ML20066A062

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Amends 86 & 80 to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,respectively, Revising Tech Specs to Modify Most Negative Moderator Temp Coefficient LCO & Associated Surveillance Requirements & Bases Section
ML20066A062
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1990
From: Adensam E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
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ML20066A064 List:
References
NUDOCS 9101020415
Download: ML20066A062 (38)
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{{#Wiki_filter:~ r .#sp *%%o, UNITED STATES ~% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f. I WASHWG TON, D. C. 20566 1 %,...../ ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. A6 1 License No. NPF-2 1. The Nuclear Regclatory Comission (the Comission) has found that: A. The ;pp11 cation for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee),datedJuly 13, 1990, cos:plias with the standards and recuirements of the Atomic Energy Act af 1954, as amended (the Act), j anc the Commission's-rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter It B. The fw H it) will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted-in compliar.ce with the Comission's regulationst D. The issuance of this license amenenent will not be inimica'i to the connon defense and security-or to the health and sa'ety of the publict and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this,11cen;e amendmenti and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating Licuse No. NPF-2 is hereby. amended to read as follows: 9101020415 901221 PDR ADOCK 05000340' P ppR cs

2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B. as revised through Amendment No. 86. are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10N Original Ugned By-Elinor G. Adensam. Director Project Directorate !!.1 Division of Reactor Projects. I/!! Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December f.1, 1990 4 4 ,l i 't A I orc L 00 : DRPR:PM:PDZl:D a /RP :..:....3)A..g OG

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1; a 1 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE ANENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPER_ATING LICENSE NO, NPF-2 DOCKET NO 50-348 I Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines. _ Remove Paoes insert Pages 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-1 8 3/4 1-1 l B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 t l l i ( l l i I + y -- --~ ,uw-,.m-,+9-n p.,- e., 4 gr,m, m 3 m w, wm-- 4 y ya yy-9s-

_m._.__.__._.. _.__ _. _ _. _ _ _ _. _. _. _. _ -. ~. _ _.. _. _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ ___ i i 4 i ? I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS . MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be: ? i

a. Less than or equal to 0.5 x 10 delta k/k/*F for the all rods withdravn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), belov 70% THERMAL t

POWER conditjon. Less than or equal-to O delta k/k/'F at.or s above 70% THERMAL POVER. )

b. Le w negative than -4.3 x 10'd delta k/k/'F for the all rods l

vithdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER-condition. APPLICABILITY: Spectfication 3.1.1.3.a~- MODES 1 and 2* only# Specification 3.1.1.3.b - MODES 1, 2 and 3 only# i i ACTION:

a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of 3.1.1.3.a above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to'vithin its limit within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours. These l

vithdrawal limits shall be in addition to-the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies.that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods i

vithdrawn condition. \\ I

3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 vithin 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim: control rod withdrawal limits and-the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring'the positive MTC to within its limit for the all

) rods withdrawn condition.

b. Vith the HTC more negative than the limit of'3.1.1.3.b above, be in HOT SHUTD0VN vithin 12 hours.
  • Vith K,,,. greater than or equal to 1.0
  1. Sae Special Test Exception 3.10.3 FARLEY UNIT.1-3/4 1 4~

Amendment No.J7, 86-w,,,.,,.w,,,,,,-,,,,Ne,y..v,,,,,., y-- ,%% ce.,,,-e - -,. ~, - --,,p, ,vr_,,,,m. .,-4,4 2.>-e--w.m,.-,,.-- ..__.a, ..,...E,-.-,,,--.,.,- .+,..y-. =

1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................,u.......................... 4.1.1.3 -The MTC shall be determined to be within~its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3.a. above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POVER, aftergeach fuel loading.

r b.TheMTCsha}1bemeasuredatanyTHERMALPOVERandcomparedto f -3.65 x 10" delta k/k/'F (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL' l-- l POVER condition) within 7 EFPD_after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this indicates the MTC is more negative than ~3.65 x 10"pomparison l delta-i k/k/'F the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit of specification 3.1.1.3.b, at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle. (1). l l t -(1) Once the equilibrium boron concentration (all rods withdrawn. RATED THERMAL POVER condition);is 100 ppm or less, further measurement of the MTC in accordance with 4.1.1.3.b may be suspended, providing that the measured MTC at an equilibrium boron concentr equal to 100 ppm is less negative.than -4.0 x 10~gtion less than or delta k/k/'F., i l i FARLEY-UNIT =1 .3/4 1-5 Amendment.No.-26, 86 l ~ L. _..,_ - _--._.._.,,..m.- . -. ~.. _ -. _, _ - -. _ _ _.

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL i 3/4.1.1.1 AND 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOVN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTD0VN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor vill be maintained sufficiently ,i' suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. SHUTD0VN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,,' load operating The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T at no i temperature, and is associated vith a postulaled steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the' analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOVN MARGIN of-1.77% delta k/k is required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOVN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety i analysis assumptions. Vith T less than 200'F,-the reactivity transients resultingfromapostulatedslUmlinebreakcooldownareminimalanda1% delta k/k SHUTDOVN MARGIN provides adequate protection. 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIERT The limitations oh moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to en:3re that the value of-this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses. The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditional accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions e other than those explicitly stated vill require extrapolation to those ~ conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison. The moet negative MTC value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC) vas obtained by incrementally-correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved (1) a conversion of the HDC used in the FSAR safety analyses to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POVER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences in MTC observed between EOL, all rods withdravn, RATED TilEMAL POVER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator' temperature and pressure, rod insertion, axial power skeving, and xenon concentration that can occur in normal operation and lead to a significantly more negative EOL MTC at RATED THERMAL POVER. These corrections transformed the MDC value the FSAR safety analyses into the limiting MTC value of -4.3 x,10~ysed in delta k/k/'F. The surveillance requirement HTC value of -3.65 X 10~ delta k/k/'F represents a conservative HTC value at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making correptions for burnup and soluble boron to the limiting HTC value of -4.3 x 10~ delta-k/k/'F. FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1 -Amendment No.. 26, 86

