ML20065D018
| ML20065D018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  (NPF-58-A-056, NPF-58-A-56) |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065D021 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-M77736, NUDOCS 9404060172 | |
| Download: ML20065D018 (7) | |
Text
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I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 56 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 4
DOCKET NO. 50-440 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.
Remove Insert 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-6a B 3/4 6-2 8 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2a B 3/4 6-2a-B 3/4 6-2b (repositioned) 1 9404060172 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000440 P
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal a.
transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock' door shall be closed, and 3
b.
An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 2.5 scf per 3
hour at P,,11.31 psig.
APPL ICABil ITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and #.
ACTION:
With one or both air locks having:
l a.
r 1.
an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock, a) Maintain at least one OPERABLE air lock door closed
- and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> lock one OPERABLE air lock door closed.
b) Operation may then continue provided that at least once per 31 days, one OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed i
2.
one inoperable air lock door, or, both one inoperable door and an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock, 3
t a) Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed ** and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
b) Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that at least once per 31 days the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT When handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Entry into and exit from the air lock (s) or primary containment, including through a " locked closed" door, is permitted under administrative controls.
- If one or both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from the air lock (s) through the OPERABLE door is permitted under administrative controls to perform repairs of the affected air lock components. Also, if both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from primary containment is permitted under admiristrative controls for 7 days.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 56
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDli10N FOR OPERATION (Continued)
SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION f, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a t
potential for draining the reactor-vessel.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
[
b.
With a primary containment air lock inc able in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 er 3, except as a result of an inc.
able air lock door and/or interlock mechanism, maintain at least - e air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at t
least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, c.
With a primary containment air lock inoperable, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION
, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door and/or interlock mechanism, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or suspend all operations involving handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining tne reactor vessel.
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PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6a Amendment No. 56
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES l
3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT (Continued) 3/A.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (Continued)
The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 with the exception of exemptions granted.for testing the air locks after each opening.
l 3 /4. 6.1. 3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the containment leakage rate given in Specifications' 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2.
The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation.
Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the containment.
An allowance has been provided within Action a.1 for access into or through the containment air locks when an interlock mechanism in one or both air locks is inoperable. Action a.1 requires that at least one of_the two l
OPERABLE doors for each affected air lock be maintained closed, and if the interlock mechanism has not been restored to OPERABLE status-within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, one door must be locked closed.
The provisions of footnote
- may,be utilized for entries and exits.
The administrative controls of footnote allow the unlocking and use of the air lock provided that an individual is stationed at the air lock, dedicated to assuring that' at least one OPERABLE air lock door remains closed at all times. This allowance is provided to address those situations when the use of an air lock with only an inoperable interlock mechanism may be preferred over the use of the other air lock, such as when the other air lock has an inoperable door.
l An allowance has also been provHed in Action a.2 for access into or l
through the containment air locks whsa one air lock door in one or both air locks is inoperable. The first sentence of footnote ** provides that entry -
and exit through the OPERABLE door on one or both air locks is permissible under administrative controls for the performance of repairs of the affected air lock components. The second sentence of footnote provides for entry into and exit from the containment for activities other than just the repairs of affected air lock components under administrative controls, but only l
permits these entries when both air locks have an inoperable door, and limits l
such use to a 7 day period. The administrative controls for the second i
sentence shall define limits on entry and exit, in order to minimize openings l
of the OPERABLE door.
l PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No.M,56 i
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1 t
1 1
l 3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS f
BASES i
i j
3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY l
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that-the release of radioactive i
materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage
{
)
paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the t
i site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during i
accident conditions.
i During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary
)
j containment, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, the # footnote permits the opening of six vent j,
and drain pathways for the purpose of performing containment isolation valve leak rate surveillance testing provided the reactor has been suberitical for at least seven days.
Offsite doses were calculated assuming the postulated i
fuel handling accident inside primary containment after a seven day decay 1
time, and assuming all the airborne activity existing inside containment after j
the accident is immediately discharged directly to the environment (i.e., no i
containment). Although this analysis would indicate that no restriction on i
the number of vent and drain pathways was required, the number of open pathways was restricted to six for conservatism.
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3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure nat the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assu.:.ed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure of 11.31 psig, P. As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage r, ate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible dege.dation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
Overall integrated leakage rate means the leakage rate which obtains from a summation of leakage through all potential leakage paths. Where a leakage path contains more than one valve, fitting, or component in series, the leakage for that path will be that leakage of the worst ~ leaking valve, fitting, or component and not the summation of the leakage of all valves, fittings, or components in that leakage path.
Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves.
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. D,35
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.. - -. ~ ~
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l-CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
' B A S'E S i~
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS (Continued) i The administrative controls for both-sentences of footnote " include i
provisions that after each entry and, exit, the OPERABLE door must be promptly I
closed.
The allowances of footnote-
~are acceptable because of the low j
probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door will be open-for entry into and exit from the j
containment.
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The air supply' to the containment air lock and seal system is the service I
and instrument air system.
The system consists of two 100% capacity air i
compressors per unit and can be cross-connected.
j-This~ system is redundant and x
extremely reliable and provides system pressure indication in the control 1
room.
jj 3/4.6.1.4 MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM l
i Calculated doses resulting from the maximum leakage allowance for the t
main steam line isolation valves in the postulated LOCA situations ~would be:a j-small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, provided the main steam line.
l j
system from the isolation valves up to and including the turbine condenser remains intNt.
0perating experience has indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the MSIV's'such that-the j
specified leakage requirements have not always been maintained continuously, i
The requirement for the leakage control system will reduce the~ untreated I
leakage from the MSIV's when isolation of the primary system and containment i
is required.
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3/4.6.1.5 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY i
This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of j
the unit.
Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 15 psig in the event of a LOCA.
visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to A
demonstrate this capability.
3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on primary containment to secondary containment differential pressure ensure that the primary containment peak pressure of 11.31 psig does not exceed the design pressure.of 15.0 psig during LOCA i
conditions or that the external pressure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differential of +0.8 psid.
i The limit of -0.1 to +1.0 psid for initial positive primary containment to secondary containment pressure will limit the primary containment pressure to 11.31 psig which is less than'the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.
l PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2a Anendment No.J9,35,56 I
4 CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS BASES I
3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 185'F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis.
3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM The use of the drywell and containment purge lines is restricted to the i
42-inch outboard and 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. These valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.
The term sealed closed as used in this context means that the valve is secured in its closed position by deactivating the valve motor operator, and does not pertain to injecting seal water between the isolation valves by a seal water system.
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2b Amendment!,J9.33,56 (Next page is B 3/4 6-3)
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