ML20065B061

Testimony of Rc Jones & LC Lanese Re ALAB-708,Issue 9 on Reliance on Feed & Bleed Cooling.Prof Qualifications Encl

ML20065B061
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/16/1983
From:	Rosalyn Jones, Lanese L METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20065A980	List: ML20065A977 ML20065B010 ML20065B017 ML20065B025 ML20065B040 ML20065B047 ML20065B061 ML20065B079
References
ALAB-708, NUDOCS 8302220381
Download: ML20065B061 (10)

Text

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February 16, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOM 2"C SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. JONES, JR., AND LOUIS C. LANESE IN RESPONSE TO ALAB-708 ISSUE NO. 9 (RELIANCE ON FEED AND BLEED COOLING) 8302220381 830226 (DRADOCK 05000289 PDR

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SUMMARY

l This testimony is in response to the Appeal Board's request that Licensee and the Staff set forth the ponditions for which feed and bleed cooling will be relied upon at TMI-1.

The testimony confirms Licensee's previously stated position that feed and bleed cooling is only required for those beyond design basis events involving an extended loss of both main and emergency feedwater. This testimony also shows that the TMI-1 l- safety valves are capable of successfully relieving two-phase flow.

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INTRODUCTION 1

This testimony, by Robert C. Jones, Jr., Supervisory 2

Engineer, Operational Analysis Unit, Babcock & Wilcox Company, 3

and Louis C. Lanese, Senior Safety Analysis and Plant Control 4

Engineer, GPU Nuclear Corporation, is addressed to Issue No. 9 5

f the Appeal Board's Memorandum and Order of December 29, 1982 6

(ALAB-708), which states:

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9. Whether and under what circumstances reliance 8

on feed and bleed is necessary at TMI-l (from g the licensee and the staff).

10 This testimony will also respond to the concerns expressed by 11 the Appeal Board at page 39 of ALAB-708, regarding the ability 12 f the TMI-l pressurizer safety valves to successfully pass two-phase flow, and the resultant effects on feed and bleed 13 cooling capability.

14 15 RESPONSE TO ISSUE NO. 9 16 BY WITNESS JONES:

17 The feed and bleed method of providing core cooling --

18 utilizing the High Pressure Injection System (HPI) to " feed" 19 water to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and " bleeding" the 20 water from the RCS through the pressurizer relief (PORV) and/or 21 safety valves -- is an additional method of providing forced 22 cooling which would be used as a defense in depth procedure for 23 events beyond the design basis.

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. l In the event of a loss of main feedwater transient, with 1

or without a concurrent small-break LOCA, actuation of emer-2 gency feedwater (resulting in automatic actuation of HPI) or 3

actuation of HPI within approximately 20 minutes will assure 4

adequate heat removal througP the steam generators.1/ It is 5

only for those beyond-design-basis events, involving an 6

extended loss of both main and emergency feedwater, that feed 7

and bleed would be required to remove decay heat from the 8

primary system.2/

9 The feed and bleed mode of core cooling has been thor-10 oughly analyzed by B&W in conjunction with the additional 11 small-break LOCA analyses performed following the TMI-2 12 accident. The scenarios analyzed included: (a) a loss of all 13 feedwater (main and emergency) with a single failure in the HPI 14 system, (b) a loss of all feedwater coincident with small 15 breaks of various sizes (0.07 ft2, 0.02 ft2, 0.01 ft2), and (c) 16 a loss of all feedwater with t very small break (0.01 ft2) and 17 with a subsequent PORV failure. (These analyses are summarized 18 19 1/ For small-break LOCAs greater than approximately 0.02 ft2, secondary side heat removal is not required, as the break 20 itself is large enough to remove the core decay heat. In addi-tion, automatic actuation of HPI will occur for these break 21 sizes.

22 2/ In this case, the inventory injected by the HPI is used to assure the core is covered by liquid coolant or a two-phase 23 mixture and thus adequately cooled, while the water discharged through the PORV or safety valves removes the energy added to 24 the primary system by the core.

25 26 in Tables 2, 3 and 8 of Licensee's Testimony of Robert C.

1 Jones, Jr., and T. Gary Broughton in Response to UCS Contention 2

No. 8 and ECNP Contention No. 1(e), ff. Tr. 5038, and at Tr.

3 5064-73, 5074-87 and 5103-04 (Jones).) Initiation of HPI --

4 and thereby initiation of the feed and bleed mode -- within 5

approximately 20 minutes (for those cases where the ESFAS 6

setpoint is not reached) assure:s the provision of adequate core 7

cooling.

8 g BY WITNESS LANESE:

10 At page 39 of ALAB-708, the Appeal Board has requested 11 inf rmation concerning the ability of the TMI-1 safety valves 12 to pass two-phase flow and the effect that this ability may 13 have upon the TMI-1 plant's capability to achieve feed and bleed cooling. GPU Nuclear, in conjunction with other partici-14 15 pating utilities, sponsored a program to test safety and relief valves. The test program was conducted through the Electric 16 Power Research Institute (EPRI). The valves tested included the same model Dresser safety and relief valves used at TMI-1.

