to reactor operator candi-l dates a test contsining some psychological questions. The test is primarily l designdd to indicate aptitude fo,r operator-type work.) Six of the ten util-l ities administered the MMPI to nonsecurity nuclear personnel. Several utilities used more than one test, sometimes as a followup to.an j earlier test that was inconclusive or suggested possible problem areas, and I sometimes as part of the routine testing program. Other tests used include the Thurstone, the Sixteen Personality, Factor Questio,nnaire (16 PF), and the l Gordon Personal Profile-Inventory (GPP-I). In most cases, professional licensed psychologists or psychiatrists evaluated j the tests and' conducted followup interviews on questionable cases. Usually this professional evaluation and counseling was provided by consultants or by. a con-tract clinic. Some utilities required all applicants to undergo a clinical interview no matter what their test score, but this was the exception. Two ee II-14 = =

. _.,. i. _ ,_ [ j . _... ~. _ _. -.. 1 l } utilities had the test evaluated by two independent professional licensed a j psychologists or psychiatrists, and made provisions for additional indepe'ndent i interviews by other professionals if certain criteria were met. Solicit'ing ]j more than one professional opinion increases the objectivity of the results and makes personnel decisions based'on the tests more defensible. j 8. Utility Attitude on Psychological Tests 1 i ] By and large, the utilities surveyed were pleased with the use of psychological tests, the MPI in particular. One utility, ndting a high correlation between

a.

j background ' checks in which derogatory informa' tion. is found and certain MPI

j indicators, thought it was an excellent screening tool. Another utility, which I

conducts background screening and oral interviews of,its security applicants j before giving them the MPI, thought it served as a " good confirmation" of the i screening.that had been done beforehand. Another uti)ity felt it was "surpris-ingly effective." They felt it was more effective at detecting real or poten-tial drug or alcohol problems than it was at detecting other mental problems. Only one of the ten utilities. surveyed expressed displeasure with psychological testing. That utility preferred using the polygraph and felt that as a screen-ing or confirmatory tool, " psychological testing is not there yet." Appendix 8 to 10 CFR 73 requires that armed security-personnel at nuclear plants be mentally alert, capable of exercising good judgment, and be emotionally stable. These requirements imply that the licensee must. screen security person-nel for emotional stability. This rule explains part of the widespread psycho-ij logica1' testing of security personnel, but it does not account for the extensive j use 'of MPI for the psychological testing of nonsecurity personnel. A contri- . buting factor to the widespread use of such psychological tests for nuclear li personnel is the general industry acceptance of ANSI N18.17 (ANS 3.3), "5tandard on Security for Nuclear Power Plants" (now being revise'd), which calls for such l! testing as part of a procedure for determining employment acceptability standard. One utility indicated that its overall screening program for nuclear personnel a jj was perceived'as being so successful that the general manager for conventional !( plants wants to adopt it as part of his personnel selection program. II !i \\; j II-15 l} e t F T MFm% 8 e b' F"' 8. [ II% I p

_..m..___. The psychological testing of long-term employees was one area in which not 'all util.ities were completely comfortable. Such testing causes some consternation and morale problems with long-time employees whose access to a nuclear plant may be restricted as a result of the test. Generally, utilities expressed no reserva-tions about testing applicants 'and new employees; several utilities had expanded their programs to test current nuclear employees; and at least one utility is considering a retesting program for all employees (every three to five years). 5 e l W 0 e s e 1. i O e l l II-16 ~ Il i! Ltl.__ . -.,... - ~ _... m,.~- ~- l t -

.,,,..,.... y m e. ,..-...m,w w.xw.r. esva.,c .x,,.w.,amammmm,mmm ) il Topic 5: Utility Use of Supervisor Training and Behavioral Observation l A. Aberrant Be'havior Proce'dures 4 Every utility surveyed had a program that coupled supervisory training.in recog-nizing aberrant or abnormal behavior with supervisory observation of employee .j behavior and performance. At one utility this program was limited to the-security force. At most utilities the emphasis was not on detecting drug or alcohol abusa per se,, but on sensitizing supervisors (particularly first line supervisors) to signs of deteriorating. Job perfc, Dance and changes in an employee's behavior patterns. Mostprogramsins[ructedthesupervisor,upon ~ detecting a behavior pattern symptomatic of any of a wide range of problems ~ that the employee might have, to approach the employee from the point of view that the employee's job performance had deteriorated and that the supervisor had concerns both with job performance and with the possibility that there might be a medical or personal problem causing it. In this approach, if the employee refuses to acknowledge the existence of a problem and refuses to seek medical advice or employee assistance (usuelly inhouse counseling), he is put on notice that he must improve his job performance or face disciplinary action. The key in this approach is to relate the employee's problem to job performance and to. let appropriately qualified professionals deal with any underlying problem, such as alcoholism or drug abuse. The supervisor is instructed not to play psychol-ogist or psychiatrist and not to try to diagnose the cause of the employee's deteriorating performance. l The following excerpts on behavioral observation by supervisors from one com-pany's employee guidance program procedure manual, reasonably characterize .the aoproach used by the utilities surveyed. l Specific action to be taken by the supervisor to c'orrect poor job l performance due to emotionally based personal behavior problems does not differ basically from action to be taken to correct poor job performance resulting from any other reasons. ~ 1. The supervisor should make sure each employee is informed'and understands what is expected in terms of work performance and attendance. ~ i II-17 ~

.. x -. _. ~..... :., :. .-.. ~ :.

w

- = j i I 2. The supervisor should be alert, through continuing observation, to changes in the work and behavioral patterns of employees. ~ 3. The supervisor should document all unacceptable behavior, 'I attendance and job performance that fails to meet established standards. 4. The srpervisor should discuss deteriorating work performance or attendance with the employee.. Make it clear that the Company is concerned with job performance. Unless performance improves the enployee's job is in jeopardy. 5. The supervisor should, if work continues to deteriorate, suggest that the employee contact the Director of Employee Guidance. In referring the employee to the Program, the supervisor should explain th.at the employee must decide whether or not to seek assistance. .B. [ Training .i { All of the utilities conducted special training courses for supervisors in recog-nizing and handling abnormal or aberrant behavior. For most utilities this course was part of an overall training p'rogram required for all new supervisors (at one utility the course was limited to security personnel). Most courses required from four to eight hours to complete, but at least three utilities pro-vided supervisors with 16 hours of training in recognizing and handling aberrant behavior. Most courses were taught by utility personnel. One was taught by a professor from a nearby university. Some utilf t'ies include all security per-sonnel in the courses, including,non-supervisors. Some of the courses in aberrant behavior specifically address behavior resulting from taking drugs and al cohol.- In addition to general courses on aberrant behavior, at least three of the utilities conduct an inhouse course for supervisors.and security personnel on drug and drug-user identification and recognition.g These courses are typi-cally two to four hours in length and are taught by an ex-narcotics officer on the licensee's staff. In one case the utility hired an ex-narcotics officer primarily to teach such a course. 1 6 9 O e II-18 4 4 I

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- -assW - m. h C. Utility Attitude Toward Behavioral Observation l One utility objected to the use of the term " behavioral observation, feeling'

j the term carried a suggestion of " big brotherism" to it. However, its program
l for dealing with drug use and o'ther aberrant behavior did not differ signi-: j ficantly from other licensee programs surveyed.

Personnel at this particular ^ utility felt the key to a successful drug-and alcohol-abuse prevention program 4 was "a good screening program plus good supervision," supervision that included being aware of signs of deteriorating performance in general and drug use in particular. Perhaps a new term, such as " management awareness" or " performance y monitoring" should be used in lieu of " behavioral observation." No matter what } name is attached, each utility surveyed included supervisory observation of { employees for aberrant behavior in its evaluations of employee reliability. As a general rule, the utilities felt that their behavioral observat. ion programs were reasonably successful and provided a pragmatic and much less intrusive way to deal with the drug and alcohol problem than would, for example, random blood, breath or urine tests. Chemical tests are the' subject of Topic 8 of this report. One utility had little use for behavioral observation training, but not for behavioral observation itself. Itfeltthatbehavibralobservatton,particu-larly as it related to drugs and alcohol, was ma' inly common sense, and the key to it was selecting good supervipers; no behavioral observation training was thought to be necessary. Another utility, which has a very progressive reha-bilitation and employee assistance program, objected strongly to the idea of.a drug and user recognition course. The criticism was based on their own less-than-satisfactory experience with such a course, and a very strong company philosophy that drug and alcohol abuse need not be healt with any differently from any other job-related aberrant behavior. Such opinions that challenged the usefulness of training on aberrant behavior or. drug and drug-user identi-fication were the exception. Most licensees found such courses useful, espe-cially those that had instituted their own special course.on drugs. l II-19

T ' *

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a 4 Topic 6: Employee Awareness Employee awareness can be broken down into three major areas: (1) awareness of a company policy on drugs and alcohoi; (2) awareness of drugs, the dangers, of drug and alcohol use, and the' effects that such use can have on human per-formance, and (3) awareness of company rehabilitation or employee assistance programs. 1 As indicated in the discussion of Topic 2, all but one of the utilities sur-veyed had a written policy on drug and alcohol us.e. They exercised a variety 1 of means to convey it to their employees, including: letters to each employee { from a company official; requirements that employees sign an acknowledgment that 1 they have read and will follow company pol' icy; inclusion of copies of the com-pany drug and alcohol policy in application or orientation materials or in employee handbooks; posting of the policy in prominent places; discussions during plant safety meetings, and ensuring that supervisors are familiar with the policy and can explain it to employees. Another way of communicating policy and company resolve to use it was through formal or informal dissemination of news of disciplinary actions, including. terminations, taken against employees who violated the policy. Based on information available to the Task Force during this survey, it seems clear that reasonable efforts were made by most licensees surveyed to communicate their policies on drug and alcohol abuse to their workers. However, based on information gathered during the survey, it, appears that few licensees have a program to heighten employee awareness of drugs and the dangers and' effects of drug and alcohol abuse. Indeed, the number of licensees who had programs for supervisor awareness of aberrant behavior was nearly matched by the number of licensees who did not have training on aberrant behavior o'r diug and alcohol awareness training for regular employees. Based on the information obtained during the survey, it appears that only one utility has provided rou-tine training for its nuclear power plant employees in identifying drugs and j recognizing symptoms-of drug and alcohol abuse. One utility that had estab-lished a drug course for supervisors and security personnel is considering making the course available to all employees. II-20 1 i UG. - Y E"M'u - - -- Ew ? nG MMS.MMdhN"V'*I S'A5 WMMMO

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._ a _ a l i 4 Topic 7:,Employeri Assistan;e and Rehabilitation Programs All of the utilities surveyed had an employee assistanc'e or rehabilit.ation program. Nine of the programs cove' red both alcoholism and drug dependence; one q covered alcoholism only. The p'rograms generally were open to both volunteers and personnel referred by management or supervisors. Surveyed companies generally had a policy of not taking disciplinary action against an employee who was enrolled in an assistance or rehabilitation program and was making satisfactory aj pro'gress. On the other hand, no utility would retain indefinitely an employee

l who had a drug or alcohol problem serious enough to affect the quality of his

] work and who did not;show reasonable desire for and progress toward rehabilita-l tion. Although many of the surveyed utilities have their own employee. assistance 1 i staff', including in some cases trained counselors and masters-degree-level ] ps'ychologists, the professional rehaoilitation was generally performed under ] the supervision of local physicians, nearby hospitals, local Alcoholics Anony-l mous chapters, or other civic or medical groups actively concerned about chemical dependency. In several cases, the utilities had entered into contrac-tual agreements with doctors or counseling groups to provide rehabilitative services for their employees. The utilities' employee guidance staffs, often working confidentially with employees desiring rehabilitation, perform counsel-ing and monitoring functions, but normally refer employees with serious drug or alcohol probler; to outside medical professionals. In some cases, employees could participate in rehabilitat, ion programs on company time.. For a number of utilities, employee costs for participation in rehabilitation programs were partially or completely offset by medical benefit plans, such as Blue Cross /. Blue Shield. Information on drug and alcohol rehabilitat. ion programs and other forms of employee u sistance are disseminated in most of the same ways the company drug and alcohol' policy is disseminated, including a letter from a high corporate 1 official (for example, Chairman of the Board) to each employee. See the third excerpt (Chairs.aa's letter) from licensee policies under Topic 7. j I The following excerpt from the policy statement of one utility is reasonably representative of the spectrum of employee assistance / rehabilitation programs offered by the surveyed utilities: II-21 4 ,I - _ a --s mw.pr.w.ar.nw.mc.cm..:m.wwwww.m n.-=r.,mcww.e v.ma.m .-w.w-as-.-

2. .a .- - -. -..... - ~. ~ ~. q i j 1. General 1 The Company recognizes problem drinking, alcoholism,.and other drug dependencies as treatable illnesses, and it is our policy to aid employees in recovery from them. The Company assists employe'es with such dependencies to obtain appro-priate treatment, just as for other illnesses. Any employee who fully observes prescribed treatment can expect to Le considered for all policy and benefit purpos.es as employees with other disabilities.' An employee whose work performance is adversely affected by problem drinking, alcoholism or other drug dependencies and who refuses to accept or fails'to follow prescribed treatment will be subject to disciplinary or other appropriate' action. ',L 2. Treatment Program The Empicyee Medical Assistance Coordinator will assist employees in securing proper treatment. This service is available on either a voluntary basis or upon referral by supervision, and will be kept confidential in the same manner as all.other medical.information. Necessary Time Off for treatment is provided in the Sick Benefit Plan. Under certain conditions, financial assistance may be made available to employees undergoing treatment for problem drinking, alcoholism or other drug dependencies, where expenses incurred are not covered by the Company's health insurance plans and where such treatment is recommended by the Medical Director and the Manager-Employee Services. Several utilities emphasized that they were people oriented and that their reha-bilitation programs reflected this philosophy. One official said that five years ago his company had no employee counseling service and that now it had five full time staff members working in employee counseling. He explained that such services were not only people oriented, reflecting the company philosophy, but that they were also motivational and in the long run, cost effective. His comriany's written management procedure for the employee guidance program begins as follows: STATEMENT: The purpose of the Employee Guidance Progiam is to help. prevent, in a positive manner, employees from losing their jobs due to a behavioral problem ar il.Iness. The corresponding savings in the dignity and worth of individuals and the prevention of the related human suffering j and misery is worth the efforts of all concerned. a II-22 l YasWi ww.s v ~~me.wwawutw.n. iaeaw m a M' "m"~wm y

1. 2 a m 1.

