ML20064K221

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Forwards Proprietary & Nonproprietary Info Re Environ Qualification of Class IE Equipment.Application for Withholding & Affidavit Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)
ML20064K221
Person / Time
Site: McGuire Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/1980
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Harold Denton, Youngblood B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19260G356 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0588, RTR-NUREG-588 NUDOCS 8010170369
Download: ML20064K221 (88)


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Dt xz PowEn COMPANY Powra Bert.ntio 422 Socra Cnemen Srazzi.CnAnt.oriz N. C.asa4a www o. ma nza.sa.

October'14, 1980

- Vice Petsiot=t irgghc=t:anga7Ca Setans *noowetion 373 4ces Mr. H. R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:

Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Projects Branch No. 1 C.

APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Subj ect: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369 l

Dear Mr. Denton:

The attached information updates that provided in my letter of August 13, 1980. For convenience, the entire package of information has been resub-mitted with revised material and pages marked Revision 1.

This information constitutes Duke Power Company's response to NRC letters dated October 15, 1979 and February 15, 1980, concerning equipment qualifications.

t This submittal includes:

1.

Five copies of Information Related to Electrical Equipment Qualification (Proprietary).

2.

Five copies of Information Related to Electrical Equipment Qualification (Non-Proprietary).

Also enclosed is:

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One (1) copy of Westinghouse Affidavit, CAW-80-31 (Non-Proprietary).

As this submittal contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Elec-s 8

tric Corporation, it is supported by an affidavit signed by Westinghouse,

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the owners of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on 8,

which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Com-Y mission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in para-graph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.

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~ Mr. H. R. Denton, Director October 14, 1980 Page Two Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accor-dance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Consnission's regulations. Corres-pondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of this application for withholding or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit should reference CAW-80-31, and should be addressed to R. A. Wiesemann, Manager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P. O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230.

Veiy truly yours, 0.

~W William O. Parker, Jr.

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CAW-80-31 AFFIDAVIT C0!C'OtNEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

ss COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:

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Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Robert A. Wiesemann, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse") and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:

hJ IIY Robert A. Wiesemann, Manager

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Regulatory and Legislative Affairs Sworn to and subscribed before me this e, day

_1980.

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i i CAW-80-31 (1) I am Panager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, in the Nuclear Technology Division, of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and as such, I have beea specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public dis-closure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing or rule-making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions.

I (2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of I

10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations and in con-junction with the Westinghouse application for withholding ac-companying this Affidavit.

(3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential connerical or financial information.

(4) pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the in-formation sought to be withhelu Trom public disclosure should be withheld.

(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.

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3-CAW-80-31 (ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public.

Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of infonnation customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.

The application;of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the c

rational basis required.

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential com-petitive advantage, as follows:

(a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, metnod, etc.)

where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without' license from Westinghouse consti-(

tutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

(b) It consists of' supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.

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I CAW-80-31 (c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

(d) It reveals cost or price information, production cap-acities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its custaners or suppliers.

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(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future West-3 inghouse or customer funded development plans and pro-grams of potential connercial value to Westinghouse.

(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent pro-tection may be desirable.

(g) It is not the property of Westinghouse, but must be treated as proprietary by Westinghouse according to agreements with the owner.

There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:

(a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its com-petitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.

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r 5-CAW-80-31 (b) It is information which is marketable in many ways.

The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.

(c) Use by our competitor would put Wettinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducity his expenditure

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of resources at our expense.

(d) Each componeht'of broprieta'ry information pertinent ~

to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary infor-mation, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.

(e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market.

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and thereby give a market advantage to the competition in those countries.

(f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.

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.. CAW-80-31 (iii) The infonnation is being transmitted to the Comission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790, it is to be received in confidence by the Comission.

(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources to the best of our knowledge and belief.

(v) The proprietary infonnation sought to be withheld in this submittal is appropriately marked infonnation provided to

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Westinghouse utility customers in WCAP-9745 entitled

" asults of Westinghouse Review of Environmental Qualifi-cation References for WRD Supplied Category II Equipment with Respect to the Staff Positions in NUREG-0588" for their use in responding to the NRC request to review their qualification programs against the standards established in NUREG-0588.

This infonnation enables Westinghouse to:

(a) Develop test inputs and procedures to satisfactorily verify the design of Westinghour,e suppifed equipment.

(b) Assist its customers to obtpin licenses.

I Further, the information has substantial comercial value as follows:

(a) Westinghouse can sell the use of this infonnation to l

Customers.

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. CAW-80-31 (b) Westinghouse uses the information to verify the design of equipment which is sold to customers.

(c) Westinghouse can sell testing services based upon the experience gained and the test equipment and methods developed.

Public disclosure of this information is likely to cause

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substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to design, manufacture, verify, and sell electrical equipment for com-mercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others having the same or similar equipment to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.

The development of the equipment described in part by the information is the result of many years of development by Westinghouse and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.

This could only be duplicated by a competitor if he were to invest similar sums of money and provided he had the appropriate talent available and could somehow obtain the requisite experience.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

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McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit i Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment NRC letters dated October 15, 1979 and February 15, 1980 concerning the environmental qualification of Class IE equipment defined the NRC Staff's requirements with respect to NUREG 0588, Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment.

Basically, the Staff's requirements were as follows-i

1) Provide a table listing by generic type all Class IE equipment including the appropriate qualification data for the equipment. The format for this table was provided in the Staff's October 15, 1979 letter.
2) Review the adequacy of the environmental qualification for the equipment identified in Item 1 above with respect to the Staff's position described in NUREG 0588, document the degree

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of conformance, and justify any deviations.

Further, the NRC issued a Memorandum and Order on May 23, 1980 establishing NUREG 0588 as the requirement which applicants must meet in order, to satisfy General Design Criterion 4 relating to the environmental qualification of Class lE equipment.

In response to the NRC Staff's requests for information in this matter, Duke Power Company is providing the following: - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Inside Containment - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to HELB Environment Attacnment 3 - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment

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Locatec Cutside Containment and Exposed to the Post-LOCA Recirculation Radiation Environment 1 - Duke Power Company Position on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588 - Comparison of the Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment Located Inside Containment to the Duke Position on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588

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. - Comparison of the Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to HELB Environment to the Duke Position on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588

- Comparison of the Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to the Post-LOCA Recirculation Radiation Environment to the Duke Position on the Category II I

Guidelines of NUREG 0588 1

i Attachments 1, 2, and 3 provide the tabular listing of Class lE equipment i

exposed to a harsh environment and includes appropriate qualification data for the equipment. Attachments 4, 5, 6, and 7 document the degree of conformance of the equipment qualification programs with the Category II guidelines of NUREG 0588.

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ATTACHMENT 1 SUMM RY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT C

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McGUIRE NUCitAR STAl10N - UNIT I Pete 2

$Urs9 ART OF f MVIRONMENT AL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lt EQUIPMENT Revision l l

LOCAf f 0 IN5IDE CONT AINM(NI Mon-Propeletery i

.s t rMINT MODEL 04 ACCID (NT E NVIP980tt N T OPIsAtlllii OPfRASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACT QUAllFICATI0s1 s ellFItAll0N MANUTACitJRf R IDfNilflCATION ENVIR0let(NT TO WHICH REQ'llef 0 IN DEMONSTRAI(D REQulatt p(MON 11RAlt0 Rtr04T AND lt)

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Rosemount RCS Tegerature (NR)

Pre ss Ik.8 pelg Press:

(Post SLB) plus I hr (lmr contelrpent)

RH:

100%g RH:

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Press: 14.8 psig Press:

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(La.ser contalseent)

RN:

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hydronide soln.

effects only)

Model 176 RF

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The po w r reage new ron detectors are not required for sccidents that ceose e change ---

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Temp: 100 F Temp:

3 sonths 5 year N/A N/A WCAP 7820 end R Mo'abiner Press: 14.8 psig Press:

post 00E post Ott Supplements 14

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RH:

8001 RN:

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Red; 8.lXt0 R Red:

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Chem Sprey: Sorlc Chem Spray: Soric Suppleaents 14 ecid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetreborate soln, hydromide soln.

Method: Test I.

Contale.nent Air Jmy/Rellence 2xF-))0081 te.p:

ISO F Temp:

))O F 1 eenths I year N/A N/A test Report FF-16282 i

Satsen Fan Motors Press: 14.8 psig Pre ss: 85 psis post Det post est and supplementel (Upper contalement)

AN:

8001 RH:

1001 Technical Paper 14-4001 7

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7.6Nt0 4 Red:

lx10 R Test Report 5-604 Chem Sproy: Boric Chee $ prey: Boric fast Report NUC-9 end l

Supplement 4/14/80 ecid and sadlue acid and sodlum tetreborete sola.

hydroxide sola.

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SUMMARY

OF ENvlBONMENTAL QUAllFICAll04 0F CLASS It EQUIPMENT Revision I LOCATED INSIDE CONTAlNMENT Non-proprietary e wHgNT MonfL 04 ACC10fMi (NVIR0m fMT Op( 9AR O LI T Y CpfRAgillyy ACCURACT ACCURACT QUAtlFIC4Tl0N e:,3 tif ttAfl04 MANiff ACTURf A 10(MilFlCATION E N V 4 R0fett NT TO WHICH R(Q'llsf D $N DEMO NS TRAf(D REqutRED Din 0NSTRAl[0 ptP0el ANO ggg settR (2)

QtaALIfilD ACCIDfHT METH00 (NVlR0'etfMT ())

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Nydrogen Sklas=or Joy /Bellence I TF-882345 Te,:

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))O F 2 sonths I year N/A N/A Test Report FF-14282 ren Motors Press: 14.8 psig Press: 85 psig post Ott post Det and Supplemental (Upper contelrunent)

IIN:

100%

BN:

300L 7

9 Technical pas r IA-4081 Red:

7.6510 R Red:

1310 R Test Report I-604 Chee 5 prey: Boric Chem 5 prey: Soric Test Report NUC-9 and acid and sodlese acid and sodlue Supplement 4/14/80 tetreborate soln.

hydroxlde sola.

Method: Test Vilve Stor Rotork 7 NAl. Il NAI, Teep:

327 F Tee,: 340 F

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}c deys N/A N/A Test Reports:

Operctres 14 NAI. 16 NAl.

tress: 14.8 psig Press:

75 pelg (Notes 8 and 9) post DSE "III

  • Deceder 1970 (Lower conseltnent) 30 NAI, 40 NAl, RN:

1001 RN:

1 IR ll6e October 197) 7 10 NAI, 90 NAl Red:

6.7X10 4 Red:

2elo R TR 222. June 1975 Chee Sprey: Doric Chee Sprey: Soric acid and sodlise acid and sodtwo Netted: Test tetreborate sola.

hydromide soln.

Wilve Motor Lleitorque SMS Temp: 327 F Teep 340 F

$ min 30 days N/A N/A Test Report 600-376-4 Operiters Press: 14.8 psig Press: 105 pelg (Notes 8 and 9) post Det Septeder 1972 (lower contelew t)

RN:

J00% 7 RN:

100%

Redt e.7110 A Bad:

2ml08 Test Report 600-456 Chee Sprer Boric Chee Sprey: toric Deced er 1975 ocid and sodlise acid and sodtwo tetraborate soln.

hydronide soln.

Method: Test Wstve Solenold Velcor V526 feep:

327 F is,: 346 F Operate Npon

)I days N/A N/A fe88 R* Ports Opers' tars V57)

Press: 14.8 pelg Press: II) pelg receipt of a post Dog Q4-$2600-585 and (Lower contelement)

V70900-21-1 RN:

100%

RN:

100%

safety signal QR-70900-21-1 i

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V10900-21-)

Red:

1.8110 R Red:

2m10 9 Chee sprey Boric Chem Spray: soric Methods fest scid and sodless ocid and sodlue l

tetroborate sola.

hydroalde soln.

l Contalreant Air Rotor %

llNAll Temp:

1%0 F Temp:

340 F

$ min (men) 30 days N/A N/A Test Report Nil /%

Beturn Isolation Press; 1%.8 psig Press:

75 psig post DOE post egg Dece d er 1970 Osaper Motor RN:

100%

RN:

1001 (Upper contelrument)

Red:

8.IXl0 R Red:

2n10 R Test Report fell 6 8

Chen Sprey: Boric Chen Sprey: soric October 197) acid end sodtwo acid and sedlwa l

tetraborate sola, hydronide soln.

