ML20065B077
| ML20065B077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1982 |
| From: | Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065B080 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.2.10, TASK-2.K.3.01, TASK-2.K.3.02, TASK-TM G1-82-553, GO1-82-0553, GO1-82-553, NUDOCS 8209140242 | |
| Download: ML20065B077 (1) | |
Text
T Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 Docket No. 50-460 September 9,1982 G01-82-0553 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Ms. E.G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 1 RESPONSE TO NUREG 0737 ITEMS II.K.3.1, II.K.3.2 and II.K. 2.10 In Section 1.10 for the WNP-1 FSAR, in response to NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.1 and II.K.3.2, the Supply System stated that an analysis was being performed to demonstrate that upgrades to the PORV block valve and associated controls will decrease the probability of a small break LOCA caused by a stuck-open PORV.
In response to these two NUREG 0737 items, we also stated our intention to provide analysis that would justify the retention of the as-designed PORV setpoint to allow the PORV to open at a pressure below the high pressure reactor trip setpoint.
These analyses are included in the attached report titled, "PORV Reliability Study and Setpoint Analysis for Tennessee Valley Authority and Washington Public Power Supply System," BAW-1740.
The report concludes that with the upgrades and with the as-designed PORY setpoint the PORV system will not be a major contributor to the probability of small break LOCA.
Therefore, we intend to accept the conclusions of the report to install the automatic PORV block valve closure system and retain the as-designed PORV setpoint.
NUREG-0737, Item II.K.2.10 requires a safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip. We do not intend to add this trip. The attached report establishes that with the upgrades, the reliability requirements are easily achieved even with the elevated PORV challenge rate resulting from the lack of such a trip.
As stated in Section 1.10 of the FSAR, in response to Item II.K.2.10, to add such a trip would take away the plant's ability to runback for such an event, f1o4o e8
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