1 e a i j i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES [ i MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) Once the equilibrium boron concentration falls belov 100 ppm, MTC measurements may be suspended provided the measured HTC value at an equilibriuy boron concentration < 100 ppm is less negative than -4.0 : 10' delta k/k/'F. The dIffe limiting EOL MTC value of -4.3 x 10'{enceibetween this value and the delta k/k/'F conservatively bounds-i the maximum change in MTC between the 100 ppm equilibrium boron concentration (all rods vithdrawn, RATED THERMAL POVER condition) and the licensed end-of-cycle, including the effects of boron concentration reduction, fuel depletion, and end-of-cycle coastdown. The surveillance requirements for meast'rement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the HTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. 3/4.I.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR,, CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor vill not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less'than 541'F. This limitation is req.uired to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the P-12 interlock is above ita. setpoint, 4) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 5) the reactor pressure vessel-is above its minimum RT temperature. yp, 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging l pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid-transfer pumps, and'5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators. With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in. the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOVN FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 26, 86 t ,..-.,-m.-.. .m-m-~,~- r, ..w .m,_-- .,,i-~,.-, , a-

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e ^%, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e J ..wiuorow, o. c. h,....+/ l r ALABANA POWER COMPANY i DOCKET NO. 50-364 t j JOSEPH N. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO TACILITY' OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 80 License No. NPF-8 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comissio' (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendme it by Alabama Power Company (the-licensee), datori July 13, 1990, complies'with the standards and recuirenants of the Atomit, Eriirrgy Act of-1954.; as amended (the Act), anc the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 1 B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provistorts of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission t - C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities nthe,rized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii).that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regult.tios. ; D. The issuance of.this license amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the publict and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 5! of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements havt .^ been satisfied. t 2. Accordingly, the Itcense is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications._ as indicated in the attachment to this license amendnent; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating' License No. NPF-8 is hereby 4 amended to read as follows: t-

c

.. n 1. 2

14. l, (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as 3 revised through Amenchnent No.80. are hereby incorporated in the license. Alabama Power Company shall operate the facility in 4 accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4tSSION h s Elinor G. Adensam, Director Project Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications 4. Date of Issuance: December 21, 1990 D l ~

s ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE ANENDNENT NO. An TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the followin the enclosed pages. g pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines. Remove Pages Insert,P_Lggi 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-1 8 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 u 4 I f I l l l

a REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS H0DERATOR TEMPERATURE COEPPICIENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) shall bei

a. Less than or equal to 0.5 x 10 delta k'k/'F for the all rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), belov 70% 1FF"HAL POVER condition.

Less than or equal to 0 delta k/k/'t at or above 70% THERHAL POVER.

b. Less negative than -4.3 x 10 delta k/k/'F for the all rods l

vithdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERHAL POVER condition. APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3.a - H0 DES 1 and 2* only# Specification 3.1.1.3.b - H0 DES 1, 2 and 3 only# ACTION:

a. With the HTC more positive than the limit of 3.1.1.3.a above, operation in H0 DES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
1. Control rod withdraval limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the HTC to within its limit within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours.

These withdrawal limits shall de in addition to the insertion limits of Specific'ation 3.1.3.6.

2. The control rods are maintained within the vitadraval limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifles that the HTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 vithin 10 days, describing the value of the measured HTC, the interim control rod withdraval limits and the predicted average core burnop necessary for restoring the positive HTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.

l

b. Vith the HTC more negative than the limit of 3.1.1.3.b above, be l

in HOT SHUTDOVN vithin 12 hours.

  • Vith K,,,

greater than or equal to 1.0

  1. See Special Test Exception 3.10.3 l

l FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. #9, 80

i i j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .e....................................................... i 4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. The NTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3.a. above, prior.to initial operation above l

5% of RATED THERMAL POVER, after3each fuel loading. b.TheMTCsha}1bemeasuredatanyTHERMALPOVERandcomparedto -3.65 x 10' delta k/k/'F (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL l POVER condition) within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium In the event this boron concentration of 300 ppm. indicates the MTC is more_ negative-than -3.65 l. delta 3 ] k/k/'P, the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit of specification 3.1.1.3.b, at-least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle. (1) l l 4 1 i 4 i I (1) Once the equilibrium boron concentration (all rods withdravn, RATED THERHAL POVER condition) is 100 ppm or less, further measurement'of the HTC in accordance with 4.1.1.3.b may be suspended, providing that the measured HTC at an equilibrium boron concentr equal to 100 ppm is less negative than -4.0 x 10'gtfon less than or delta k/k/'F.- 1: 1 FARLEY-UNIT 2-3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 80

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 AND 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTD0VN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTD0VN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor vill be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. SHUTD0VN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as e function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,y. The moet restrictive condition occurs at IOL, with T at no 1 cad operating temperature, and is associated with a postulaled steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldovn. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOVN MARGIN of 1.77% delta k/k is required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTD0VN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and to consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. Vith T less than 200'F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated stelm line break cooldown are minimal and a 1% delta k/k SHUTDOVN MARGIN provides adequate protection. 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations oh moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses. The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific' set of plant conditions: accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated vill require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison. The most negative MTC value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC) was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC t used in the PSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These i corrections involved: (1) a conversion of tha MDC used in the FSAR safety I analyses to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POVER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences in MTC observed between E0L, all rods withdrawn, RATED THEMAL POVER conditicns, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod insertion, axial power skeving, and xenon concentration that can occur in normal operation and lead to a significantly more negative EOL MTC at RATED THERMAL POVER. These corrections transformed the MDC value the FSAR safety analyses into the limiting MTC value of -4.3 x,10'ysed in delta k/k/'F. The surveillance requirement MTC value of -3.65 X 10' delta k/k/'F represents a conservative MTC value at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making correptions for burnup and soluble boron to the limiting MTC value of -4.3 x 10~ delta k/k/'F. FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 80

? REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES t MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) Once the equilibrium boron concentration falls below 100 ppm, MTC measurements may be suspended provided the measured MTC value at an equilibriup boron concentration < 100 ppm is less nega..ve than -4.0 x 10- delta k/k/'F. The dIffe limiting EOL MTC value of -4.3 x 10~{ence between this value and the della k/k/'F conservatively bounds the maximum change in MTC between the 100' ppm equilibrium boron concentration (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POVER condition) and the' licensed end-of-cycle, including the effects of boron concentration reduction, fuel depletion, and end-of-cycle coastdown. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the teactor vill nat be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 541*F. This limitation is rcquired to ensure 1) the moderator temperature. coefficient is -vithin its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal' operating range, 3) the P-12 interlock is above its setpoint, 4) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 5) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT,,, temperature. 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation..The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE' diesel generators. Vith the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum ofitvo boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in-the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths. inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOVN i I L FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 80- .. ~, _. _~

t! a ((>S RfC UNITED $TATES g NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 WA$HINGTON, D. C. 20666 i l 5,..... I SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I _ SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO.80 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANTc VNITS 1 AND 2 I DOCKET NOS. 50-348' AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 13,1990 (reference 1) Alabama Power Company (APCo orthelicensee)submittedanapplicationtoamendtheTechnical Specifications (TS) of the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley). Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would modify (1) the most negative moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) limiting condition for operation -- (LCO) (2) the associated surveillance requirements, and (3) the associated Bases. The purpose of this LCO and surveillance re is to ensure that the most negative MTC at end-of-cycle (EOC) quirements remains within the bounds of tne Farley, Units 1 and 2, safety analyJes, in particular, for those transients and accidents that assume a constant value of the moderator density coefficient (MDC) of 0.43 delta /k per gm/cc. Farley Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.3.b involves - an MTC measurement at any thermal power within 7 effective full power days (EFPD) after reaching an equilibrium primary coolant boron concentration of 300 ppm. After corrections are made, the measured value is compared to the hot full power surveillance requirement limit with all control rods out of the core. In the event that the measured MTC is more negative than l the surveillance requirement limit, the MTC must be remeasured and compared with the EOC, MTC LCO value at least once per 14 EFPD'during the remainder of the :ycle. The Farley, Units 'I and 2, LCO and surveillance L requirement valuta in the TS for the most negative MTC are conservative (less negative) Hen compared to the value of the MTC corresponding to_ the MDC which is usec in the safety analyses. For the high discharge burnup cores used for farley Units 1 and 2, APCo anticipates that future measured values of MTC required.near EOC may result in an MTC that will be more negative than the surveillance requirement limit. This will then require APCo to make MTC measurements once every 14 EFPD until the EOC. Failure to meet the surveillance requirements MTC does not necessarily mean that either the most negative ~ ,_._.2 -. - ~. -

2 MTC that would occur near EOC would be exceeded or that the safety analysis MTC would be exceeded. APCo states that these additional MTC measurements, if needed to comply with the surveillance requirements, would be an undue burden to Farley, Units 1 and 2. APCopropgestochangetheLCO(3.1.13.b)mostnegativeMTCvaluefrom -3.9 X 10 delta k/k/*F to -4.3 X 10'4 delta k/k/'F. 5unet Mance -3.65 X 10'4 1.1.3.b would be changed from -3.0 X 10'4 Requirement 4 delta k/k/'F to delta k/k/'F. These changes would remove about 0.25 X 10'4 delta k/k/'F from the difference between the survei' lance requirements and the EOC, LCO, MTC values. These values would still be bounded by the Farley safety analysis values of the MTC of -S.1 X 10'4 delta k/k/'F, which is used for maximum negative reactivity feedback analyses. In addition, a change is proposed to Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.3.b to allow for suspension of extended measurements every 14 EFPD once the equilibrium boron concentration falls belo MTC value is less negative than -4.0 X 10'g 100 ppm provided the measured delta k/k/'F. These changes apply to the current and future reload cycles for Farley, Units 1 and 2, and are supported by an evaluation provided in a Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) report (reference 2) submitted with the amendment application. 2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Methodoloqy The current method used to determine the most negative MTC is described in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (STS) in Bases Section 3/4.1.1.3 (reference 3). Tho method is based on incrementally correcting the conservative MDC used in the safety analysis to obtain the most negative MTC value or, equivalently, the most positive MDC at nominal hot full power core conditions. The corrections involve subtracting the incremental change in the MDC, which is associated with a core condition of all control rods inserted, to an all control rods out core condition. The MTC is then equal to the product of the MDC times the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at rated thermal power conditions. This STS method of detennining the most negative MTC, LCO value results in an all control rods out MTC which is significantly less negative than the MTC used in the safety analysis and may even be less negative than the best estimate EOC all control rods out HTC for extended burnup reload This has the potential for requiring the plant to be placed in a cores. hot shutdown condition by TS 3.1.1.3 even though substantial margin to the safety analysis MDC exists. This problem with the current STS method is caused by adjusting the MDC from a hot full power all control rods inserted to a hot full power all control rods out condition in defining the most negative MTC. The hot full power all control rods inserted condition is not allowed by TS on control rod positions for allowable l power operation in which the shutdown banks are completely withdrawn from j the core and the control banks must meet rod insertion limits.

