ML20069E558
| ML20069E558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069E563 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8209240126 | |
| Download: ML20069E558 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES g
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
E WASHINGTON, D. C 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION AMENDMENT N0. 2 TO NPF-13 GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-416 Introduction The licensee proposed three separate changes to the operating license for Grand Gulf Unit 1 which are as follows:
a)
Incorporation of additional one time Technical Specification exceptions for Phase I operations (MP&L letter dated July 2,1982).
b) Change to the stated level for control room pressurization (MP&L letter dated August 5,1982).
c) Delay of the control room envelope leak tightness test (MP&L letter dated August 10,1982).
Evaluation a) One Time Technical Specification Exceptions In the license, the staff granted certain one time exceptions from the Technical Specifications prior to exceeding 1.0 percent of rated thermal power for the first time.
Since then, the licensee has identified other Technical Specifications for which they need an exception for Phase I operation. The bases for the requested exceptions are consistent with the rationale and justification used in the formulation of the original license condition.
In many cases, the requested exceptions are related to systems which will be isolated during Phase I operation or to systems which monitor fission product inventory. At power levels less than 1.0 percent power, there will be a sufficiently low fission product inventory so that these associated systems will not be required. The staff has reviewed the nature of the requested exceptions and the bases for the requests and finds that a one time exception for Phase I operation is acceptable.
Therefore, the additional exceptions from the Technical Specifications are granted.
b) Control Room Pressurization Level In Attachment I to the operating license, the pressure level for the testing of control room leak tightness was stated as 1/2 inch water gauge. The licensee has indicated that this was an adninistrative error and the value for pressure level should have been 1/8 inch water gauge. The staff has reviewed the requested change to 1/8 inch water gauge and finds it consistent with the criteria in the Standard Review Plan, Subsection 6.4.III.3.d.(2)(1).
Therefore, the change of control roon pressure to 1/8 inch water gauge for leak tightness testing is acceptable.
B209240126 820817 PDR ADOCK 05000466 P
. c) Control Room Envelope Leak Tightness Test The sealing of the control room envelope that is r quired for the completion of the leak testing program is still in progress.
Therefore, the licensee has requested a delay in this preoperational test from prior to initial criticality to prior to exceeding 1.0 percent of rated thermal power.
In support of this request, the licensee has provided an analysis of post accident dose exposures for control room personnel with a reactor fission product inventory corresponding to a 5.0 percent power level. For this analysis, they took no credit for the removal of iodine by the recirculation filter system. Calculated doses associated with both ground level and elevated releases are within the acceptable dose limits specified in GDC-19.
The staff has evaluated and concurs with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the deferral for the completion of leak testing of the control room envelope to prior to exceeding 1.0 percent of rated thermal power is acceptable.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amount nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that this amendment involves action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this statement.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not i
involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in complience with the' Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: August 16, 1982
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