=, IMPLE G TATION: 1 l ' I. Program Objectives. 1 A. The Employee Guidance Program has been developed to supplement i existing benefit programs and assure maximum effort in assisti ng i i the problem empicyee. The program has 4 objectives: j 1. To retain valued erployees. ~ l l 2. To restore productivity through early identification of personal behavior problems. 3. To motivate employees to seek help. 4. To refer employees to the appropriate assistance resources. Two other companies emphasized their commitment to strong employee assistance and rehabilitation programs. At one of them, the (;tility Chairman sent a letter to his employees in 1978 reminding them of the availability of the utility's employee assistance program. His letter rpad, in part: j

Dear Fellow Employee:

EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM Because the Company is genuinely interested in the physical and emotional well-being of its employees, it is hoped that those in need will take advantage of the services available through (the utility's) Employee Assistance Program. In these days of extraordinary stress, rapidly changing times and the. existence of personal problems, individual counseling has proven to be very helpful. We are pleased that the (Local) Council on Alcoholism continues to provide counseling service for (Utility) employees who may .be afflicted with alcoholism, drug abuse or related problems. l Since the inception of this program, counseling for work related stress, and meny other personal difficulties including alcohol and drug dependency, has received the attention of a professional counselor. ~The service may be arranged either.by referral or as a voluntary ~ decision by'an employee desiring such assistance. If by referral, you may be excused from work by your supervisor to attend counseling sessions. If you voluntarily. decide.to seek counseling service, you could arrange to meet with the counselor during other than working hours at a mutually . l agreed upon time and location. I: I N \\- 4 II-23 i wwmamammwm ~ ~ m m a u+ ~., - -

._.____,5._...a. m.. . a.s. \\ h The other company having a strongly stated commitment to rehabilitation, pre-l fers to approach the fitness-for-duty problem from the viewpoint of ultim' ate job performance or deteriora' tion, rather than what might have caused it.' One E of its corporate general managers asked the following question: In terms of potential consequence, shouldn't we consider whether there is any need.to treat drug use any differently from any other on-the-job aberrant behavior? His company which has had an employee rehabilitation program since 1917, cites a rate of 80% at which employees who have used the employee assistance program return to the same job after treatment, and an overall annual utility turnover rate of less tnan 5%, including retirements. The written company posture on alcoholism'and drt.g abuse includes the employee's family. It begins as follows: ^ ALCOHOLISM AND CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY PROCEDURES Program Administration Whether an employee drinks alcohol and how much are personal matters with which the Company is not concerned. If drinking or abuse of other drugs leads to unsatisfactory job performance, then the Company is directly concerned and will ast. The action taken in all such cases will be based on the assumption that the employee has a health problem-and requires assistance in treating that problem. An employee who develops a problem which, in the judgement of the supervisor, is adversely affecting his/her job performance will be so advised in accordance with the steps outlined under " Supervisory Procedure." The case will be handled on a confidential basis. The employee's career will not be affected if he/she cooperates. If assistance is not accepted, or if treatment fails to produce favorable results and the prot,. ems continue to exist, the case will be handled as in any l other instance of unsatisfactory job performance or failure to take care of a health problem. . Since alcoholism and chemical dependency in the employee's family may affect the employee's job performance, the Company will extend, through the employee, the same information and guidance as is avail-able to our employees. li ~ ,t ~ !i II-24 Ks e' % Y. E 'O f

.. ~ g.. :.: - - Topic 8: Detection of Drug or Alcohol Use by Chemical Tests A. Random Chemical Tests for Detection As part of the Task Force effort, a physician specializing in chemical depen-dency'and a professor specializing in analytic toxicology presented seminars to the NRC staff on their respective areas of expertise. Both doctors were famil-f ar with the capabilities and limitations of chemical tests - specifically, ' breath, blood, and urine tests 'to detect the presence of alcohol and drugs in i the body. Both doctors felt such tests are more scientifically certain than any ~ other method for conclus'ively determining the presence of drugs or alcohol in a ~ person's body. Both believed that carefully monitored chemical tests, performed I on a sample taken from a randomly selected employee, would serve as a'very ' effective method for detection (and deterrence) of drug and alcohol use. As a result of this expert opinion, and as part of a Task Force effort to formulate a generic approach to the threat of drug and alcohol problems in the i nuclear industry, the Task Force solicited the. views of utilities on the use of chemical tests - on a random basis, as part of a routine physical examination program, or as confirmation of suspected abuse by an employee (the latter two uses are discussed below). / i The Task Force learned that none of the licensees surveyed used chemical tests on a random basis, and that none'of them intends to. As indicated in the dis-cussion under Topic 1, every utility surveyed was opposed - sometimes very y strongly - to the use of chemical tests on a random basis for detecting drug i I j and alcohol use. " The primary reasons ~for this opposition are consistent with ) the general licensee position,on the drug and alcohol problem described in ] Topic 1. They include the following: (1)' it is not" clear to them that drug and j alcohol use among nuclear plant personnel have caused or are causing a serious ] threat to'public health and safety; (2) some. felt it would be inappropriate, l burdensome, and overreacting for NRC to require the use of so strong a measure a as chemical tests,in a situation where the existence or extent of a, serious drug and alcohol problem is (in their view) unestablished; (3) it would create a i further deterioration of morale among nuclear workers, a situation that has p q II-25 s I e h* s s enne Y \\ ~

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occurred (they said) largely because of NRC requirements, (4) it would affect 4 the good employee as ~well as the bad and would tend to cause the better e'aployees to leave the industry - it would be one more sign that the government does not trust them; and (5) it would be greatly unfair to most employees. Other reasons cited as to why chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine on l a random basis would not be a good idea were: concern about legal aspects - invasion of privacy and unreasonable search; concerns that there might be a problem with false positives (a test incorrectly indicating the presence of a drug that was not there); a belief that in some' states notice of such a test ~ has to oe given in advance; concern about the cafibration of the tests; a concern that continued NRC pressure on employees would create an environment that fosters aberrant behavior; and a concern that a program of chemical testing would be costly and hard to administer. 1 8. Other Uses of Chemica' Tests In view of the overwhetning opposition to random chemical tests, there was a surprisingly wide acceptance of the use of chemical tests for drug use detec- ~ tion under other circumstances. Fully half the sample (five) use chemical tests ~ under certain circumstances for detection of drug use. Of these five, three use chemical tests for more than one of the following purposes: preemployment physical examinations, annual physical examinations, or in a probable-cause situation (that is, when an employee's behavior suggests he may be on drugs or alcohol). At least two other utilities are considering the use of such tests or would use them under certain conditions. The current uses of chemical testis by utilities break down as follows: At least-q three utilities use chemical tests for drugs as part of their preemploym'ent o screening process for security personnel. At least one'uses such a preemploy-ment drug screen for all personnel and an annual drug screen for all but clerical personnel. At least one other utility is considering instituting a drug screen as part of the preemployment physical. Two utilities routinely perform drug screens as part of the annual physical for security personnel; one tests for alcohol' also. At least two utilities have used chemical tests for drug detec-tion in probable-cause situations (when an employee's behavior indicated he I II-26 m e

might be on dr.ugs) to establish conclusively the presence or absence of drugs in a. suspected employee. At both utilities, positive test results led to ter-minations. One of these uti1,ities arranged with local physicians to handle suspected drug and alcohol referrals from the utility. The physicians are encouraged to take blood or uri'ne samples if possible, as the following excerpt from a set of the utility's guidelines for supervisors indicates: Once the supervisor has made the observations and concluded that the employee is tinder the influence of an intoxicant, the employee should be immediately referred to a physician for medical clarification of his/her condition. An attempt should be made to obtain a blood or urine sample from the employee by the physician. The employee do'es have the right to refuse to see a physician or provide a blood or urine sample. 'One utility, which strongly opposed random sampling, suggested that an amend-ment of the regulations requiring blood and urine analysis in a probable-cause 4 situation would to make it easier to prove drug or alcohol use in qtiestionable - i cases. Personnel explained that without the scientific proof that chemical tests provide, they had a difficult time proving inebriation or drug use. They said that drug-and alcohol-abusing employees sometimes hire lawyers who get the charges dropped and the employees reinstated, causing a morale problem among nonabusing " innocent" employees. Such a rule would permit or require them to l use chemical tests in a probable-cause situation and should stipulate measurable criteria for alcohol (for example, 0:05% blood alcohol) and drugs that would define unfitness for duty. -l e t t j \\ i . i ,j i II-27 - ht4F '*"K2 WO4 h'.

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--..-..-... = - : -- +.- ~- ---~ --- - i z. v-- Topic 9: Other Prevention / Detection Methods Earlier parts of this report discussed licensee use of background investiigations, psychological testing, supervisory training and behavioral observation, employee awareness, employee assistance p'rograms, and chemical testing. Each of.these } tools is used by some licensees as a part of their overall program to combat drug and alcohol abuse by their employees. Several other prevention / detection ~ measures are used. These include the use of searches, the use of drug-detecting. dogs, the monitoring, of absenteeism, and the use of investigators. Each of these measures is discussed briefly below. ~ ) 1 1 A. Searches i All utilities surveyed conducted searches of personnel, packages, and vehicles i required by NRC for prevention of the introduction of weapons er explosives to a nuclear plant site. Some also conducted searcnes of exiting personnel, packages, and vehicles primarily to detect the theft of small tools, copper 1 pipe, and so on. None of the searches is designed to detect drugs or alcohol; however, occasionally the searches do detect alcohol or beer in a lunch box or in a car on company property. Several utilities noted that small quantities of marijuana and other drugs such as amphetamines are occasionally confiscated

j from interstate truckers delivering supplies to nuclear plants when the trucks I;

are searched upon entry to the proteci.ed areas. Another utility noted that, on [ occasion, guards have found drugs in company vehicles at entrances to the pro-tected area. Occasionally a guard's curiosity about a vial of prescription I. drugs will lead to a call to a physician or pharmacist to confirm the contents. Several utilities have rules that require workers taking prescription drugs to u j' . report that information to their supervisor, a company nurse, or a human i resources group. t, ll j The general attitude of utilities surveyed regarding pat-down searches was a lj quite negative, ranking just below their condemnation of random urine tests. l One security director pointed out that because of the small physical volume of j most drugs, effective personnel searches for drugs would have to be even more ) invasiv'e of personal privacy than the pat-down searches used for weapons or explosives. i. ll ] II-28 f' -- -dkT 3_"M% h (- T ..a [k= 4, [ *, {} [ J] I-QQg'] D

4 _. u _. 1 4 0 j Utilities differed in their approaches to searching vehicles in parking lot ~s. { ] Although none performed such searches routinely, some felt that if the parking j lot were on company property, the utility could, should, and in some cases l does search employee vehicles in the parking lot for drugs or alcohol in a l probable-cause situation. Othe'r utilities were stot sure of their legaT founda-tion for such searches, and preferred to involve local law enforcement author-l ities in cases of suspected drug or alcohol possession, use, or sale in a parking lot. B. Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs 1 1 i Two of the utilities surveyed use trained drug-sniffing dogs as part of their drug ' prevention / detection program. At one utility, the dog is brought on site I once every two months or so. He also is used in the parking lot. At the other utility, unannounced searches by state police and their drug-detecting dogs are conducted during outages when the site's population is swollen by temporary personnel from local craft unions. The' dogs search thoroughly; lockers are included in their search. Another utility has dogs on site, but they are not for drug detection. Some opposition to the routine use of drug-detectin'g dogs was expressed by i several licensee security staffs. One felt use of such dogs would be demoral-izing to the work torce - a sign,that the utility did not trus.t its employees. j Another felt drug-dececting dogs might be useful, but felt the dog sho'uld be small - not " obtrusive like an attack dog." ' One secr ity manager felt that i drug-detecting dogs'would lose their effectiveness if used routinely because 3 drug users would find a way to seal their drugs so the dogs could not smell i j them. He preferred not to " play his dog. card" unti1 he had a strong indication i of drug possession or use, at which time he would bripg dogs in unannounced. 1 C. Monitoring of Absenteeism Abnormally high absenteeism, and unusual patterns of absenteeism (for example, ll absenteeism on Mondays and failure to return to work after lunch) are pheno-mena social scientists monitor as potential signs of alcoholism or other chemical dependency. At least eight of the ten utilities surveyed monitor j II-29 y I ' k N hY. %D # W ".Vkbo + ?I.". 'I 5 #. T ' ob

- - C ~ - - L ^ absenteeism in one form or another, although not necessarily for the purpose of detecting drug or alcohol abuse. Some monitor absenteeism as a means'to control abuse of sick leave,' and others monitor it as part of good management i practice. However, several monitor patterns of use of sick leave to detect situations that may indicate alcohol or other chemical-dependency problems. Most have computerized absentee monitoring systems and make the results avail-able to managers and supervisors for followup and counseling. Some perform trend analysis on the data, looking for suggestive patterns. 4 1 .t D. Use of Investigators . ;] } Some utilities have their own staff of investigators and conduct their own drug [.i and alcohol investigations as well as investigations of meter-tampering, petty theft, and so on. Some utilities have, on occasion, hired outside investigators to work on their staffs as undercover agents to try to detect theft of company '? property, dereliction of duty, or drug possession, use, or sale. Licensee ll appraisals of the' overall usefulness of undercover operations were somewhat jj-mixed. From the utilities interviewed that indicated that they had used under-I cover agents in connection with drug detection, several lessons-learned emerged. Although it was generally less difficult to detect drug-related problems among. some groups of workers (loosely knit groups were easier to infiltrate) it was !) much more difficult to obtain evidence sufficient to stand up in court. More-over, several utilities expressed frustration with law enforcement and pros-

1 ecuting officials who might not be interested in a simple marijuana use or pos-0 session case at a nuclear plant because their priorities oriented them toward

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trafficking cases involving more dangerous drugs and having greater potential l for'a major drug " bast." This feeling, however, was not shared by all utilities ,in the survey. Several had conducted successful undercover operations with the g

j full assistance and participation of local or state law enforcement agericies.

{ The opinions of the utilities on the effect that such operations have on ~

j employee morale were likewise mixed.

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. ___ --s--2m u.a.o-~umnamac.ma:.ame ' m.._... ..a e r 4 III. A SURVEY OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL PROGRAMS OUTSIDE THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY In addition to soliciting information on drug and alcohol programs of NRC licensees, the Task Force gathered information on the drug and alcohol programs of several organizations outside' the nuclear industry. Four nonindustiy drug and alcohol programs are described in the following pages: Two of the programs ~ are mandated by government agencies and two of the programs were established, on their own by private industry. The two governmental programs described were selected because of the similarity the drug and alcohol, problem poses for those agencies and for the NRC. Like the NRC, both of the selected government agencies are responsible for ensuring that public health and safety is not endangered as a result of unreliable human per-fo'rmance in a high technology setting. The first government program described is the Personnel Reliability Program of the Department of Defense (D00) for nuclear weapons personnel, as implement!ed by the U.S. Air Force. The Federal ~ Aviation Administration's (FAA) program for combating drug and alcohol abuse by flight crews or air traffic controllers is the other government program described. Because of its relevance to the NRC's' efforts to address the drug and alcohol program, the FAA's existing and proposed regulatory base for addressing drug and alcohol abuse is discussed at l'ength. The desciiption of the D00 program is based on excerpts from relevant D0D regulations. The de-scription of the FAA program is ased on excerpts from FAA regulations and a Task Force interview of the FAA's Federal Air Surgeon and senior members of his staff. The report goes on to describe the drug and alcohol programs of two companies considered by some experts to have exemplary employee assistance programs. The private companies are Kimberly-Clark and General Mot (rs. The Kimberly-Clark pro-l gram is based on a Task Force interview of Kimberlp-Clark's medical director and employee assistance manager. The description of the General Motors program was excerpted from a professional journal on employee assistance programs. Both l' private progra'as cover employees who operate machinery and equipment, which, if operated irresponsibly, could endanger the safety of the employees and their coworkers. In the case of General Motors, impaired job peiformance by an. l employee during the manufacture of an automobile could ultimately jeopardize the safety of individuals in the general public. e =m sui =-'#vr. ~~

.- L ~ - - ~ - - :-- = t -{ 1. Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program j Perhaps the most significant safety-related function of the Department o'f i = l Defense (D00) is ensuring that nuclear weapons entrusted to its use are handled in a manner consistent With preserving national security and main-I taining public health and safety. To ensure that nuclear weapons are handled in a manner consistent, with D0D objectives, it is necessary to' ensure that personnel working directly or closely with nuclear weapons are reliable, where reliability spans the traits of trustworthiness, medical j fitness, and mental fitness. To this end, the'0ffice of the Secret'ary of

1 Defense promulgates policy guidelines (D00 Directive 5210.42) in personnel

]- reliability, to be implemented through separate Air Force, Army, and Navy regu'lations, for D00 personnel and contractors having access to nuclear weapons, components of nuclear weapons, and delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The following excerpts from the Air Force's implementing regulation (AF Regulation 35-99) for the D00 Nuclear Weapons Reliability Program describe features of the Air Forec's program releva" t to this report's survey of approaches to the drug and alcohol problu. The Air Force's nuclear surety personnel reliability program was structured in accordance with the general D00 guidelines referred to above and it is reasonably representative of the nuclear surety programs of the Army and Navy. The Air Force program, like the.NRC's proposed Access Authorization Rule (see Appendix A), provides for background screening and a program of continual behavioral observation (" con-tinuous evaluation of certified personnel"). Like NRC's proposed Fitness for 8 Duty Rule (see Appendix B), alcohol and drug abuse are disqualifying criteria. .Like the Task Force's generic Baseline Program, it provides opportunity for renabilitating personnel with chemical dependencies. Excerpts from AF R'gu-e lation 35-99 (14 April 1981) follow, Military Personnel PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM The purpose of this regulation is to provide the direction necessary to' implement the Personnel Reliability Program. It establishes the requirements and responsibilities for screening, selecting, and con-tinuously evaluating all personnel who control, handle, have access III-2 i _' q '/' h 4 &[. b d " [I N Y g

. ac. ::. u m- =-----.-- j 1 to, control the launch of, or control entry to, nuclear weapons or i nuclear weapon systems. It provides for the selection and retention l 'of personnel who are emotionally stable and have demonstrated good j judgment and professional competence. It also provides guidance for the removal of all individuals of questionable reliability. i l' A. Background and Terminology i AF Regulation 35-99 continues: l 1-1. The Reason for the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).. This program is designed to make sure that each person who performs duties with nuclear weapons or weapons systems, or critical components, j meets the highe.st possible standards of individual reliability. 1-2. How the Program Works. This program is designed to screen and continually evaluate personnel selected for nuclear weapons. duties. Usually, new entries into a career field that require evaluation move from basic training into technical training and then into field organi-zations. Therefore, students who are candidates for PRP duties are i evaluated during basic military training (BMT) and in formal tr'aining schools.

d. The intent of this program is' to ensure the highest possible individual reliability through screening and through continual eval-uation, but to avoid creating unnecessary administrativa requirements.

e. Although the management of this program is a function of command and supervison, every member of the Air Force has an obligation to report any unusual behavior or s,ituation tilat appears likely to de-grade the reliable performapce of these performing PRP duties.