Method: Test

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$tymARY OP (NVIRO'eitNTAL QUAttflCAll0N Of CLA55 If EQUIPMENT Revision i LOCAT(D ONSIDE CONT AleMENT Non-Propeletery gggleMfui NODEL 04 ACC10fMT ENVIRotetidi OPERAtlLity Ort RAe s tliY ACCURACY ACCustACY QURLiflCAf t0N 10tNTIFICAT10N HANtIFACTURIR 19(NIIIlCAIl04 (NVIR0tettNT TO WHICM REQ'llRf D e Dir10N5fRAIED BlQUIRIO Dtit0N5tRA110 St? Opt ANo QuALIFilD ACCIO(NT METHOD utitg E R (2)

(NVlSONH(NT { (4) Valve Solenold Asco NPS)l6134E Teg: 327 F Teg: 346 F Operate upon 30 deys N/A N/A Test Report Opertters NP8)l6E)6E Press: 14.8 psig Press: 110 psig receipt of a post DGE AQ521678/TR (tenar costatement) RH: 100% RN: 1001 safety signet. 6 8 Red: 3.8Xt0 g Red: 2 10 R Method: Test them Sprey: N/A Chem Sprey: Boric acid and sodlwo hydroalde soln. vstve Soleneld Target 77CC Teg: 327 F Temp: 385 F (Note IO) 14 days N/A 1/A test Report 2375, operators Rock Model Press: 14.8 psig Press: 66 psig post Ott 3/26/73 RH: 1001 RH: 8001 7 8 Rad: 5.7X10 R lied: 1.)m10 4 Itethod: Test Chee Sprey: Soric Chee $ preys gotic acid and sodtwo ocid and tetroborate soln. hydro Ine Diffsrential Pres-Solon 7P51A0W Temp: 140 F Temp: 850 F I =In 5 min 1 0.5 psly 1 0.3 psig feet Report A293-80 sore Switch for Press: 14.8 psig Press: 15 psig post DSE post Ott Test Report A294-80 @eger Control RN: 1001 RH: 8001 5 E (Upper contalesment) Red: 8.8110 4 Rad: 1.5ml0 R Method: Test Chee Sprey: Soric Chem Spray: Soric acid end sodlwa acid and sodlwa tetreborate soln. tetreborate soln. Electrical 9.G. O'Brien types A,0.Ce Teg: }27 F Teg: 340 F 4 sonthe 4 months N/A N/A test Reports (R-247, Penetrations D,t F.G H. J. Press: 14.8 psig Press: 15 psig post Ott post Det ER-257, and ES-227 (Lo.or containment) R,t.M. and RH: 8001 RH: 1% cathodle pro-Red: 8.5x10 4 had: 2:10 R Method: test / Analysts 7 taction pene-Chem Spray: Soric Chem Sprey: Soric tratton acid and sodlwa acid and sodlwo (Note ll) tetreborate sola, hydromide soln. (%te 12) Cable

  • Okonlte EP insulation Teg 127 F Teg:

345 F 30 days I)0 days N/A N/A test Reports FN-8, Control, Inst rusaen-Press: 14.8 pelg Press: 104 psig post 00f post DDE 11-1, G-), llot, enf t: tion, and 2 RV RH: 1001 RN: 1001 149 7 0 power Red: 6.7110 R Red: 2n10 R (tower contefament) Chea Spray: Soric Chen Spray: Soric Itethods Test acid and sedlwe scle end sodlwo tetroborete sola. hydromide sole.

~ n e McLJ1RE Muttt AA 5f Atl0N - UNIT I Pege $ $UrssfRT OF (NVIRONMtNTAL QUAlltICAll0N OF CLASS If EQUIPMENT Revision i 10CAlt0 INSIDE CONTAltet(NT Non-Propefetory ulPMraf Por.tt 04 ACCIDENT INVIR0889f N T OPE RAS ILIIT OrtR481LITT ACCURACT ACCURACT QUALIFICAt lost .pglFBCAll0N MANUT ACTURf R 10fNilFICAfl0N ENvlROM9 TNT 10 WHICN REQ'flRfD IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSIRATED REPORI RNO (g) Fute(R (2) QuAllflED ACClefMI M(IH00 (NVIRONMENT ()) (4) Cchte - Okontte lefsel 280 Temp: 327 F Temp: 349 F 4 months 120 days N/A 18/A Test Report R-0-1 lastrumentation Insulation Press: 14.8 psig Pressa lit pelg. post DDE (Septead,er 1973) (Leser conteles ent) RN: 1001 RH

1001, Red:

8.5310 R Red: 2nl0"R Met' hod: Test I Chem Sprey: Soric Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlue acid and sodles tetreborate sein. hydronide soln. Ceble - Anaconde EP insulation Tesap: 327 F Temp: 346 F ) sonths 4 months 18/A p/A Test Reports F-CL)50-2 Control and 2RV and Press: 14.8 pelg Press: II) pelg post DOE post Det end F-Ch)50-). and power (P/Nypelen RN: 1001 RH: 100% Supplement I 0 (twer contaltunent) Insulation Red: 8.IIl0 n Red: 2nl0 R Chen Sprey: Boric Chem 5 prey: Boric Methods Test scid and sodlue acid and sadlum tetraborete sola. hydromide sola. j' days 30 days ll/A N/A Test Aeport F-C415) Cable - Orend Rex ILPt Insulation Tes,: 327 F Teg: 346 F w Control Press: 14.8 psig Press ll) psig post Det post Det (tower contalement) R H; 1001 RN: 3001 Methods fest I 8 Red: 6.;n10 n Red: 2 10 R Clem Sprey: Boric Chee Spray: Boric acid and sodlue acid and sodlue tetroborate soln. hydroxide soln. Ceble - Seemsel 14aore IP/Mypelon Temp: 327 F Tese: 340 F 30 days 30 days N/A N/A fest Report F-C)60) Ins t rument a tion lasulation Press: 14.8 pelg Press: 10$ pelg post Det post Def 8001 Method: Test (teneer contalennent) RH: 1001 RN: I Red: 6.7El0 n med: fal0"a them 5 prey: soric Chee Sprey: Doric acto end sodlue ocid and sodles tetraeorate soln. hydronide soln. Cable terminetlon/ Roychee WCSF-N Tesy: 127 F Tesy 357 F 4 eenths 4 months N/A N/A Test Reports F-C4033-). Spilce Meterial lleeves Press: 14.8 psig Press: 70 psig post 99f post 90( ond 78100 lLewer contelnement) and RN: 1001 RN: 100t I g Method: Test / Analysis Greakouts med: 8.5110 n Red: 2 ale a Chee 5 prey: Doric Chee Sprey: Soric acid and sodium acid and sodlum tetroborate soln. hydroxide soln. i -ea

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e Page 7 Revision 1 Non-Proprietary MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT Note 1 All equipment identified in this table is located inside the containment, specifically in the lower compartment except for the electric hydrogen recombiner, containment air return fan motors, hydrogen skimer fan motors, containment air return isolation damper motors, dif ferential pressure switches for damper control and cables associated with these devices which are located in the upper compartment. k_ Note 2 The parameters that compose the overall worst-case containment accident environment are as follows: Tempe ra ture (Upper Compartment): 180F peak; tine history as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-24 (Rev 36). t l Temperature (Lower Compartment): 327F peak; time history as shown in FSAR Supplement 1. Q042.73, Figure 7 Revision 39. Pressure (Upper and Lower Compartment): 14.8 psig peakitine history as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-23 (Rev. 36). Relative Humidity: 100% Radiation: Total Integrated radiation dose for the equipment location inciedes 40 year normal operating dose plus the appropriate accident dose ( (except for the narrow-range and wide-range RTD's). Chemical Spray: Boric acid and sodium tetraborate spray resulting from mixing in the containment sump of borated water from the RWST ard sodium tetraborate solution from Ice bed melt. Nota 3 Equipment operability requirements in the containment accident environment are as identified in FSAR Table 3.11.1-1 (Rev. 25). W l

Page 8 o Revision 2 Non-Proprietary 1 Note 4 Environmental qualification test reports for the following equipment have previously been submitted to the NRC Staff: . Transmitters-Barton (by Westinghouse) . RTD's-Rosemount (by Westinghouse) . Electric Hydrogen Recombiner (by Westinghouse) . Containment Air Return Fan Motors (by Duke) i . Hydrogen Skinter Fan Motors (by Duke) i . Solenoid.0perators-Valcor (by Duke) . Electric Penetrations (by Duke) . Cable Termination / Splice Material (by Duke) . Stem-Mounted Limit Switches (by Duke) . Cable Entrance Seal Material (by Duke) Note 5 A requirement for McGuire Unit 1 is to limit the positive error for the ( trip function of narrow-range steam generator level } gags.nitters to +53. b The original Lot 2 report noted an error of [ ]% early in the steam test transient. Additional tests were performed on the same unit using [ ]b,c.e. This caused the temperature of the [ ]b,c.e more closely during the first minute and limited the positive error to less than [ ]%b,c.e. In other words,b,c.e has been reduced to a the temperature difference between the (ble to McGuire Unit I functional requirements. ] level compati Note 6 Deleted ] Note I a Deleted { Note 8 Five minutes is adequate time to assure containment isolation and the required repositioning of other safety-related valves. Note 9 4 During the 30 days following a postulated accident, the containment i I temperature and pressure will approach normal; therefore, additional j service can reasonably be expected from this couipment. i i i I i e ~,, -_,--- ,.c m-.~.-, y,., .__,y _.,,__.m,_ _,,,,r,., ,,....-_,__.y ._.7,, .,_,.___m

Page 9 Revision 2 Non-Proprietary Note 10 The Target Rock solenold valves are ustJ In the reactor head vent system to provide a path for removal of non-condensable gases. Core events leading to the generation of significant amounts of non-condensable gases occur early in the postulated accident sequences and are of short duration; therefore, these valves are only required to operate within the first few days of the accider.t. The need for venting non-condensable gases is not anticipated beyond the 14 day qualification of the valves. _Hote 11 Electric penetration types B,C,F,G and K are the only penetrations required to function electrically in the containment accident environment. All electric penetrations, however, are designed and qualified to maintain their nachanical Integrity under normal and postulated accident environmental conditions. (_ Note 12 The McGuire electric penetrations are protected from direct spray Impingement by galvanized steel boxes. Note 13 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0660. Qualification data will be provided by October 1,1981 in accordance with the September 5, 1980 clarifications to the HUREG. Note 14 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0660. Qualification testing for this equipment is scheduled for completion in December, 1980. The results of this testing will be provided upon receipt and review of the formal report by Duke Power Company. Note 15 The radiation environment for this equipment is dependent on operating time in the accident environment. This information will be provided upon receipt and review cf formal test reports by Duke Power Company. Note 16 The cables for the containment radiation monitors (high range) which are located inside the containment are routed in conduit, and, therefore not exposed to chemical spray.

m2-2a M2 m'- J., -e-A-. L4 ae -~k-5- -a4 MD 4 m-&m.--n us e- .s A a, J _, _ 4 e e e O j 6 i I I i f ( ATTACHMENT 2-4 SUPNARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT.. LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT P 1 e l' i (- l l l 2 1 i i e r - -.. -.--...,., - -. - - - -.... -.._, -.-- -,-._,,- - ~ ~ -.. -,,,.,,,,.------....- --


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e PlcGUIR[ NUCLEAR SIAf l0N = (Ndif 5 Page 8 StewsARY OF (NVf R0rm(NT AL QUALIFIC A310N OF CLA$$ It EQUlPMENT Revision l LOCATED OUTSIDE CONI Allmf Mf AND EXPO $to to HELO litVIR0rettNT (QuirMINT MOCfL OR HEtt ENVIR0rmtur orgAAellitY OPERA 88tliY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUA L I FIC A t leg soggglFICatt04 MANurACiuntR 10t NilF ICA f l0N E NV I Rore*(N T TO WHICH RfQUIRED IN DEMON 5 3 RAlt 0 AfQUIRED DEMONSTRATED AtPORT Ane Nte* S t a (gg QUAL IF IE D HELO
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ItknlNA183m 904El (tunt'd) to 507 - Llaltlag States 2WM temp: 212 F Temp: 318 F Continuous Continuous lea NA UL Listing. Cregninent : $11 ding 10/2b/75 letter Link terminal Slacks from Robert W. Chapman & Co. Metted: test M.IA f(RntNAll0N cat lNE I$ stC y .... Components la this AIC are not a .guired to funct ioc for HE L0 s tha t o f 'est thelt envlrone.nt.. Duke poport M05/PDG-77-5 KTC 2A - Limiting tussman

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pg 6 ATC 4 - Limiting Struthers-Dunn 209 Teg til F Temp: 212 F Continuous Continuous leR NA ncGuire Nuclear I tomponent: pe lay s Station Pipe Rune e. g Temperature Com- ) ponent fest File No. GS Method: fest "IE b4 . Comoonents la thls ATC are not r quired to functiot-for HEL0s that of 'ect tl Ir environe nt... Oute Report M05/r0C-77-1 att 6 - gleiten.1 States M Teg: 212 F Temp: }ll F C ont inuous Continuous MA NA UL List ing. Commnent : $11 dim 80/24/75 letter Link terminal cl.n6s from s bert W. o Chapaan & Co. netheJ: test s t 9 ~e. m an e-% ..+ -

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$(QIjl Al 0 D(MON $lRAl(0 ptrott AND her0(t ggg QUAllflf 0 MELS ngiNoD (NVIRONMf MI (2) AAfA ItanghAl10N CA91Hf l5 (Cont'J) I Alt 10 .... Component in this ATC are not required to functl. e for M(L9s that s' fect thelf envlror eat 'vport k' A-17 1 e A F(, 20. (Smiting Bussman 1.439 Temp: 212 F Temp: 250 F Continuous Continuous NA NA Bussmen Manuf actur-Coaeone nt : Fusete loc h s Ing 8einort 3/l)/79 ATC 22 - limiting tussman I) 3792 Temp: 212 F Temp: !$0 F Continuous Continuous NA NA f) Bussaan Manuface Cuevoteat : Fuseblocks il 8575 wria,sepoet 3/1)f, Il Wert al conflesia-t ion - Docuavat et le Requested w lintC l - t imit ing C ut le r-Haav'e r 0 2'a temp: 208e F Temp: 255 F Continuous Coeit tnuous lia NA Duke sees eroducel Component: setAys QuellficStlon & Ife Facility aesort TR-010 Me tled: fest 148U Ollfeerat tal $olon Mfg Co. 7PS30W ....Thl< equipre nt is riot ret ilred to function f er HEL9s that affe t its envf ron>wnt Duke Report i j Peessure 5=liches M05/P06-72-0 i firestat (t empe r at u re United (tectric 8 W.-4CS ....Thl. esgulpeient is viot rec ilted to function ' se Hit 9s that af fe t it s environment Duke s port e switch) M01/PrG-77-1 i ELECI Al( At CONTROL PAN (t$ AND #[LAf

