ML20065F360
| ML20065F360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1982 |
| From: | Read D CHAPEL HILL ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP EFFORT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8210010328 | |
| Download: ML20065F360 (14) | |
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l 00CKETED US U.0 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'E2 SIP 30 m:32 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Glenn O. Bright Dr. James H. Carpenter James L.' Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of
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Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al.
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50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,
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Units 1 ani 2)
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September 17, 1982 SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT REGABDING PSYCHOIOGICAL STRESS CONTENTIONS
- 1. Introduction On May 14, 1982 Chapel Hill Anti-Nuclear Group Effort (CHANGE)/ Environmental Iaw Project (ELP) filed with this Board its ' Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene," at page 14 of which were included contentions numbered 39 and 40, all-eging inadequacy of the Applicants' Environmental Report (ER),
l for failure to consider (1) psychological stress upon people living near the Shearon Harris plant (s) occasioned by its op-eration and (2) long-term psychological disturbances in child-ren living near the plant. At the special prehearing confer-I ence held at Raleigh, North Carolina on July 13 and 14, 1982, l
Daniel F. Read, acting in his capacity as representative for CHANGE /ELP, asked that the Board " defer" these contentions.
Since then, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has ruled on ' deferral" of contentions, Duke Power Company et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB 687, N.R.C.
(August 19, 1982). For the reasons set out below, CHANGE /ELP believes that the contentions as drafted are valid issues, properly within the jurisdiction of.this Boani, and I
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i Page 2 that the question of deferral is moot with respect to these issues.
CHANGE /ELP now files this supplemental statement of reas-tions are
,ons why it believes the psychological stress conten valid. As no new contentions are being advanecd, and as this statement is not in the nature of adding basis or specificity (which is not really at issue, since no information has been advanced by the Applicants or Staff on which to base contentions) but rather in the nature of legal argument, CHANGE /ELP believes the late filing criteria of 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a) are not appli-cable, and that the Boarti's duty under 10 C.F.H. 2.718 to con-duct a fair hearing should encompass allowing CHANGE /ELP to advance these arguments as to the applicable law. In the alter-native, CHANGE /ELP hereby moves, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.730, i
that the Boatti cons: der these arguments in ruling on the pro-ffered contentions, by allowing th w in as amendments to the originals pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a), for the following reasons in satisfaction of the criteria of that section:.
(i) CHANGE /ELP is not represented by counsel. The argu-ments herein are essentiially of a legal nature, involving mat-ters which only recently came to the attention of CHANGE /ELP.
Also, the Commission's policy statement complained of did not appear in the Federal Register until July 22, 1982, after the conference. Finally, the Board has earlier shown its will-ingness to entertain legal argument after expiration of the
" normal" filing deadlines, e.g., CHANGE /ELP's and CCNC's "Brief Concerning Spent Fuel Transshipment."
l (2) The issues controverted will not be raised elsewhere.
No other agency has authority to consider these issues, People Against Nuclear Energy v. N.R.C.,
F.2d
, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir.1982) (citing opinion of Commissioner Bradford), nor has any other party to this proceeding had such contentions ad-i mitted by the Board.
(3) Based on the PANE v. N.R.C. case cited above, the contentions raise issues cognizable under the National Envir-onmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4331 et sea._, and there-
Page 3 fore litigation of them in the present proceeding will con-tribute to the development of a full, hence sound, record.
(4) As noted above, no other party has had similar com tentions admittad, nor have any parties, based on information and belief, advanced similar arguments to those advanced here-in.
(5) Due to the vital nature of the issues involved, and the direct impact of the proposed license activities on the helth of CHANGE /ELP and its members, CHANGE /ELP's partici-pation with respect to these issues will not unduly enlarge the scope of this proceeding, particularly in light of the Board's statutory mandate under NEPA to assess "ag adverse environmental impacts which cannot be avoided should the proposal be im-plemented," 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
Therefore CHANGE /ELP asks that the Board admit the.
proffered contc:ntions. Should the Board in its discretion ordertheApplicantsortheStafftopreparestudiesandfdal-ysis of psychological stress phenomena caused or likely to~be caused by the operation of the plant (s), CHANGE /ELP will withdraw this request subject to the right to formulate com tentions based,on the analyses advanced when such analyses l
are available.