0 3 Re/erence 2 provides an alternative method for adjusting the safety analysis MDC to obtain a most negative MTC. This method is termed the most negative feasible MTC. The most negative feasible MTC method seeks to detemine the conditions for which a core will exhibit the most negative MTC value that is consistent with operation allowed by the TS. For example, the most negative feasible MTC method would not require the conversion assumption of the all control rods inserted, hot full power condit.sn but would require the conversion assumption that all control rtM banks are inserted the maximum amount that are pemitted by the TS. Ret 0rence 2 uses the most negative feasible MTC method to determine EOC MTC tensitivities for those design and operational parameters that directly impact the MTC in such a way that the sensitivity to one parame'.er is independent of the assumed values for the other parameters. The panmeters considered with this most negative feasible MTC method

include, soluble boron concentratioa in the coolant moderator temperature and pressure control rod insertion axial power shape transient xenon concentration.

The most negative feasible HTC approach uses this sensitivity information to derive an E00, all control rods out, hot full power, MTC, LC0 value based l on the safety analysis value of the MDC. This most negative feasible MTC approach has, according to the licensee, A number of advantages over the previous method for detemining the most negative MTC, LC0 value. The most negative feasible MTC will be sufficiently negative so that repeated MTC measurements from a 300 ppm core condition to E0C would not be required. The most negative feasible MTC method does not change the safety analysis moderetor feedback assumption. The safety analysis value of MDC is unchanged. The most negative feasible MTC method is a conservative and reasonable basis to assume for an MTC value of a reload core and is consistent with plant operation defined by other TS.. Finally, the most regative feasible MTC method retains the surveillance requirement on MTC at the 300 ppm core l condition to verify that the core is operating within the bounds of the i safety analysis. The licensee has determined the sensitivity of the above parameters on the EOC MTC for three different reload designs representative of future Farley, Units 1 and 2, reloads. These reload designs included fuel designs, discharge burnups, and cycle lengths which are typical of those l expected for Farley, Units 1 and 2. The soluble boron concentration a s not used in the sensitivity analysis because the EOC, hot full power, all control rods out, MTC TS value is assumed to be at 0 ppm of boron, the definition of EOC, and because the most negative MTC occurs at 0 ppm of boron in the coolant, 3 - - + - = =gm-d' V y y W -e

l 1 i 4-j l The sensitivity study did not include _the radial power. distribution which can vary under nomal operation and can affect the MTC. The operational activities that affect the radial power distribution do so through.the i j movement of control rods and activities that affect the xenon concentra-tion. The allowed changes in the radial power distribution are implicitly ' i i included in the MTC sensitivity to control rod insertion and xenon concentration. The licensee states that the MTC sury 111ance requirement value would be obtained'in the same manner as currently described in the STS Bases e (reference 2). The MTC surveillance requirement value is obtained from the E00, all control rods out, MTC value by making corrections for burnup-and boron at a core condition of 300 ppe of boron. l [ The staff has reviewed the assumptions-and basis for the most_ negative-feasible MTC method described above and concludes that they are acceptable because (1) they will result in conservative, most negative, MTC, LC0 and surveillance requirement values.that could result from allowed operation of Farley, Units.1 and 2, from nominal conditions, and (2) the MTC measure-l ment at 300 ppm of boron core condition will assure, using the MTC i surveillance requirement value, that the safety: analysis-MDC will not be; exceeded. 2.2 Farley. Units 1 and 2. Accident Anal _vsis MDC Assumption-l The licensee uses an MDC for performing accident analyses. For events i sensitive to maximum negative moderator _ feedback, a constant value of the NDC of 0.43 delta k/gn/cc is assumed throughout the analysis. For hot-i full power and full flow nominal operating conditions, the temperature and pressure are 577.2*F and 2250 psia,. respectively.. At these condigions, i the MTC equivalent to the MDC of 0.43 delta k/gn/cc is -5.1~X 10~ delta k/k/'F. - We will refer to this MTC as the safety analysis MTC. _ Based on - its review. MDC is accepthe staff concludes that the evaluation of the MTC from th that is, the MTC is equal.to.the MDC_ times the rate of change of density-with temperature at the nominal pressure and temperature of the coolant at rated therm 1 power conditions. 2.3 Sensitivity Results Farley, Units-1.'and 2. TS 3.2.5 provides the LCO values of theideparture ~ from nucleate boiling (DNB) parameters reactor coolant system-(RCS): allowablepressurizerSIs)s;u.andpressur;izerpressure.;Themin average temperature (T re-is 2220 psia and maximum allowable T is-581.2 'F. These values of the minimum pressurizer pressure.and maxiE0 T were also-assumed for the: safety analysis. The current nominal < dlUgn T ' for Farley. Units 1 and 2, is:575 'F'so that' the safety analysis ySpresents a 6.2 'F maximum allowable increase in T nominal a conditions. Thecurrentnominal=designpressurelis2250psilVIothatthe safety. analysis represents a 30 psia maximum allowable decrease from l yt*4***Y FB-p'e i N F W W'+tr tNM'** T p ph-- -i V1b-e--yt-1+h? ' M e m m? gv mfi e w S'g- *T-+1-y='t**28T4'NNePM Tot Yy 1-w og W e--aprm twge a re-'eN -si' W w"- qui'y h es-r __,g NPPhr1-"-'t-gy.rgy"Wew -gg,-3 +neup y y