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'\\ s McGulAl NUCLfAA SIATION = UNif 8 Page ll 5tPtMARY OF (NVlRONM(NI AL QUAtlf l( At lON OF CL A55 f t (Quern [NI Seviglen I LOCAL (D OUf 5001 CONIAINMENT ANO EsPOSED to HELS (NVin0NntNT usen(NT MOC('. 04 HElg (NV O R0 reil N T OPERAtiLifV OPERASILIIY ACC URAC T ACCU #ACY QUAllflCAffoM ,,e gi l F l[ A f l04 MANUfACTURIA IDE N f if l(All0N (lqVI R0retl N T TO kHl(H R(QUIRED ON, OEMONSTRAlto REQulit0 ptn0N5f aAlto stront ANo Ntn0LA (g) QUALffIED M(L8 MitH00 (NVIRONM(NT (})- Aus eld) filtere,I me l l ence fiC5 1320.$3- . Thi equipment is riot te ulted to function for HELBs that aff.ct its environment Duhe Report: t.haust fan le 00 r>040 M05/P0G-77-I annulus Ventflation Farr . Thi s equipeent is not re. utred to function for HEles that aft.ct its environment Dune neport: fitter Unit l&VFU-l4 n05/PDG-77-8 8nnulus Vent ilation Farr . Thi s equipment is not re'utred 2o function ' or HE L9 s t hat af f <st its environisent Dune Report: filter Unit 1AVFU-19 M05/PDG-77 1 annulus Vent. Fan IA Joy /#e llence 2Y f *2 7)608 .. This equipeent is not te utred to function f or HELgs that af f, et its environment Duke Aerort: MCS/PDG-71-0 Annerlos Vent. Rotock 7A/)MJ ...... This equipewat is ret re utred to function for HEL93 that af fect Its envlronment Dube Aeport $amper Actuators MD5/FDG-77-1 te nte Starter INtA Westinghouse A201 J)C A ....... Th' s equipsent is not re,utred to function for HEL0s that af f< ct les environment Duke Report M05/ PPG-17-8 Aea. ire Starter INIB Westlnghouse A201 J)CA ...... Th s equipewnt is not re iulted to fonction 'or HEL0s that off. ct it s envlronment Duke Report nD5/Pec.77-l Cont ac t or ifv274 kestinghouse A209 J)CA Ih 6 equipment Is not te tulred to function 'or NEL0s that aff. ct its environmens Duke Report n05/PcG-77-8 Velve Sole *wl4 Valcor I) V70000-21-1 Temp: 212 F Temp: 346 F Operate upon Coatinuous NA NA Il fest Report: O pe r a t or s and receipt of e Qa r09to-2 4-1 V703oo.21-) safety signal ey si Ilarlev

2) V526 29 fest aeport:

Qa52600-585 n thod: lest e Velve Solee old Atto NP 8)l6()t f feep; 212 F te 9,: }t.6 F Operate upon Continuous NA NA fest Report: i eper.cors NP 8)l6t)6f receipt of e 40528678/la safety signal Method: lest n., .m ~ e-- ~ ~

J I I ) etcCulet NUCLEAR 5fAllON = Unit 1 Page $2

SUMMARY

OF (NVIRONntNTAL QUALIFIC ail 0N OF CLASS If EQUIPMfMI Rowlslon I LOCAf tp OUf 510E CONIAllatf Mi ANO L APOSED TO HELS tuvlROrntENT s e juirmlNT Moc(L 04 HELS E NV t 80Pe9(NI OPE RAB I LI TY CPERA81tity ACCtJRACT ACCtJRACY quAtlplCA tleg lfl(Als0N MANUFAC IUR(R O DI N f if lCAll0N (NVIRUlst(N T IO k'ilCN REQUSA[0 IN DEMON 5f 4Af(0 Itiquip(D Of ft0NSI AAII0 All-Ott ANO NimBER QU4t IF $ (D MILS 8ttlH00 l INVI R0tutf M t ,%:ve n tor Operators llettorque SMS Temp: 212 F Ten,: 2$0 F Continuous Continuous 84 4 44 timitorque lest Rep.. o Order Numt.ers: 6 8 3 -A. 829-A. 600461. 6/7/76 8]I-A. 832-A. B I)-A. 834-A. Method: Test 8)$-A. 8 3 7-A. 375826-4 385632-A SM8 Temp: 212 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous NA NA Llmitorgce Test peec. Order Numbers: 383584-4 ead 600176-4. 9/72 391179-A 600856. 12/3/75 4 Method: fest Velse notor Operators Rotork 7NA2 30NA2 Temp: 212 F temp: 16) F Continuous Continuous MA NA Rotork fest 9eports. IINA2 40NA2 (Note k) 14N42 70m2 Nil /4. December 1970 16NA2 90NA2 14166. Octet,er 197) 19222. June 1974 TR)02$. Apeli 1980 Method: Te st 7N41 30N41 Temp 212 F Temp 340 F Continuous Continuous MA NA Rotork Test neports IIN41 4DN4 5 lleNA l 70NAl Mll/4. December 1970 I 16NAl 90N45 1R116. October 197) IA222, June 197$ Method! Test Cohle - OLonite EP Insulation Tempt ))0 F Terip: 345 F Continuous Cont inssous 84 4 NA Test Reports FN-l Cont on.l, ro ins t rime na (Note $) toi end, xV N-l. G-). Il0E and th i i prne r Method lest Cable - Okontte Tefael 283 Temp: ))0 F Temp: 341 F Continuous Contlevous NA NA Test Report A-0-1 las t rument et ter. Insula t ion (Note $) (Sept emt.o r 1979) Method: lest C ohle - Anecunde EP insulation temr.: ))0 F Temp: 38 6 F Cont inuous Continuous isA NA Test Reports Control and 2 KV and (Note $) F Chj$0-2 and pone r EP/Hypelen lasuletlon F-Cfs)$0-) and 4 Supp lement i Method: Test t e

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Page 13 Revision 0 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT Note 1 The methods employed to evaluate pipebreaks and to determine the resulting environmental parameters are discussed in Duke Power Company Report MDS/PDG-77-1, The Evaluation of the Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment for McGuire Nuclear Station. Note 2 (~ The HELB environment is assumed to exist for 2i hours based on 30 minutes at the peak temperature after which action by the operator isolates the break and allows Auxiliary Building temperature to decrease to norwal ambient in 2 hours. Note 3 The motors installed on Unit 1 pumps will be selected from the shop order numbers listed. All motors listed have been qualified in the same manner. Note 4 Rotork Test Report TR-3025 shows that when the qualified temperature for these valves is exceeded, the torque switches may fail on the next operation of the valve. Since at least one additional operation is available after the valve's temperature qualification has been exceeded, the valve can be relied upon to move to its safety position. ( Note 5 The HELB analysis has identified pipe breaks resulting in higher temperatures; however, there are no cables exposed to temperatures above 330*F. -~

ATTACHMENT 3

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL. QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT l. LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TiiC POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION RADIATION ENVIRONMEliT 1 t 7" .t A. i. i i + i ) l i, we T ---m*-Tf 7 wN

  • t W r v 9+w fr$--

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f.., e' f \\ PACf I pu t.ulf l tatt LI AP SIA3104 - s Pe l

  • I 5tputADY Of I Wylp0hMt NI At (JUAl lF il A100N OF ttA55 11 10ulentut 80C All0 DUI5lbf CONI AlleilNI ANft isP05fD 10 fW POSI-t0( A FIC lP(tiLA100N 8401 ATION lervlPotellNI
  1. CUIPMfgf MANUFACTURE #

MOOf L OR Ri f IRC UL A100N RA0lAll0N QtbLIFe(All0N 10( Ni lF it.AilON SOFNflfl(All0N RADIA100N ttvil 10 WHl(H REPORT AND Mf1H00 leuM88 R I WilR0petl NT QUAT 17100 (l) (1801 (2) (IID) s-m. j. f'tJHP MOIORS . These mtors are not rewired to operate in the post - LOCA recirculation l Soric Acid fransfer Pumps Cheayump/ Westinghouse. Buffalo Chempump Model Ct#4-10K=l2H-18 ra llation environment.... 1-84 and IB m3 tors Soron lajection Cheapesap/ West inghouse. Suf f alo Chempump Model GUH-)K-75lH-15 ... These au> tors are not teaulred to operate In the post - LOCA recirculation ra llation environment pecirculatloa Pimaps IA and 18 motors 4 8 Centrifugal (harging Pumps Westinghouse. Buffalo 72FM587-157). 72F M 587-257) 6.9=10 RAD 2=10 RAD WCAP 8754 Rev I 14 an.I la smitars 12FM587-35 7). 72FM587457) WCAP 7829 (Note 3) Methodt test and Analysis tent elnaent Spray Pumps Westinghouse. Buffalo 1)F56019-157) 7)f 56019-257) 5.2ml0' PAD tal0' RAD WCAP 8754 Rev i 1A and 18 anotors 1)F5fol9-)S7). 7)F56019-457) WCAP 7829 (Note 3) Method; Test and Analysis Fuel Paol Cooling Pumps Westinglwsuse. Suffalo 12FM68 9-1574. 72FM649-2574 5=10' RAD 2n30 RAD WCAP 8754 Rev i 1A and 18 motors /2FM650-1574. 72F4650-2574 WCAP 7829 (Note )) Method Test and Analysis Residual Heat Remval Pumps Westinghouse. Suf falo 11FI)h94-1572. 71F t1494-2572 5.2=10 RAD 2 10 RAD WCAP 8754 Rev l IA and la =2 tors 71FI)495-1572. 7tFI)495-2572 WCAP 7829 (Note )) Method: test and Analysis 4 5 Rain and Jontelnnent Spray Allis-Chalmers 9.1a10 RAD Inl0 RAD Docuarntation sequested ir Rooms Sinap Pumps IA and le Method: Test autors 8 5 Safety Injection Puays 1A Westinghouse. Buffalo 1)F69618-1575. 7)F69618-2575 2.8ml0 AAo falo RAD WCAP 8754 Rev l an.l Is s= tors 7)F69618-)$75. 7)T696l84515 WCAP 7829 (Note )) Method! lest and Analysis FAN ANO AlR HANDLlNG llNll M0f0R$ Innui.Is Ventilat ion Systeen .loy/Re llence 2VF-273608 Iml0 RAD lal0 RAD Rollance tetter dated 8/3/80 Fa is 14 an.1 18 mntors 4 IVF-M 4512 $,10 RAD 2xIO RAD Rellance Report MUC-9. 7/1/75 Auslitary Bulld.nq Filtered Rellance tahaust Fans IA and 18 mtor Method: Test and Analysis u._

() 0 i c Pact 2 MLt,uta l Ht til An 51 All0N = LNel f l (V1580 0 $1]MMARV Of INVIRONMINI At QUAllFl( All0N 07 CL A55 IE (QulPMINI 10C AllD 0U15101 CONI AONME NI AND t sPoilD 10 t ht P051-LOC A All IRCUL All0N RADIA190N INVIRosetlNI IQUIPnfMI MANUTACTURfA MODEL OR al C I RC ULA l 10N RADIAL 10N QuAtlff(AtION lDINllflCAllON lDINilfitAll0N RA01A110N Livil 10 WHICH REPORI AND Mlll#th (l) NUM8lA f NV1Rotett N1 qual 171(0 (100) (2) (100) JMNO AIR HAN0(INC. UN] Molon5-Cantinued 6 6 Olesel Generator Ventilation .hiy/Re llence 1y7-273608 2nto RAD Into RAD Reglance Letter dated 8/3/80 O ns IA and le motors Method: Test end Analysis I fuel Poi,8 Coollag Pump Air Bellence )VF-882)ll $ml0 RAD $nl0 RAD Duke Report 1320-4 12/18/78 Handling tnfts BA and 18 i mentors Method: Test and Analysis Ana Pung Air HanJilng Rollence 2VF-882)ll 7ml0' RAD 2s30 RAD Rellance Report HUC-9, 7/1/78 Units IA and 18 motors 'l Method: Test and Analysis i ll Mj5.r ty ggogs powgA j 'gUl PM( Ni koo Volt Load Centers Could R-Line 6ml0 RAD I:10 RAD Report OH-302-618 (Note 4) g Worst case: litXD I meer Control Centers Nelson ElectrlC Class 10356 6ml0 RAD Inl0 RAD Nelson Electrlc letter 6/27/81 Wurst case: SIMR84 and ifMt95 Method: Test and Analysis Olesel satterles N1fe MIP-4 $n10 RAD (Note $) (Note $) Worst Case: IfDGB sel e er Chargers Pcmer Conversion Products 35-130-100CE $,lo) PAD (Note $) (Note $) Potential Transformers