- 2. The Contentions The contentions allege inadequacy of the Applicants' ER.
As such they do not directly allege inadequacies in the statu-tory analysis required by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). Howver, it is beyond cavil that the environmental impact statement (EIS) required by NEPA for the proposed licensing action will be based on the ER. Preparation of the draft EIS does not, by Commission regulation,10 C.F.R. --51.22, even begin until re-ceipt of the ER, and it is required to discuss the matters covered as directed by regulation in the ER, 10 C.F.B. 51.23(a)
(EIS must include matters required to be in the EB by 10 C.F.B.
51.20(a), (e) and (g)). Similarly, the cost / benefit analysis required in the EIS by 10 C.F.R. 51.23(c) is evaluated on the l
l l
Paga 4 same basis as the ER,,geet 10 C.F.R. 51.20(o). The near-perfect congruence between the criteria required by 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)
(C) and those enumerated at 10 C.F.R. 51,20(a)(1)-(5) as re-quirements for the ER bear out this close connection. Inescap-ably, an adequate ER is essential to an adequate EIS, partic-ularly since the Applicants are the sole source of reliable in-formation as to many of the proposed license activities. In addition, the ER cost / benefit balance required by 10 C.F.R. 51.20(b) cannot be drawn if it omits a major health effect of the activity on the local population. Therefore, the alleged inar.'.equacies in the ER go to the assessments required by NEPA, and the contentions are properly framed. As a matter of public policy it is to the Applicants' and the Commission's advantage in building public confidence that these issues be analyzed ani dealt with as early as possible; admitting them for liti-gation at this stage will further this goal.
- 3. The Procedural Background At the time of the hearing in this docket in July the PANE case had only recently been decided by Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: the amended judgment was filed April 2, 1982, and opinions were filed May 14, 1982 The NRC did not publish its " Statement of Policy: Consider-ation of Psychological Stress Issues" until July 22, 1982, 47 F.R. 31762-3 At the time of the hearing, then, NBC policy on psychological stress contentions was unclear. The Boarti stated that when that policy did issue, that it would deter-mine the admissibility of such contentions according to it, including the CHANGE /ELP contentions at issue here.
The policy statement sets stringent requirements for the admissibility of psychological stress contentions, gener-ally requiring some "c&tastrophe" similar to that at Three Mile Islani as the cause of the stress, which would if applied here require the rejection of the proffered contentions. For the reasons outlined in section 4 following, CHANGE /ELP be-lieves that the policy statement is not binding in this pro-ceeding. For the reasons outlined in section 5 following,
Page 5 CHANGE /ELP believes that the reasoning of the policy state-ment is also faulty. Therefore, the Board must allow the pro-ffered contentions to be, litigated, or in the alternative compel the analyses requested to be performed.
- 4. Effect of the Policy Statement Under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et sea., the Commission is empowered to issue rules and regulations regartl-ing,among other matters, licensing proceedings and their con-duct, 42 U.S.C. 2201(p), B.P.I. v.
A.E.C., 502 F.2d 424 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), and to establish licensing boards and appeal boards, 42 U.S.C. 2241. In establishing such rules and regulations re-garding adjudicatory procedures before it, the Commission is by law expressly bound, 42 U.S.C. 2231, to follow the dictates of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et sea. The APA establishes procedures for the development of such rules, whi'ch may have the effect of law, through informal and formal rulemakings and through adjudicatory proceedings. An extensive case law has dev' eloped since the APA's passage in 1946, clar-ifying and defining its procedural requirments.
