ML20064G809
| ML20064G809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1994 |
| From: | Denton R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9403160365 | |
| Download: ML20064G809 (21) | |
Text
.o BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC 1650 CALVERT CUFFS PARKWAY. LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657-4702 ROBERT E. DENTON vice PRESIDENT nucle An ENERGY (dso) 260-4 4 55 March 7,1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Alternate AC Power Source Desien Report
REFERENCE:
(a)
Letter from Mr. R. E. Denton (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated July 7,1993, Modification to our Station Blackout Rule
Response
In the referenced letter, it was noted that we needed to provide design information concerning the alternate AC power source we intend to use to mitigate a station blackout event. We commi:ted that the alternate AC power source would meet the criteria given in NUMARC 87-00, Appendix B. provides information on how the alternate AC source meets this criteria. In addition, we agreed to provide additionalinformation concerning the design of the alternate AC source. That information is contained in Attachment 2. This completes the series of design reports for both the safety.related and non-safety-related diesel generators.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours, 1
OM (f
RED / PSF /dlm Attachments: (1)
NUMARC 87-00 Alternate AC Power Criteria (2)
Alternate AC Diesel Generator Report ec:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr.. NRC T. T. Martin, NRC P. R. Wilson, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR 7
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n-3' A'ITACIIMENT (1)
NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA
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Italtimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
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March 7,1994 H
ATTACllMENT_t NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA Each of the following paragraphs correspond to the Criteria outlined in Appendix B of the NUMARC 87-00 document, Revision 1, which represents the Industries' approach for compliance with the station blackout (SBO) rule.
L B.1 The new alternate AC (AAC) system and its components need not be designed to meet Class IE or safety-related requirements. Ilowever, in order to utilize a Class 1E emergency diesel generator (EDG) as an AAC power source, this existing Class 1E EDG must continue to meet all of the applicable safety-related criteria, The proposed AAC power source for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant is a new augmented quality SACM diesel generator, equipped with auxiliary systems, similar to one being installed as the SACM safety-related emergency diesel generator (EDG) serving Class 1E 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11. One safety-related equipment specification was used to purchase both diesel generators from SACM. The non-SACM components (e.g., structures and piping) for the A AC diesel generator are not qualified or certified to IEEE and regulatory requirements applicable to a Class 1E EDG application.
Appropriate performance requirements are imposed on critical AAC diesel generator equipment in order to ensure the design basis requirements of the A AC diesel generator are maintained, 11. 2 Unless otherwise provided in this criteria, the new AAC system need not be protected against the effects of:
(a) failure or misoperation of mechanical equipment, including (i) fire, (ii) pipe u hlp, (iii) jet impingement, (iv) water spray, (v) flooding from a pipe break, (vi) radiation, pressurization, elevated temperature or humidity caused by a pipe break, and (vil) missiles resulting from the failure of rotating equipment or high energy systems; or (b) seismic events.
Generally, by locating the AAC diesel generator (and its auxiliary systems) in a separate structure external to the power block buildings, the potential for effects described in (a) above have been prevented through physical separation. Ilazards internal to the SBO Diesel i
Generator Building are not evaluated for their potential to cause failure during an SBO event.
As required by the Standard Building Code (SBC), likely weather-related external events are considered in the design of the AAC power system and the structures that house AAC diesel generator equipment.
The AAC power system and associated structure (s) are not d: signed to remain functional during or following design basis seismic events (i.e., not designed to meet Category I requirements).
1 Rev.O
ATTACIIMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 Al, TERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA
- 11. 3 Components and subsystems shall be protectcd against the effects of likely weather-related events that may initiate the loss of off-site power event. Protection may be provided by enclosing the new AAC diesel generator in a structure that conforms with the Uniform Bul! ding Code and burying exposed electrical cable runs between buildings (i.e., connections between the new NSR diesel generator and the Class IE shutdown busses).
