ML20065M900
| ML20065M900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1990 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065M899 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012110248 | |
| Download: ML20065M900 (9) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:._ i N PE -M/of ' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-1, .3.1.5. Two_ standby liquid control system subsyst' ems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL' CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*. ACTION: EXCe i kr kh c.onAibon emce.cl in I a. .In OPERATIONAL CONDITION'1 or 2: D0% 1. With one system subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN'within the next 12 hours. 146ERT 2. With both' standby liquid control. system subsystems inoperable,n. l l g restore at least one subsystem to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. b.* In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*: b 1. With one system subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.within 30 days or insert all insertable control rods within the.next hour. 2. With;both-standby liquid control system subsystems inoperable, insert all insertable control rods =within one hour. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.5 Each standby liquid control system subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: gg.t At least once per 24-hours by-verifying t'at; a. h 1. The temperature:of the sodium pentaborate solution isj ithir,- the lis.ite ef Tigur; 2.1.5-1. g ujAT D 2. The available volume of sodium pentaborate solution is gr;;';; th;.r ;r ;qu;T t '520 gal kp. The heat tracing circuit is OPERABLE by determining the g ' ' g 3. temperature of the pump suction piping is - '"' "g '"- rigure 3.1.5 1. h IMGEAM'. .B
- With any control rod withdrawn.
Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. 41 9012110248 901207 PDR ADOCK 05000416 P PDC
c, 2 LINSERT.Aw
- Page 3/4-l-18
3.- With the's' odium pentaborate concentration-greater th'an:15.2' weight; '[ percent and the not. tank volume. greater than.or eq'ual to. .4281 gallons andLless_than_or equal to;5088~ga11ons,_Lverify_the... sodium pentaborate solution; temperature to be; great'er than or equal.- .to the standby liquid control-system solution. minimum. temperature- ' limit of Figure 3.1.5-1.once.per 4 hours.and; restore:thel sodium-pentaborate solution:to.within the normal < operation;11mits ofl Figures.3.1.5-l'.and 3.1.5-2 within-. 72-hours.: 10therwise, ' declare ~ ~ both standby 11guld control system? subsystems. inoperable;.and beLin at least. Il0T SHUTDOWN within the next '12. hours.1 SP -{
- l a,
INSERT B- 'Page 3/4<1-18 _ greater than or equal to 75'F and?16ss.than or equal to L 30 f 1 ~t . I ' _Page 3/4 1-18 INSERT C within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-2. _ _ s_ - J. 1 INSERT D_ Page.3/4:1-18 that power _is available to at.least'one division;of. heat: tracing circuitry and .j i t t l A9011153/SNLICFLR - 13 j p q l l-t. -.. ; c. u...- _.. u ..-....a. ~.
NPE 49/052 -REACTIVITY CONTROL SYe.TEi45- ' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- (Continued): -j b. At least once per 31 days;by;. 1. Starting-both pumps and: recirculating demineralized water to'th'e'. ^ test tank.- J 2. Verifying the continuity of thelexplosive charge. '3. -Determining that-the niil d1: ::ight Of ::diu: p:nt:br:t: i: grette th:n er ';u:1 to 5900 lb: :nd the concen ion of: boron in. solution is within theblimits of Figure 3.1. y chemical 3 analysis.* j 4. Verifying that.each valve,Lmanual, power operated or automatic, 1. in the flow path'that--is not locked, sealed,.or-otherwise secured in position,.is inLits correct position. .I Demonstrating that, when tested pursuant..to' Specification.4~.0.5,
- c.
the minimum flow requirement of 41.2 gpm at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1300 psig.is met,:without actuation of the pump- ' i reliefsvalve. d. 'At least once per 18 months.during shutdown'by;. 1. . Initiating.one of the. standby-liquid control system subsystems, including an explosive _ valve and verifying;that. a flow path fromlthe. pumps to.the reactor pressure vessel;is available by. pumping demineralized water into the reactor: l -vessel. T_he replacement charge 1for.the explosive valve shall be' from the same~ manufactured batch as the=one-fired or.from another batch which has been certified by having one of that - batch successfully fired.. Both system subsystems;shall be: tested in - 36' mont'as. 2. -Demonstrating that=the pump relieffvalve. opens within 3% of the system design-pressure and. verifying-that the' relief'~ valve a does~not actuate during recirculation toithe: test tank. 3.