Under section 4 of the APA, the Commission may develop and-j promulgate binding rules of general applicability by informal rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. 553. For rules governing licensing pro-ceedings generally, this is the preferred method, " designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application," National Labor Belations Board v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 89 S.Ct.1426,1429 (1969). Addition-ally, the Commission may develop rules of general application through its adjudicatory process, Id. at 765 6, 89 S.Ct. at 1429-1430, see also Securities and Exchanste. Commission v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), as for example the NRC has attempted to do with respect to defining what is in fact an acceptable contention. This latter approach is obviously fraught with the difficulties of interpretation (and likeli-hood of subsequent litigation) inherent in the " common law" approach.
Page 6 It is clear, however, that policy statements have no binding effect: section 4(b)(A) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A),
specifically excludes " interpretative rules" and " general state-ments of policy" from rulemaking. A rule arrived at via a j
rule making is a " statement of general or particular applica-bility and future effect" designed among other things to describe the " organization, procedure, or practice require-ments of an agency," 5 U.s.C. 551(4). 5 U.S.C. 553 requires that such rules must be promulgated following traditional notice and comment procedures. Generally, rules which are not promulgated by this procedure (or by adjudication) are inval-id; to the extent that the policy statement of of. July 22 I
purports to have a binding effect on licensing Boards, it is invalid.
This view is substantiated by Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
- v. Federal Power Commission, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and the many cases which have followed it. In Pacific Gas an onier of the FPC attempting to set forth a policy giving guid-ance and uniformity to companies unsure of the proper means of implementing end use scheduling was challenged by non pri-ority users. Although there was some question in the case as to exactly what the challenged order was, the Court deci-ded that it was in fact a policy statement, published without the notice and comment procedures required by the APA. Bei' ore reaching that result, and in essence rendering the order of no effect, the Court discussed at length the differences be-tween a policy statement and a " properly adopted substantive rule":
A general statement of policy is the outcome of neither a rulemaking nor an adjudication; it is neither a rule nor a precedent but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which the agency hopes to implement in future relemakings or adjudications. A
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general statement of policy, like a press release, presages an upconing rulemaking or announces the course which the agency intends-to follow in future adjudications.
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. - - - =. - - - - - - - -
Page 7 The critical distinction between a sub-stantive rule and a general. statement of policy is the different practical effect these two types of pronouncements have in tations] A properly adopted substantive [Ci subsequent administrative proceedings.
rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law. In subsequent admin-istrative proceedings involving a substan-tive rule, the issues are whether the ad-judicated facts conform to the rule should be waived or applied in that particular in-stance. The underlying policy embodied in the rule is not generally subject to chall-enge before the agency.
A general statement of policy, on the other hand, does not establish a " binding norm." It is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is address-ed. The agency cannot annly or rely on a general statement of policy as law because a general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as pol-icy. A policy statement announces the agen-cy's tentative intentions for the future.
When the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be urenared to succort the policy.iust as if the policy
,gtatement had never been issued. An agency cannot escape its responsibility to present
[
l evidence and reasoning supporting its sub-l stantive rules by announcing binM ng prece-dent in the form of a general statement of policy. 506 F.2d at 38-39 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
To allow the agency to adopt rules and apply them when they are not based "upon substantial and extensive record evid-ence," 506 F.2d at 39, not only deprives the public of its right to participate in the decisionmaking process as safe-guartled by the APA but also creates intolerable problems for the reviewing courts, 506 P.2d at 39 40. Thus the rule in Pacific Gas represents good law and has been followed consist-ently, see for example Consolidated Edision of New Yorx. Inc.
- v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Regular Common Carrier Conference of the United States v. U.S., 628 F.2rl 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). There have been some exceptions to the rule': for example, in the Con Ed case cited above the Court held that I
I the emergency conditions of the national gas crisis made the
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Page 8 burden of justification on the agency somewhat less "elab-orate." Waivers to general policies have been offered to attempt to cure their defects: however, in Guardian Federal Savings & Loan v. Fedez al Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.,
589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir.1978), it was held that the policy statenent must leave the administrator free to exercise his informal discretion, *; hat the mere presence of some discretion in the form of a waiver is not enough to satisfy the APA, 589 F.2d at 666 67. On the other hand, a policy guideline was
" entitled to a presumption of applicability" in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384-86 (D.C. Cir.1979), because it did allow waivers, but also because it had been made avail-able for public comment and the agency had advanced reasons for declining to adopt the industry proposals. The basic rule of law remains, however, and must be applied also to the Commission's July 22, 1982 statement.