1-3. To Whom the Program Applies:

a. Air Force Military Personnel:,

(1) All active duty Air For.ce personnel who are presently as-signed, or selected for assignment to duties involving the control, handling, or access, to nuclear weapons,. nuclear weapons systems, or critical components... 1 (2) Members of the Reserve and' Air National Guard (ANG) if they are assigned to a PRP position... g

b. Civilian and Contractor Personnel:

L .(1) Air Force civil service employees who are assigned duties associated with nuclear weapons or critical components... (2) Contractor, contract engineering, and technical services personnel who perform PRP duties... 1-4. Explanation of Terms: a. Access. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in ' such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or dau ge a. nuclear weapon when such tampering or damage could go undetected upon III-3 l4rg vee +tW' 'eew)., Thghg-;WTgia,;i:6WJLLeu.F6ie.G%i%WW't.!bJ.ws>M ah44-LP"G DN*N g

.aw w w w r wwnwzeemwmnammmvwwws:ngmwrysw w.hw:*t N completion of the task being performed. Usually, a person would not be considered to have access if an escort or a guard were provided for either the person or the weapon when the person is in close proxi-mity to.the weapon. b. Certification. A statement, signed on an AF Form 286, by the certifying official. It attests to the fact the individual named in the certificate has been' screened, evaluated, and meets the standards for assignments to the PRP. c. Certifying Official: (1) For militgry and Department of Defense (D00) civil'ian-personnel, this individual is: (a) The unit (or immediate) commander...who is res-ponsible for the operations and security of nuclear. weapons and weapons systems', or critical components... (b) The official who is resp leading to a PRP assignment and who can main,onsible for training tain the personal contact needed to evaluate the trainee. (2) For D00 contractor personnel, this official is the person designated in the contract as having technical knowledge of the contract and having contact with the individuals he or she wi.11 certi fy. g. Critical Component. A component that requires application of the Two-Man Concept during a portion of its life cycle. (1) A nuclear weapon, with or without its fuzing and firing system installed. (2) A combat delivery vehicle that has had all preload functions completed and is ready for nuclear weapon mate or load. (3) A combat delivery vehicle that has a nuclear weapon (s) mated or loaded. (4) Hardware, software, or code components designated by the Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group (NWSSG)'or the Director of Nuclear Surety. The Director of Nuclear Surety determines when a critical component that is permanently removed from the weapon system, ceases to be critical. h. Critical Position. A position in which the individual's authorized duties require close physical proximity to a critical component, and requires th.e individual to use technical data per-taining to electrical or mechanical portions of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system, affecting the launching, ' firing, releasing, or detonating a nuclear weapon. J. Individual Reliability. Assurance of reliable performance in carrying,out duties that are associated with nuclear weapons, weapons systems, or critical components. 1 III-4 l ~!

n.w2 war.aw:.w.m.c me-emensNew;2m:mernumnauser. mms. w2srazEr ' -i p. . Permanent Decertification. A formal procedure for permanently - l prohibiting an individual from performing PRP duties. It is a duty i restriction and is not a punitive action. !j Suspension. An a' tion taken by a certifying official to ' r. c relieve an individual from PRP duties for a short period. It is j used when the individual's security. reliability is not in question, and when the action is not likely to cause temporary or permanent i decertification. It does not require formal decertification. A suspension is recorded on a. log kept within the unit...and may be i initiated by the certifying official, the supervisor, or the individual. i a s. Tamper. To deliberately perform an incorrect procedure or unauthorized act involving a critical component, or nuclear weapon or weapon system. u. Technical knowledge. Knowledge that would allow an indi-vidual to tamper with a nuclear weapon, weapon system, or criti' cal component in a way that would not b.e detected during normal prefire operations, or during a weapons monitoring inspection. Such tamper-ing might cause unauthorized prearming, arming, launching, firing, releasing, or detonation of a nuclear weapon or degradation of weapon performance. Temporary Decertification. A formal procedure used to pro-v. hibit an individual from performing PRP duties for a period of 180 days or less. As soon as enough information is available, the tem-parary decertification will be removed or the individual will be permanently decertified. w. Unit Commander. The individual with responsibility for operations within an identifiable. Air Force function (usually the squadron commander). In most cases, the unit commander is the formal certifying official. 1-5. Responsibilities of,the Unit of Immediate_ Commander: Has final responsibility for the relia,bility program in his i: a. or her unit. b. Identifies each position in his or her unit in which the incumbent must be certified for performance of PRP duties... c. Initially certifies, or verifies certification of, each person who is scheduled to perform PRP duties.in his or her unit... d. Constantly evaluates his or her' personnel who are PRP certified... l. ~ ~ III-5

ca .1 r 2.:. _ ..w ~ =. 5 11 Acts to suspend or decertify individuals as necessary... e. I B. Guidelines for Determining Reliability l l ~ AF Regulation 35-99 offers guidelines for determining reliability of jt individuals who are assigned PRP duties: j 2-1. Mandatory Selection Requirements. In the interest of national security, and because of the possibility of dire consequences when working around iluclear weapons, individuals who are assigned PRP duties must meet a higher standard than those.who are not in the PRP. l The :aember selected must: .t a. Have an "S-1" physical profile. 9 b. Have the technical competence needed to perform the duties l assigned. Have the required security clearance and investigation. c. d. Have a positive attitude toward nuclear weapons duty and the objectives of the Personnel Reliability Program, e. Not be under consideration for separation for cause, or under court martial charges. 2-2. Commander or Supervisor (Certifying Official) Determination of Individual Reliability. The' commander makes a judgment,. based on knowledge of past behavior and insight gained from a personal inter-view with the individual. The commander must use this insight, together with specific facts, a detailed knowledge of performance, and consultative opinions from other agencies (such as the hospital) to arrive at the best judgment about the individual's reliability. I a. The commander evaluates 411 ability from the operational ' integrity point of view by determining whether the individual will perform his or her specified tasks at the proper time and, from the safety point of view, by determining whether the in'dividual might deliberately or accidentally commit an unauthorized act that could ' compromise the system. (1) The commander's judgment must take into account the capability' and intent of the individual to perform the assigned duties, as well as the nature of those duties. (2) To arrive at the "best judgment" of reliability, the comma'nder requires input from supervisory, medical, and security police personnel. (3) The underlying concept is simply to make the best ju'dgment about whether an individual can be depended upon to perform (., the assigned duties when req' tired. } III-6 i j 7#SciNIF1M6wdNd4Wr3*M%ds.rMW@hns/MNeKk;@ilhTMOFAr=E.m 6Ru AX.. mWhk.wlcvRhva%4 Lc,

.,.a y,p.m m w. _ w w,.,. n. .,,. a. n,. ,.;. ~, v.,,.m. ~. v., .,,.,.m, ~..= ] i b. The best indication of reliability is past performance. The commander must review the individual's job or duty history for evidence of the following desirable traits: (1) Dependability in accepting responsibility. l (2) Carrying out his or her duties effectively and in an approved manner. i (3) Flexibility in adjusting to changes in working environment. (4) Good social adjustment and emotional stability. (5) Ability to use good judgment in meeting adverse or emergency situations. c. Evidence of any of the following would give the commander a reason to question the reliability of an individual: 1 (1) Any court-martial or a civil conviction of a serious nature. j (2) Negligence or delinquency in duty performance. (3) Significant physical, mental, or character traits, j or aberrant behavior, sustained by medical authority, that might affect the reliable performance of duties. i (4) Behavior patterns that show or suggest a contemptuous attitude toward the law or regulations. (5) Drug or alcohol abuse. (6) Poor attitude, lack.of motivation toward assigned duties, or financial irresponsibility. d. When the historical data has been evaluated and the certi-fying official has personally interviewed the individual, a judgment may be made about the reliability of the individual. Even if it is decided that the membe'r is dependable, there e. is still a requirement to constantly evaluate his or her reliability, and especially to detect signs of possible unreliable performance before any compromise can o,ccur. The best method of continuous eval-uation is to measure present performance and behavior against past' performance, and to look for any changes in behavior or performance patterns. Some personality and behavior factors that may affect reliability are described below. (Ed Note: These factors are broken into four categories: factors relating to thinking or attitude; factors rela,ted to behavior or activity; factors related to awareness or level of consciousness (includes alcohol and drug intoxication); and fa,ctors related to mood and feeling.) f. The immediate supervisor is usually the first person to detect a change in reliab.le performance. Some sources that could provide information on an individual's reliability include:

(1) Medical notification of illness, injury or treatment that could affect duty performance.

(2) The unfavorable information file (UIF).. . l (3) Being a suspect or subject in an Office of Special Investigation (OSI) or security police report. (4) Observations of coworkers. III-7 w -- g

(5) Comments of the individual or his or her dependents. (6) Social Actions Officer. (7) Chaplain. (PRP individuals identified on quarterly' roster). (8) Community agencies (Red Cross, " Crisis Action Centers," and so forth). 2-3. Medical Determination of Reliability i a. Records Review. The unit commander or the CBP0 requests' a - { medical records review as' part of the process of certifying an indi-i vidual to perform duty under the reliability program. Such a review ~ i is carried out as follows: j (1) Physicians, or designated medical technicians, review the health record to look for any eviden_ce of. emotional instability, 4 1 character behavior disorders, or medical coriditions that could cause a sudden loss.of consciousness, or require treatment with narcotics, 1 sedatives, or tranquilizers... 1 (2) If the record shows that the individual may not be suitable for the performance of PRP duty, the certifying official. - will be provided specific rationale in writing. (3) The commander may arrange for further specialty con-j sultation if needed, to reach a medical decision about the individual's suitability for the specific duties. 1 (4) If the health record is not available, the candidate will be given a medical screening examination. It is not necessary to accomplish a complete physical examination. A medical screening consists of an interview by a competent medical authority to determine if a medical problem exists., (Eo Note: D0D guidelines indicate that this medical evaluation "shall include careful considerati'on of psychiatric aspects of the case, to include psychiatric consultation when indicated.'") j b. Specific Referral. If the unit commander refers the indi-vidual for medical evaluation for a specific problem, medical person-nel will: l (1) Obtain any necessary specialty. consultations. (2) Assess the specific problem in light of past per-i formance, projected performance, and nature of duties performed. ~ (3) Provide a medical recommendation to the commander. 2-4. Medical Judgment as a Result of a Clinic Visit. In the milita~ry

i medical setting, the physician, dentist, or attending practitioner must assess each pa?,ient in terms of his or her suitability to continue to perform the assigned duties. This assessment must consider three

,,] factors: the nature of the duties performed; the nature of the illness j or injury; and the nature of the treatment. ,1 ] a. If the provider of care feels that the patient's continued i certification under PRP is questionable, the following actions are appropriate. (1) Admit to the hospital or quarters and continue treat-ment; or, j III-8 e g

a .(2) If returned to duty, call the unit commander or his or her representative, maka a PRP recommendation, and (if applicable) ' initiate a profile change... b. This regulation does not require the provider of care to notify the unit commander or his or her representative, each time,an individual with a PRP certification is prescribed medication. It is necessary to notify and make a recommendation only when narcotics, sedatives, or tranquilizers are prescribed. Notification for other categories of drugs, such as antihistamines is only made if they will significantly affect the patient's physical or mental abilities. How- . ever, when notification is required, only the unit commander or his or her designee is required to be notified. c. For most medical problems it is not the " reliability" or. " stability," but the capability of the service member that is being evaluated. (1) In most instances, this capability can besti be assessed by the attending practitioner who knows the effects of the illness or injury, the prescribed treatment, and the nature of the patient's duties. The use of drug lists is prohibited, since they are never all inclusive and may lead to a false sense of security. (2) Medical personnel will notify the unit if an indi-vidual's behavior suggests emotional instability, current drug and alcohol abuse, or the need for treatment with narcotics, sedatives, or tranquilizers. (3) I." all other medical encounters with patients who have PRP certification, a medical judgment will be made as to the patient's suitability or capability to perform assigned duties, and the need to notify the unit. Whenever the practitionerj as any doubts, howev.er, h the unit must be notified. (4) Prompt notification to the unit is important. ~ y 2-5. Self-Determination of Reliability. Individuals assigned to PRP duties have the responsibility ts. monitor their own reliability from the safety standpoint. They should be aware of how certain problems, concerns, and circumstances may reduce their effectiveness--any may inven impair their performance, to the point where a safety hazard exists. Individuals must, advise supervisors o,f all factors (includ-ing medical or dental care) that could have an' adverse impact on their performance and safety. Failure to discharge til s responsibility may i cast doubt on the individual's reliability and continued performance in PRP duties. C. Certifying Individuals for PRP Duty Insofar as certify'ing indivf' duals for PRP Duty, AF Regulation 35-99[ l continues: l III-9 l l!

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4-2. Certifying Official's Interview (Guidelines). The certifying official's personal interview with the individual being certified ~ should cover the followjng points: a. Spirit and intent of the PRP. The intent of this program is to prevent the possibility of an act that could lead to the unauthorized launch of a mi'ssile or aircraft armed with a nuclear. weapon, or the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. -i i b. Qualifications } Individuals must be stabl,of personnel selected to perform PRP duties: e, and free from emotional disturbance, impulsive traits, or serious personal problems. c. Individual's responsibilities under the PRP. Should cover the monitoring of his or her own reliability:as well as those with j whom he or she works. q d. Explain suspension, temporary and permanent decertification, and their possible impact on the individual. 2 Any other topics that may be unique or of special interest e. to your unit. 4-5. Continuous Evaluation of Certified Personnel. Continuous evalua-tion 1:; the most important ingredient in an effective reliability pro-gram. If at any time the certifying official determines that an indi-vidual no longer qualifies for PRP duties, the certifying official must initiate suspension or decertification action by using the procedures ~ in chapter 5. ~ 4-8. Investigative Requirements: Critical Position. The individual in a position designated a. Critical must have a background investigation (BI) or higher investi-gation, completed before final certification. b. Controlled Position. The individual in a Controlled posi-tion must have a favorable National Agency Check (NAC), Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC), or higher investigation, completed

before final. certification. Non-US citizens must have a BI.

li c. Currency of Investigation: (1) For an initial assignment to a critical or controlled jl 5 years old. -NOTE:. This does not apply to individuals who were ini-PRP position, a security investigation must be updated if it is over i tially certified before 1 July 1976. l (2) For a second or subsequent assignment to a critical or controlled PRP position, a security investigation that is over a 3 5 years old requires updating only if the individual has been out; of PRP duties for more than 5 years, or has a break in service of more than 1 year since t_he last investigation. j III-10 j s ~ l me= mmmm- ,a .www ~~ ~ ~~~ ~

n. ., ~.c n.m e w r k m - m .. ~, _ ~ D. Suspension, Decertification, Review, and Disposition The following material was excerpted from AF Regulation 35-99: 5-1. Removing a Member From PRP Duty. When a member fails to meet th'e t selection requirements outlined in chapter 2, the immediate commander should question the member's assignment to, or continued duty in, the PRP. The decertification procedures for this program are deliber-a. ately designed to allow expedient removal of an individual from PRP when, in the judgment of the immediate commander, there could be a problem of program safety or security. i. b. Decertification is not a punitive action, nor does it cast an adverse reflection on any member who is decertified. The decerti-fication action is separate and apart from any punitive or adminis- .trative action, even though the act or problem that results in decer- ,tification may also be cause for other action. c. Members may be removed from PRP duties in one of three ways: by suspension; by tempoiary decertification; or by permanent decertification. The commander must decide which should be use'd... 5-2. Suspension. This is an action'to relieve a member from PRP re-lated duties immediately, without.' formal decertification.

a. In some situations, suspension is the only action taken; for example, when a member has been prescribed a medicine that could significantly affect his or her physical or me.ntal abilities.