, nominal pressurizer pressure. Based on these maximum allowed system variations, a maximum allowable limit is placed on-the moderator density variation. Using the sensitivity of the MTC to temperature and pressure, derived from the analysis of the three reload designs, a bounding delta MTC (a proprietary value) was obtained associated with these maximum allowable coolant temperature and pressure deviations from nominal conditions. i Farley, Units 1 and 2. TS 3.1.1.3 requires an all control rods out configuration in the evaluation of the MTC. TS 3.1.3.5 requires that all shutdown banks be withdrawn from the core during normal operation (Modes 1 and 2). TS 3.1.3.6 limits control bank insertion by rod insertion limits in Modes 1 and 2. All control. rods can be inserted at hot zero pcwer coincident with a reactor trip. In general, greater control rod insertion ~-i results in a more negative MTC assuming that all other parameters are held constant. However, greater control rod insertion will also cause a reduction in core power and T which causes the MTC to become n. ore positive. This effect is mor$Vlronounced at lower power with the positive change being more impottant than the negative change in-the MTC. Based on this line of. reasoning the licensee determined that-the most negative MTC configuration will occu,r at hot full power with control rods. inserted to: the rod insertion limits. The licensee analyzed three reload core designs, using a bounding value of control bank D insertion at hot full power with no soluble boron in the coolant. This analysis gave a bounding deltaMTC(aproprietaryvalue)associatedwiththecontrolbankinserted to the rod insertion limits for Farley, Units 1 and 2. The axial power shape produces changes in the MTC caused primarily by the rate at which the moderator is heated as it flows up the core, with the MTC sensitivity to extremes of axial power shapes being small. This effect can be correlated with the axial flux difference, which is the. difference in the power in the top of.the core minus the power in the lower half of the core. The TS for Farley, Units 1 and 2. include-limits on the axial flux difference. The licensee determined that the more negative-the axial flux difference, the more newtive the MTC.- The licensee e sly:cd three reload designs and determined the sensitivity of the MTC to axial flux difference. This analysis'gave a bounding delta MTC (a proprietary vtlue) for an assumed bounding value of axial flux di fference. Although no TS limits exist on either the xenon distribution or concentra -- tion..the axial xenon distribution is effectively limited by TS limits on the axial flux difference..The physics of the xenon buildup and decay process limits the xenon concentration. The effect of xenon axial distribution is quantified in the effect of the axial power shape on the MTC, as discussed previously. The effect of the overall xenon concentra-tion on the MTC needs to be evaluated separately. The licensee determined that the MTC became more negative with no xenon in the core. Therefore, the licensee analyzed the-three reload core designs _at E00, hot full-power, all control rods out, with no xenon present. 'This analysis gave for. Farley, Units 1 and 2, a -delta MTC _(a proprietary value)' for the xenon concentration factor. 1

. All of the delta MTC values described above are sunened to provide a total delta MTC for Farley, Units 1 and 2, based on the allowed deviations of the various factors from nominal values. The staff has reviewed the discussion and analysis of the primary factors of the most negative feasible MTC method and concludes that the results obtained are acceptable because approved methods and conservative assumptions were used to generate the :results. 2.4 Far_ ley. Units 1 and 2. EOC MTC TS Valt.e Using the total delta MTC obtained with the most negative feasible MTC method,thelicenseedeterginedthattheFarley, Units 1and2, safety analysis MTC of -5.1 X 10' delta k/k/'F should be increased by the total delta MTC plus an additional amount for conservatism. The resulting E00, hot full ggwer, all control rods out, MTC for Farley, Units 1 and 2, is -4.3 X 10 delta k/k/'F. This value replaces the current TS value. Thus, detennination that an MTC for the EOC, hot full gower, all control rods out, reload core is less negative than -4.3 X 10' delta k/k/'F provides assurance that the safety analysis MTC remains bounding. The licensee also performed an analysis to determine the surveillance requirement value of the all control rods out reload core at 300 ppm of boron. Analysis of reload cores similar to Farley, Units 1 a reload designs resulted in a conservative value of 0.65 X 10'gd 2 future delta k/k/*F to bound the expected difference in MTCs between the 300 ppm of boron core condition to E00. Thus, the MTC surveillance requirement value is -3.65 X 10'4 delta k/k/'F compared to the present TS value for Farley, Units 1 and 2. The staff has reviewed this determination of the most negative MTC LCO and surveillance requirement and concludes that they are acceptable. 2.5 Suspension of MTC Measurements Below 100 PPM As stated earlier, if the measured MTC after reaching 300 ppm of boron is more negative than the surveillance requirement limit, the MTC must be remeasured and compared with the E00, MTC, LCO value at least once every 14 EFPD during the remainder of the cycle. The licensee has proposed a note to Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.3.b which would allow suspension of extended MTC measurement once the equilibrium boron concentration falls below 100 ppm, )rovided tha last measuied value is less negative than -4.0 X 10'4 delta k/ </'F. The clope of a line connecting this secondary surveillance criteri valueof-3.65X10'gnvaluewiththe300ppmsurveillancerequirement delta L/k/'F is more characteristic of actual MTC behavior with core depletion and somewhat less steep than the slope of a line connecting the TS values. Projection of the line connecting the 300 i i ppm surveillance requirement value and this secondary surveillance criterion value to a boron concentration o exists to the EOC, LCO limit of -4.3 X 10'{ delta k/k/'F.0 ppm (EOC) shows that m

~ i t J ~7-i The staff finds this proposed change acceptable since it conservatively i bounds the maximum change in MTC between the 100 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and the EOC, including the effects of boron concentration reduction, fuel depletion, and EOC coastdown and also eliminates several measurements near EOC which perturb reactor operation and generate large volumes of waste water. 2.6 S1fety Analysis Imoact of Most Neastive Feasible Approach Changes in the parameters discussed previously could take place during a transient to mate the MTC more negative than allowed during normal operation. The most adverse conditions seen in the affected transient events will not result in a reactivity insertion that would invalidate the conclusions of the FSAR accident analyses. Thus, the MDC used as a basis for the most negative feasible. MTC, TS will not change. The reload safety analysis process will include verification that the MDC safety analysis value remains valid. The staff concludes that this verification process for the safety analysis MDC is acceptable. 3.0