If the policy statement is without binaing effect, then the Boarsi must remain " free to exercise its informal discret-ion," Guardian Federal, suura, andr although it may be guided by the Commission 8s tentative statement of policy, it must l
supply valid reasons for rejecting the proferred contentions.
- 5. Effect of the PANE Decision However, the PANE decision does not supply such justif-ication for rejecting the CHANGE /ELP contentions. To the con-trary, it supports those contentions and requires that the psychological effects on health of the proposed license activ-ities be-considered in the environmental evaluations of the plant (s).
In deciding the PANE case, the Court of Appeals had before it two major issues, (1) that potential harms to psychological health were cognizable under NEPA and (2) that potential harms to psychological health must be taken into account by the Commission as part of its responsibility for the public health i
and safety under the Atomic Energy Act, slip op. at 3. The Court rejected the Atomic Energy Act contention, but agreed with PANE with respect to the NEPA contention, with the opin-I
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Page 9 ion by Circuit Judge Wright, concurred in by Senior Circuit Judge McGowan, representing the opinion of the Court on that issue,,gge, sliv on. at 2. Judge Wilkey dissented as to NEPA, while his rejection of the AEA contention was adopted as the majority position, I_d. In summm izing his opinion, Judge Wright did not limit the scope of the holding, only whether or not the finding that psychological stress is cognizable under NEPA required preparation of a supplemental EIS:
PANE contends that...the Commission must take into account potential harms to psychological health and community well-being. We hold that these environmental impacts are cognizable un-der NEPA. Therefore, the Commission must make
- a. threshold determination,. based on adequate study, whethei ~the potential psych' logical o
health effects of renewed operation of TMI-1 are sufficiently significant that NEPA re-quires preparation of a supplemental environ-mental impact statement, Slip op. at 3.
After summarizing the case's procedural development, slip
_o_p. at 3-9, Judge Wright proceeded to a NEPA analysis. It should be noted here that this analysis was not a pre-action analysis of the sort contemplated by 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), but one re-quired as part of the Commission's ongoing duty to adjust to changed circumstances, slip on. at 9. Further, it should be noted that the Court was deciding between two positions, one of which would have denied any responsibility to consider psychological stress, and the other which requested the full panoply of procedures associated with the preparation of a full EIS, slip on. at 9 and 11. It is not surprising that the Court merely found that the impacts were cognizable, and re-manded for a decision as to whether or not an EIS was required.
CHANGE /ELP would point out here that it is not asking for an l
EIS on this question, but that these cognizable impacts be considered in the environmental snalyses evaluating the effects of the plant.'s operation: the contentions allege inadequacy for lack of consideration, not lack of a separate document.
Judge Wright first considered the position advanced by the Commission in its brief opposing the PANE contention:
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Page 10 l
[T]he Commission's brief contends that the psychological effects alleged by PANE, which were caused by the TMI-2 accident and would assertedly be perpetuated by restart of TMI-l 1, are beyond the scope of NEPA....This asser-l tion is far-reaching. Regardless of the sev-l erity of psychological health effects, the position taken in the Commission's brief would exclude them from consideration at any stage of the NEPA procedures relating to any pro-posed federal action. We find this interpreta-tion of NEPA unpersuasive. The Commission's brief ignores the simple fact that effects on psychological health are effects on the health of human beings, slip op. at 11-12 Judge Wright proceeded to review the overriding legislative concern with human health expressed in NEPA, summarizing as follows:
EIS [or to be c[n]o subject to be covered by an
...In short, "
onsidered under NEPAJ can be.
more important than the potential effects of a j
Citizens Against Toxic Spravs. Inc. v. Bergland, federal program upon the health of human beings,"
428 F.Supp. 908, 927 (D. Ore. 1977)
We conclude that, in the context of NEPA, at 12-13 ( footnote omitted)gical health, slip op.
health encompasses psycholo (phrase added).