  • RCP Westimjhnuse PTM 75 4x10 RAD Ent RAD Westing % se fransfo m r Olo Report 11/11/77. Life State.

y I' D *' sent ll/14/17 Method: Test sad Analysis TERMINAil0N cap f M(15 g lAIC)-L imit ing Component i (Note 6) (Note 6) 1.lal0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) IAt(21-timiting Cnnponent (Note 6) (Note 6) I,lml0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 1(RMitIAL 90M Q IO 108 Limit ing Component: (Note 6) (Note 6) In10 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) IO lll-Limit ing Congg>nent : 5tates ZWM 1.8n10 RAD (Note 6) INot' %I SllJing Llnh Terminal glocks

PA6t .3 S t V15104 4 MCGulet NU(LI All SI AllDN - UNll l Sunnaar Or INVlm0failNI AL QUAllFl( All0N Of (LA55 1( (QUSPMINI 10C Afl0 OUf 5tet CONI AINMf MI AND INIS5tD TO IME POSI-LO( A pillR(UL All0N RA01 AI104 INVIR0tetf NT IQUlrMINI MANUFACIURfA M00fL OR aftle(UtAll0N RAplAI10es quAtlFICA110N lef utillCAfl0N lbf M11F ICA110N RADl41004 LEvit 50 WNICM atPORT AND MilN00 (1) ineaalR INVl*0mntN1 quALirlto (Ilo) (flop i{RMON4j' POIf 5 f(ont ificaed) Ialli tlalting component: States ZWM l.lslo' RAD (88ote 6) (Note 6) Silding Link terminal Blocks 1plie6-timit ing Camponent : (Note 6) (Note 6) 1.6a10 RAD (Note 6) (llote 6) IBit*9-Limiting C-nt States ZWM 2.8al0 AAD (Note 6) (bte 6) 5 Sliding Link ferminal Olocks Tel50-Limit ing Component: States ZWM ).5 10 RAo (Note 6) (Note 6) Sliding Llak terminal Stocks TSIB2-Limiting Component: States lWM ).7ml0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) Sliding Link TermPsal Olocks TOl83-Limsting Component States FWM ).7a10 AA0 (esote 6) (Note 6) 5 Sliding Link ferminal Slocks 18184-t iet t ing Component g (Note 6) (Note 6) I,$n10 RA0 (llets 6) (Note 6) 18185-Limiting Component: States ZWM l.6sI3'RAo (Note 6) (elote 6) SIlding Link Terminal Blocks TB188-timiting Component: 5tates TWM In10 RAD (880te 6) (Note 6) Silding tlnk terminal 8tocks i 6 f tl89-Limit ing Component: States FWM 1.6ml0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) l Silding Link Terminal giocks le196-timiting Component: States FWM 1.8ml0 RAD (Note 6) (Blote 6) l Sliding Link terminal Blocks l T0205-t imit ing Component: States ZWM 2 10 RAD (Note 6) (seote 6) lliding Link terminal elocks 18201-tlelt ing Csongionent: (Note 6) (Note 6) 4 Inte'AAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 19211-timiting Co w enent States lWM $.2x 10 RAD - (seote 6) (Note 6) Silding tinh Terminal slocks 19212-Limittag Co gonent States ZWM 4.2n 00 " LAD (Note 6) (Note 6) Sil.Ilng Link Terialnal elocks t am.

Q e

n. 4.if t p l enNllAR 53JIlDN - IIN i l I StetMADV Of INvim0ls91NI AL QteAt tf il atioM Of (t ASS Il EQU$PnlNT tot At t o OUIS IDI (ONI A BNME NI AND E 8 P050 0 10 O HI PD59-tO( A al(IP(UtAfl0N RADlat 00N INvimosetlN1 IQUlrMI NI StANUf ACTURin M00f t OR Al(lR(UtAll0N RA0 6 Allpel QUAT lFICAfl0N llel Nill g( At l0N 90lN11 Fila 310N RA0 6 Al l0N tlVil 10 WHICN SIPODI AND MllH00 (6) eMatti A INVI#nNMENT QUAL 17lig (11D)

(2) (510) mz }[RM $ N_A U0t15 JCoat inued) 18274-timit ing Component (Note 6) (Note 6) 9.6m10 A40 (Note 6) (Note 6) 18225-timiting Co.,onent: (Note 6) (Note 6) ).lal0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) is238-t imit ing Co.,onent: (Note 6) (Note 6) 3,l.10 aA0 (Note 6) (Note 6) 5 is239-timit ing Co.,onent (Note 6) (Note 6) 3,y,gg aAo (Note 6) (Note 6) 5 18260-timiting Coa,onent: (Note 6) (Note 6) 3,,,7aA0 (Note 6) (Note 6) te406-timiting e. _nts (Note 6) (Note 6) 1.4=10 AAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 3 t te408-timiting Co wonent: (Note 6) (Note 6) 3.4al0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 5 184l5-tiet t ing Camponene t (Note 6) (Note 6) g 7,gg AAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 18416-I loit ing Component g (Note 6) (Note 6) g,7,gg aA0 (soote 6) (Note 6) 5 19442-t imlt ing Component: (Note 6) (Note 6) ja10 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) 1944)-L imit tnq Congonent 3 (Note 6) (Note 6) Sal 0 #AO (Note 6) I' tote 6) i l l IB447-timiting Component: States 2m f.7alo RAD (Note 6) (slote 6) Silding Llok Terminal 81ock 104%-t Balt l.sg Component s (Note 6) (Note 6) Isl0 RAD (Note 67 (Note 6) ID506-Ilmating Composvent: States IWM l.6m10 RAD (Note 6) (Isote 6) 511 Jing Link terminal Blochs 0 issup-timiting Ccayonent: States FWM I.6aI0 AAD (Note 6) (Note 6) l Sildlng Link terminal giocks MIST {tlAnl0uS PANI (g ire-ICP-58-timittnq (Note 6) (Note 6) jal0 RAD INote 6I INot' EI Convenent : ewa -, we - w 'd

f f MCC.u s el NUCLI AR 11 AtION = UNil i SUMMA #v Of tNVIR0mmtNf At QHAtlFIC A100N 0f (t A5% 18 IOUlhetNT h$10NO LOCAll0 Ou1 SIDE CONI AlNMINI AND itPOSIO 10 IHf POST-LOCA Rf tlRCULAll0N RAOIATION E NVIR0estlN1 l 8 (QUlpMlN1 MANUfACTUe(R M00fL 04 RI(latutAt 40e1 RA01All0N QUAT tf OCAT 104 10fMflFOCAll0N 10fMIIFICAll0N R40lAI10N ttVf L 10 teelCN REP 0at AND MffM00 (1) tRM0f a INVIRONMfMT quALIFigg (110) (I) (150) 18 LYL.9'P8 RAIEf1 6 I Velve Me,tF0perators Llettorque SMO Sal 0 AAD 2ml0 RAD timitorque Test Re met 600461, Limitorque Order Nweers: (worst case) dated 6/7/76 613-A. 829-A 8)l-A 8]I-A. Method: Test i 833-A 834-A 835-A. 857-A, 375826-A 385632-A 4 1 8 SMO 5=10 RAD 2mIO RAD tialtorque Test Report 600456, timitorque Order Nis4ers: (worst case) dated 12/9/75 383584-A and 391179-A Method: test Velve Motor Operators motork 7NA2.llNA2. 14NA2 16804 2, $nl0 RAD )sl0 AAD Rotork Test Report ul4/2 7 30 sea 2 f.ONA2. 708042. 90eeA2 (worst case) dated 5/70 Method: Test 6 7esAl. BINAI. 14eeAl 16 m l. 5=10,3, ,,,,8mA0 Rotork Test Report TR-II6, ]OseAI. 8 0ml. 70NAI 90NAl (worst case) dated 10/7) 1 Metled test 6 8 velve Solenoid Operators Velcor V526 5=l0 AAD 2 10 8A0 Velcor Test Retors (worst case) QR-52600-5'S Method: fest 2ml0' RAD Velcor test Report V70900-21-1 and V70900-Il-) 8.6ml0 RAD (worst cese) 08-70900-21-1 Method: Test and Analysis 6 8 Velve Solenold Operators ASCO NPS)l6E)4E and NP8))61)6E 1.6a10 AAD 2nl0 AA0 ASCO Test Report Aq521678/lR (worst case) Method: Test Velve Stem Mounted tielt esAMCO (A-l?0-302 IslO RA0 Into RAD Neoco Test Report deced (worst case) 7/24/78 for EA-170-102 IImIt switches Method: Test (A-180 and EA-710 lato RAD 2ml0 RAD 18enco Test Reports dated (worst case) 9/5/78 and 2/20/78 for iA-180 and EA-740 Ilelt switches Method: Test a --r , - -. - = = =

r PACI 6 Mf LHirl OnKilAR SIAllON - tN. I ' I AtVlll0N O $Urv9ARY Of INv tRO'e11NI AL QtIAt tf ital 10M os (t Agg 11 I ggl PMI N, 10t Ailo OUTSIDI (0Nf Alletf M1 AND 13PO$1019 f Ht PO$3-LOC A Alt lRf ut A140N RA00at10N INvlF04etlNI IQUIPMlNI MANUfACTURin M00ll OR Rf t lR(Ut All0N RA01All0N QttAt t f l( Al l0N

  • lDfNllff(A110N 10lNilfICAfl0N RADIA100N Livlt 10 WellCN ALPORT AND M11N00 (I)

NUM6fA INvlRONMlNT QUAtlfile (180) (2) (110) .z._ _ _e mw-11D.(({tANf 0US Iwai,,tsOM 7 7 Motor Operated Deapers Rotorb 7A/3 rad 3ml0 RAD jal0 RAD Rotock Test Reports Wil/4, l (worst case) dated 12/10 and TR=ll6, dated 10/7) Method: Dy stellarley to Rotork NA2 Operator three-Wey Selenold Velve Pow rs 265-0002 Salo RAD (Note 7) (Note 7) Annulus vent Fan Unit (Note 6) (Note 6) 3 10 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) Control Panel-t imItirig Component : AVf U Allison Control Penel-(Nute 6) (Note 6) jal0 RAD (Note 6) (Note 6) Limit Ing Component: Proport ional f eeperature Love Controle

54. 834. 838, 8134, 8160, tel0" RAD (Note 7)

(Note 7) Cont rolle r 816$ 817) and 8174 Hlq% Temperature Detection United Electric 8006-6C5 5pl0' RAD (Note 7) (Nggg y) T he rmost at N Resistence fesperature Weed 10 l-l. 2 N-A-)-C 2-1 2mlO RAD (Note 7) (Note 7) Detector S Of f terential Pressure Solon TPSIDW 5.2ml0 RAD (flote 7) (Note y) SwI cf. Olfferential Pressure Solon JPSIADW 5m10 R40 (Note 7) (Note 7) Switch limit $=ltch Micro Switch L$M4N lul0 RAD l.2ml0 flAD Micro Switch Report LTR # 15027-l Method: Test fer-Inol Blocks 9uchanen 0721 and R0721 5ml0 RAD (Note 7) (Note 7) O !! n 8 Control and 2FV Power Cable Anaconda EP lasulation and (P/Nypelor

1. lalo RAD 2alo RAD An.aconde Test Reports F-C4)50 2 and F-C4350-)

Insulation Method: lest l e p. e.- rep er-A e + e

M( Lulti ens (tf AR $1 A110N - 12411 I pggg y $UMMARV 0F INVIS085s(NIAt QitAttfilA310N OF CLA$$ It lQUIPMINI REVl590N O 10(41tD OU151DI (ONI AlNMINI AND lilPO$1D 80 f Hf PO$latD( A SICIRCUL.All0N RADI Af tow (NVIRosett NI IQUIPMINT MANUfACTURfR MODit OR RfCIR(UtAll0N RA0lAtl0N QUALIrltAt40N g pg Nily ggag icN lefNilflCA110N RADIAIION [{Vil 70 Intf(H RIPORT AND MllHOD ggg NtM3f A INVIPDfeif NI qua*IFll0 (110) (2) (810) - -._ -_ n _ ~ f A gl,L{ cont inued) Control Cable grand Rem XtPE 1.lal0 RAD 2xt0 RAD grand tem fest Report F-Cle ll) Method: Test Cont rol. Inst rument at ion Okontte EP lasulation 9.lal0 RAD 2sl0' RAD Okonite feet Reports fN-8, 0 and 2kV Piner Cable G-), N-l. Ilot and 141 Method: Test 8 8 Inst rument at ion Cable Okonite Hypalon I.InIO RAD 2nl0 RAD OkonIte Test Report 190f Methot test Inst rument at tos table Okontte PVC jal0 RAD $n10 RAD (Note 8) 0 inst ripent at ion Cable Okonite Tefret 280 f.Inl0 RAD 2 10 RAD Okontte Test Reeort R-0-1' Method: Test Instrumentat ion Cable Samuel Moore EP/Hypalon lasulation 1.la to RAD fato RAD Samuel Moore fest Report F-C %8) 7 instrumentation Cable Samm t floore PVC Jal0 AAD Sml0 RAn (Note 8) TRAN5 Milt (R) 7 (ant ainment Sump Bartvn 38(A 4.Inl0 RAD talo RAD Test Report 43904-8 level f rans=lt ters Method: Test 4 t m o,