SUMMARY

Based on the review discussed above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the most negative MTC TS, the MTC surveillance requirement value at or near 300 ppm of boron core condition, and the associated 4 Bases as well as the suspension of MTC measurements at less than 100 ppm, are acceptable for the following reasons: (1) The most negative feasible MTC method considered the important factors affecting the MTC and the limits on these factors. (2) Approved computer codes and methods were used in the analyses, j (3) The MTC measurement at or near 300 ppm of boron will provide assurance that the MTC at E00, hot full power, all control rods out l conditions will be less negative than the safety analysis MTC. (4) Future reloads for Farley, Units 1 and 2, will be analyzed to confirm i the most negative MTC TS at EOC and the MTC surveillance requirement [ at a core condition of 300 ppm of boron. (S) The difference between the surveillance requirement at or below 100 ppa of boron and the limiting EOC MTC value conservatively bounds the maximum change in MTC between the 100 ppm boron concentration and the licensed EOC. (6) Future relcads'for Farley, Units 1 and 2, will be analyzed to confirm .i the applicability of the safety analysis value of the MDC.

2 4 i j 1

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

l These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or i use of a facility component located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change the surveillance requirements. The staff i i has detemined that these amendments involve no significant increase in tha amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released off site, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendmants involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eli for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)gibility criteria Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental 1 assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these-amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Comission made a proposed detemination that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Rocinter (55 FR 34363) on August 22, 1990, and consulted with the state o' A abama. No public coments or requests for hearing were received, and ~ the State of Alabama did not have any coments. The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the p(ublic will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,2) s regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. LetterfromW.G.Hairston,!!!(APCo)toUSNRC,datedJuly 13, 1990. 2. " Safety Evaluation Supporting a More Negative EOL Moderator Temperature Coefficient Technical Specification for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2," WCAP-11953 (proprietary) and WCAP-11954 (non-proprietary), December 1988. 3. " Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors," NUREG-0452, Revision 4, issued Fall 1981. Dated: December 21, 1990 Principal Contributor: L. Kopp

c)

  1. on neu
  2. c UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

{ 1 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20$$5 1.' December.21, 1990 1 Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 Mr. W. G. Hairston, III Senior Vice President Alabama Power Company 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Dear Mr. Hairston:

L

SUBJECT:

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 80 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 REGARDING END-OF-LIFE MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TACNOS.77163AND77164) The Nuclear Regulatory Comriission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.86 to: Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 80 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your submittal dated July 13, 1990. The amendments change the Technical Specifications to modify the most negative moderator temperature coefficient limiting condition for operation, the associated surveillance requirements, and the associated Bases section. A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Comission's bi-weekly Federal Renister notice. Sincerely, ?~X Stephen T. Hoffman, Project Manager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. '86 to NPF-2 2. Amendment No. 80 to NPF-8 3. Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosures: See next page

I 14 4 i Mr. W. G. Hairston, III ] Alabama Power Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant CC: I l Mr. R. P. Mcdonald Resident Inspector Executive Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 24 - Route 2 Alabama Power Company Columbia, Alabama 36319 P. O. Box 1295 3 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Regional Administrator, Region II 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Mr. B. L. Moore 101 Marietta'5treet, Suite 2900 i j Manager Licensing Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Alabama Power Company 3 j P. O. Box 1295 Chairman Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Houston County Comission Dothan, Alabama 36301 Mr. Louis B. Long, General Manager Southern Company Services, Inc. Claude Earl Fox. M.D. Houston County Comissioh State Health Officer P. O. Box 2625 State Department of Public Health = Birmingham, Alabama 35202 State Office Building Montgomergy, Alabama 36130 Mr. D. N. Morey General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant James H. Miller, III, Esq. P. O. Box 470 Balch and Bingham Ashford, Alabama 36312 P. 0.~ Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North i Mr. J. D. Woodward Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Vice-President - Nuclear Farley Project Alabama Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 i ) l I l x. _.

9) p% $80 e ((j '93 UNITED STATES + r 7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s, j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 '%.....f ALABAMA POWER COMPANY' DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 86 License No. NPF-2 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power ',ompany (the licensee),datedJuly 13, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provi'sions of the Act, and the rules-and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 l of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows: i l t F.h.m e "-" e

.. ~ _ ~ ! l (2) Technical Scecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as-revised through Amendment No. 86. are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.-- 3. This license amendment is effective.as of its date of issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h Elinor G. Adensam. Director Project Directorate Il Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical-Specifications Date of Issuance: Decembcr 21, 1990 I l

4l ATTACHNENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO, 86 TO FACIllTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKrT NO. 50-348 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines. Remove Pages insert Pages -3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS j H0DERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITING CONDITION TOR OPERATION 1 3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) shall be A. Less than or equal to 0.5 x 10 delta k/k/'P for the all rods withdravn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), belov 70% THERHAL POWER condition. Less than or equal to O delta k/k/'F at or above 70% THERHAL POWER. Less negative than -4.3 x 10 delta k/k/'F for the all rods l p. vithdrevn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERHAL POVER condition. APPLICAoILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3.a - H0 DES 1 and 2* only# Specification 3.1.1.3.b - H0 DES 1, 2 and 3 only# ACTION:

a. Vith the HTC more positive than the limit of 3.1.1.3.a above, operation in HODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
1. Control rod withdraval limits are established'and maintained sufficient to restore the HTC 'o within its limit within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours. These vithdiaval limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
2. The control toda are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the HTC has been restoted to within its limit for the all rods j

vithdrawn condition.