Judge Wright also pointed to the interdisciplinary approach required by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(A), to justify this posi-tion. He then went on to discuss and refute the Commission's extensively supported arguments (1) that the issue of psych-ological stress is beyond the scope of NEPA because it is not readily quantifiable, slip op. at 14-15, and (2) that the case law establishes no requirement for consideration of the issue, slip op. at 15.
In summing up his NEPA analysis, Judge Wright fit it to the facts before the Court:
...In our view, Congress intended to include psychological health within the meaning of
" health" for purposes of NEPA. NEPA does not encompass mere dissatisfactions arising from social opinions, economic concerns, or politi-4 cal disagreements with agency policies. It does apply to post-traumatic anxieties, accompanied by physical effects and caused by fears of re-l curring catastrophe. Therefore, the severity i
of a psychological effect is not only relevant to whether an EIS is required under NEPA, as
Page 11 Judge Wilkey concedes, Wilkey dissent at 13, but also to the cognizability of the impact under the statute.
We need not attempt to draw a bright line in this case. Tnree Mile Island is, at least so far, the only event of its kind in the American experience. We cannot believe that the psychological aftermath of the March 1979 accident falls outside the broad -scope of the National Environmental Policy Act, slip op.
at 16-17.
In its policy statement, the Commission seizes upon these last two paragraphs, effectively ignoring the entire body of the opinion. Rather than reading the Court's failure to de-vise a " bright line test" as merely a recognition that the facts "in this case" were sufficiently compelling as to make such fine procedural distinctions unnecessary, the Commission reads out of this language a strict three-part test, policy statement at 3, which in effect requires that a nuclear acci-dent-at least as severe as the one at Three Mile Island have already occurred in the area affected by. proposed license act-ivities to justify admission of psychological stress conten-tions, policy statement at 3 4. Only where post-traumatic anxieties caused by fears of recurring catastrophe and accom-panied by physical effects are present and alleged would the j
Commission allow their admission into litigation, policy state-ment at 3 4. The Commission thus hopes to render the judgment virtually meaningless, by conditioning NEPA consideration of psychological stress issues not upon the implicitly future
" environmental impact of the proposed action," 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2)(C)(1), but on past disasters in the area around the plant under consideration.
The Court's opinion leads to a different result: "The key to our decision is the potential effect on health," slip op. at 16 (emphasis added), indicates the Court's concern for future events, not the past. Similarly, the Court found that "the holocaust potential of an errant nuclear reactor," slip op.
at 15 (emphasis added), justified departing from the body of case law under NEPA. The discussion of cognizability based on thesevfyityofeffects,slivon.at16-17,mustbeseenagainst l
Page 12 this background: ~ instructive in this regard is footnote 10, slip op. at 16-17, CIJn the esthetic realm Judge Leventhal re-cognized that some effects were intended by Congress to be considered and that others, per-taining " essentially to issues of individual and potentially diverse tastes," were outside the scope of NEPA. [ Citation] He referred to psychological factors as an analogy; in both some questions are "not realms, he wrote, le into concrete measuring translatab readily[ Citation] But the difficulty of meas-rods. "
urement does not exclude the beauty of scenery in the national parks from consideration under NEPA. nor should it exclude the medically diast-nosed effects of traumatic accidents on the_
fiuman mind, (emphasis added).
Surely no one would dispute that the beauty of park scenery is to be considered before taking action that would damage it or establishing conditions that might imperil it, and it l
foll'ows that psychological stress ought to be considered.b_e-fore allowing operation of a nuclear reactor with its atten-dant " holocaust potential." PANE was challenging the proposed 1
operation of the otherwise undamaged TMI-1, not TMI 2: other i
l than its location, there is nothing to separate TMI-i from l
many other reactors around the country, each with its own
" holocaust potential" and the ensuing psychological stress.