This criterion states that the new AAC power system components and required subsystems need to be located within a structure meeting, as a minimum, the Uniform Building Code (UBC) requirements. The UBC equivalent design code of record for the area of the plant is the Standard Building Code (SBC). The AAC structures and exposed diesel generator components are designed to withstand likely weather conditions (high winds, snowfall, etc.)
as identiBed and addressed in the SBC for the area of the plant. Although the SBC does not j
explicitly require physical protection for roof-mounted equipment, this equipment is evaluated for the applicable weather-related effects. The weather events were considered in formulating the Standard Building Code and therefore compliance with the building code constitutes compliance with the design requirements for the likely weather-related events. Therefore, as a minimum, AAC structures are designed to withstand loads as addressed in the SBC.
j llowever, a safety-related, Category I Diesel Generator Building is located adjacent to the nonsafety-related SBO Diesel Generator Building. In order to preclude failure and impact on the adjacent Category I structure, the main girders, columns, and bracing for the SBO Diesel Generator Building have been analyzed to demonstrate that the SBO Diesel Generator Building will not collapse under design basis earthquake (nve operating basis earthquakes (OBEs) followed by a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)) loads. Miscellaneous AAC related equipment mounted outdoors or on the roof of the SBO Diesel Generator Building, which i
could exceed the parameters for a Spectrum Il tornado missile (as denned by Standard j
Review Plan 3.5.14, Revision 2) are anchored to resist tornado wind loads.
The Class lE engineered safety features buses are h>cated in the Auxiliary Building.
Electrical cabling between the SBO Diesel Generator Building and the Auxiliary Building is housed within a buried concrete ductbank. In order to run AAC diesel generator cabling into the Auxiliary Building, raceway is routed up the wall of the Auxiliary Building's exterior wall and over the roofs of the Turbine Building and the Auxiliary Building. In order to protect cabling against the effects of likely weather-related events, this raceway, as a minimum, is designed to meet the requirements of the SBC.
B.4 Physical separation of the new AAC equipment from safety-related components or equipment shall conform with the separation criteria applicable for the unit's licensing basis.
Generally, components for the AAC diesel-generator are physically separated from safety-related systems by hicating them in a separate structure external to the power bhick buildings.
Some systems and components in the Category I Diesel Generator Building at:,o service equipment in the SBO Diesel Generator Building (e.g., lube oil drain system). These systems 2
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1 ATTACilMENT I NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA are common to both buildings. In order to prevent tornado-generated or other types of missiles from affecting safety-related equipment in the Cr.tegory I Diesel Generator Building, 1
missile barriers are installed in the SBO Diesel Generator Building at wall penetrations (above gra<!e) between the Category 1 Diesel Generator Building and the SBO Diesel Generator Building for these common systems. These missile barriers are safety related and classified.
as Category 1.
Some systems and components in the power block service equipment in the SBO Diesel Generator Building (e.g., fire protection and demineralized ter systems). Connections to plant systems is performed so as not to adversely aff-safety-related components' or equipment.
Section 8.5 of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) describes the criteria for separation and routing of cabling throughout the plant.
This section of the UFSAR will be revised to describe the criteria for the separation group designation for the AAC diesel generator. These criteria wili maintain adequate physical separation of the new AAC equipment from safety-related components or equipment.
11. 5 Failure of the new AAC diesel generator components shall not adversely affect Class IE AC power systems.
Class 1E electrical systems are housed within a safety-related Category I Diesel Generator Building kicated adjacent to the SBO Diesel Generator Building. Mechanical systems common to both the SBO Diesel Generator Building and the Category I Diesel Generator Building (e.g., building drainage systems) are' evaluated to ensure the failure of AAC diesel generator components do not adversely affect the operability of safety-related structures, systems and components.
As stated in Criterion B.3, the SBO Diesel Generator Building structures have been analyzed to ensure the AAC structure will not collapse into the adjacent Category I Diesel Generator Building during a seismic event.
Electrical isolation, alignment and common cause failure of AAC diesel generator are discussed in Criterion B.6, B.7 and B.8.
B.6 Electrical isolation of AAC power shall be provided through an appropriate isolation device. If the AAC source is connected to Class IE buses, isolation shall be provided by two (2) circuit breakers in series (one Class IE breaker at the Class 1E bus and one non-Class IE breaker to protect the source).
The AAC diesel generator is isolated from the Class lE engineered safety features buses by two circuit breakers in series (i.e., one Class 1E breaker at the engineered safety features bus and a non-Class 1E breaker located in the SBO Diesel Generator Building) and four Class 1E disconnect switches (one for each engineered safety features bus). The Class IE circuit breakers serve as the interface between the new AAC diesel generator power system and the existing 4.16 LV distribution system.
a 3
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ATTACIIMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA The 480 VAC distribution system for the AAC diesel generator is connected to the Class IE 480 VAC system in the Category I Diesel Generator Building. Devices which electrically isolate AAC electrical systems from Class IE systems in the Category I Diesel Generator Building are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2.