Page 8 t Revision 0 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION RADIATION ENVIRONMENT Note 1 Class IE equipment that is exposed to the post-LOCA recirculation radiation environment has been evaluated for proper radiation qualification and is included in this table if it is exposed to a total integrated dose equal to 3 f or greater than lx10 RAD. A total integrated dose (i.e.$ orty year normal plus one year accident radiation dose) of less than lx10 RAD is considered negligible since no materials hava. been identified at McGuirg that exhibit a significant aging mechanism whel exposed to less than lx10dRAD. ~ / Note 2 The recirculation radiation environment consists of the forty year normal operating radiation dose plus the dose received from one year of post-LOCA reactor coolant recirculation. Note 3 The motors installed on Unit 1 pumps will be selected from the shop order numbers listed. All motors listed have been qualified in the same manner. Note 4 The McGuire 600 volt load centers are qualified by similarity to 600 volt load centers at Oconee Nuclear Station as reported in Report Number 0M-302-618. Note 5 4 Radiation testing of this equipment is not required for levels below lx10 RAD per Section 8.1 of IEEE 535-1979. Note 6 Documentation of radiation qualification is currently not available for the components used in the termination boxes and area termination cabinets. If documantation cannot be obtained, these components will either be tested, relocated, or replaced by a qualified substitute. Note 7 A cualification program is currently in progress for these components. The results of this program will be reported upon completion. .. = -,... W

i Page 9 Revision 0 Note 8 The level of radiation qualification will be confirmed from testing scheduled for completion by November, 1980. Preliminary radiation qualification level is 5x10/ RAD based on IEEE Transactions Paper 68-TP-651-PWR, Vol PAS-88 No 5, May 1969 a [ I i i i l l l r i l r v :-- --~ ~

ATTACHMENT 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 [ \\ 1 I

t MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE QUALIFICATION PARAMETERS FOR DESIGN BASIS EVENTS i 1.1 Temperature and Pressure Conditions Inside Containment - Loss-of-Coolant 1.1.1 The time-dependent temperature The containment structural design and pressure, established for the has been based on the results on design of the containment struc-an analysis performed by Westing-ture and found acceptable by the house employing the methodology staff, may be used for environ-described below. The results of mental qualification of equi - this analysis are reported in Sec-7 ment. tion 6.2 of the FSAR. 1.1.2 Acceptable methods for calculat-Westinghouse employs the methodology ing and establishing the contain-described in WCAP-8312A for calculat-ment pressure and temperature ing the LOCA mass and energy release. envelopes to which equipment Appendix A to NUREG-0588 indicates should be qualified are summarized that this methodology is acceptable below. Acceptable methods for cal-to the Staff. culating mass and energy release rates are summarized in Appendix A. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) Ice Condenser Containment - Calcu-Westinghouse conforms to the Staff late LOCA containment environment position for Ice-Condenser Plants using LOTIC or equivalent industry by employing LOTIC to calculate the codes. Additional guidance is pro-containment transient following LOCA. vided in SRP Section 6.2.1.1.B, NUREG-75/087. l 1.1.3 In lieu of using the plant-specific Plant-specific profiles are the j containment temperature and pressure basis for McGuire equipment quali-I design profiles for BWR and ice fication testing. condenser types of plants, the gen-eric envelope shown in Appendix C may be used for qualification test-ing. l ..-._m ,+, +

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUTE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITIOF 1.1.4 The test profiles included in Plant specific profiles are the basis Appendix A to IEEE Std. 323-1974 for McGuire equipment qualification should not be considered an ac-testing. It should be noted that the ceptable alternative in lieu of IEEE 323-1974, Appendix A temperature using plant-specific containment and pressure profiles envelope the temperature and pressure design worst-case McGuire containment acci-profiles 'inless plant-specific dent temperature and pressure condi-analysis is provided to verify tions and have been used by some manu-the adequacy of those profiles. facturers for generic qualifications. 1.2 Temperature and Pressure Conditions Inside Containment - Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) [ 1.2.1 Where qualification has not The environmental qualification been completed, the environmen-testing for equipment located in-tal parameters used for equip-side containment has been completed. ment qualification should be calculated using a plant-speci-fic model based on the staff-approved assumptions discussed in Item 1 of Appendix B. 1.2.2 Models that are acceptable for Westinghouse employs the methodology calculating containment parameters described in WCAP 8822 for calculat-are listed in Section 1.1.2. ing the mass and energy release fol-lowing a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). At the specific request of Duke, Westinghouse has completed the mass and energy release calculations assum-ing no entrainment. Westinghouse conforms to the Staff position for Ice-Condenser Plants by e= ploying LOTIC to calculate the containment transient following MSLB. l 1.2.3 In lieu of using the plant-Plant specific profiles are the specific containment temperature basis for McGuire equipment quali-sad pressure design profiles for fication testing. BWR and ice condenser plants, tne generic envelope shown in Appendix C may be used. 2 m~m

f a NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.2.4 The test profiles included in Plant specific profiles are the basis Appendix A to IEEE Std. 323-1974 for McGuire equipment qualification - should not be considered an testing. It should be noted that the acceptable alternative in lieu of IEEE 323-1974, Appendix A temperature using' plant-specific containment and pressure profiles envelope the temperature and pressure design worst-case McGuire containment accident profiles unless plant-specific temperature and pressure conditions analysis is provided to verify the and have been used by some manufacturers adequacy of those profiles. for genric qualification. 1.2.5 Where qualification has been The environmental qualification tests ' completed but only LOCA condi-for equipment installed inside the tions were considered, then it containment at McGuire that is required / must be demonstrated that the to function during and following a MSLB LOCA qualification conditions envelope the maximum calculated MSLB exceed or are equivalent to the - conditions. maximum calculated MSLB conditions. 1.3 Effects of Chemical Spray 1.3.1 The effects of causticsspray Chemical spray is included in quali-should be addressed for ths fication tests for equipment located equipment qualification: The inside the containment provided the . concentration of caustics used ' equipment is required to operate in forl qualification should be the.. spray environment. equivalenCtto or more severe. ~ s than'those used in the plant containmenc~ spray system. 1.3.2 If the chemical composition of I'n the McGuire containment spray the caustic spray can be ~affected system, no single failure car. occur ~ by equipment mi1 functions, the' that.~will result in a more severe s most severe caustic spray environ-spray solution composition than the l ment that results from a single anticipated composition. failure in thi spray system should be assumed. See SRP Section 6.5.2 (NUREG-75/087), paragraph II, Item (e) for caustic spray solution guidelines. s I w., 3 ( =W

JUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4 Radiation Conditions Inside and Outside Containment The radiation environment for The calculated radiation environ-qualification of equipment should ment is based on the 40 year normal be based on the normally expected operating dose plus the appropriate radiation environment over the DBA dose. equipment qualified life, plus that associated with the most severe design basis accident (DBA) dur-ing or following which that equip-1 ment must remain functional. It I should be assumed that the DBA-related environmental conditions occur at the end of the equipment qualified life. The sample calculations in Appen-dix D and the following positions provide an acceptable approach for establishing radiation limits for qualification. Additional radiation margins identified in Section 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Std. 323-1974 for qualification type testing are not required if these methods are used. 1.4.1 The source term to be used in The radiation environments through-determining the radiation environ-out the station following a DBA g ment associated with the design LOCA are determined assuming instant-s_ basis LOCA should be taken as an aneous release from the fuel to the instantaneous release from the fuel containment of 100% of the noble gas to the atmosphere of 100 percent inventory, 50% of the core iodine in-of the noble gases, 50 percent of ventory, and 1% of the remaining core the iodines, and I percent of the fission product inventory. This source remaining fission products. For term is used to derive radiation levels all other non-LOCA design basis for all equipment requiring radiation accident conditions, a source term qualification. The release fractions involving an instantaneous release are consistent with TID-14844 and from the fuel to the atmosphere of NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.6 b. 10 percent of the noble gases (ex-cept Kr-85 for which a release of j. 30 percent should be assumed) and 10 percent of the iodines is acceptable. 4

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POW.R COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.2 The calculation of the radiation All radioactivity released initially environment associated with de-remains within the containment. Air-sign basis accidents should take borne radioactivity is assumed to be into account the time-dependent homogeneously distributed throughout transport of released fission the containment at 10 minutes into the products within various regions accident because of containment air of containment and auxiliary return fan actuation. Recirculation structures. of water from the containment sump is also assumed to begin at 10 minutes into the accident. Prior to initiation of recirculation, normal radiation environments are assumed to exist-i throughout the station outside con-(' tainment. The time-dependent transport mechanisms onsidered are consistent with NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.6b. 1.4.3 The initial distribution of acti-See the response to 1.4.2 above. vity within the containment should be based on a mechanistically ra-tional assumption. Hence, for com-partmented containments, such as in a BWR, a large portion of the source should be assumed to be in-itially contained in the drywell. The assumption of uniform distri-bution of activity throughout the containment at time zero is not { appropriate. 1.4.4 Effects of ESF systems, such as To increase the con rvatism of the containment sprays and contain-calculated radiation values, no credit ment ventilation and filtration is taken for removal processes such as systems, which act to remove air-containment spray, filters, or natural borne activity and redistribute deposition. The only removal mechanism activity within containment, should considered is radioactive decay. be calculated using the same as- + sumptions used in the calculation of offsite dose. See SRP Section 15.6.5 (NUREG-75/067) and the re-lated sections referenced in the Appendices to that section. 5 -=.e 4y


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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.5 Natural deposition (i.e., plate-The assumption of an instantaneous out) of airborne activity should plate-out of 50% of the iodine released be determined using a mechanistic from the core is not used. As stated model and best estimates for the above, natural deposition is not used model parameters. The assumption in the development of post-LOCA ra-j of 50 percent instantaneous plate-diation levels. out of the iodine released from the core should not be made. Re-moval of iodine from surfaces by steam condensate flow or washoff by the containment spray may be assumed if such effects can be justified and quantified by an-g- alysis or experiment. ( 1.4.6 For unshielded equipment located The gamma dose in containment is that in the containment, the gamma dose dose calculated at the centerpoint of and dose rate should be equal to the containment. Shielding effects are the dose and dose rate at the considered for equipment located out-centerpoint of the containment side the crane wall and in the accumu-plus the contribution from loca-lator rooms. tion dependent sources such as the sump water and plate-out, un-less it can be shown by analyses that location and shielding of the equipment reduces the dose and dose rate. 1.4.7 For unshielded equipment, the beta Beta dose calculations are consistent (_ doses at the surface of the equip-with the gamma dose calculations as ment should be the sum of the air-discussed above. Also see the response borne and plate-os. sources. The to 1.4.8 below. airborne beta dose should be taken as the beta dose calculated for a point at the containment center. 1.4.8 Shielded components need be All Class 1E equipment located in-qualified only to the gamma radi-side containment that is required to ation levels required, provided mitigate a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB in-an analysis or test shows that side the containment has sufficient the sensitive portions of the shielding to prevent the exposure of I i 6

.4 ~ NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPAN'l GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.8 (Continued) (Continued) component or equipment are not ex-any organic materials assoc ated posed to beta radiation or that with this equipment to a beta ra-the effects of beta radiation diation environment. heating and ionization have no deleterious effects on component performance. j 1.4.9 Cables arranged in cable trays See the response to 1.4.8 above. in the containment should be as-Additionally, armored cables are used sumed to be exposed to half the in safety-related applications inside beta radiation dose calculated containment at McGuire; therefore, f' for a point at the center of the beta radiation effects on cable insula-containment plus the gamma ray tion is considered negligible. dose calculated in accordance with Section 1.4(6). This reduction in beta dose is allowed because of tLe localized shielding by other cables plus the cable tray itself. 1.4.10 Paints and coatings should be See the resp;1se to 1.4.6 and 1.4.7 assumed to be exposed to both beta above. and gamma rays in assesing their resistance to radiation. Plate-out activity should be assumed to remain on the equipment surface unless the effects of the removal mechanisms, such as spray wash-off or steam condensate flow, can be justified and quantified by analysis or experiment. 1.4.11 Components of the emergency Radiation levels outside containment core cooling system (ECCS) lo-following a design basis LOCA are cated outside containment (e.g., based on the release fractions dis-pumps, valves, seals, and elec-cussed in 1.4.1 above. This released trical equipment) should be quali-activity is assumed to be retained fied to withstand the radiation in and diluted by water from safety i 7