- Demonstratingthatall)heattracedpiping.betweenLthestorage-
. \\ . tank and the reactor-vessel is' unblocked-by' pumping 1from the' storage tank to.the test tank'and then draining and flushing 1 -the' piping with-demineralized: water. 4. Demonstrating that the storage tank heater 3is.0PERABLE by-verifying the expected: temperature risetfor the sodiumLpentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heater-is' energized.
- This test shall also be performed anytime water or boron is added to the g op solution or when the solution temperature drops belo tr.: 'imit f Tigur: 2.1. E l.
Ghe sue.+1on piping temperature i
- This test shall also be performed whenever}b tb S::t tr :ing :f rauf t; h:v:
-bee
- found to begin:per:b1:-and may be performed bytany series:of sequential, overicpping or total flow path steps such that the entire flow path is included.
h 6h ( GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-19 Amendment-No. 41; l
-.,m. W g " DM&WNSS'MEM5 f. 2S'x' I d'SS SSxxN'OS' i s'sSs' A'x>m qm ,- - -.., g y nm SS x52<'SSSxN'c M'S' M'S' xN'cSx i 7.:<xN'x AN NN 'A 'J Bt t t 't Xs'OS ,,N i NNNXNx'SxN' xs' xN's' s M' ' "x'S'x 'xS'N s2s S 'M M N '; S ' c S ' M ' p I. I_ l. TANK CONCENTRATION,% BY WEIGHT >p[ q SOO!UM PENTABORATE SOLUTION TEMPERATURE /CONCENTRATK)N REQ FIGURE 3.1.5-1
~ l o B 150 140 5 130 o l UMITED OPERATION l [ 120 9 8 E / o g m 2 100 g j y===a= 0 h* E / l M 70 e m p gr y,r4 pg g g y c f rz ju 5 5 3 40 as E 10 15"' 20 25 25 30 -4 CONCENTRATION (% BYWBGHT) FIGURE 3.1.5-1 SODIUM PENTABORATE SCLUTION TEMPERATURFJCONCENTRATION REQUIREMENTS
e + t I e' l s l -g g l ljl &l ll N 1HDIEM AG NOl1VH1NEONOO 31VWOGVINEd Wnl0OS INEDWEd. GRAND GULF UNIT 1 3/4121 AMENDMENT NO.
N PE -88/of - REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued) The RPCS provides automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted. A rod is out of sequence if it does l not meet the criteria of the Banked Position Withdrawal. Sequence (Reference 1) as described in the FSAR. The RPCS' function is allowed to be bypassed in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) if necessary, for example, to insert an in-operable control rod, return an out-of-sequence control rod to the proper in-sequence position or move an in-sequence control rod to another in-sequence position. The requi ement that a second qualified individual verify such bypassing and positioning of control-rods ensures that the bases for RPCS limitations are not exceeded. In addition, if THERMAL POWER is below the-low power setpoint, additional restrictions are-provided when bypassing control rods to ensure operation at all times within the basis of the control rod drop accident analysis. The baseline analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in Reference 1. Analyses applicable to the current cycle are addressed in the appropriate cycle-specific documentation. The RPCS is also designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during higher power operation. A dual channel system is provided that, above the low power setpoint, restricts the withdrawal distances of ali non peripheral control rods. This restriction is greatest at highest power levels. 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM y The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for bring-ing the reactor from full power to a cold, xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the withdrawn control rods remain fixed in the rated power pattern. To meet this objective it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of-660 ppm in the reactor core in approximately 90 to 120 minutes. A minimum Ovcilable quantity of 1530 g:llen: Of ::dium p nt:bcr t ::1ution (-- -estt ining minimum of 5000 lb:. Of : dium p;nt:bcr t: is required to.:::t : -stw%:un requir ::nt of K There is an-additional allowance of 165 ppm in the reactoi core to a'. count for imperfect mixing and leakage. The time requirement was selected to ',verride the reactivity insertion rate due' to cooldown following the xenon put:un peak and the required pumping rate is 41.'2 gpm. The minimum storage volume of th: 001uti n is established to allow for the portion below the pump suction that cannot be inserted. The temperature requirement is neces-sary to ensure that the sodium pentaborate remains in solution. t 32E AT B 1. C.J. Paone, " Banked Position Wii.hdrawal Sequence," GE Topical Report, NED0-21231, January 1977. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 73)