In most instances, this means those drugs that are classified as nar-cotics, sedatives, or tranquilizers (see. paragraph 2-4b). In this case, the commander would not necessarily take any formal decerti-fication action. Personnel,under suspension must be excl.uded from having access to nuclear weapons, but not necessarily from entry to all restricted areas. ~ 7 3 5-11. Decertification Procedures When Drug or Alcohol Abuse Is Involved. When an individual is suspected of drug or alcohol abuse as defined in AFR 30-2, the' certifying official immediately removes the member from PRP duties and starts an investi.gation. If first time possession or use of marijuana is involved, see b below. If identifid by Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) L covert drug. investigation; see f below. - l a. If the investigation shows that the individual is a " drug abuser" a's defined in AFR 30-2: L .(1) The certifying official initiates temporary decerti-l fication action, and enters the member into drug rehabilitation. If L the estimated duration for completion of the rehabilitation program is:in excess.of 180 days, or if the prognosis for completing the ) III-11 p 1 l

a= as.... =...=.a a. = rehabilitation program is poor, the member should be permananE.ly I decertified. (2) If, upon. the membersisucessful completion of the'dr.ug. rehabilitation program, the absence of drug abuse can be established, and if the rehabilitation committae recommends the member's reinstate-ment to PRP duties, the certifying official may then reinstate the member. ' (3) If the investigation reveals the use of a hallucinogen either posing the threat of flash-back (for example, LSD), or severe behavioral effects (for example, PCP), the certifying offical must impose a permanent decertification. ~ (4) subsequent drug abuse 3by the individual while under the PRP results in permanent decertification. b. When an individual is suspected or-invo'Ived in the first i! time personal use of marijuana, or first tinie possession of marijuana for personal use, the certifying official assesses each O dividual .i according to AFR 30-2, paragraph 4-20., Certifying officials should carefully evaluate all information before retaining or rencving individuals from PRP duties. Single or unsupported' allegations of personal use of marijuana, or.first time possession' for personal use, need.not dictate. removal from PRP duties. Those individuals identi-fled as first time possessors or users of marijuana, who are entered into the drug rehabilitation prograia, are eligible for reinstatement to PRP duties on entry into Phase V of the drug rehabilitation program. Each case of this nature must be fully evaluated by the certifying official before returning the member to PRP duties. c. If the investigation 4 hows that the individual is an "alechol abuser" as defined in AFR 30-2, the certifying official initiates temporary decertification action, and enters the member into alcohol rehabilitation. (1) If the individual:is diagnosed as an alcoholic by com-petent medical authority, or if;the prognosis for completirg the il rehabilitation program is poor,!the' member will be permaneritly decerti-fied. On successful completion of the folicw-on support phase, an individual may be considered for recertification or removal of the 1 permanent ' decertification (in accordance with paragraph 5-12), if unanimously agreed upon by the Alcohol Rehabilitation Committee (inclu-

ding medical concurrence), the unit' commander, and the PRP certifying official.

i (2) Except as noted in:(1) above, if upon the member's ~ entry into follow-on support, ths absence of alcohol abuse or dependency can be established. and the rehabilitation conmittee recommends the member's reinsfatement to PRP duties, the certifying official may, after careful evaluation of the case, reinstate the member. (3) Subsequent alcohol abuse within a 24 month period, by the individua-1 while under the PRP, usually results in permanent de-certification. 'l 9 1; 5 III-12 t j =r_m n m m m a w w.m : m m m % a l,. -, - ~. - -..,..,.. --. - A -.

c'2 ;;pd*gqw.fss faess y.MWevMmmmemKcma sh VM?iMMMMt!PMfMMM i~ 1 d. .If the investigation shows that the individual is not a drug' or alcohol abuser, or that the alcohol involvement was an isolated incident [that is, one-time driving under the influence of intoxicants or drugs (DWI)], the certifying official may, after care"ul considera - tion of all factors, reinstate the member. One alcohol and 'ne drug related incidents usually require o e. permanent decertification if the period of time between the incidents is 2 years or less. A full evaluat. ion of the circumstances must be made by the certifying official, based upon information from social actions, medical services, and other applicable agencies, to determine , if permanent decertification is or is not appropriate. f. The certifying official is not required to immediately suspend ' or decertify an individual because a covert AFOSI drug investigation s has been initia.ted. AFOSI must notify the certifying official of the circumstances of the investigation. The actions taken will depend upon ,the severity of the allegations and the sensitivity of the individual's duties. The certifying official must decide if the risks of continued duties are negligible, and if removal would seriously inhibit ongoing efforts to identify other drug abusers who are PRP qualified. Credible allegations of drug usage involving substances other than marijuana must, j however, result in immediate removal from PRP. 5-12. Reinstatement of Permanently ' Decertified Personnel. In a case where there is enough justification, a member who has been permanently decertified may be returned to PRP duties or may have the permanent decertification removed. Removal should not be requested simply be-cause the individual is no longer assigned or expected to be assigned to PRP duties. The evidence must be clear tha,t the disqualifying problem no longer exists and would not return'under a stress situation. a t t 1 III-13 -a =a- ~ wen *m+= j

...._______.~w__,u_. = .e 2. The Drug and Alcohol Program of Another Federal Regulatory A gncy: The Federal Aviation Administration 4 The Task Force visited the W'ashington Headquarters of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to discuss the FAA's approach to the problem of drug and alcohol abuse by pilots, air traffic controllers, and other FAA-licensed or employed personnel in safety-sensitive positions. The FAA officials inter-viewed were the Federal Air Surgeon, Deputy Federal Air Surgeon, Chief Psychia-trist for the Office of Aviation Medicine, and the Chief of the Occupational Health Division. Because of the parallelism between the.NRC's responsibili-ties with respect to civilian nuclear power and t.he FAA's responsibilities with respect to civil aviation, the FAA's drug arid alcohol program, including its current and proposed regulations, will be discuosed at length. A. Existing Regulatory Base One of the responsibilities of the FAA is to regulate the civilian aviation industry in a manner consistent with the maintenance of public health and safety. In this regard, the FAA's mission with respect to civilian aviation is not unlike NRC's missio'n with respect to civilian nuclear power. The FAA promulgates safety regulations that.hpply to airlines.as well as to 800,000 commercial and private flyers (airmen). In order to achieve flying status, airmen must obtain FAA-issued ce'tificatior for fiying competency and for medical fitness. There ar2 three differem. classes of certifications, graded according to the level of airman responsibility involved. In decreasing order of responsiblity, these certifications coser (1) air carrier pilots-in-comniand, (2) other commercial pilots, and (3) students and private pilots. ,.The FAA regalations regaroing the use of drugs and alcohol are the same for all classes of airmen. The following excerpts from 14 CFR define the FAA's existing regulatory basis with respect to drugs and alcohol (a " crew member" is any pilot, flight engineer, I' light navigator,411ght attendant, or other person assigned to perform duty in an aircraft during flight): III-14 ~.

~ _ - - - .2--~... . :.. c..: 891.11 . Liquor and drugs (a) No person may,act as a crew member of a civil aircraft - (1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage. (2) While under the influence of alcohol; or (3) While using'any drug that affects his faculties in'any way contrary to safety. (b) Except in an emergency, no pilot of a civil aircraft may all.ow a person who is obviously under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs (except a medical patient under proper care) to be carried in that aircraft. S91.12 Carriage of narcotic drugs, inarijuana, and depressant or. stimulant drugs or substances (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may operate a civil aircraft within the United States with knowledge that narcotic drugs, marijuana, and depressant or stimulant drugs or substances as determined in Federal or State statutes are carried in the aircraft. j (b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to any carriage of narcotic drugs, marijuana, and depressant or stimulant' drugs or substances authorized by or under any Federal or State statute or by any Federal or State agency. The existing FAA rule S91.11(a) is similar in some respects to NRC's proposed Fitness for Duty Rule; however, the NRC rule is less specific - for example, ithasnoprovisionsimilartot,heFdA'seight-hourclause. Note also that the nature of the licensee population to whi.ch the FAA rule applies is dif-ferent from the nature of the NRC lice'ns'ee population. The FAA rule applies to 800,000 individual airmen. NRC's proposed. Fitness for Duty Rule and Access Authorization Rule would appl to nuclear utilitiesk requiring them to set up

rograms intended to achieve an outcome on the level of individu&l.s similar to th'at of the FAA rule. Given that only a small percentage of the nuclear licensee personnel having safety-sensitive positions are individually licensed by the NRC as reactor operators, an NRC rule'that applied only to 1icensed G

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,-~~ _.. .un-w..m.mmmmmm w.m,m-yhry,wam,m.mmmpw,,, individuals would not cover a broad enough spectrum of critical personnel. Hence, the proposed NRC rules are written to apply to utilities rather than f to individuals. B. Proposed Revisions to the FAA's Rules on Drugs and Alcohol The FAA has found its current rule on drug and alcohol use to be difficult to enforce. For example, it is difficd1t to prove _whether an apparently intoxicated individual was drinking less than eight hours before flying unless a credible witness actually saw him consume alcohol during that time. More-over, the length of time since alcohol has been consumed is not so much a measure of one's ability to perform flight duties competently as is the amount of alcohol present in the blood. (The FAA's Office of Aviation Medicine cites a preponderance of scientific information that shows a direct relationship between the amount of alcohol in the bloodstream and physical, mental, psycho-motor, and judgmental impairment.) To address the problems of (1) nonenforceability of the current rule, and (2) lack of a quantitative standard for impairment due to alcohol, the FAA has initiated a rulemaking action which would set the legal criterion for impairment at 0.04% blood alcohol content and provide for breath tests to be administered by EAA inspectors in probable-cause situations. The proposed revisions include ' implied consent provisions which would result in the loss of air certification for refusal to submit to an FAA-administered breath test. e III-16 men

.._~.......-.-----.-.c .. =. - - -. -. ~ The FAA published the proposed amendments to its drug and alcohol regulatio'ns in the Federal Register on July 27, 1981. The Federal Register notice con-tained several passages particularly relevant to NRC's current situation 'vis- = a-vis drug and alcohol use by n'uclear personnel in safety-sensitive pos'itions. Excerpts from the Federal Register notice follow: A.

Background

The FAA is concerned about serious hazard to safe aircraft operations resulting from the impairment of a pilot's faculties due to alcohol. For a number of years'it has expended a substan- .tial amount of time and funds trying to educate the flying public to this danger. As part of this effort the agency has worked close-ly with groups such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association in educational programs. Although these programs have been bene-ficial the problem still remains. There continue to be a signi-ficant number of accidents each year in which alcohol is a caus'e or a factor. The FAA now believes.that it.aust take steps in accordance with this proposal to reduce the frequency of these accidents by strengthening the rules relating to the consumption of alcohol. The current rules have been difficult to enforce. Without the blood alcohol standard and the required breath,. test proposed by this notice, there is no simple and reliable evidence available to estab-lish that a pilot is under the influence of' alcohol. While a witness may indicate that a pilot has been drinking, the pilot may not exhibit the mannerisms or physical, indications of an intoxicated. person. On the other hand, even the common indications of intoxication may no~t convince.an enforcement tribunal that a violation has occurred without scientific evidence. Safety is further jeopardized by the fact that under the current rule the FAA may not take enforcement action until the intoxicated pilot actually operates the aircraft. This pr,oposal would allow an FAA inspector to request a breath test of a person attempting to operate an aircraft. In most cases this can be., expected to, deter such a pilot from operating an aircraft....The means of enforcement proposed in this notice has been determined to be the least offensive or burdensome interference...that will still result in positive iden-tification of violators. B. NTSE Recommendations ...the NTSB noted that each year it determines alcohol to be a caus'e or factor in about 40 aircraft accidents, almost all of which are fatal. In 1978 the NTSB recorded 50 general aviation accidents involving alcohol as a cause or factor, 46 of which were fatal. III-17 ok e w

'.f The role of alcohol in a fatal accident is easily established because a blood sample is routinely tested for alcohol during the autopsy. However, after a survivable accident, the NTSB is unable to obtain blood alcohol test unless the person consents. For this reason, the NTSB believes many more aviation accidents may have ~ been alcohol-related than 1s currently known. The NTSB also noted that all 50 states have established motor' vehicle violations relating to alcohol by referring to blood alcohol levels. In addition to these laws, which are frequently called " implied consent" laws, some states can also require a pilot to submit to a blood alcohol test. ~ In view of'the effectiveness of these. laws, the NTSB made two recommendations to the FAA. First, it recommended that the FAA. amend'S61.3 to include an implied consent cTause as a condition for issuance of a pilot certificate to require an airman to submit to testing. The Board's recommendation was to amend $91.11 to specify alcohol levels at which a pilot is considered to be under i the influence of alcohol. C. GAO Recommendations The GAO made s.',ilar recommendations in a Report to Congress by the Comptroller General, entitled " Stronger Federal Aviation Administration Requirements Needed to Identify and Reduce Alcohol Use Among Civilian Pilots" (CED-78-58; March 20, 1978). The report recommended a maximum alcohol level for pilots and mandatory testing for blood alcohol level. The GA0 report pointed out that from 1965 to 1975 the NTSB cited alcohol impairment of pilot judgment and efficiency as probable cause or contributing factor in 485 general aviation accidents of which 430 resulted in fatalities. During the same time period, there were 53,627 total genersi aviation aircraf t accidents of which 7,041 were fatal. Thus, approximately 1 percent of the total accidents in that time period were alcohol related and .l approximately 6 percent of the total fatal accidents were alcohol-related. Moreover, of-these accidents determined to be alcohol-related, approximately 89 percent were fatal, with approximately three deaths per accident. D. Effects of Alcohol Even sma'll amounts of alcohol affect judgement, coordination, performance and reaction time. Vision, hearing, touch, information processing, memory, reasoning, and attention span may also be affected by alcohol gonsumption. Inflight testing of experienced professional aviators *has shown.that even 40 milligrams percent by weight of alcohol in the blood exerts detrimental effects on performance which are incom-patible with flight safety. P i III-18 .me rn,

anw-edenw.imsofamwm2mmesset>rmem/can=mm7mmtrememmMh um'n I i.: 4 s E. Proposal The ability of a crewmember to function without impairment of performance is an essential element in the safety of flight and in the effectiveness of the air traffic system. Since alcohol can affect the ability of a crewmember to function and thus is detri-mental to aviation safety, the FAA must make every reasonable effort to prevent those who are under the influence of alcohol from flying. The purpose of these amendments is to facilitate the enforce-ment of the present alcohol and drug regulations by providing an objective standard and thereby serve as a deterrent to crewmembers. who may conside.r drinking or using drugs before or during flight. These amendments will also assist the FAA and the NTSB in deter- . mining whether an accident or incident was caused by, or related to, consumption of alcoholic beverages or use of drugs. F. Minimum Blood Alcohol Content Level The FAA proposes to strengthen enforcement of the present alcohol regulations by adding a prohibition against acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 40 milligrams percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. [40 milligrams by weight can be understood as the equivalent of 40 milligrams of alcohol in a sample of 100 milli-liters of blood.] Forty milligrams percent ha's been chosen as the prohibited level because it'is the level at which definite impairment of a person's performance has been scientifically demonstrated. It must be epphasized, however, that any person who acts, or attempts to act, as a crewmember within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic. beverage would violate S91.11. While the new provision is ~needed in conjunction with-the l current 8-hour time limit on drinking before flight, it must j also be noted that mere compliance with the 8-hour rule may not be enough to ensure that a crewmember's bl'ood alcohol level l is below the prohibited level at takeoff. Since the normal human metabolising rate of alcohol by the liver is onl'y 15 milligrams percent per hour, a person could ingest a large amount of alcohol even 8 hours prior to flying and still have a blood alcohol content at takeoff that would be at or above the prohibited level and could impair his or her performance as a crewmember. l i ~~ III-19 4 i

. x.= e G. Breath Test and Alcohol Test Results The FAA also proposes to establish criteria for. requiring a' crew-member to subait to a chemical breath test. The breath test can be administered on the spot by an authorized r'epresentative of the Administrator and will indicate reliably the person's blood alcohol level. The use of such a test is more objective and accurate than i mere observance of a person's appearance and conduct. Whenever a breath test is taken or other test results are requested, the Administrator's action would be based on reasonable grounds for believing that the person acted, or has attempted to act, as a crewmember of a civil aircraft within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage, while under the influ-ence of alcohol or while having a blood alcohol level of 40 milli-grams. percent or higher. The proposed rule also prescribes substantial penalties for any crewmember who refuses to submit to a breath test or to furnish the results of medical tests, as well as for violations of $91.11(a). 'i 5 I. Requests for Drug Test'Results ~ Since there is no simple test for drugs similar to the chemical breath test for alcohol, the FAA has not proposed to require crev-members to submit to tests for drugs. However, under the' proposed rule, a crewmember may be required to furnish the Administrator with results of tests that have been taken. The Adninistrator's request would be based on reasonable grounds for believing that 3 the person acted or attempted to act, as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while using a drug affecting the person's faculties in j a way contrary to safety. j Substantial penalties are also proposed for refusal to furnish j medical test results that indicate the presence of drugs and for i ~ the use of drugs in violation of $91.11(a)(3). +j J. . Drug Violations Unrelated to Aircraft Operatio'ns l Sections 61.15, 63.12 and 65.12 provide that no person who is l convicted of violating any Federal or State statute relating to the growing, processing, sale, disposition, possession, transportation,

i or importation of narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant or stimu-lant drugs or substances is eligible for any certificate or rating issued under Parts.61, 63, or 65 respectively, for a period of 1 year and that such a conviction is grounds for suspension or revoca-i tion of any airman certificate issued under those parts. When a con-

'i vittion does not in any way relate to the operation of an aircraft <t or illegal use of an aircraft, it is questionable whether these. It III-20 95#MMAWf55d/%%MMmeihueVWbMPMtidwdiuttfMEWMCnMWWWW6NNM