18 g The EPRI test program was the subject of testimony presented before the Licensing Board in response to Board Questions on UCS Contention 6. See Correa, et al., ff. Tr. 8746, and Zudans, ff. Tr. 8824.

The results of those tests showed that the pressurizer relief valve was acceptab.'e for the range of operation at l

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1 TMI-1, including feed and bleed cooling under both steam and 1

liquid relief conditions. The safety valves were shown to be 2

acceptable under all modes of operation after certain modifica-3 tions were made.

4 First, the safety valve inlet piping has been changed from 5

a long inlet to a short inlet arrangement. Test results 6

indicated that valve instabilities could occur for the long 7

inlet arrangement in situations where the valve was discharging 8

water from the loop seal.

9 Second, the TMI-1 safety valve settings were revised to 10 allow blowdown of no more than 20% (versus the previous 11 blowdown of 3%). This increased blowdown eliminates valve 12 instabilities that were detected for both steam and water flow 13 situations.

14 Four tests were performed in which the TMI-1 model safety 15 valves were required to relieve liquid. One test was a 16 transition from steam to liquid, and three tests were liquid 17 flow tests. In the transition case and two liquid flow cases, IO the valve flow rate met the test acceptance criteria. In the 19 final liquid flow case, pressure in the test loop was not 20 controlled by the valve; however, the valve flow rate (550,000 21 lbm/hr) achieved during the test exceeded the requirements for 22 controlling pressure and cooling the core at TMI-1. All four 23 cases demonstrated that the pressurizer safety valves are 24 suitable for operation in the feed and bleed mode of cooling at 25 26 _4_

TMI-1. Moreover, the results confirmed the analysis provided 1

in Licensee Exhibit 9 (the B&W analysis of feed and ble.ed 2

cooling).

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ROBERT C. JONES, JR.

Business Address: Babcock & Wilcox Company Nuclear Power Generation Division Post Office Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Education: B.S., Nuclear Engine'ering, Pennsylvania State University, 1971. Post Graduate Courses in Physics, Lynchburg College.

Experience: July 1982 to present; Supervisory Engineer, Operational Analysis Unit, B&W. Responsible for the performance of plant transient analyses and analyses used in the development of operator guidelines. During this period, has continued as Project Engineer for B&W analyses performed in response to NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.30.

June 1975 to July 1982: Acting Supervisory Engineer and Supervisory Engineer, ECCS Analysis Unit, B&W. Responsible for calculation of large and small break ECCS evaluations, evaluations of mass and energy releases to the containment during a LOCA, and performance of best estimate pretest predictions of LOCA experiments as part of the NRC Standard Problem Program. Involved in the pre-paration of operator guidelines for small-break LOCA's and inadequate core cooling mitigation.

June 1971 to June 1975: Engineer, ECCS Analysis Unit, B&W. Performed both large and small break ECCS analyses under both the Interim Acceptance l Criteria and the present Acceptance Criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K.

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e LOUIS C. LANESE Business Address: GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Education: B.S., Engineering Science, Newark College of Engineering, 1970, M.E., Nuclear Engineering, New York University, 1972. Nuclear Engineering courses, Polytechnic Institute of New York, 1975 to 1980. Com-pleted course work for Degree of Engineer.

Experience: Senior Safety Analysis and Plant Control Engineer, GPU Nuclear Corporation, 1979 to present. Responsi-bilities include the performance of the TMI-l Restart Safety Analysis; TMI-l Emergency Feedwater design, design review of TMI-l restart and long-term modifications. Member of TMI-2 Generation

. Review Committee (GRC), 1979 through June 198.2.

Member of TMI'-l GRC, 1979 to present.

Chairman of the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group Analysis Subcommittee from May 1981 to July 1982.

Currently a member of the Analysis Subcommittee.

Member of the GPUNC inhouse committee responsible for implementing the Abncrmal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG) at TMI-1. Currently working on improvement of steam generator tube rupture emer-gency procedures,* including analyses of tube rupture events using the RETRAN computer code. Working with EPRI in benchmarking RETRAN with RELAP 5 for tube rupture events. Independent safety reviewer for emergency procedures from-August 1982 to present.

Control and Safety Analysis Engineer, GPU Service Corporation, 1978 to 1979. Responsibilities included the performance of containment analyses in support of plant operation; developing analyses in support of the TMI-2 feedwater system modifica-tion; preparation of the TMI-l restart safety analysis.

Lead Nuclear Licensing Engineer, GPU Service Corporation, 1977 to 1978. Primary responsibility for TMI-2 licensing activities and for licensing matters involving generic safety issues affecting all GPU system plants.

LOUIS C. LANESE Page Two Safety and Licensing Engineer, GPU Service Corporation, 1974 to 1977. Responsibilities included technical resolution of TMI-2 licensing open items; conformance of Forked River systems design to licensing criteria; and, safety review of Oyster Creek radwaste facility.

Assistant Safety and Licensing Engineer, Ebasco Services, Inc., Performed licensing and safety review of St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Safety Analysis Report pertaining to instrumentation and power systems; cooling water and HVAC systems, radwaste systems; and, accident analysis. Performed dose analyses and developed secondary system source terms.

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