INSERT A to Page B 3/4 1-4 To meet the 3% shutdown requirement, the minimum required solution. concentration at the design volume of 4530 gallons is 14.4 weight percent. In order to establish this minimum concentration, it is necessary to have a minimum weight of 5803 pounds of sodium pentaborate. INSERT B to page B 3/4 1-4 w y-The sodium pentaborate solution is required to be maintained above the minimum required concentration and below the maximum allowable concentration on Figure 3.1.5-2. INSERT C to Page B 314 1-4 The sodium pentaborate solution volumes specified in ACTION a.3 and Figure 3.1.5-2 are based on a 90 F nominni sodium pontaborate solution temperature. A - A-. x l l l l l l l l A9011153/SNLICFLR - 14
I h)PE - 98/05l -REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEMS i l BASES STANDBY-LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (Continued)- With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system;. operation of the reactor it permitted to-l continue for short-periods of time.with the system inoperable or for longer . periods of time with'one of the redundant components inoperable. Relief valves are povided on the SLCS pump discharge piping to protect the SLCS pump and piping from overpressure conditions. Testing of the. relief' valve setpoint and verifying that the relief valve does not open during steady. state operation of the'SLCS pumps demonstrates OPERABILITY offthe relief valve. The' relief valves are ASME Class 2 valves and, as such, have a i 3% tolerance in the opening pressure from the set pressure, per the ASME Code (Section III - Division 1 Subsection NC-7614.2(b), 1974 Edition). Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the system. Once the solution is' established, boron con-centration will not vary unless t ce boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once each-24 hours assures.that the solution is-available for use. ggg
- j. Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals will-assure that these valves'will not fail because of deterioration of the-charges.
Compliance with the NRC ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62 has been demonstrated by means of the equivalent control capacity concept using the plant specific minimum parameters.- This concept requires that each boiling water reactor must have a standby liquid control system with.a minimum flow capacity and boron content equivalent in control capacity to 86 gpm for 13% weight sodium pentaborate solution (natural boron enrichment) used for the:251-inch diameter reactor vessel studied in NEDE-24222,. Reference 2. The described minimum sys-tem parameters (82.4 gpm, 13.6% weight with natural. boron enrichment) provides an equivalent control capacity to the 10CFR 50.62 requirement. The techniques of the analysis are presented in a licensing topical report NEDE-31096-P, -Reference 3. Only one subsystem is needed to fulfill'the system design basis, and two subsystems are needed to fulfill ATWS rule requirements. An SLCS subsystem consists of the storage tank, one divisio. al pump, explosive type valve, and associated controls, and other valves, piping, instrumentation,'and controls necessary to prepare and inject neutron absorbing solution into the reactor. 2. " Assessment of BWR Mitigation of ATWS, Volume II," NEDE-24222, December. 1979. 3. L. B. Claasen et al., " Anticipated Transients Without Scram, Response to NRC ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62," G. E. Licensing Topical Report prepared for i the BWR Owners' Group. NEDE-31096-P, December 1985. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4a Amendment No. 73)
'r 1 d 1NSI:RT A t o Page 11 3 /4 1-aa g e w -- % Temperature surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that j 4 assures a high probability that the solution temperature remains above ths saturation tem;>eraturf as illustrated by Figure 3.1.5-1. More frequent y i surveillance is required when operating in the " Limited Operation" region of l Figure 3.1.5-1 because of decreased margin to satu.'ation. i _s 1 i il i i I N 1 I 1 i J l l A9011153/SNLICFLR - 15 -m ,. _.. ~... _. _. _,.. _..,,... _ _ _ _ _ _.,. _.. ...,c. .,.. _.,}}