...a .c O activities indicate a disposition towcrd irresponsible exercise of airman privileges. While the FAA by no means condones illegal acti-vities relating to drugs, its principal concern is the use of air-craft in smuggling operations that may involve hazardous maneuvers and low flying to avoid detection or the improper modification of an aircraft. For this reason, it has determined that denial, revo-cation, or suspension of a' certificate should be limited to drug violations in which the use of an aircraft was involved. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to revise these sections to limit them in this ~ j manner. 1 i 1 J PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGliT RULES l 6. By revising $91.11 to read as follows: 591.11 Liquor and drugs. (a) No person may act, or attempt to act as a crewmember of a a civil aircraft-- ] (1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic g beverage; 1 (2) While under the infl.uence of alcohol; (3) While using any drug that affects the person's faculties i in any way contrary to safety; or. (4) While having 40 milligrams percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. (c) WhenevertheAdministratorhasare[sonablebasisto d believe that a person who acted, or' attempted to a::t, as a crew-j member of a civil aircraft may lpve violated paragraphs (a)(1), ~ (a)(2), or (a)(4) of this section that person shall do ei.ther or a l both of the following as re, quested by the Administrator l (1) Submit to a chemical test of the breath. i (2) Furnish the Administrator, or authorize any clinic, i} hospital, doctor, or other person to release to the Administrator, i; the results.of each medical test'.taken, within 4 hours after acting or attempting to act, as a crewmember, that indicate percentage by weight of alcohol in the, blood. ll '(d) Whenever the Administrator has a reasonable basis to 't believe that a person who acted as a crewmember 'of a civil ir-craft may have violated paragraph (a)(3) of this section, upon a request by the Administrator, that person shall-- (1) Furnish the Administrator, the results of each medical test that indicates the presence of any drugs in the body take'n within 4 hours after acting or attempting to act, as I a crewmember; or (2) Authorize any clinic, hospital, doctor, or other person to release to the Administrator the results of each medical test that indicate the presence of any drugs.in the body taken within 4 hours after acting, or attempting to act, as a crewmember. g III-21 en }

n3 3, w. : ys., #ww - .~...e .s ~ m.... m. c (e) Any chemical or medical test information obtained by the Administrator pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) of this section may be evaluated in determining a person's qualifications for any airman certificate or possible violations of the Fr:deral Aviation Regula-tions (14 CFR Chapter I), and may be used as evidence in any legal i proceeding pursuant to Section 602, 609 or 901 of the Federal Avia-1 tion Act of 1958. Public comments on the proposed rule are now being addressed by the FAA staff. The staff of the Federal Air Surgeon indicated that the FAA had receiv'ed little unfavorable comment regarding the " implied consent" provisions of the proposed rule. g The proposed rule would provide for FAA inspectors to administer breath tests for alcohol to airmen when the FAA has a reasonable basis to believe paragraphs (a)('1), (a)(2), or (a)(4) of 14 CFR 591.11 had been violated. Given the large percentage of pilots who do not work for an FAA-licensed company, the'use of FAA personnel to administer the breath tests is necessary in order to enforce the rule. The different composition of NRC's licensee population would give NRC greater flexibility in devising enforcement strGegy for any analogous NRC rule. C. FAA Medical Certification The FAA divides airman certification into three classes, based on the level of airman responsibility exercised by each. Medical recertification, including physical examinations by FAA Flignt Surgeons or FAA-approved private physicians, are required on a six-month, one year, and two year basis for the respcctive ~ levels of airman cdrtification. The medical standards that must be met for the various levels of medical cer.tificates are also graded, with more stringent -- standards applying to airmen in classifications exercisi'ng areater responsibi-lity. Air traffic controllers must hold a second-class medical certificate (medical recertification every year), the same medical requirement that com-mercial pilots must meet. FAA regulations (14'CFR 67) establish a uniform set of alcohol, drug, and other fitness related medical standards that must be met for each class' of" medical certificate. These uniform standards are as follows (excerpted from 14 CFR 67): III-22 ~ 9

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567.13, 15, 17 ('first, second or third)-class medical certificate -(a) To be eligible for a (first, second, or third)-class medical certificate, an applicant must meet the requirement of paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section. (d) Mental and neurologic: (1) Mental. (i) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of any of the following: (a) A personality disorder that is severe enough to have repeatedly manifested itself by overt acts. (b) A psychosis. (c) Alcoholism. As used in this section, " alcoholism" means a condition in which a person's intake of alcohol is great ' 'enough to damage his physical health or personal or social functioning, or when alcohol has become a prerequisite to his normal functioning. (d) Drug dependence. As used in this section, " drug dependence" means a condition in which a person is addicted to or dependent on drugs other than alcohol, tobacco, or ordinary caffeine-containing beverages, as evidenced by habit,ual use or a clear sense of need for the drug. (ii) No other personality disorder, neurosis, or i mental condition that the Federal Air Surgeon finds-- 4 (a) Makes the applicant unable to safely perform the duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate that be holds or for which he is appiying; or (b) May reasonably be expected, within two years after the finding, to make him unable to perform those duties or exercise those privileges; and the findings are based 'on the case history and appropriate, qtrali-1 fied, medical judgment relating to the. condition involved. (2) Neurologic. (i) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of either of the following: (a) Epilepsy. (b) A disturbance of consciousness without satisfactory i medical explanation of the cause. N (ii) No other convulsive disorder, disturbance of conscious-ness, or neurologic condition thaf, the Federal A'ir Surgeon finds-- l (a) Makes the applicant unable to safely perform the duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate that he holds or for which he is applying; or (b) May reasonably be expected, within two years after the finding, to make him unable to perform those duties or exercise those privileges; i and the findings are based on the case history.and appropriate, qualified medical judgment relating to.the condition involved. ll

l III-23

1 a u. L.- .e~w.L.. .c.,.L a.u.} o o 1 I To implement these regulations, FAA-approved aviation medical examiners are instructed to not issue medical certificates to applicants who have an established medical histo'ry or clinical diagnosis of alcoholism or drug dependence. In order to receive an Airman Medical Certificate, an airman must fill out an application form (FAA Form.8500-8) which includes'the questions: " Nave you ever had or have you now any of the following:...A'ny drug or narcotic habit... Excessive drinking habit." This application form must be signed by the applicant, who is subject to criminal penaltjes for knowing and willful falsification. D. Air Traffic Controllers Air traffic controllers (ATCs) are employees of the FAA. As indicated above, ATCs must hold a second-class medical certificate (reexamination every year). Air traffic controllers must meet other FAA guidelines relating to their job fitness, including the following requirements, excerpted from the FAA Manual, j " Facility Operation and Administration,'! which largely address the use of legally obtainable over-the-counter or prescription drugs: i Supervisors should obtain the medical opinion of the Flight Surgeon concerning any employee whose medical cdndition appears questionable; An employee temporarily prohibited from traffic control duties because of required medication or other questionable medical " status may be assigned to temporary administrative duties dependent upon availability of productive work and the capability of the employee to do the work. Employees who possess a current medical clearance are responsible to comply with all restrictions, limitations, or cancellations of the certificate, applicable to the performance of air traffic control duties. i e 9 4 e III-24 J e e e 9"

-.a.1.:6 ;m.. i.m. Z N.;._ _ i __.,. ._.__..m.:. a_m s 264. USE OF DRUGS AND SEDATIVES The following policy shall apply in regard to the use of drugs and sedatives: a. Personnel may be assigned to their regular positions of operation within ARTCCs, terminal facilities, FSSs, and IFSSs even though they are taking innocuous medication such as aspirin derivatives, v.itamin preparations, nose drops, skin ointments, and routine immunizations. b. Personnel taking either regular or prolonged antihistamines may be assigned to positions of operation, provided indiv.idual ~j special considerations are obtained. These special considera-tions may be granted on a permanent basis after it has been determined;by the Flight Surgeon that there are no deleterious effects of the antihistamine or the condition for which it is

j being used.

265. RESTRICTED DRUGS I a. Personnel ordinarily assigned to an operating position, includ-ing those who have direct supervison of the specialists within ~j the facility, shall not use the types of drugs listed below with-in a 24-hour period before assumption of duty: (1) Sedative type drugs.

i (2) Tranquilizers.

(3) Any drugs such as, but not limited to, antihypertensive agents or duodenal ulcer medications which have an effect on the central or autonomic nervous cystem. (4) Any other drug and/or medication lillely to affect the alertness, judgment, vision, equilibrium, or state of Consciousness. b. When the employee is a*dvised by a physician that ade'quate treat-ment of an ailment will require use of the types of drugs or medication referred to above,.the employee shall not perform control duties. If the period of required treatment by these types of drugs or medication is anticipated by the physician to i - be indicated, the supervisor should promptly obtain the opinion of the Flight Surgeon concerning the cont,inued utilization of the employee. The sedical determination as to continued opera-tional duty by an ATCS on medication will be made by the Flight 4 Surgeon after consultation with the supervisor on a case-by-case . basis. 266. BLOOD DONORS j Personne1 shall not be assigned to traffic control duties until at i least 12 hours have elapsed after blood donation. 3 j ~

l q

III-25 l, 4

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w.c v - ~...; ..-.~. a o 267. USE OF ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS Standards of conduct for FAA employees regarding the use of' . l intoxicants are contained in Order 3750.5. In addition to l conforming to those standards, ATCSs shall not perform air traffic control functions, or directly supervise personnel ~ performing these functions, within eight hours after partaking in intoxicants. Regarding the use of background investigations as a screening mechanism for ATC applicants, the FAA medical officials pointed to federal laws

which prohibit the federal, government ** from denying employment to anyone solely on the basis of a past history of alcoholism or' drug abuse.

These' laws effec-t tively profiibit the FAA or any other federal agericy covered by the law from ( including as part of their background investigation procedures, a conscious ~ effort to establish a prior history of chemical dependency and/or state of rehabilitation. The FAA performs psychological testing as part of its screening process for applicants for ATC positions. The test used is the 16 PF (Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire), which was mentioned under Topic 4 of this report. The FAA has devised a screening system for this test suitably tailnred to its parti-cular screening needs and priorities. The FAA includes modules on human behavior and employee performance as part of a three-week training course for new ATC supervisors. The human behavior training does cover alcohol and drugs as potential causes for anesual behavior or unsatisfactory job performance. The FAA officials indicated that new ATC supervisors are former ATCs who excelled at their jobs arid received promotions because of their good performance. Most worked side by side with other ATCs ,for several years before becoming supervisors. Often the new ATC supervisor is not assigned to a new control tower, so he becomes the supervisor of the

Public Law 91-61.6, " Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970," and Public Law 92-255, " Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972."
- The CIA, FBI, and NSA are exempt from this requirement.

4 III-26 6 ( A + "

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j people he 'has been working with for several years.

Even if this is not the' case,'ATC supervisors and ATCs have a common ba'se of ATC experiences and often share similar backgrounds. 'The FAA medical staff interviewed suggested that .3 ATC operators and supervisors were probably not very different from nuclear .i reactor operators and superviso'rs in these regards (that is, close knft, )j common base of experience, similar background, promotion from within). ,1 ~ ,2 4 O The Air Surgeon's -staff indicated that if such ingrown, close-knit, work situa- 'I tions are coupled with a punitive or disciplinary followup program (for example, dismissal) for alcohol and drug problems, reliance on a detection program based on ll supervisory observation and referral is not likely to be effective. (There is [] a reluctance on the part of supervisors of close-knit groups such as control-11 lers, to report subordinates for alcohol or drug abuse or addiction, or to refer i them for treatment, if the supervisor thinks management will take punitive action 1 such as revoking certification). Although administrative action might be appro-I priate in cases of simple drug or alcohol abuse (for example, a nonalcoholic l reports to work intoxicated), medical treatment is appropriate for cases of alcoholism and drug addiction. If management approaches alcoholism as an ad-itinistrative matter rather than as a medical problem, there will be few self-referrals. Moreover, few peers, family members, or supervisors will refer a l loved one or colleague for treatment if such referral will jeopardize his career !4 or promotion potential. The FAA's solution to this penetration problem for L pilots, another closely knit gro,up, is discussed in the next section. E. The FAA and Rehabilitation As indicated in the section on FAA medical certification, an established medical l I; history or clinical diagnosis of alcoholism or drug; dependence is considered disqualifying for any level of medical. certification.( The FAA Federal Air Surgeon takes the position, with respect to alcoholism and drug addiction, that an individual with either of these conditions constitutes a threat to safety and that for certain safety-sensitive positions, such as pilot or air traffic controller, ei'ther condition is, in and of itself, disqualifying. This policy relieves the FAA of the burden of having to prove incapacitation or' impa.irment ll;- III-27

i

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\\ . _ -. _,. - - ~. - - =., .....a. ...c. ....=. n Q... ..a in a given situation for an alcoholic pilot: if he is a clinically diagnosed alcoholic, he is, by FAA standards, considered to be impaired and he would be denied an aviation medical c'ertificate, therefore the opportunity to fly. The Air Surgeon considers the risk to public safety posed by alcoholics and drug addicts to be too great to let them act as airmen at all, unless they have been suitably rehabilitated, as dis' cussed below. The Air Surgeon's position is that for a safety-sensitive position such as pilot. ) or air traffic controller, impairment resulting from alcoholism or drug addic-tion need not be demonstrated. These medical conditions themselves constitute w impairment'for such a safety-sensitive position.' The FAA's medical certification procedures allow for granting an exemption from this requirement, on a case-by-case basis, for pilots who present adequate evidence of recovery from alcoholism. The exemptions.are granted or denied by ] the FAA's Federal Air Surgeon, after he has considered the results of any psy-chiatri'c examinations and psychological evaluations and the recommendations of ]. a group of medical experts. A key consideration in whether a pilot is rein-stated or not is years of abstinence and demonstration of commitment to rehabilitation. "It is unusual for an individual to be granted an exemption ~ with less than 2 years of abstinence unless.very stringent medical surveillance 'l can be provided." (Ref. 7). l} Several years ago, the FAA liberalized this policy, which applied to all classes j of pilots. The change resulted from (1) an increased rate of permanent remis- 'j sions as a result of an improved state of the art of active intervention approaches and prof,essional treatments, and (2) the fact that the FAA's exemp-j . tion petition approach was not conducive to self, supervisory or peer group .j referrals by commercial pilots whose livelihood depended on receiving th'e avia-l' tion medical certtfication. By insisting on a strict i'nterpretation of the . regulation, the FAA was creating a disincentive for alcoholic commercial pilots who were alcoholics to openly seek rehabilitation. Under these circumstances, the overall irrterest of. aviation safety was not best being served (Ref. 7). i i / III-28 li l! Q r% &n2Mi&MiLu ? "Kw:8 W = TJ k1Dw2aS M uuMhshuau M M M a~G hna M M,

. _.-a ..~&-.. u.- .... ~. -,.- .:..;.~...~. j Concurrently with the FAA's recognition that there were probably a number j of undiscovered commercial pilots who were alcoholics, the pilots themselves, l (through their union) and the airlines (who were developing their own company' rehabilitation programs) were also seeking a solution to the problems. i ~ The FAA's response was to slowly reduce the period of abstinence j needed before an individual may be returned to duty, by substituting strict surveillance for a variable period of time, and insisting that a responsible medical source sponsor the request for exemption (or conditional return of the medical certificate). The medical sponsor l would be either the medical department of the airline, or the medical representative of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). This gave the involved medical representatives of the airlines and the pilots further impetus to develop responsible programs for detection, con-frontation, supervised rehabilitation, and finally, for monitoring the rehabilitation if the pilot was returned to duty. But, most - importantly, it implied a sharing of responsible decision making about the degree of recovery. The sponsoring medical agent was not merely " rubber-stamping" a pilot's request for return of medical certification, he was making informed decisions based upon a knowledge of alcoholism and the individual. The surveillance or monitoring system evolved into a tripartite involve-ment to formally include the peers, the supervisors, and the sponsor-ing medical department. This produced the necessity for training physicians who deal with pilots as sponsors to become knowledgeable about alcoholism. Another result was the hiring of nonmedical alcoholism professionals by the airlines. It.also produced the necessity to orient lay people, supervisors.and peer representatives, to an understanding of alcoholism. It is now possible for a commercial airline pilot, sponsored by an appropriate medical department, to be considered for an exemption I and. return to duty within 3 months after completion of an initial .l* intensive rehabilitation program.- Typically this consists of approxi-c; mately.1 month at an inpatient facility specializing in alcohol 'i . rehabilitation. In order for an exemption request to be acted'upon by the FAA, all l1 pertinent medical records must be submitted and reviewed. In addi-tion, all petitioners must undergo a comprehensi've psychiatric examin-l. ation and psychological test evaluation by a limited number of profes-sionals familar with aviation and alcoholism. The purpose of this evaluation is not only to screen for underlying psychopathology and organic brain disease, but to serve as an independent review of the progress.of r,ehabilitation (independent of the treatment faciljty). In addition, the psychiatrist is able to develop'a baseline fo.r con-tinued monitoring of the recovery progress, and become a valuable ,l' resource in making judgments about relaxing the surveillance at a later date. ~ j i III-29 -~ l[ es+wrema, ewe %wamwe emarsev.mse+mmaeaw.

aa c.L... m. -J-- m. j Under this program, which is very exacting in comparison to most rehabilita-4 tion programs, more than 400 airline pilots have been returned to flight duties in the past five' years. The'FAA's Federal Air Surgeon considers two fadtors to be particularly impo:* tant in the success of this rehabilitation structure: the establis'hment of an environment in which alcoholics can seek rehabilita. tion ~ without losing their jobs and the active involvement and participation of the pilot's union, ALPA. The success rate of this program has been 85 percent, with success defined as no relapses over a very carefully monitored two year period following the return of medical certification. ~L e 4 e e O e 9 4 e A ll [ L e i l.! a III-30 1 M6KWigeidAsn$WEEr6W4ssidO43'cefdGi@ld.6YsbiTdIMWSIiM*ENAN50'NNEbAD5NM9IEEN2D AN'N 9

2....- - - ~. , ', N ...m -i ] 3. Kimberly-Clark's Employee Assistance Program c; I Kimberly-Clark Corporation, a manufacturer of paper products, is considered by several experts on chemical dependency, including the FAA's Federal Air Surgeon, f. to hue a very effective program for addressing the problem of drug and-alcohol abuse by its employees. A team from the Task Force visited Kimberly-Clark's Headquarters complex in Neenah., Wisconsin, to discuss the Kimberly-Cla'rk pro-gram with the Staff Vice President for Medical Affairs and the Manager of the Employee Assistance Program. Kimberly-Clark is or,e of the private concerns approved by the FAA to provide employee assistance,to airline pilots suffering z i from alcoholism. .l ' A.