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE PGWER COMPANY GUIDELINES PuSITION 1.4.11 (Continued) (Continued) equivalent to that penetrating injection and ice bed melt. Where the containment, plus the exposure appropriate, radiation penetrating from the sump fluid using assump-the containment is included. This tions consistent with the require-analysis is consistent with that re-ments stated in Appendix K to 10 quired by NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.6b. CFR Part 50. 1.4.12 Equipment that may be exposed to Class lE equipment that is exposed radiation doses below 104 rads to a radiation environment is evalu-1 should not be considered to be ated for proper radiation qualifica-exempt from radiation qualifi-tion. cation, unless analysis supported 1 by test data is provided to verify that these levels will not degrade the operability of the equipment below acceptable values. 1.4.13 The Staff will accept a given The calculated radiaiton environ-component to be qualified pro-ments for McGuire are comparable vided it can be shown that the to those values presented in component has been qualified to Appendix D. integrated beta and gamma doses which are equal to or higher than those levels resulting from an analysis similar in nature and scope to that included in Appendix D (which uses the source term given in item (1) above), and that the component incorporates appropriate factors pertinent to the plant design and operating characteristics, as given in these general guidelines. 1.4.14 When a conservative analysis has See the response to 1.4.13 above. not been provided by the applicant for staff review, the staff will use the radiation environment guide-lines contained in Appendix D, suit-l ably corrected for the differences in reactor power level, type, contain-ment size, and other appropriate factors. 8 Revision 1

e 4 NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPAhT GUIDELINES POSITION 1.5 . Environmental Conditions For Oat-Side Containment l.5.1 Equipment located outside con-Equipment located outside the con-tainment that could be subjected to tainment that could be subjected to high-energy pipe breaks should be a postel-ted pipe break environment qualified to the conditions result-and that is required to either miti-ing from the accident for the dur-gate the break or bring the unit to ation required. The techniques a safe shutdown condition is qualified to calculate the environmental for the pipe break environment. parameters described in Sections 1.1 through 1.4 (Category II) above The methods employed to evaluate pipe should be applied. breaks and to determine the resulting environmental parameters are discussed ( in Duke Power Company Report MDS/PDG - 77 - 1, The Evaluation of the Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment for McGuire Nuclear Station. 1.5.2 Equipment located in general Equipment located in general plant plant areas outside containment areas outside containrent and not where equipment is not subjected exposed to a DBA environment is de-to a design basis accident envi-signed and/or qualified for the normal ronment should be qualified to and abnormal range of environmental the normal and abnormal range of conditions postulated to occur at the environmental conditions postu- -equipment location. For these general lated to occur at the equipment areas outside containment except in location. the control complex, the environment considered is that which results from a loss of the normal powered venti-lation system. The environment in x the control complex, however, remains within a normal range because the con-trol complex is served by a redundant Class IE HVAC system. 1.5.3 Same as Category I; or, there For general plant areas outside con-may be designs where a loss of the tainment where the area temperature environmental support system may could be postulated to exceed the expose some equipment to environ-design temperature of the equipment ments that exceed the qualified in that area, a temperature monitoring limits. For these designs, appro-system is provided. This temperature priate monitoring devices should monitoring system is discussed in the be provided to alert the operator McGuire FSAR, Supplement 2. that abnormal conditions exist and to permit an assessment of the con-ditions that occurred in order to determine if corrective action, such as replacing any affected equipment, is warranted. 9

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.0 QUALIFICATION METHODS 2.1 Selection of Methods 2.1.1 Qualification methods should a. For equipment required to perform conform to the requirements de-a safety function in a postulated fined in IEEE Std. 323-1971. LOCA, MSLB, HELB, or post-LOCA 1 a recirculation radiation environ-ment, the environmental qualifica-tion methods meet the intent of IEEE 323-1971 requirements. b. For the equipment not required to oper-ate in a harsh accident environment, 1 (~ environmental testing per IEEE 323-1971 was not performed. Rather, the equip- ~ ment was designed and analyzed to assure that it maintains its required perfor-mance capability throughout the speci-fied range of normal and abnormal en-vironmental parameters. In general, factory performance / functional test-ing at ambient conditions is completed on equipment prior to shipping and, for some items of equipment, a produc-tion unit may be tested at the specified 2 maximum ambient temperature. These pro-duction tests, together with the design specificaton for the equipment, which specifies the range of normal and abnormal environmental parameters and engineering ( analysis, provides sufficient assurance of equipment capability in accordance with the Staff position under Item 2.1.4. 2.1.2 The choice of the methods selected For equipment located inside contain-is largely a matter of technical ment that is required to perform a safety judgement and availability of in-function in a postulated LOCA, MSLB, or HELB formation that supports the con-environment, environmental qualification is clusions reached. Experience has in general by testing. shown that qualification of equip-ment subjected to an accident envi-For equipment located outside containment a h 10 Revision 1 ---r y --v, -m r

i. NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.2 (Continued) (Continued) ronment without test data is not that is required to perform a safety adequate to demonstrate functional function in a postulated.HELB or post-1 operability. In general, the staff LOCA recirculation radiation environ-will not accept. analysis in lieu of ment, qualification is in general by test data unless (a) testing of the. testing, analysis, manufacturer's spe-component is impractical due to cific design, and/or combinations of i size limitations, and (b) partial these methods. type test data is provided to'sup-port the analytical assumptions and The qualification method is provided conclusions reached. in the equipment tables. 2.1.3 The environmental qualification of. equipment exposed to DBA environ-(~ ments should conform to the follow-ing positions: x The basis should be provided for The required duration of operability ~ the time interval required for is based on assumptions in the FSAR operability of this equipment. accident analysis, system requirements, 1 - and/or the time the environment is expected to remain outside its normal range following a DEA. i The required and demonstrated duration of the safety function of equipmeat subject to a LOCA, MSLB, KELB, or post-LOCA recirculation radiation environ-1 sent is provided in the equipment tables. The operability and failure cri-The primary purpose of equipment quali- ^ teria should be specified and the fication is to reduce the potential safety margins defined. for common-mode failures due to post-ulated environmental conditions. Equip-ment will therefore be considered to have ;i i failed the test and/or analysis if the functional requirements identified in the j attached tables cannot be met, unless an investigation can establish that the failure mechanism is not of common-mode j origin or that plant specific analyses can demonstrate that the reduced capabi-lity is acceptable. ( In certain cases, failure criteria, per se, was not specified prior to qualification j testing; however, the failure of the equip-ment would have been an obvious failure (i.e., equipment would not function). t Margin is discussed in Section 3.0. 11 Revision 1 e ,r-,-<r, ,w-9 -..mv -..--,w . ~,. -- -.4.--.,

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.3a Equipment that must function in Equipment that must perform a safety order to mitigate any accident function in a LOCA, MSLB, HELB, or should be qualified by test to post-LOCA recirculation radiation en-1 demonstrate its operability for vironment, is qualified by test and/or i the time required in the environ-analysis. The acceptance criteria for mental conditions resulting from the text and/or analysis is that the that accident. safety-related function must be demon-strated for the specified duration of operability in the postulated accident environment. 2.1.3b Any equipment (safety-related In general, the failure of safety-or non-safety-related) that need related equipment that is not re-not function in order to mitigate quired to perform a safety function in (~_ any accident, but that must not a postulated harsh accident environment fail in a manner detrimental to is not detrimental to plant safety. plant safety should be qualified by test to demonstrate its cap-The effects and consequences of adverse ability to withstand any accident environments on non-safety related environment for the time during equipment has been identified as a which it must not fail. Category I item under NUREG-0585 "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report" and will be resolved as part of the action plan set up to address Recommendation #9. Addition-ally, the subject of non safety-related control systems was addressed in IE Information Notice 79-22. 2.1.3c Equipment that need not function Where an item of safety-related equip-in order to mitigate any accident ment is located in an area such that ( and whose failure in any mode in it may be exposed to a LOCA, MSLB, HELB, any accident environment is not or post-LOCA recirculation radiation en-1 detrimental to plant safety need vironment but is not required to perform only be qualified for its non-any safety-function as a result of the accident service environment. breaks, the failure of such equipment, due to the adverse environment, has been Although actual type testing is determined not to prejudice the safety preferred, other methods when functions of other equipment claimed justified may be found acceptable. in the accident analysis. The bases should be provided for concluding that such equipment is not required to function in order to mitigate any accident, and that its failure in any mode in any accident environment is not detri-mental to plant safety. 12 Revision 1 1 T ~ ^^

e NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.4 For environmental qualification of As stated in the response to Item equipment subject to events other 2.1.lb, the design specification re-than a DBA, which result in abnor-quirements for equipment not required mal environmental conditions, act-to function in a harsh environment I ual type testing is preferred. together with factory performance / dowever, analysis or operating functional tests and engineering i history, or any applicable com-analyses (including some cases where bination thereof, coupled with the testing is performed at maximum partial type test data may be ambient conditions) provide the re-found acceptable, subject to the quisite assurance for equipment ca-l applicability and detail of in-pability. formation provided. 2.2 Qualification by Test 2.2.1 The failure criteria should'be The response to Item 2.1.3 is appli-established prior to testing. cable for equipment required to operate in a LOCA, MSLB, EELB, or post-LOCA 1 recirculation radiation environment. 2.2.2 Test results should demonstrate As stated in Item 2.1.la environmental that the equipment can perform its qualification demonstrates the cap-required function for all service ability of equipment to perform safety-conditions postulated (with margin) related functions when subject to the during its installed life. consequential adverse environment of LOCA, MSLB, HELB, or post-LOCA recir-I culation radiatien. For equipment not required to operate in a harsh environ-ment, the response to Item 2.1.Ib applies. The requirement to demonstrate this capability during the installed life implies an addressment of aging. This subject is discussed under Item 4. The subject of margin is discussed under Item 3. 2.2.3 The items described in Section 5.2 The Duke Power Company position with of IEEE Std. 323-1971 supplemented respect to Section 5 of IEEE 323-1971 is by items (4) through (12) below provided in the response to Item 2.3.3. constitute acceptable guidelines for establishing test procedures. t 13 Revision 1

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.4 When establishing the simulated In general, a single profile, envelop-environmental profile for quali-ing both MSLB and LOCA, is used for fying equipment located inside qualification of equipment located containment, it is preferred that inside containment which is required a single profile be used that enve-to perform a safety function to mitigate lopes the environmental conditions a LOCA or MSLB. The exceptions to the resulting from any design basis use of a single qualification envelope event during any mode of plant for LOCA and MSLB are, in general, when: operation (e.g., a profile that envelopes the conditions produced (a) A component is only required by the main steamline break and to mitigate against either the loss-of-coolant accidents). LOCA or MSLB. In such a case, qualification has been completed to conditions enveloping the possible consequences inside containment from the single event and additionally, it is verified that failure of the component in any other more limit-ing environment will not prejudice any safety-related function (b) The resulting test conditions would unjustifiably exceed acceptable conse rvatism. 2.2.5 Equipment should be located above In general, safety-related equipment flood level or protected against is located above the maximum post-submergence by locating the equip-LOCA water level. The exceptions to ment in qualified watertight en-this design philosophy are certain closures. Where equipment is motor operated valves and associated located in watertight enclosures, cables. The submerged valves are dis-qualification by test or analysis cussed in FSAR Section 15.4.1.3. should be used to demonstrate the adequacy of such protection. Where i equipment could be submerged, it i should be identified and demon-strated to be qualified by test for the duration required. i t 14

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.6 The temperature to which equipment In performing qualification tests for is qualified, when exposed to the equipment exposed to a LOCA, MSLB, or simulated accident environment, HELB environment, the external environ-should be defined by thermocouple ment temperature is measured as close to readings on or as close as prac-the equipment surface as practicable. tical to the surface of the compo-nent being qualified. If there were no thermocouples located near the equipment during the tests, heat transfer analysis should be used to determine the temperature at the component. (Acceptable heat transfer analysis '7 methods are provided in Appendix B.) 2.2.7 Performance characteristics of Where the safety-related function of equipment should be verified the equipment requires operation in before, after, and periodically the LOCA, MSLB, HELB, or post-LOCA during testing throughout its recirculation radiation environment, i range of required operability. the equipment performance before, dur-ing (where practic.al) and after expo-sure to the simulated event is veri-fied. 2.2.8 Caustic spray should be incor-The response to Item 1.3.1 is appli-porated daring simulated event cable for equipment located inside con-testing at the maximum pressure tainment and qualified by test to oper-and at the temperature conditions ate in the LOCA or MSLB environment. that would occur when the onsite spray systems actuate. 2.2.9 The operability status of equipment The response to Item 2.2.7 is appli-should be monitored continuously cable. I during testing. For long-term testing, however, monitoring at discrete intervals should be justi-fied if used. 2.2.10 Expected extremes in power supply Class IE equipment is supplied by voltage range and frequency should guaranteed stabili::ed power supplies. be applied during simulated event As a consequence, the range of the i environmental testing, electrical parameters is considered to be within equipment capability. j I i 15 R vision 1 ~ .-.$~~',

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.11 Dust environments should be Duke has implemented housekeeping pro-addressed when establishing quali-cedures to preclude adverse dust con-fication service conditions. ditions at McGuire. Therefore, dust environments are not required as a l qualification parameter. I 2.2.12 Cobalt-60 is an acceptable gamma In general, Cobalt-60 sources are radiation source for environmental used to simulate the effects of gamma qualification. radiation for equipment qualified by test to operate in a LOCA/MSLB or 1 post-LOCA recirculation radiation environment. 2.3 Test Sequence 2.3.1 Justification of the adequacy of In general, when testing is used to the test sequence selected should qualify equipment required to perform be provided, a safety function in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment, the following test sequence is employed: 1. The equipment is subjected to a calibration and/or veri-fication test at ambient con-ditions. This test included verification of safety related functions. 1 2. No specific abnormal tests are required si2ce the accident environment envelopes the ab-normal condition with s. margin. 3. The equipment is irra-diated, using a Cobalt-60 source, to the estimated worst case gamma dose ob-tained from in-service oper-ation and required ac-cident and post accident perfo rmance. 4. The same equipment is test-ed to verify equipment cap-ability during a simulated seismic event. 16 Revision 1 -p