3. 4 Special Report is prepared and subr.itted to the Commission i

pursuant to Specification _6.9.2 vithin 10 days, describing the value of the measured HTC, the-iMerim control re! withdraval I limits and the predicted average core burnup ne:essar/ for restoring the positive HTC to within its limit for the all rods withdravn condition.

b. Vith the HTC more negative than the limit of 3.1.1.3.b above, be in HOT SHUTDOVN vithin 12 hours, t

l l

  • With K,,,

greater than or equal to 1.0 i

  1. See Special Test Exception 3.10.3 FARLEY-IINIT 1 3/4 1-4 Amendment No, 57, 86 l

a j I REACTIVITY-CONTROL SYSTEMS -l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-- 4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each-fuel cycle as follows:

a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to:the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3.a. above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POVER, after3each fuel loading, b.TheMTCr:s}lbemeasuredatanyTHERMALPOVERandcowparedto

-3.65 x 10' delta-k/k/'F (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL l POVER conditior.) within 7 EPPD after reaching an equilibrium 2 boron concentration of 300 ppe. In the event this indicates the MTC is more n.gstive than -3.65 x 10'gomparison delta -l k/k/'F, the hTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC s limit of specification 3.1.1.3.b, at least once per 14 EFPD 3 during the remainder of the fuel cycle.- (1)- -l' -j i (1) Once the equilibrium boron concentration (all: rods withdrawn, RATED ) THERMAL POWER condition) 17 100 ppm-or less, further measurement of the MTC in:accordance with 4.1.1.3.b-may be suspended, providing that the measured MTC at an equilibrium boron.concentr equal to 100 ppm is less negative than -4.0.x 10'gtion less than or delta k/k/*F. .FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 1-5 -Amendment No. 26,.86'

e 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL EisTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 AND 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTD0VN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTD0VN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients' associated with postulated accid:nt conditions are controllable within. acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor vill be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. SHUTDOVN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of i fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T The most restrictive condition eccurs at EOL, with T at no load operating temperature, and is asr'aciated with a postull. led steam line break-accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldovn. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOVN MARG 1H of 1.77% delta k/k is required'to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOVN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and--is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T less than 200'F,:the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated slum line break cooldown are minimal and a 1% delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protection. 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations oh moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) are provided to l ensure that the value of this coefficient renins within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses. l The HTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of I plant conditions; accordingly, verification of;MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated vill require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison. l The most negative MTC value equivalent to the most pesitive moderator l densit*/ coef ficient (MDC) vas obtained by'incrementa'.ly correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved: (1) a conversion of the HDC used-in-the FSAR safety analyses to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change:of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL P0uER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences in MTC observed l between EOL, all rods withdrawn, RATED THEMAL POVER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod-insertion, axial power skeving, and xenon concentration that can occur in normal operation and lead to a'significantly more negative EOL HTC at RATED THERMAL POVER. These corrections transformed the HDC:valuo the FSAR safety analyses into the limiting MTC value of -4.3 x 10'psed in delta k/k/'F. The surveillance requirement HTC value of -3.65 X 10'4 delta k/k/*F represents'a conservative MTC value at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by' making correpHons for burnup and soluble boron to the limiting HTC value of -4.3 x 10' delta k/k/'F. FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 26, 86-

. ~.. =_.

m. i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

Once the equilibrium boron concentration falls belov.100-ppm, MTC-measurements may be suspended-provided the measured HTC value at an- -4.0 x 10 y boron concentration'< 100 ppm is less negative than equilibriu delta k/k/*F. The dTffe limiting EOL MTC value of--4.3 x 10'gence:between this value and the delta k/k/'F conservatively bounds the maximum change in MTC between the 100 ppm equilibrium boron. concentration (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POVER condition) and the licensed end-of-cycle, including the effects of boron concentration reduct4,on, fuel depletion, and end-of-cycle coestdown. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC at.the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to-confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly-due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration-associated with fuel burnup.- 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor vill not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 541'F.- This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient l is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation r L is within its normal operating range, 3) the P-12 interlock is above its setpoint, 4) the pressurizer is capable of-being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 5) the reactor pressure vessel _is above-its minimum i RT,,, temperature. 3/4.1.2-B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron' injection system ensures that negative. reactivity control is-avaliable during each_ mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps,.and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE. diesel generators. Vith the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two' boron injection flow paths are' required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths; inoperable. The boration' capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide 11 SHUTDOVN l l-I FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 lAmendmentNo. 26, 86 =-

V 'o ! UNITED FTATEs ~ f" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~ n { 'E WASHING TON, D. C, 20556 j s.,...../ ALAR,AMA POWER COMPANY' DOCKETNO.-50-36,4f JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. JNIT 2-AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OP_ERATING LICENSE i Amendment No. 80 License'No..NPF-8 1. The Nuclear _ Regulatory Connission (the Commission) ha's' found that: o A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company.(the licensee), dated July 13, 1990, complies with the standards and.* requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Connission's rules; and regulations set forth in--10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the provisioris of the Act, and the rules?and regulations of;the Consission; C. There is reasonable' assurance (i) that the activities authorized by-this amendment can-be-~ conducted without endangering the' health and safety of the public, and (ii) that-such activities will be conducted. L in compliance with the<Conaission's regulations; D. The issuance of this ltcense amendment will not be inimical to the-conson defense and security.or to the health and' safety of the public; and-E. The issuance of this amendment-is in accordance with!10 CFR Part 511 of the Commission's-regulations and'all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license-is amended by changes to the Technical-Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment;- and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read'as follows: a. i ge g-- eg gp g-ei# -t.*- y p p g-g-a 9 ---9 y , + --q+ rwgy=949._m&'

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.80. are herehy incorporated in the license. Alabama Power Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.- FOR-THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Original-Signed By: Elinor G. Adensam, Director Project Directorate-11-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications l Date of Issuance: December 21, 1990-4 0FC. :L DRPR:PM:PD21:D PR: OGCl L

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-il ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDNENT NO. an, TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO, NPF-8, s DOCKET NO, 50-364 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines. Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 l i e vy w -y 7 7 T' e r v

n._ =.,-.n .-.--.us-,,a.ua n u-REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ..........................m................................................ 3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall bei:

a. Less than or equal to 0.5 x 10 delta k/k/'F for the all rods withdcavn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), belov 70% THERMAL POVER condition.