Health Management Program

~, ' The Kimberly-Clark program for combating drug and alcohol abuse is not a sharply ^ defined subprogram clearly separable from the rest of Kimberly-Clark's employee health program. Rather it arises as a natural consequence of the total employee l-health program. The company views alcoholism and drug abuse as progressive health problems, which like many other health problems, can be successfully treated. To address its concern about the health.and well-being of its employees and their famil.fes, the company has established a comprehensive Health Management Program, which includes medical screening services, health and t 1 physical education training, and the Employee Assistance Program. Just as. Employee Assistance fits logically and naturally into the framework of wellness ll and an overall condition of health, drug and alcohol counseling fit logically .i and naturally into a (employee assistance) framework of employee well-being and ~! prob'lem solving. } 3 ] The following excerpts from an October 1981 paper authored by the Kimberly- ] Clark Staff Vice President for Medical Affairs and members of his staff describe the breadth and scope of the health maintenance program in more detail: j In 1977 Kimberly-Clark Corporation initiated a preventive health maintenance effort called the Health Management Program. The objective of the program is to achieve a higher level of wellness and productivity in employees and to reduce absenteeism and the y g; III-31 ,i

x-,.- r. -,.....,m.s. 4,..y ~y g. w ,,..,,, a rate of escalation of health care costs. The program consists of j two main parts--Health Screening and Health Promotion. Medical testing and examination;are covered in the health screening. Health i promotion is comprised of the Employee Assistance and Health Educa-tion Programs. Health screening and promotion activities are con-i ducted on company premises,under the same roof. i The program was opened to all salaried employees in the Fox Valley a in April of 1977 and to hourly employees in October of 1979....In September of 1981, the program was expanded to include a midday pro-gram whereby employees may use one hour during the time period of 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. to do their prescribed exercise workouts. In 'i January 1982 employee-spouses and retirees and their spouses will j be included in the program. Retirees will be admitted to the pro-gram at no charge as are employees. Employee-spouses and retiree. spouses will be-charged an annual fee of $100 which will include the complete physic'al examination and screening, use of the Exercise. i 1 Facility, and participation in the Health Education classis. In addition, the program has been expanded to the Kimberly-Clark Health Care, Paper and Specialities Companies with headquarters in Roswell, Georgia. ? i PROGRAM DESCRIPTION ~ Health screening consists of a medical history and health risk profile which is scored to indicate the employee's level of risk for certain illnesses (e.g., heart attack). This is followed by a series of lab-oratory tests in the multiphasic screening unit, exercise testing by treadmill or bicycle ergometer, and 1 complete physical examination. When all the data are in, the employee meets with a member of the Health Services staff for an evaluation and "wellnesi prescription". The well-ness prescription outlines an exercise program and may recommend coun-seling and/or health. education., The employee is made aware that the chief responsibility for hi,s health is in his hands. (: The Employee Assistance Program was designed to provide assistance to ll employees who have personal problems which are interfering with their. Ii job performance. These problems include drug or alcohol. abuse, financial l or legal difficulties, and family or marital problems. Individual and group counseling are available to both employees and their families. In addition, the program serves as a referral service for special health j problems such as alcoholism and mental illness'; Follow up after treat-ment for alcoholism or other serious problems is a very important part j of the Employee Assistance Program. i; The article goes.on to describe the Health Education Program and exercise pro-j grams. At the $2.5 million Health Services Center at Neenah, the 25 person l{ staff offers more than 30 different courses including courses in swimming, ll conditioning, weight training, dancing, nutrition, CPR, first aid, over.the-counter drugs, and stress management. The paper continues: III-32 ~ 1-

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The program has also been beneficial in the recruitment of potential employees. Kimberly-Clark's public image has been enhanced through awards received from organizations such as Blue Cross and the Ameri.- j can Association of Fitness Directors in Business and Industry. The i University of Wisconsin Extension also recognized the work done by - j the. Employee Assistance Program with an award. ,l (Above excerpts taken from a paper dated October 1981 entitled "Kimberly- . j Clark's Health Management Program Results and Prospects," by R. E. Dedmon, 1 M.D., C. M. Smoczyk, M.S., and P. D. Xonkul, B.S.) B. The Employee Assistance Program Consistent with t';e Kimberly-Clark emphasis on th,e. total health of the indi-vidual, the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) is aimed at a wide range of , employee problems, including drug and alcohol abuse. The EAP Manager in-j dica"ted that " broad brush" employee assistance programs, which address { marital, family, emotional, and other problems of employees (as well as alcoholism and drug abuse) have been replacing traditional alcoholism pro-grams at many of the nation's corporations since the early 1970s. He cited several factors to help explain this phenomenon: EAPs offer a higher level ~ of employee penetration (more employees participate in the program); earlier intervention (many problems manifest thsmselves off the job before the-y do on the job), broader scope and less (or no) social stigma. I h Several other advantages of EAP programs were offered: chemically depen-dent employees are not likely to be referred to any program by supervisors ~, l peers, family, or self if such referral jeopardizes their job or potential i for advancement. While some traditional alcoholism programs have come to be l' regarded by employees as " witch hunts," many employee assistance programs 1 offer the perception of a more forgiving and understanding source of help. 'In ac'dition, the early-intervention precept of EAP contributes to earlier i referral and an opportunity to deal with problems before they show up in a ll

feeline in work performance.

Employee assistance programs are generally l extended to employees' families as well: this' helps with corroboration and motivation when the employee is troucled, and it helps the employee l' with problems when'a member of his family is troubled. In contrasti to ~ referrals by supervisors to outside help, the EAP, by having a high per-centage of employee problems funneled through it, can act as a quality III-33 y A be. $ eA Y s

ummararm smemnammac::Vir2hanu rum 3a!metsamminrSEarE325ifSeNWJ ~ control monitor for consistency of referral, followup, and quality of service provided by organizations to which employees are referred. The objectives of the Kimberly-Clark EAP program are set forth on a company handout as follows: OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM 1. Assist employees and immediate family members in obtaining assistance with any special health problem which may be of concern to them. 2. Retain emp.loyees, the Company's most valuable resource. 3. Reduce or control Company losses due to special health problems. The following points taken from Kimberly-Clark's policy statement

for the Employee Assistance Program, explain the corporation's philosophy and position on EAP:

It is the policy of the Corporation: 1. That chemical dependency is a progressive health program which can be successfully treated. 2. That all supervisory personnel will be trained to recognize and understand patterns of. job performance deterioration which may be caused by, health problems. 3. The Corporation is concerned with.an employee's personal problems only when the employee requests assistance or when the problems affect job performance. 4. That participation in the program will not jeopardize an employee's job security or promotional opportunities. t \\

This statement is generally consistent with Standards for Employee Alcoholism /

Assistance Programs developed jointly by several national organizations inclu-ding: the Association of Labor-Management Administrators and Consultants on Alcoholism; the National Council on Alcoholism; the National Institute on l Alcohol Abuse' and Alcoholism (NIAAA); the U.S. Office of Personnel Management; and the AFL-CIO and other segments of organized labor. These standards are available from NIAAA's Clearinghouse for Alcohol Informati.on, P.O. Box 2345, Rockville, MD. III-34 ~~ m m

u_ -.-.w L..a 'x : 5. That all records and discussions of personal problems will be handled in a confidential manner, as are other medical records. These records and discussions shall be maintained' separate from the employee's personnel file, and as a part of the confidential medical records. 6. That the program is no't designed to provide treatment, but rather to provide earlf identification, motivation, and referral to appropriate resources for further assistance. In addition to this service a follow-up program will be provided to assist the employee in his recovery when necessary. 7. That specific services rendered in treatment and/or during rehabilitation not covered by insurancetor other benefits,. will be the responsibility of the emplo'yee. 8. That the Management Compensation Committee will evaluate and recommend necessary changes regarding the Employee Assistance Program. The Staff Vice President - Medical Affairs will serve ex-officio on the Management Compensa- . tion Committee for meetings relating to the Employee Assistance Program. This policy does not alter or replace existing administrative policy or contractual agreements, but serves to assist in their utilization. ~ Kimberly-Clark's EAP program presently covers about 13,000 of its 18,000 employees in the United States and Canada..The Corporate Employee Assistance Program Manager spends about 50% of his time visiting Kimberly-Clark mills and other plants to set up local EAP programs. He expects to have all

l employees in the United States and Canada covered by an EAP program within two l

. years. Local counseling firms, after screening and qualification by the head-quarters EAP staff, are hired to provide EAP services at local plants. The Kimtierly-Clark experience in setting up satellite EAP programs indicates: .(1) Each site is different and ha's different needs; the. local program should be tailored to recognize these differences. Establishment of a local ad'isory v committee at each' location is helpful; (2) The active involvement of employee unions is an essential ingredient for paving the way for employee acceptance of ti.e program and participation in it; (3) The EAP program should be. intro-duced to locat employees by the ranking local official on company time in a presentation that affords the local EAP counselors the opportunity to be seen III-35

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~2.~~ .x._.-~.. -... - ~., by and talk to the employees (as a group); (4) The staff setting up the loc'al EAP program must carefully structure it so that' neither management, the union, nor the personnel department feels that their responsibilities are being usurped; and (5) An EAP program will not work if it does not have the trust and faith of the employees and 'the support of both management and unioris. The headquarters EAP staff consists of three full-time counselors who serve 4700 Kimberly-Clark workers in the immediate Neenah vicinity. About half the 4700 workers are engaged in manufacturing, the other half in research and corporate support. Since 1977 the headquarters EAP staff has handled 1200 local referrals., of which 800 were Kimberly-Clark employees and 400 i were family members. The percentage for referrals by category were: alcohol / drugs, 35%; behavioral / emotional, 27%; family, 10%; marital, 10%; and'others, 18 1 About 35% of referrals are supervisory referrals. The EAP program has a 70% rehabilitation rate (rehabilitation is done by local hospitals,, doctors, AA groups, and such,_with counseling, referral, and followup by EAP staff). In one study of 25 drug and alcohol referrals, the EAP program saw a reduction in absenteeism of 43% and in accident rate of 701 Seventy percent of the EAP staff's time is spent in followup. i j Other salient features about the Kimberly-Clark EAP' program include: an EAP phone network for sales personnel; availability'of EAP services up to 30 days after unfavorable termination; apd no restriction on number of EAP referrals because of alcoholism. In addition, the five progressive levels of company discipline call for the supervisor to offer'the services of the EAP to the employee, using, progressively, the verbs " inform," " encourage," " recommend," " expect," and " inform." t C. Other Relevant Information g The Employee Assistance Program at Kimberly-Clark is oriented toward early intervention, problem identific .on, referral, and followup. The drug and alcohol program is an inseparable subset of the overall Employee Assistance Program. A constituent.in the smooth functioning of the EAP is training.the supervisors to recognize job performance deterioration and'to observe employee performance (see second point in the excerpt from the corporate policy). III-35 . EYbEA ~Ws$:%Eh N & L th AN'W8#'# O$MIY YYY W

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.2-The Kimberly-Clark supervisory training and employee observation are not unlike what the Task Force saw among the ten surveyed NRC licensees. Kimberly-Clark does differ from most licensees, however, in that its training does not ' include l j any special emphasis on drugs and alcohol. Drugs and alcohol are treated, in, y accordance with corporate policy, just like any other medical problem.. Other c'ifferences from the pro. grams of NRC licensees include: backgro'und- 't investigations are not generally performed except for security personnel and certain key employees; and there is no testing of the general employee popu-lation (not even intelligence (IQ) tests) - not'even security personnel are subject to' psychological tests. 9 ^'g i o 9 a e e g I 1 e 9 e h III-37 l w h

_._._mmm.m._ m ~.e.r mmem mewmem l 4. General Motors Drug and Alcohol Program 1 1 The General Motors Corporation is considered by several experts on chemical dependency to have a very effective program for addressing the problem of drug and alcohol abuse by its employ'es. The Task Force did not visit General Motors e as part of its survey. However, an article appearing in the November / December 1981 issue of the EAP Digest (a journal 'for employee assistance professionals) contains a brief description of the General Motors program and its success ra t'e. Although the General Motors program now covers both drugs and alcohol, it was initiated to address the alcohol problem and the articl' 'is oriented e toward alcoholism..It begins with some information on the scope of the alcoholism problem nationally. The article, which was written.by Nicolas A. Pace, M.D., had previously appeared in the Journal of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals, Vol. 12 No. 3, Summer 1981. Dr. Pace is assistant professor of clinical medicine at the New York University School of Medicine, Medical Director of the New York Executive Offices of General Motors Corporation, and co-founder and past president of the New York City affiliate i of the National Council on Alcoholism. 'la Excerpts from the article follow: / A Prescription for Help 7 The average alcoholic, contrary to popular opinion, is not found on. skid-row; only five percent of alcoholics fall into this group. Rather he or she is usually employed; is in the mid-30s age group; has a good. job, home, and family. Few alcoholics admit, even to themselves, ,that they hive a drinking problem or that it is destroying their lives. Alcoholism is a problem of enormous medical and social magnitude and'is growing steadily worse. U.S, government sources indicate that it is one of our leading public health problems ~.- Of the 100 million adults who consume alcoholf; beverages, nine miltlion are estimated to be alcoholics--at an annual cost to the United States of $43 billion. In addition, some experts indicate that,there are now 3.4 million teen alcoholics in the United States, and their ranks are expanding at an alarming rate. Over, the, past decade, the consumption of alcohol has increased by 26 percent, adult per capita liquor consumption is now 2.7 gal.lons per year. The cost of alcoholism in terms of its effect on human lives. underscores the need for control of this disease. The life expectancy e III-38 ~~ 1 }

~ ~ + of the alcoholic is shortened by ten to 12 years. The suicide rate ~ among alcoholics is 340 times that of'tha rest of the population. Thirty-three percent of, child abuse cases are due to. alcoholism. Sixty-four percent of all murders are alcohol related. Fifty percent of all fatal automobile accidents are alcohol-related--a total of 3 27,000 deaths per year. Fifty percent of fights or assaults in the home are alcohol-related; 36 percent of all pedestrian fatalities are alcohol-related. Americans spend about $21.5 billion annually on alcoholic beverages, generating about $9.8 billion in tax revenue. According to the ll.S.- government, alcoholism is' costing industry $19.6 billion annually in loss of time, illnesses, accident and health benefits, and disability. Stated simply, the estimated cost to industry is about $2,000 per year for every alcoholic on the payroll. At General Motors alone, prior to the beginning of the program I will describe, $30 million',a year was the cost. The GM Program The General Motors Corporation Alcoholism Recovery Program, which has now been expanded to include other substance abuse, is a humane approac.h to help employees who become victims of alcoholism through a system of early identification, referral for proper treatment, and concerned follow-up. 4 In the late 1960s, James Roche, then chairman of the GM Board of Directors, became familiar with the success of the GM program for corporate employees which I had previously established at the New York. Executive Offices. By using the job and the possibility of job loss ~ as a motivating force, alcoholic employees were referred for treatment-- with a 90 percent recovery of a year or more of sobriety. Seeing this success in my lc,:a1 program, Mr. Roche, in November 1971,' announced to a group of his peers (chief executives.of the Fortune 500) that henca-forth GM would establish a corporate-wide alcoholism program covering its 800,000 employees. The GM. program was officially established in June 1972 by a state-ment of cooperation with General Motors and the International Auto Workers Union. This statement included the following Statement of Policy: Alcoholism is recognized as a highly complex but treatable ' disease. Employee alcoholism beccmes a concern when it interferes with job performance. Every effort should be made to identify the disease in its early stages.and to encourage the employee to obtain treatment without j delay. l-Early identification should be based entirely on evidence of i? poor job performance and other related factors. Withr the-Statement of Policy it was noted that: The medical director, or his representative, would be available for consultation concerning the need for treatment but would not pro-vide such treatment. III-39 N *