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.3.1 (Continued) (Continued) 5. The same equipment is test-ed under applicable simulated accident and post-accident conditions. Completion of the above test sequence gives assurance that the equipment can perform safety-related functions under a normal, abnormal and design basis event conditions. The design basis event testing applies extremes of radiation, ( vibration (seismic), te=perature, humid-ity and chemical spray in a conservative sequence and verifies that the equipment being qualified is not marginal with respect to these parameters. The subject of margin and aging are dis-cussed under Items 3 and 4, respectively. 2.3.2 The test should simulate as For equipment that is qualified by closely as practicable the post-testing, the test environment simulates ulated environment. as closely as practicable the postulated environment. 2.3.3 The test procedures should In general, the qualification testing conform to the guidelines des-of safety-related equipment at McGuire cribed in Section 5 of IEEE Std. conforms to the guidelines of IEEE 323-323-1971. 1971. The Duke position with respect to the documentation requirements of IEEE 323-1971 is provided in the response to Item 5.2. 2.3.4 The staff consideres that, for For equipment which is qualified by vital electrical equipment such testing and which is required to per-as penetrations, connectors, form a safety function in a LOCA, MSLB, cables, valves and motors, and or HELB environment, the test sequence transmitters located inside con-identified in the response to Item 2.3.1 tainment or exposed to hostile is generally employed and as a con-steam environments outside con-sequence does not, in general, employ tainment, separate effects test-separate effects testing. Separate ing for the most part is not an effects testing, if used, is justified. acceptable qual'fication method. The testing of such equipment should be conducted in a manner that subjects the same piece of equipment to radiation and the hostile steam environment sequentially. 17 i l 1 ,.1_ _

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPAhT GUIDELINES POSITION 2.4 Other Qualification Methods Qualification by analysis or Duke does not necessarily rely on operating experience implemented, operating experience to establish as described in IEEE Std. 323-1971 the qualification of safety-related and other ' ancillary standards, may equipment, rather, operating experience be found acceptable. The adequacy may be included in support of quali-l of these methods will be evaluated fication by test and/or analysis. The on the basis of the quality and equipment tables identify the qualifi-detail of the information submit-cation methodology employed for each ted in support of the assumptions item of safety-related equipment. made and the specific function and location of the equipment. These methods are most suitable for equip-(_ ment where testing is precluded by physical size of the equipment being qualified. It is required that, when these methods are employed, some i partial type tests on vital compo-nents of the equipment be provided in support of these methods. 3.0 MARGINS 3.1 Quantified margins should be For most plant specific applicaticas applied to the design parameters margins are available between the qual-discussed in Section 1 to assure ification parameters and the plant that the postulated accident con-specific requirements, ditions have been enveloped during testing. These margins should be Margins are as shown in the equipment i applied in addition to any margins tables. (conservatism) applied during the [ derivation of the specified plant parameters. 3.2 The margins provided in the design Same as 3.1 1 l will be evaluated on a case-by-case i basis. Factors that should be considered in quantifying margins are (a) the environmental stress levels induced during testing, (b) the duration of the stress, (c) the number of items tested and the number of tests performed in the hostile environment, (d) the per-formance characteristics of the I equipment while subjected to the environmental stresses, and (e) the specified function of the equip-ment. 18 Revision 1

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 3.3 When the qualification envelope in This generic envelope is not speci-Appendix C is used, the only fically employed by Westinghouse or required margins are those account-Duke for qualification testing. It ing for the inaccuracies in the should be noted that a given manu-test equipment. Sufficient con-facturer's test curve may approximate servatism has already been included this generic curve. to account for uncertainties such as production errors and errors associated with defining satis-factory performance (e.g., when only a small number of units are tested). 3.4a Some equipment may be required by In general, equipment required to oper-(. the design to only perform its ate in a harsh accident environment is l1 safety function within a short time qualified to perform its safety function period into the event (i.e., within over a considerable period in excess of seconds or minutes), and, once its the calculated worst case time to perform function is complete, subsequent the safety functions as derived from the failures are shown not to be detri-accident analysis. The arbitrary ad-mental to plant safety. Other ditional one hour time requirement has equipment may not be required to not been applied to all equipment. The perform a safety function but must time margins indicated in the equipment not fail within a short time period tables are considered acceptable, into the event, and subsequent failures are also shown not to be detrimental to plant safety. Equipment in these categories is required to remain functional in the accident environment for a period of at least 1 hour in excess t of the time assumed in the accident analysis. 3.4b For all other equipment (e.g., In qualifying equipment required to post-accident monitoring, recom-operate in a LOCA, MSLB, HELB, or biners, etc.), the 10 percent post-LOCA recirculation radiation 1 time margin identified in Section environment, margin is included in i 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Std. 323-1974 may qualification testing by selecting be used. conservative qualification parameters and/or test sequences. l1 Some of the areas where margin is usually implicit in a test sequence is as follows: 1. The full radiation dose, simulat-ing effects of in-service and acci-1 dent radiation doses, is applied in a single step prior to seisnic and HELB test simulations. 19 Revision 1

t NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE P0%T.R CO?fPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 3.4b (Continued) (Continued) 2. The seismic event simulation applies significant mechanical stress to the i equipment prior to the KELB simulation. 3. The single envelope normally employed for HELB simulation, not only encompasses the effects of LOCA and MSLB accidents, but a whole spectrum of break sizes and lccations within these accident definitions. As a consequence, the envelope employed invariably contains significant margin with respect to the transient for any single break size and location. 4. The single HELB simulation normally employed combines the high irradia-tion dose associated with the LOCA with the high temperature associated with the MSLB. 4.0 AGING l 4.1 Qualification programs that are Safety-related valve operators (motor committed to conform to the and solenoid) located inside containment ( requirements of IEEE Std. 382-1972 and continuous duty motors located in-(for valve operators) and IEEE Std. side containment have been mechanically, s 334-1971 (for motors) should con-thermally, and radiation aged to an sider the effects of aging. For equivalent of 40 years of service in this equipment, the Category I accordance with IEEE 382-1972 and IEEE positions of Section 4 are appli-334-1971, respectively. cable. t 4.2 For other equipment, the qualifi-Addressment of aging was not a require-cation programs should address ment in qualification programs for aging only to the extent that Category II equipment. However, with equipment that is composed, in the wealth of in-service experience part, of materials susciptible to covering a variety of equipment types, aging effects should be identified, no significant in-service aging mech-and a schedule for periodically anisms have been identified which could I replacing the equipment and/or prejudice the qualification tests per-l materials should be established. formed on new equipment within a few l During individual case reviews, the years from start-up. I staff will require that the effects l 20 1

NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY l GUIDELINES POSITION l 4.2 (Continued) (Continued) of aging be accounted for on selec-Duke Power Company is evaluating the ted equipment if operating experi-in-containment Class 1E equipment and i ence or testing indicates that the will report at the time of discovery equipment may exhibit deleterious any equipment for which significant i aging mechanisms, aging mechanisms are identified in-cluding the justification for continued use and/or reasonable alternative action. This on going investigation will necessarily be very time consuming and will rely heavily on EPRI research, NRC studies, NPRDS information, IE Bulletins and Circulars, and industry C. research and testing. 5.0 QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTATION 5.1 The Staff endorses the require-Duke Power Company will arrange ments stated in IEEE Std. 323-and maintain in an auditable form 1974 that, "The qualification sufficient qualification documen-documentation shall verify that tation that will support the quali-each type of electrical equip-fication that is required for each ment is qualified for its appli-type of safety-related electrical cation and meets its specified equipment. performance requirements. The basis of qualification shall be explained to show the relation-ship of all facets of proof need-( ed to support adequacy of the ( complete equipment." " Data used to demonstrate the qualification of the equipment shall be pertinent to the ap-plication and organized in an auditable form." 5.2 The guidelines for documentation The qualification test reports in IEEE Std. 323-1971 are ac-referenced in the equipment tables ceptable. The documentation for equipment qualified to operate in should include sufficient infor-an accident environment, in general, mation to address the required meet the requirements of Section 5 l information identified in Ap-to IEEE 323-1971 by providing certain pendix E. A certificate of con-essential information. For example: formance by itself is not accept-able unless it is accompanied safety-related functional require-by test data and information on ments to be demonstrated the qualification program. 21

i e I NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 5.2 (Continued) (Continued) range of applicable environmental parameters to be considered - identification of the test tait description of the test facility and monitoring instrumentation description of test unit mounting and interfaces summary of the test procedures C summary of the test results 22

ATTACHMENT 5 r COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 i I d Is e r-..- .. - -ww,we.-wwo --swr +- 6--v-ww-w-w-- -.-*-4


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~ / I Q f J McGUIRf NUCLEAR SIATION - UNIT I Pege ! COMPARIS0N OF THE INVIR0hMENTAL QHALIFICATION OF CLASS IC EQUIPMENT 8evisloe 0 LOCAf te INSIDI CONIAlle9 TNT TO IHE DUlst P051310N 04 IH( CATECORY 11 GUIDELipts OF NUstG 0$88 Naa-P*opeletery velve Solenold Operators Deeper Dlff Press flectrical Cable form / Ste=4tounted u nHt N1 (Velcor,Asco. Motors 5 witches Penetrations Cable s Splice Noteriel fielt 5= Itches Seel Material IptullFICATION Target Rock) (Rotork) (5olon) (0.G. O'Drlen) (All SupPflers) (Reychee) (Namco) ()M) NUngG 0588 It e. 2.1.1 e C C C C C C C C 2.1.1 b N/A N/A N/A N/A C N/A N/A N/A 2.l.2 C C C C C C C C 2.1.) C C C C C C C C 2.1.) e C C C C C C C C 2.1.1 b C C C C C C C C 2.1.) e C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.I.% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.5 C C C C C C C C 2.2.2 C C C C C C C t 2.2.) t C C C C C C C 2.2.4 C C C C C C C C 2.2.1 C C C C C t t 2.2.6 C C C C C C C C ] 2.2.7 C C C C C C C C ~ 2.2.8 C C C C C C C C 2.2.9 C C C C C C C C 2.2.10 C C C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.18 C C C C C C C C 2.2.12 C C C C C C C C 2.3.1 C C C 11) C C C C 2.3.2 C C C C C C C C 2.).) C C C C C C C C 2.).4 C C C (1) C C C C 2.4 C C C C C C C C 3.8 C C C C C C C C 3.2 C C C C C C C C }.) C C C C C C C C }.4 e C C C C C C C C 3.4 b C C N/A C C C C C 4.1 C C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.2 N/A N/A C C C C C g 5.1 C C C t C C C C 5.2 C C C t C C C C

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l Page 3 Revision 0 Non-proprietary MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 Note 1 The reported tests on the prototype, Lot 1, and Lot 2 units involve multiple tests on multiple units. The differences between the individual units are known and are minor, and thus the experience in total represents an in-depth knowledge of the characteristics of these transmitters under severe environment conditions. This experience, together with the conservative parameters employed for testing, provide an unparalleled assurance that these units will perform to specification j ( under all anticipated service conditions. Note 2 Certain Barton transmitters are claimed for short-term functions, that is until the containment pressure reaches the point at which safety injection is initiated by high contaimnent pressure. A conservative estimate indicates that these transmitters are required to perform their short term functions until a containment pressure change of 8 psig has occurred. This pressure corresponds to a maximum containment temperature of 280*F and would occur no later than 3 minutes following the initiation of the break inside containment. Thus, Westinghouse specifies a trip accuracy of t 10% for up to 5 minutes as a conservative qualification requirement. The Westinghouse qualification program [ ] a,,c an additional 1 hour while maintaining the specified trip accuracy. The 1 hour margin requirement has been introduced by the Staff due to concerns over the consequences of transmitter failures after a few minutes into the accident scenario. In particular, that such failures could lead to negation of the safety function or generate information that could mislead the operator. These concerns are not valid in this case due to the manner in which these transmitters are employed and qualified: Trip Function The qualification tests demonstrate that the trip accuracy requirement is maintained for up to 5 minutes and that the requisite trip signal will be generated. Once the signal is generated the signal is ' locked-in' by the protection system and will not reset should the transmitter fail to continue i to generate the trip signal at some time after 5 minutes. Thus, all automatic protective actions will proceed irrespective of the performance of the transmitter after 5 minutes. e y e + ++w-