Less than or equal to O delta k/k/'F at or above 70% THERMAL POVER.

b. Less negative than -4.3 x 10 delta'k/k/'F for the all rods-l vithdravn. end of cycle life (E0L), RATED THERMAL POVER condition.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3.a.- MODES ~1 and 2* onlyt-Specification 3.1.1.3.b - MODES 1, 2.anc 3 only# ACTION: a.- Vith the MTC more positive than the limit of 3.1.l.3.a above, operation in MODES 1 and 2;may proceed provided:

l. Control rod viihdrawal. limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to within its limit'vithin-24-hours or be in HOT ST4WDBY vithin the next 6 hours. These vithdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specific'ation 3.1.3.6.
2. The control rods are maintained within-the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation' verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
3. A Spccial Report is prepared and submitted to the Commissicn pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 10 days, describing the value of the measured r:TC,1 the interim control rod withdraval

~ limits and the predicted. average core burnup.necessary for restoring the positive HTC'to vithin its limit for the all rods ~ withdrawn coniition.

b. With the HTC more negative than the limit of 3.1.1.3.b above, be in HOT SHUTD0VN <ithin 12 hours.
  • Vith K,,, greater.than cr equal to 1.0 L# See Special Test Excepti an 3.10.3 t

FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 49, 80

.9, 4 REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r 4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to:be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL' limit of Specification 3.1.1.3.a, above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POVER, after.each fuel loading.-

b.TheMTCsha}lbemeasuredatanyTHERMALPOWERandcomparedto -3.65 x 10' delta k/k/'F (all-rods withdrawn,' RATED THERMAL-l- POVER condition) vithin 7.EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this indicates the MTC is more negative than'-3.65 x 10'gomparison -l delta k/k/'F, the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the.E0L MTC limit of specification 3.1.1.3.b, at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the k.1 cycle..(1)l l t [ l (1) Once the equilibrium boron concentratica (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL-POVER condition) is-100 ppm or less, further measurement of~ .the HTC in accordance with 4.1.1.3.b may be suspended, providing that the measured HTC at an equilibrium boron concentr equal to 100 ppm is less negative than -4.0 x 10 gtion less than or delta k/k/'F. FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 80

o 4 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4 BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CORTROL 3/4.1.1.1 AND 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOVN HARGIN A suf ficient SH'JTD0VN HARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made l suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients 4 associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor vill be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. SHUTDOVN HARGIN requirements vary throughout cora life as a-function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,y, load operating The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T at no temperature, and is associated with a postulaled steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOVN HARGIN of 1.77% delta k/k is required to control the-reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOVN HARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. Vith T l resulting from a postulated stelm ess.than 200'F,>the reactivity transients line break cooldown are minimal and a 1% delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protection. 3/4.1.1.3, MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations oh moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) are provided to. ensure that the value of this coefficient remains vithin the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses. The HTC values of this specification are applicable to-a specific set of plant conditions l accordingly,; verification of HTC values at_ conditions other than those explicitly stated vill. require extrapolation to.those conditions in order to permit-an accurate comparison. The most negative HTC-value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (HDC) was obtained by incrementally correcting the HDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal ~ operating conditions.E These corrections involved (1) a conversion of the HDC used in the FSAR safety analyses to its equivalent HTC, based on the rate of change'of moderator-density with temparature at RATED THERHAL' POWER conditions,. and-(2) subtracting from this value'the largest differences in HTC observed between EOL,-all rods vithdrawn, RATED THEMAL POWER conditions, and those ost adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod m insertion, axial power skeving, and xenon concentration that can occur in4 normal operation and lead to a significantly more negative EOL HTC at RATED THERHAL POVER. These corrections transformed the HDC value the FSAR safety analyses into the limiting HTC value of'-4.3-x 10"ysed in delta k/k/'F. The surveillance requirement HTC value of -3.65 X 10' delta k/k/'F represents a conservative HTC value'at a core condition-of 300 ppm ~ l equilibrium boron concentration, and.is obtained by1 making correptions for l burnup and soluble boron to the limiting HTC value of -4.3 x 10~ delta k/k/'F. FARLEY-UNIT 2 B.3/4 1-1 Amendment-No. 80

k. O REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) Once the equilibrium boron concentration falls belov 100 ppm, MTC measurements may be suspended provided the measured HTC value at an equilibriu -4.0 x 10 p boron concentration < 100 ppm is less negative than delta k/k/*F. The dIffe limiting EOL HTC value of -4.3 x 10-{ence between this value and the della k/k/*F conservatively bounds the maximum change in HTC between the 100 ppm equilibrium boron concentration (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POVER condition) and the licensed end-of-cycle, including the effects of boron concentration reduction, fuel depletion, and end-of-cycle coastdown. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the HTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the HTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration, associated with fuel burnup. 3/4.1.1.4 HINIHUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor vill not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 541'F. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is l vithin its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is vithin its normal

  • operating range, 3) the P-12 interlock is above its setpoint, 4) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 5) the reactor pressure vessel _is above its minimum RT,,,

temperature. 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from-0PERABLE diesel generators. Vith the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of. two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in 3 the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOVN FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendmens 'n. 80}}

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