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^ a .6 wnm.hmemmmmerarmewmmsmeh L.J i.. mee= '4( + The decision to undertake. treatment is the responsibility of' the individual employee. The employee is assured that if he controls his illness and his j job performance becomes satisfactory, his job security will not be jeo-j pardized. If he does not obtain treatment or if the treatment does not i result in a marked improvement, he may lose his job. i The program includes considerable and careful follow-up for j effective rehabilitation. 1 - ( 1 As part of the General Motors Arcoholism Recovery Program, a local alcoholism committee is established in;each GM plant. The committee determines the availability of treats 1t facilities and, where they are inadequate or unavailable, it tries to improve the local situation. 1 The committee is also charged with developing ways to encourage and assist the employee to obtain treatment without delay. 4 The committee helps the alcoholic employee to confidentially con-I sult the medical director or a qualified octside facility concerning l his problem without fear of disciplinary actica. It also~ arranges for 1 the local insurance administrator or union insurance representative to

l explain to the employee the extent to which recommended treatment i

qualifies for payment under the GM insurance plan. g } GM insurance benefits for the' treatment of alcoholism include: s 45 days for acute care and 90 days for rehabilitation in'a Blue' Cross, t approved rehabilitation facility, and through group insurance, sick-ness and accident benefits for up to 52 weeks and long-term disability benefits on a time-for-time basis.up to age 65. In addition, programs have been established to educate the per- .I sonnel department to recognize the possible alcoholic employee. Personnel staff are taught to think alt.oholism when evaluating and reviewing records concerning absenteeism; tardiness, leaving early,- ~ and discipline. In each General Motors facility, the medical depart-ment is trained in areas of diagnosis, motivation, referral, and fol- { low-up of the alcoho.lic employee,. " Venture to Help" Program In 1967, the author initiated a supolementary program that was similar to the program started by Rufus Miller, M.D., at GM's Fisher Body Plant in Trenton, New Jersey. This program is called the " Venture -to Help." Its objective is to restore to health a colleague whose ability to function in a normal and sanc fashion has progressively-deteriorated through the'use and abuse of alcohol. The program operates through, weekly Alcohol.ics Anonymous-type meetings held in the General Motors Building at lunen time. This c format provides an excellent method of follow-up for the medical director and encourages open communication among program members. They have the ability to help each other, and by exerting peer i group' pressure, they can encourage each other to abstain from alcohol. It was with great pride that GM's chatrman, Thouas Ak Murphy, announced in August 1979 that the GM program has' been< co s'uccessful-that there has been a 40 percent reduction in loss of timd,'20 te s III-40 ~ bl- + y,

.. >...... =...... s b ? 50 percent reduction in sickness and accident benefits, 33 to 50 1 percent reduction in discipline problems among treated employees. Murphy announced in August 1979 that since the onset.of the cor-porate-wide program in 1972, more than 55,000 employees of General j Motors have been aided by the program, with a 70 percent success . i. rate.. .I + (Abo've excerpted from the article, "A Prescription for Help," authored by

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=_= _. =.:.. + IV. TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS This report is primarily based on what the Task Force learned from discussions with the management of ten utilit,es and several nonlicensees about the pro-yj grams they have in place to combat drug and alcohol abuse by their employees. d For almost every organization consulted, the Task Force had reason to believe f that the organization had in place a drug and alcohol program considered to be j effective by knowl.edgeable persons. The Task Force did not presume, on its ~ .j own, to independently assess the effectiveness of the programs reported on in 4 this document. However, learning about these programs that are generally con-1je sidered to be above average and effective, and in consultation with experts in .l various fields relat'ed to the drug and alcohol problem, the Task Force has observed a number of characteristics that can be reasonably expected to be a 'found in a purportedly effective program, a

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A spokesman for the industry security community cautioned the Task Force against

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"ratcheting" the industry (recommending that every licensee have a drug and ]1 alcohol program similar to the best program the Task Force had seen). The Ta k Force responded by saying that it had noted a number of different, yet apparently effective, licensee approaches to the drug and alcohol problem, each one of which might be the "best" for that licensee, but which might not work so'well for another licensee. The job before the Task Force wa.s not to find a hypothet-1'- ical "best" program among those observed, but rather to observe effective pro-i grams and glean from them a set 'of common denominators that one would reasonably {l expect to find in an effective program, and to fashion from these common denomi-l nators a generic baseline program. Th'is' baseline program would not necessarily be the " optimum"*or "best" program, but would consist of those features the Task l Force judged to be necessary, and would expect to f;ind in any effective program. } The emphasis is not on what is best, but'what is effective. \\ In subsequent paragraphs, the Task Force describes a " baseline" program con-j taining the features that we would expect to find in a purportedly effective L program. It i.s.important to note that several key elements of this," baseline" L program (background investigations, psychological tests, and behavioral observation), are included in the draft proposed Access Authorization Ru'le. 1 1 4 i ~ 47 6R mm N5mTL rsha. mm,

a-- L ~- : ^ O O e These elements were recomrended for inclusion in a future screening rule by the NRC Hearing Board which reviewed a previous access authorization progbas rulemaking effort. It is important to note also tha~t several subprograms of the " baseline". program (existence of policy, resolve to use the policy, employee awareness programs and employee assistance and re. habilitation programs) were included in 1.he- " baseline" program based on the Task Force observations of purportedly effec-tive licensee programs. Subsequent Task Force activity outside the nuclear industry developed information confirming the importance of including these subprograms in an overall program. In particular, responsible officials of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and the National Institute on Drug Abuse confirmed both the necessity of these subprograms in an overall effective program and the apparent completeness of the Task Force's total set of subprograms. Based on the information available to the Task Force, including details of the ten licensee programs, the Task Force has developed the following Baseline Drug / Alcohol Program. 1. A Generic Approach to the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Problem: A Baseline Program for the Nuclear Industry The. Baseline Program consists of the following components, only some of which are the subject of pending rulemaking action: A. Written Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy The utility should have a firm, written, policy statement on the use of ' rugs d and alcohol which'makes it clear that onsite use and possession are forbidden j, and.that usages, onsite or offsite, which could affect public health and safety, is forbidden as well. o G IV-2 1 e {MU N JE AE th = 7 g g wh --f a = g Q '4

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.am _mwwtwwtu.mamummmuswaravmwmreec2memmews ._rr22TaeRam NRC's statutory interest in this matter is limited to protaction of public - I health and safety in connection with its li' ens'es. However, licensees' e interests extend beyond safety considerations and they may wish to include legal, economic, and other considerations in their written policy statements. Topic 2 contains several examples of policy statements that are not liniited strictly to safety matters. B. Resolve To Use the Company Policy Management commitment to the implementation and enforcement of policy is essen-tial. Nonenforcemen.t of the company's drug and alcohol abuse policy is tanta-mount to having no policy. Having set the policy, the company is obligated to use it to maintain credibility and to deter future problems, no matter what the I short-term cost may be in terms of utility embarrassment and press coverage. Utility resolve to deal firmly and decisively with drug and alcohol problems as soon as they are recognized is an essential characteristic of any utility having an effective and confidence-inspiring drug / alcohol program. C. Employee Awarer;ess Program Every employee of the company (including managers a'nd supervisors) should be given a personal copy of the utility policy on d' rugs and alcohol, and the company should endeavor te see tpat he reads and understands i.t. Dissemination of the company policy should be.only one facet of a larger f employee awareness program conducted by the utility. Employees also must be made-aware of the fact that the company will not hesitate to use its firm, written drug policy, even if it means termiilation erf employees in whom the company may have invested considerable, time and money,. Employees should be made aware of the dangers inherent in any onduty or intemperate offduty use i of alcohol or drugs and how such use can affect a worker's ability to function in a manner consistent with preserving the health and safety at his plant as well as the public's health and safety. The utility should ensure that all employees, not just supervisors, have developed a level of drug and' alcohol awareness sufficient to recognize symptoms of chemical dependency exhibited by ~ IV-3 y

e d'! their coworkers. The utility should make all employees aware of the company's

l, programs for employee assistance and rehabilitation, their availability, 'and

~ ~ their provisions. ,] Employee awareness of the safety implications of drug or alcohol use should.. extend to prescription drugs and nonprescription drugs that may affect their lf alertness and judgmental capabilities. The company should have, like'the-Air Force, provisions for employee self-determination of reliability under which employees in safety-sensitive positions are obligated, for safety's sake, i to inform their supervisors and/or competent company medical or counseling 1 officials of any condition which may affect their fitness for duty. D. Employee Assistance or Rehabilitation Program Several licensees (and nonlicensees) interviewed put a great deal of faith in !l the ability of well-conceived and well-managed employee assistance and rehabil-itation programs to restore a productive worker to his previous (higher) level of productivity and effectiveness. Some licensees indicated that recovered-1 alcoholics may be better employees than. employees who have never been alcoholics or have never had their alcoholism recognized. They argued that they were less worried about a recovered alcoholic than they were about someone on their staff who might be abusing alcohol or drugs but who was trying to hide it. Moreover, they said, the alcoholic who has undergone rehabilitation with the company's help and assistance makes a very loyal employee. As indicated under Topic 7, l' some utilities view employee assistance and rehabilitation programs as highly t i cost effective. NRC's primary concern in the matter of the drug and alcohol problem is main-tenance of public health and safety, not employee rehabilitation. Howev'er, each of the licensees surveyed had some form of an empl'yee assistance o rehabilitation program, integrating it in some fashion into the rest of their 'l program to combat drug and alcohol abuse. Based on its survey of licensees and on a considerable emount. of other information of.which it is aware,- the Task Force believes that some form of company-sponsored employee assistance or rehabilitation program is an e,ssential constituent in achieving a balance of subprograms which, taken together, comprise an effective c' rug and alco'hol 9 IV-4 M7 T 77 ' 'd. 4 *E * 'I Nb b F r.. -. _, -- ~.. -,.,,. -. _.. - _ -.,.. ,~. _ - -.. - - -, _ - -. _ _ -, _. - - -,.,. - -.. _ _. _ _ -,,.,,. - - - -, - - -, - -.. _.. - -.,...,, _ - - -

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~ program. The. weighting a company gives employee assistance and rehabilitation !) in defining its overall program will vary, but an overall effective mix of subprograms would be difficult to achieve if that weighting were zero. The. company's overall drug and alcohol program should be conceived and implemented in such a manner that the employee assistance or rehabilitation prograni serves to enhance overall plant safety, not detract from it. The employee assistance program should have the strong cooperative backing of maragement and unions and it should complement the company's policy on work-related use or possession of drugs or alcohol. '. l E. Employee Screening Programs The Task Force recognizes that, despite the best efforts of a company to satisfy the first four elements of the Baseline Program, there may be some employees who are less trustworthy, less stable, or less reliable than desired or who do not share the deep concern of the utility and their fellow employees for discharging their public trust to use nuclear power in the safest manner pos-sible. This disregard for the rules may include disregard for the company's drug and alcohol policy. It would be to the benefit of both the utility and the public if such people were not allowed access to vital areas in nuclear reactor facilities. Whenever possible, screening siuch personnel from employ-ment appears to be one.important way to achieve ~this goal. Even if screening is not 100% reliable for detecti,ng undesirable applicants, it.provides at least for removing the obviously troubled individual from further consideration. 1 Although some employees may entirely develop the undesirable traits just j described after they go to work for the utility, some of them will certainly l-show signs of those traits before or at the' time they apply for a job with the utility. Comprehensive background investigations, inc,1uding arrest record checks and' prior employment checks, constitute a fundamental tool for determining whether an applicant has behaved unacceptably in the past. Moreover, consider- ,I able scientific and sociological opinion supports the use,of psychological tests, property administered and interpreted, as a primary tool in assessing mental stability and proclivity for addictive behavior. 1 j l' .IV-5 i k AM h l

i The Task Force believes that both background investigations, including arrest o record checks, if possible, and psychological tests, such as the MPI or 16 PF, should be part of the Baseline Program for all persons whose job requires access to a nuclear power plant. The Task Force's Baseline Program includes, the following time frames: a five year background check of new permanent-nuclear employees; a two year background check for unescorted temporary workers who are on site only during cold shutdown (or appropriate comp'en-- satory measures); grandfathering of nuclear employees who have been with the company and performed satisfactorily for three years or more; psychological testing of applicants, permanent ~ and temporary;"and periodic psychological testing (retesting) of experienced workers (every five years). For those nuclear workers in safety-sensif.ive jobs (including security person-nel and reactor operators), the Task Force suggests that some supplementary additional drug-and alcohol-oriented preemployment screening be performed. Com-plete checks of medical histories for the past several years, chemical tests of urine and blood to detect use of drugs and alcohol as part of the preemployment physical, interviews with trained interviewers, and polygraph tests are other measures that should be considered. The Task Force does not include these measures in the Baseline Program but suggests companies consider their use (state and local law permitting) as confirmatory tools to supplement the base-line program of background investigations and psychological tests. F. Drug-and Alcohol-Detection Programs Some employees may develop a disregard for the company's rules, including the company's policy on drug and alcohol use, after employment. For these employees ,and any of similar inclination wh'o are not eliminated from employment considera - tion as part of the screening process, a company needs some form of ongoing program to detect and identify drug and alcohol abuse. The Task Force believes that the generic Baseline Program should include, as a detection meiasure, a program of supervisory and security force training in aberrant behavior identification coupled with an ongoing program of continued e 9 IV-6 e O ~~ --. b 90 - p

a + y 1 1 ~ I behavioral observation (" management awareness"). The Task Force agrees with the licensee who felt that the detection program'need not focus exclusively on I drugs and alcohol, but rathe'r that supervisors should focus on detecting changes in the quality of job performance, except in cases of obvious intoxication or other chemical dependency. The' supervisor should refrain from Judging "a per-formance problem to be alcohol or drug related but, instead, should refer the employee to qualified medical or counsel'ing help. The Task Force, like this licensee, is concerned about any aberrant behavior that threatens the safe ope' ration of a nuclear power plant, be it caused by drugs, alcohol. or something else. Essential to the success of such a program is a well conceived and imple-mented employee assistance or rehabflitation program and a training program in behavior (performance) observation for supervisors and the security force. More-over, the Task Force believes this training program should contain some instruc-tion in drug and drug-user awareness and identification. The inclusion of such training should not be construed to suggest.that supervisors need be expert on drugs nor that they should diagnose employees as being drug users. On the contrary, such instruction should be designed to' increase the breadth and depth of the tools the company gives the supervisor to work with in implementing the con-tinual behavioral observation program. The Task Force believes that the following detectio'n measures also should be included in the Baseline Program: monitoring.of absenteeism; searches of employees' lunch boxes, l'ockers,, privately owned automobiles,,and so on, as allowed by state and federal laws and when probable-cause has been esta'blished by plant management or by the security, f_orce; and provisions in company work rules for immediate removal from a safety-related function when probable-cause exists. In the latter situation, the licensee may find the use of chemical tests to the extent allowed by state and feiferal laws to be effective as a con-firmatory~ action. g The licensee may.wish to include ot'her detection measures in his prograin, for ' instance the use of dogs trained to detect drugs, th" use of investigators (overt or undercover), and chemical tests for drugs as part'of the annual phy-sical examination. The Task Force recognizes the added capability'affor.ded by such measures but does not feel they need be included in the Baseline Program.