Page 4' Revision 0 Non-Proprietary Information to Operator The transmitter qualification verifies that equipment failures do not occur in a period up to 1 hour and 5 minutes after initiation of the accident. In fact, the qualification verifies that the transmitters will continue to orarate for at least 4 months post-accident while maintaining the accuracy requirement specified for post accident monitoring instrumentation. Note 3 The only difference between the RTD models supplied by Rosemount is in the[ ]a,b.c;therefore, the environmental results reported in WCAP-9157 for Rosemount [ ]a,c j are equally applicable to the Rosemount [ 3a,c, Note 4 j { The power range neutron detectors are not required to perform any safety functions in an adverse accident environment. However, Westinghouse in-vestigations into potential system interaction scenarios resulting from adverse accident environments identified a possible scenario in which an adverse accident environment resulting from an intermediate steamline break inside the containment could cause a malfunction of the power range neutron detectors. This interaction scenario is one of four which were the subject of IE Information Notice 79-22. Duke Pcwer Company has analyzed the effects of an adverse accident environment on the power range detectors and has concluded that there are no credible failures of these detectors that could result in unsafe plant conditions. 1 Note 5 The referenced topical reports, WCAP-7709L (Proprietary) through Supplement 4, and L' CAP-7820 (Non-Proprietary) through Supplement 4 which sumarize the l ~ l Westinghouse qualification tests on the Model A Hydrogen Recombiner to IEEE 323-1971, have been reviewed and approved by the NRC as indicated in a letter from D B Vassallo to C E Eiche1dinger dated May 1, 1975. This i evaluation indicates that the Staff will not require any further review of these documents except to verify the plant specific applicability of the qualification parameters Note 6 1 j NRC letter dated March 7,1980 requested Duke to provide justification for the acceptability of separate effects testing for the containment air l return and hydrogen skimer fan motors. Specifically, the NRC Staff's concern was that although the motor insulation system and.other motor components are qualified for a radiation environment in excess of the calculated nomal plus accident radiation environment, the Motorette testing did not include exposure to a steam environment following exposure i to radiation. I

Page 5 Revision 1 Non-Proorieta ry Duke Power Conpany has reviewed the design and testing of these fan motors. We have determined that the combined effects of a radiation environment and a steam environment were previously included in the qualification testing on a complete motor assembly. The motor assembly tested was a valve motor operator composed of the materials identified in Reliance Electric Company Report NUC-9 which are similar to the materials composing the McGuire containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fan motors. This valve motor operator (ID No. 2Y267074AlEZ) was irradiated and examined as reported by Reliance in NUC-9 and then shipped to the Limitorque Corporation where it was successfully tested in a steau environment in accordance with 4 IEEE 382-1972 as reported in Limitorque Test Report 600456. The radiation and steam environmental parameters used in the Reliance and Limitorque tests envelope the accident conditions for the McGuire fan motors. Duke Power Company therefore concludes that in addition to the environmental i testing described in Joy Manufacturing Company Test Report X-604, the environmental testing described above further assures the capability of the McGuire containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fan motors to function in the postulated McGuire accident environment. Note 7 Separate effects radiation testing was performed on the McGuire electrical penetrations. The only effects of the irradiation were a slight increase in the hardness of the elastomeric grommets that provide the environmental seal in the plug and cable assemblies and a color change in the epoxy fiberglass insulators. These effects produced no measureable change in the electrical or mechanical performance of the penetration assemblies; therefore, separate effects testing for radiation is considered acceptable. Note 8 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0660. Qualification data will be provided by October 1,1981 in accordance with the September 5,1980 clarifications to the NUREG. Note 9 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in.NUREG 0660. Qualification testing for this equipment is scheduled for completion in December, 1980. The results of this testing will be provided upon receipt and review of the formal report by Duke Power Company. I i y y

i i ATTACHMENT 6 COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIFMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 ( C. t 4 r n. -m

a ~ - l ".i [j ~' j,-, l' 'e RCCUlBt MUCttAR 51Afl0N - UNil I Pete 9 I COMPAR150# OF THE INVla0NMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 11 EQUIPMENT Revistost 0 LOCATED Ft1TSIDE CONTA19eetN1 AND IIPC$t310 MILS (NVlaountNT TO TNE DUKt P019780N ON TMt CAftG04f Il CUIDtLINf10F NUnit 0588 EqulPaef NT CONT. StaAT 814 PW* ' $ 5 PtMP ' CENT. CHC NSW PtMP CO 5tmP COMP. COOL 941 Ptper gia Heep 40fNilflCATless Pimp Motost$ -. M6T9' S_., N510s1.. Pt>P MOTOsl M0f001 E P n01085 _ Pt>P og)1ent seet045 ac10e5 +

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NUstt 0588 I t eve 2.l.le N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 2.1.lb C C N/A N/A N/A C N/A C C 3.3.3 N/A N/A C C C N/A C M/4 N/A e l 2.1.) F/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 3.l.je N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 4.l.jb N/A ~ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/a N/A N/A N/A 2.9.)c C C N/A N/A' N/A C N/A C C 3.1.4 C C N/A N/A N/A C f N/A C C 3.2.1 N/A N/A C C C [ N/A ' C N/A N/A 2.3.2 c. C C C C C C C C 3.3.) / 9/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 2.3.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A / 2. 2.*, * ,N/A 10 / 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A !.3.6 N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 3.1.7 h/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 3.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A, 2.2.9 N/A N/A' C C C M/A C N/A N/4 2.2.40 N/* z.t.ll r, N/A C C C '3/4 C N/A N/A C C C C C C C C P.2.17 (3) . (1) (11 ft) (I) (1) (t) (t) (ll: 2.).I-N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A E/4 > f 1.1.2 N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A p *A 2.).) P/A N/A C C C N/A C W/A N/A 2.) b N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 2.4 N/A N/A 'C C C N/A C N/A N/A j.9 N/A N/A C C C W/A C N/A N/A 3.2 N/A N/A C C C N/A C 4/4 N/A ).) N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A ). be N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ).Lb N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A %.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A . %.3 N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A 5.8 C C C C C C C C C 5.2 N/A N/A C C C N/A C N/A N/A

[ s NCCulRE fe>CLCAR STATION - UNii l Page ! aevision 0 COMPAtl50N OF TMC ENVIR0889tNTAL QUALIFICAll0N OF CLAS5 If EQUIPMENT LOCAllD OU15fDt CONTAINMENT AND ERF05t0 to HELO ENVIRONMENT TO THE OUEt P05l1004 ON iME CAltCORY 11 CUIDELINt5 0F NUnts 0588 10/ATC COMPONENI DU55 MAN FU5ttt0CK5 (QulPMfMT $F C00tfMC ANR AND CS FP AHU 18/AIC (DMPONINT IP/ATC COMFONENT (25ue, j793, 1839, is/ATC COMPONENT 10t NT IF l( A T 10N _ PUMP MOT 0a5_ AMU. N0f0a5 NOT0#5 _ SU*Cf SWP8tS50a5 SL f raN sL0Ca5 _ u ig. 4575) C.N pttAy1 (pth ot6) WUnts 0588 fee 2.l.le C N/A C C C C C 3.1.Ib N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.9.1 C N/A C C C C C 3.1.) C N/A C C C C C 3.1.js C N/A C C C C C 3.l.)b N/A N/A N/A C C C C 3.1.)c N/A C N/A C E C C 1.8.4 N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.3.1 C N/A C C C C C 2.2.3 C C C C C C C 3.3.) C W/4 C C C C C 3.2.b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A h/4 3.2.$ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.3.6 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 3.2.3 C N/A N/A M/A N/A N/A C 3.3.8 N/A N/A N/n N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 2.3.10 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A C 2.2.81 C C C C C C C 3.2.It (l) (8) (l) (I) (1) (l) (I) 1.1.1 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 3.3.3 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 2.3.) C N/A N/A C C C C 3.3.4 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 3.4 C N/A C C C C C 3.8 C N/A N/A C C C C J.: C N/A N/A C C C C 3.) C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 3.be N/A N/A N/A C C C C 3.bb C N/A N/A C C C C b.I N/A N/A N/A N/A P/A N/A N/A 4.2 C N/A C C C C C 5.9 C C C C C C C 5.1 C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C

,t' ' 'ab MCGUIRE NUCLEAR stall 0N - UNil 1 Page } COMPAtl504 0F TH( (NVla0NMENT AL QUAllFIC ATION OF CLASS 11 (QQlPMENT Sevleton 0 LOCAff0 OU1510t CONTAINMENT AND (IPOSED TO Nf LO ENVlRONMENT TO THE DUnt POSITION ON Int CAltGORT 11 CUIDELINES OF NUAEG 0598 IS/ATC COMPONfNT (QUlPHINI C-N SW E INO LOCHTS ig/ATC COMPONENT 19/AIC COMPONENT ANU DifF FIRESTAf PNL/CAO ConPONENT A8FIF-CP AGFIF-Flat 10fwilrt(Af10st_ (ft9. f10. 103501) ANALOG OP 150L 50 atLAv5 Pat 55 SW if MP SW ET/CtentNT ALAnM _ 14 6 10 F#01 P Amit NuafG 0588 Stee 2.4.le C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 2.1.lb N/A N/A N/A C C N/A C C 2.1.2 C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 2.1.) C C C N/A N/A C 1/A N/A 2.l.]e C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A !.l.)b C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.)c C N/A N/A C C N/A C C 2.4.4 N #A N/A N/A C C M/A C C 2.2.8 ta C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 1.2.3 C C C C C C t C 2.3.) C C C M/A N/A C N/A N/A 2.2.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.3.6 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.7 C M/A C M/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

2. 2. 9 C

N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.10 C N/A C M/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.11 C C C C C C C C 3.2.12 (1) (l) (I) (1) (t) (l) (t) (Il f.3.1 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.).2 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.).) C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 2.3.4 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.4 C C C M/A N/A C N/A N/A 3.1 C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 3.2 C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 3.) C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.4e C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.46 C C C N/A N/A C N/A N/A 4.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A W/A N/A N/A C C C N/A h/A C N/A N/A 5.8 C C C C C C C C $.2 C N/A C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A a e v v

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  • *Je NCCutRE NUCLEAA STATION - Ussit i Pe9e 4 COMPARISON OF THf INVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICAll0N OF CLASS It EQUIPMENT pevistose O LOCATED OUT5tet CostfalemtN1 AND IIP 0$tD TO NELO ENVIRO *ENT TO INE DUKt POSITION 088 iMt CATEG0av 11 CUIDELINil 0F ImptG 0588 VALVf SOLEN 0ID VALVf N0104 IgcIPMINT ABFIF.IA AV FilitA AssoutUS VENT ANNULU$ VINI SIAATER/CONTAC104 OPEAA10t$

OPtRA1045 CIMit $witCNil CAgtt$ let hilF ICAllOtt M010tS UNIT SA. It FAN N0f04 14 DAMP (A N0fons M A209 J3CA (VALCOR. ASCO) {LIMif 04QUf. R0f04K) (NANCOI (A(L $UPPLita$) NuafG 0588 Item 2.3.le N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.1.lb C C C C C N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.6.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 3.I.) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.5.)e N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C (I) C C 2.9.)b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.9.)c C C C C C C C C C 2.1.4 C C C C C N/A N/A N/A C 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C N/A .r.2 C C C C C C (2) C C 3.2.) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 3.3.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.7.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C !.t.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C (2) C C 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.2.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C N/A C C C 3.3.11 C C C C C C . (1) (1) (1) 2.2.12 (I) (I) (I) (I) (1) (1) 2.).1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.3.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.3.) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.3.b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 2.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C N/A 3.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C ).2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C s.) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C ).4e N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C (2) C C 3.bb N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C (2) C C %.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C N/A C %.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 5.8 C C C C C C C C C 5.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C C C 4

Page 5 l' Revision 1 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 COMPARIS0N OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO THE HELB ENVIRONMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 i Note 1 i The radiation qualification information required in response to NUREG 0588 and Item 2.1.6.b of NUREG 0578 is provided in Attachment 3 and Attachment 7. ( Note 2 Rotork Test Report TR-3025 shows that when the qualified temperature for these valves is exceeded, the torque switches may fail on the next operation of the valve. Since at least one additional operation is available after the valve's temperature qualification has been exceeded, the valve can be relied upon to move to its safety position. l

k -+ -n a g 6 i ATTACHMENT 7 1 - COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO THE POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION RADIATION ENVIRONMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 ( r 8 i g --,,---,-,, m y -+.-- w---

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\\ l MCCUlR[ NUCl(AR STATION = UNll l l COMPARISON OF THE ENVIP0pettNTAL QUAllflCAlloM OF CLA$$ It (QUlltitNT l LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAjNMtNT AND (IPOSED 10 P051-toCA SiCittutA100N RADIAT ION (NVIR0te1(NT TO THE DUkt POSITION ON l THE CATEGORY ll EUtott f Nt$ OF NUREG 0588 l l l I (QUIPME NT 51 Pt.MP ANNutus Vf NT AUX 9t0G FitTERED OG VENT FP C00tlNG PUMP RMR PtMP 600 V0tf l f let ttlIf IC Ail 0N @f.081, FAN Motons EEH FAN 990f0R5 FAN M0 Top 5 Aenf MOTOR $ AHU MOTORS LOA ft C E NjiM 1 l NUREC 0588 ftem 2.1.la C C C C C C C 2.3.Ib N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.2 C C C C C C C 2.1.) C C C C C C t 2.l.Je C C C C C C C 2.l.)b N/A N/A N/A N/A N /A N/A N/A 2.1.)C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,l,4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.1 C t C t C C t 2.2.2 C C C C C C C 2.2.) C C C C C C C 2,2.4 N/A N/A N/A N /A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,3,6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.2.1 C C C C C C C 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N /A 2.2.9 C C C C C C C 2.2.10 C C C C C C C 2.2.ll C C C C C C C 2.2.11 C C C t C C t f 2,3,l N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.}.2 C C C C C C C 2.3.) C C C C C C C 2.).4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.k C C C C C C C ).I C C C C C C C 3.2 C C C C C C C ),) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ). fe a N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.n h C C C C C C C s %.I N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A k.2 C C C C t C C 5.8 C C C C C C C 5.2 C C C C C C C l l 4 me a

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