The Court was considering case law dealing with housing, Job Corps centers, postal service facilities, slip op. at 15, not other nuclear plants, and it is not surprising that it found that NEPA required consideration of psychological prob.
l 1 ems before operation. In light of the above, it follows that the Court certainly envisaged that psychological stress would be considered in NEPA analysis of all nuclear plant operations.
The Commission's policy statement chooses to ignore this Even Judge Wilkey in his analysis and tries to circumvent it;Mt u, du flu muwmy op&m dissent recognized /that NEPA consideration should be manda-tory in all licensing decisions, Wilkey dissent at 18; Consideration of the pctential for harm from' exposure to radiation is not postponed until actual exposure takes place; it-is the potential harm that is to be considered. If, as PANE
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Page 13 alleges, the TMI 2 accident caused severe psychological harm, then any nuclear acci-dent has the potential for " causing" such harm. NEPA consideration therefore should be mandatory in all licensing decisions, if psychological stress is cognizable at all, Wilkey dissent at 18.
Both Judge Wilkey's. dissent and the Commission'.s policy statement note that it will better serve the public interest by concentrating on reducing the underlying safety and other l
defects that create the accident potential that causes the psychological stress, policy statement at 4-5. As the Commiss-ion itself has only recently reiterated, however, the complex-ity of nuclear power plant systems and the necessity of con-stant careful control mean that these problems will be vir-tually impossible to eliminate:
[U]nanticipated circumstances can oocur during the course of emergencies. These circumstances may call for responses different from any consi-Sered during the course of licensing-....Special circumstances requiring a deviation from license requirements are not necessarily limited to tran-sients or accidents not analyzed in the licensing process. Special circumstances can arise during emergencies involving multiple equipment fail-ures or coincident accidents where plant emer-gency procedures could be inconf.lict, cn? not applicable to the circumstances, Proposed Rule,
" Applicability of License Conditions and Tech-nical Specifications in an Emergency," Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 160, August 18, 1982, p.
35996, (emphasis added).
Congress recognized this problem as early as 1957:
Notwithstanding comprehensive testing and study, the uniqueness of this form of energy production made it impossible totally to rule out the risk of a major nuclear accident resulting in exten-sive damage. Private industry and the AEC were confident that such a disaster w&uld not occur, I
but the very uniqueness of nuclear power meant that the possibility remained, and the potential liability dwarfed the ability of the industry and private insurance companies to absorb the risk.
ECitation] Thus, while repeatedly stressing that l
the risk of a major nuclear accident was extr.eme-ly remote, spokesmer for the private sector in-l formed Congress that they would be forced to with-i draw from the field if their liability were not limited by appropriate legislation. [ Citation]
Congress responded in 1957 by passing the Price-
Page 14 Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C. 2210 [et sea.
Duke Power Comoany v. Carolina Environ-1 Study Group. Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 2620,262526,57L.Ed.2d595(19783.98 men S.Ct.
Despite assurances that Price-Anderson would only be a tempo-rary enactment, it has been co fnued twice since 1957. Despite further assurances that the nuclear power industry is now mature, and many of the problems have been worked out, it is clear from the rule-making cited and continued industry support of PricelAnderson that the underlying problems remain:
in fact, this may be one of the main sources of psychological stress, that despite vast investment and billions spent in safety research these problems remain and with them the " holo-caust potential" of nuclear accident.
- 6. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, CHANGE /ELP believes that this Board, in carrying out fp duty to " consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action,"
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1216, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (emphasis added), must allow litigation of the psychological stress contentions proffered, or in the alter-native, order that the Applicants and the Staff consider such stress in their environmental analyses. CHANGE /ELP reiterates here that it is not asking for a supplemental EIS, but for consideration of this environmental impact, as required by
- 42. U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(ii) and 10 C.F.R. 51.20(a)(2).
He ectful
- ubmitted, Daniel F. Read President, CHANGE P.O. Box 524 Chapel Hill, NC 27514 I
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