ML20066H360

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Significant Deficiency Rept SD 413-414/82-22 Re Weld Undercut,Incomplete Fusion & Arc Strikes on Stiffner,Hinge & Sill Plate to Door Pressure Plate Welds.Initially Reported on 821012.Corrective Actions Will Be Completed by 830729
ML20066H360
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1982
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8211230237
Download: ML20066H360 (3)


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DuxE POWER GOMPANY

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P.O. HOX 33180 CHAHLOTTE, N.C. 28242 IIAL IL Tt:CKEH TELEPHONE 8(yo.3) aya.45<jg vueene.npe=v November 12, 1982

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8 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/82-22.

Very truly yours, d

v Hal B. Tucker RWO/php l_

Attachment I

cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr.P. K. Van Doorn NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station i

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.

Attorney-at-Law P.O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412

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2135b Devine Street 4

pI Columbia, South Carolina 29205 6

8211230237 821112

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DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DEFICIENCY REPORT REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/82-22 REPORT DATE: November 12, 1982 FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

Vendor weld deficiencies were discovered during normal inspection of retro-fitting work performed by Owner on the personnel lock doors.

INITIAL REPORT:

On October 12, 1982, Mr. W. O. Henry, Mr. C. A. Bell and Mr. D. E. DeMart notified Mr. A. J. Ignatonis, USNRC Region II, of the subject deficiencies.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

Weld deficiencies were discovered during normal inspection of retrofitting work being performed by the Owner on the Unit 1 & 2 personnel lock doors.

The personnel locks (S/N 32360, 32385, 32290 and 32335) were fabricated and stamped in accordance with the 1971 ASME Boiler and Pressare Vessel Code, Subsection NE, Summer of 1972 Addenda, by Lamco Industries, Inc. as subcontractor j

to the designer and primary contractor, W. J. Woolley Company.

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The deficiencies basically consist of weld undercut, incomplete fusion and several arc strikes on stiffener, hinge and sill plate to door pressure plate welds. The sill plate welds are full penetration with reinforcing l

fillets. The stiffener and hinge plate welds are 3/8" and 1/2" fillet welds.

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These welds are code classified as non-category non-butt weld T-joints that l

would have been required to pass MT, PT or UT examination during original fabrication (NE-5232). The field inspection was carried out with the doors in a painted condition.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

The personnel air locks have been pneumatic tested to a pressure fifteen (15) percent greater than the specified design pressure.

In addition, plant technical specification call for semi-annual testiry to this same level.

Thus, structural problems that may be precipitated 'ay any of the aforementioned

weld conditions would in all probability be detected.

A review of the stress report for the personnel locks indicates that the welds in question are overdesigned by a minimum factor of 10 with respect to Code allowables. Additionally the door pressure plate is overdesigned by over seventy (70) percent based on allowable stresses. Thus with respect to failures the margins of safety are even greater. The depths of the deficient features in question are all within the tolerances resulting from the minimum thicknesses or sizes based on ASME Code minimum allowable stresses.

Based on the above considerations, it is our conclusion that the weld deficiencies in question, were they to have remained uncorrected, would not have adversely affected the safety of operations at the Catawba Station for the plant design bases.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Corrective action will be to repair all deficiencies in questions in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

This work will be complete by July 29, 1983.