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. _... ~ _ - 2. Summary of the Generic Baseline Frogram The following table summariz'es the contents of the preceding section. Gener'ic Baseline Program Nature of Subprogram Subprogram Administrative 1. Written Drug / Alcohol Policy ~ . Company should have a firm written. policy covering onsite'an,d offsite use or possest'o,; 2. Resolve To Use the Company Policy . In order for policy to be effective company must be committed to use it firmly and decisively when drug and alcohol problems develop Educational 3. Employee Awar~ ness Program e . Company should ensure employees are aware of company policy on drugs and alcohol and that the company will enforce policy. . Company should provide employees with training on drug and alcohol awareness and on the threat drugs arid alcohol pose to safety. . Company work rules should provide for self-determination of reliability fer employees .in safety-sensitive positions ~. Employee Oriented 4. Employee Assistance or Rehabilitation Program . Task Force believes an employee assistance and rehabilitation program is an essential constituent in an effective mix of drug and alcohol subprograms. . Employee assistance and rehabilitation programs should have the strong cooperative backing of management and labor. O O q IV-8 ~~ 'i + w m m m m m w es,= ~,m m 2 w w - -~----r-g

Nature of ' ) Subprogram Subprogram Preventive 5. Employee Screening Program Should Include: . Background investigations for all new ' nuclear employees (5 years for permanerit, 2 years for temporary). "Grandfathering" workers who have 3 years or more service. . Psychological tests (e.g., MMPI, 16 PF) for all new nuclear employees. Interpre-tation and necessary followup by trained professionals. Preventive measures that could be used to supplement the Baseline Program include: . Extensive medical record checks . Preemployment screening of urine or bl~ood for drugs or alcohol . Extensive interviews with trained inter-viewers - t . Pre-employment polygraph tests for drug and alcohol use Detection 6. Drug and' Alcohol Detection Program Should Include:. . Supervisory and security force training in aberrant behavior identification. . Continual behavioral observation by supervisors and security force. . Training for all ndclear supervisors and security personnel in drug and dru,g user identification. . Monitoring of absenteeism. . Bearches for drugs and alcohol for probable cause. . Provis.fon in company work rules for con-firmatory tests (e.g., chemical) for probable cause. ( i Detection measures that could be used to l supplement the Baseli'ne Program include: . Drug-detecting dogs.g . Use of' Investigators. . Annual chemical screens for drug and alcohol during routine physical exams.' . Polygraph tests, as allowed by state and federals laws, on applicants to determine drug and alcohol use, and on employees i when probable-cause exists. e l i .IV-9 l l , an- _..... ~ '- - - ~ - - - - 9 1

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e REFERENCES 1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection and Enforcement,. " Increasing Frequency of Drug-Related Incidents," IE Information. Notice No. 82-05, March 10, 1982. 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)" 1 NUREG-0525, April 1979, and subsequent revisions. i 3. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, " Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program," 000 Directive 5210.42, April 23, 1981. ~. 4. U.S. Air Force, " Personnel Reliability Program," Regulation 35-99, April 14, 1981. 5. General Accounting Office, Comptrollsr General, " Stronger Federal Aviation Administration Requirements Needed to Identify and Reduce Alcohol Use Among Civilian Pilots," Report to Congress, CED-78-58, ~ March 20, 1978. 6. Federal Aviation Administration, " Facility Operation and Administration," Manual 7210.3F, November 1,1981. ~ 7. B. Pakull, " Alcoholism and Aviation Medical Certification," Alcoholism': Clinical and Exoerimental Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1978. 8. Federal Air Surgeon, untitled article, U.S. Medicine, January 15, 1980. ~ 9. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and others, " Standards for Employee Alcoholism / Assistance Programs," Rockville, MD, undated. 10. N. A. Pace, '"A Prescription for Help," EAP Oigest, November / December 1981. 11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the Accident at TMI-2," NUREG-0660, May 1980. 4 ~ { t t .I 1 d llj R1 t.

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.-.....L ~ .-_.u. l i q ] APPENDIX A t UTILITY VIEWS ON ACCESS AUTHGRIZATION RULE (PROPOSED 10 CFR 73.56) - 1. The Proposed Rule The Access Authorization Rule has been advanced by the NRC staff as a means of determining the reliability of employees, and includes the abuse of drugs' or alcohol as one of the determining factors in the decision to allow access to the vital equipment of a nuclear plant. The Task Force solicited licensee opinion regarding the provisions of this proposed rule and what contributions it might make to det' cting drug and alcohol abuse at nuclear power plants. e s Most licensees surveyed were familiar with the basic provisions of the pro-posed rule, which is similar in a number of respects to ANSI N18.17 (ANS 3.3), " Standard on Security for. Nuclear Power Plants." (This comment holds true not only for utility security directors but for a surprisingly high number of corporate vice presidents and general managers.) The proposed rule presently is undergoing minor modifications by the NRC staff, but the following general ~ description explains the basic content. ~ / ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE y BACKGROUND In March 1977, the staff proposed a ru'le' requiring an access authorization pro-gram for individ0als having unescorted access to or control over special nuclear material. After reviewing public comments, the Commitsion referred the matter to a Hearing Board which recommended thati instead of.a government run clearance program, an industry-run program be developed, incorp' orating standards more specific than those contained in ANSI N18.17, the industrial standard for security of power plants. This recommendation forms the basis for the proposed rule. i O e A-1 r . L'M1R6Lw?%n%%MWwimw.tung:anhvciumamwia.awsww.wmmuas.:mwww -w

i l SCOPE OF PROGRAM ~ Background Inves'tfaations - These are designed to determine an individua'l's trustworthiness through inquiries regarding past employment, education, char- " acter, military history, and confirmation of identity. A criminal-hist.ory 1 1 check

also would be conducted.

It is proposed that investigations cover a five year period. Provisions are included for an interim access authorization pending the result of the criminal-history check. i t 1 Psychological Assessment - It is proposed to include written personality tests, f for example, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Ir$'entory, and a clinical inter- ]- view by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist when the written test results j indicate a need. 1 Continual Behavioral Observation - This feature would provide reasonable assur-ance that personnel remain trustworthy'and reliable. Licensee and contractor supervisors would be trained to detect changes in behavior patterns that could lead to acts detrimental to public health and safety. The rule provides.for i. the orderly suspension of an individual'.s access authorization in case he ex-hibits abnormal behavior. RELATED FEATURES ] Protected Areas vs. Vital Areas - Licensees indicate that most persons granted j access to protected areas also require access to vital areas. Based on this i information the staff has proposed the same screening requirements for a unesicorted access to protected and vital areas. t f

Several options are being considered to help licensees obtain criminal history information. An industry-sponsored Senate Bill (5.1589) will, if adopted,

. provide for the. direct transfer of criminal history information from the FBI i to licensees. The Office of the General Counsel (NRC) has developed comments to the Office of Management and Budget which endorse salient portions of S.1589, and recommend appropriate refinements. e A-2 thAsw.mtrusifl5

d*, O zj u y Temporary Workers - Temporary workers needing unescorted access authorization Il should meet the same initial screening and continual behavior observation requirements as per'eanent wo'rkers. Once received, this authorization may be y transferred among nuclear power reactor licensees. Under cold shutdown or 1 refueling operations, licensees'would have the option of granting a tesiporary i unescorted access authorization to unscreened individuals provided that all l requirements of 10 CFR Section 73.55 are' met and a thorough search of affected areas is conducted before restart. 3 Protection of Information - Provisions are included to ensure that information ) of a sensitive nature, contained in personnel records, be handled with discre-tion and confidentiality. Licensees would be required to provide an appropriate level'of privacy protection during the handling, storage and destruction of 1 sensitive personnel information. Grandfatherino - Limited "grandfathering" of erployees with good performance records for the last three years would'be allowed. Such individuals would not be subject to a background investigation or psychological assessment, but would be subject to ongoing behavioral observation. Access Program Director - A member of the licensee # management team should be designated to administer and maintain the access' authorization program. The p AccessProgramDirector(hPD)wi,lladjudicateindividualcasesregarding unescorted access authorization and will be responsible for granting, denying, j suspending, maintaining, and revoking.such authorizations. !4 I' l; Review Procedures - The proposed rule provides for review procedures which can l! follow collective bargaining agreements,.or a licensee-designed review process. The review process is designed to ensure that a perso,n denied unescorted access (- or whose access has been suspended will be provided fair treatment. 1 n 2. Background Investigations, Psychological Testina, and Continuat Behavioral Observation i. The three major requirements of the Access Authorization Rule are: background investigation, psychological assessment, and continual behavioral observation. I. A-3 .,,--,.w-

~ ,6 w .e k l 1 As earlier parts of this report indicate, each of the ten utilities surveyed l a already have in place programs containing these. components. Two reasons'for h licensees having such programs are (1) ANSI N18.17 calls for such progra'as,and 1' (2) NRC already has imposed similar requirements on security personnel through j 10 CFR 7'3, Appendix B. However; as the preceding sections of this repo.rt.show, l the licensees surveyed, while generally imposing tighter screening requirements j on security. personnel, apply similar programs to their other nuclear plant 4 employees and applicants. Indeed, each licensee surveyed performed background investigations of, and some sort of psychological testing on, all new (and many old) nuclear plant employees. Allbut.oneofth(tenlicenseessurveyed'hada l continual behavioral observation program for'nonsecurity nuclear employees. A i ?! third reason for the licensees having these programs (or others discussed in this report) is that they think such programs are cost beneficial and make sense for the company. With respect to the three major substantive requirements of the proposed rule, 'i almost all of the ten utilities surveyed, come close to meeting these require-ments already. With a few exceptions (discussed below), almost all would be able to meet the three major parts of the rule without sustaining major cost impact. Indeed, most licensee security directors surveyed indicated that they were essentially in compliance with the proposed rule. Given.that the Task Force's sample of ten utilities was not chosen to be. representative of the .i industry with respect to this rule, one should not infer from the above that the entire nuclear industry could meet the proposed 10 CFR 73.56 with minimal impact. l-3.

Temporary Workers and Senate Bill S.1589 q

Although the utilities surveyed would, to a large extent, satisfy the three l: major requirements of the proposed 10 CFR 73.56, there 'are some instances in l . hich compliance may be difficult. Almost all.of the the utilities surveyed w pointed to the problem the proposed rule would present if it required. temporary workers to meet the same screening requirements as ifcensee applicants. During refueling and shutdown operations, hundreds of contract workers (pipsfitters, i' i welders, carpenters, laborers, and such) may need to be on site for repairs and

l preventive maintenance to the nuclear plant. Most utilities do not have enough h

a A-4 1 ~ 1 -,.,,-,---r.-.- _..s _ur -M y

.....a.... ~ ? ') . i .( employees on their regular staffs to perform the necessary maintenance'during i shutdown and turn to contractors and local unions for the requisite manpower. If hundreds of union personn'ei must be cleared in accordance with the provisions i of the rule that apply to regular plant employees, costly delays to the timely 'l 1, restart of a plant may occur. Accordingly, the impact on licensees would be substantial unless (a) many clearances could be approved rapidly or (b) the screening requirements for temporary wor'kers were less stringent than those, for regular employees. (Note: the proposed screening requirements provide foF the suspension of screening for temporary workers desiring cold shutdown, provided all requirer,ents of 10 CFR 73.55 are met and thorough searches are conducted before restart.) If (a) were to be achieved, the licensees surveyed felt that passage of Senate Bill 5.1589 was mandatory and a commitment and resources for rapid FBI response to requests for background checks would be needed as well. Even if many clear-ances could not be approved rapidly, the licensees still believe that passage of S.1589 is necessary to 'ncrease the credibility of their clearance processes. 4. Aopeal.(Review) Procedures and the Access Program Director Each licensee surveyed felt strongly that NRC had rio business getting into the appeal procedure process. Each licensee already' has its own appeal process for employee grievances (some'throug,h union agreements) and the li.censees felt NRC should not mandate a new appeal procedure. The licensees felt the appe'al pro- ~ cess was an area into which NRC's statutory authority for public health and safety relative to nuclear reactors did not extend. Moreover, some licensees indicated that NRC intervention in this area would conflict with existing agreements with their unions. The fervor with which the survayed licensees believed NRC should not mandate an appeal process mat,ched the fervor with which they condemned the use of random urine, blood or breath tests. (It should be noted tha't licensee remarks on the appeal process issue were based on their understanding of earlier versions.of the Access Authorization Rule. Recent drafts of the* rule provide for review procedures which can follow collective bargaining agreements or a licensee-designed review process, provided th.ey allow for fair treatment of employees.) e A-5 -__ _..o.hm wn w.mw u...wr.amamm m-=.m.m _. m.a.w.e_; 2

~ ~. ? Although most licensees had no objection to establishing of an Access Program Director (APD) position, they felt that it was not necessary to establish such a position for each nuclear ' site. For utilities with two or more sites 'in the l same general proximity, they felt that they should have the option of appointing .j one APD to cover several nucleai sites. (Note: the proposed rule contains.a provision that would allow one APD to cover more than one site.) Some were also concerned that if an NRC appeal procedure were mandated, the APD would have to l spend a disproportionate amount of his time tied up in appeal proceedings. 5. Grandfathering l As indicated under Topic 1, a number of licensees felt that their drug and i alcohol and, by inference, troubled employee problems which relate to trust-worthiness and fitness are more likely to occur among new, younger members of the work force. Several expressed the view that if a person had been on their staffs and performed satisfactorily for several years, they really were in a better position to evaluate his trustworthiness than had been previous employers. Accordingly, they saw little reason that trusted, experienced employees.should be requirad to undergo.a background investigation. With respect to psychological tests for experienced employees, some licensees were positive enough about the usefulness of such tests that they were planning on their own to expand their testing programs to cover the long-time employees. Some licensees pointed out that although they thought expanding the testing program to cover onboard employees was a good idea, some of the affected workers were not happy about the new requirement. As with most regulatory proposals, licensees would rather have the option of psychologically testing g ,, onboard employees than have NRC i'mpose such a requirement. In addition to these underlying licensee attitudes which suggest that a " grand- . fathering" provision in 10 CFR 73.56 vould be welcome, several licensees told the Task Force directly that they wanted such a provision in the rule. Failure to include such.a provision would increase their personnel screening burden considerably. It also would fuel the already smoldering morale problems among plant workers caused in part, they said, by restrictive NRC regulations that convey the message that NRC does not trust the licensee's employees. A-6 .--.l.. ,. w ....,,,.s . ~.:~- -...

~. a ~ ,i ( d 6. Licensee Message's to NRC 3 ] Thelicenseessurveyedcommu'nicatedanumberofmessagesregardingtileproposed j Access Authorization Rule. Perhaps significantly, almost all the licensee s messages to the NRC deal with p'rocedures for implementing the rule, not with tne

1 g

substance of the rule. As indicated elsewhere in this report, the licensees presently have program:; largely in conformance with the substance of the rule. Some of the licensee messages were not discussed above. Briefly they are as foT1ows: a (a) The industry would like provisions for an R clearance included in the rule (something less than the full access clearance that would. permit 4 key ' worker or repairman rapid access to the site under certain conditions.) (b) It would be worth the fine tuning that full implementation of 10 CFR 73.56 j would require to get reciprocity on clearances (the proposed rule would provide for someone who has passed the screening requirements of one licensee, vendor, or contractor to be exempt from the screening require-ment of another licensee if he changes jobs). This reciprocity is espec-fally desired to lessen the screening burden caused by contract workers and vendors. One security director told of a ' vendor employee that had taken psychological tests at 17 different licensee establishments in the past year and a hal'f' becaus,e of'the current lack of reciprocity. q 'l (c) NRC should.get on with this rule., Secdrity directors have been telling.

I licensee management for 2 years.that the rule is coming and they.have 1

Now management is asking "where is it" gotten agreement on its merits.

ll and'is delaying further action on empl'yee rel.iability programs until o O NRC clearly defines its requirements. Licensees ( do not want to guess wrong on the provisions in the rule and then have to backfit. (d) The mood of the industry is to seek consistency in programs from utility ) to utility..Most would prefer to do this voluntarily, such as by adopting ANSI N18.17, rather than through a mandated federal program. i' 4 0.i A-7 l-U 4 il o

[.- .m m. ,c (o) A five year background check of craft workers is almost impossible. Many { have 12 to 15 jobs and several relocations per year. The time frame' for l the background check ci craft workers should not be more than two or three .) - years. l 1 (f) In conjunction with promulgation of 10 CFR 73.56, the industry is thinking L of setting up a visitor data file to help with screening. In addition to I security information, it would contain such information as radiation exposure 1 of mobile workers. i J e 9 e 4 I e A 4 i e 9 ., 2 e e A-8 { 1

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w 4 J...\\, /M?.4~&~ I UNITED STATES 8k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c B ) REGION 111 e, 798 ROOSEVELT ROAD ~ OL EN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 80137 i s esee y Aptil 27, N82 30 Docket No. 50-295 Docket No. 50-304 Commonwealth Edison Company ATIN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen: This refers to our ongoing investigation of allegations related to drug use by Zion Station employees and any impact of such drug use on the safe operation of that facility. Our investigation is nearing completion and an exit meeting will be scheduled with you in the future. Our investigative interviews to date_have identified two individuals .emnlend at the station who have admitted the use of marijuana oTfsite agi within the criteria we had established for cietermining = r.,1ble tffect of nacita na dnrmanca. These individual's names along with pertinent information they told our investigators were provided to you orally by Mr. A. Bert Davis of my staff on April 23, 1982. We request that you determine what program you will institute to assure that these individuals are now and will continue to be fit for duty. Please infonn us of the scope of the fitness for duty program and your schedule for implementing it within 10 days. We also request that you forward the program to us in writing within 20 days. S gb e }.

i* Commonwealth Edison Company 2 4/27/82 Your cooperation la this matter is anticipated. If you have any questions. please contact me. Sincerely, ys James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc: Louis 0. De1 George, Director of Nuclear Licensing K. L. Graesser, Station Superintendent DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS) Resident Inspector, RIII W. J. Dircks, EDO V. Stello, Jr., DEDROGR R. C. DeYoung, IE H. R. Denton, NRR G. Cunningham, ELD Mary Jo Murray, Office of Assistant Attorney General Mayor John B. Spencer City of Zion e en}}

ML20069K706

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Dear Fellow Employee:

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