B.7 The AAC power source shall not normally be directly connected to the on-site emergency AC power system for the unit affected by the blackout. In addition the AAC system shall not be capable of automatic loading of shutdown equipment from the blacked-out unit unless licensed with such capability.
The SPO Diesel Generator Building and AAC diesel generator keep-warm, pre-lube and other auxiliaries are normally powered from the 69 kV SMECO substation. In order to provide power to the SBO Diesel Generator Building during maintenance of the 69 kV SMECO substation, an alternate feed is provided from the Class 1E 480 VAC bus in the Category I Diesel Generator Building.
The AAC diesel generator is connected to the standby (onsite) electrical power system through two breakers and a disconnect switch in series. These breakers, a Class IE breaker and a non-Class 1E breaker, and the Class lE disconnect switch are normally open to isolate the non-Class IE AAC power source from the Class lE engineered safety features buses.
The AAC diesel generator is capable of repowering a single safety-related train of systems and equipment in one unit. Operator action is required to isolate the safety-related EDG dedicated to the selected engineered safety features bus. The AAC diesel generator is then started manually and connected to the engineered safety features bus. When the selected engineered safety features bus is energized, existing load sequencers initiate automatic loading of equipment.
B.8 There shall be minimal potential for common cause failure of the new AAC diesel generator. The following system features provide assurance that the minimal potential for common cause failure has been adequately addressed.
(a)
The new AAC diesel generator power system shall be equipped with a DC power source that is electrically independent from the blacked-out unit's preferred and Class IE power system.
A separate battery system is provided for the AAC diesel generator. The battery is sized in accordance with IEEE 485-1983 to supply its design basis loads (e.g., diesel generator field flashing and instrumentation) for a four hour coping duration. During normal operation, the battery charger is energized from the 480 VAC motor control center located in the SBO Diesel Generator Building. The motor control center in the SBO Diesel Generator Building is normally energized by an offsite power source (69 kV SMECO substation). In case maintenance to the 69 kV SMECO substation is being performed, an alternate 480 VAC feed from the Class 1E 480 VAC unit substation bus (located in the Category I Diesel Generator-Building) is manually aligned to energize the SBO Diesel Generator Building's 480 VAC 4
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ATTACIIMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA distribution system. Loss of the normal or alternate source of 480 VAC will not interrupt power from the AAC diesel generator battery to the AAC diesel generator DC distribution system. Thus, loss of the alternate 480 VAC feed will not create the possibility of common cause failure of the preferred Class IE power system and the AAC power source.
(b)
The AAC power system shall be equipped with an air start system that is independent of the preferred and the blacked out unit's preferred and Class IE power supply.
The AAC diesel generator is equipped with its own starting air system consisting of four air receivers that supply pressurized air to start the AAC diesel generator. The four air receivers of the starting air system are supplied air from an air compressor located in the SBO Diesel Generator Building. This air compressor is energized from the SBO Diesel Generator Building's 480 VAC motor control center and is not required to operate during the SBO event.
(c)
The AAC power system shall be provided with a fuel oil supply that is separate from the fuel oil supply for the on-site emergency AC power system. A separate day tank supplied from a common storage tank is acceptable provided the fuel oil is sampled -
and analyzed consistent with applicable standards prior to transfer to the day tank.
The AAC diesel generator is provided with two fuel oil day tanks, connected in series, that have a combined capacity sufficient to allow AAC diesel generator operation at 100 percent nominal load, without fuel transfer to the day tanks, for the design basis SBO coping period of four hours. Rep!enishment of the fuel oil day tanks is accomplished using the existing No.
1I Fuel Oil Storage Tank. Nonsafety-related piping connects the fuel oil day tanks to the.
No. I1 Fuel Oil Storage Tank. The nonsafety-related piping will be isolated from the safety-related fuel oil storage tank by a normally closed safety-related manual valve. Fuel oil in the No. I1 Fuel Oil Storage Tank will be sampled prior to transferring fuel oil to the fuel oil day tanks.
The oil in the SBO fuel oil day tanks will be sampled -and analyzed for the same characteristics and parameters and on the same frequency as is currently performed for EDG fuel oil.
(d)
If the AAC power source is an identical machine to the emergency on-site AC power source, active failures of the emergency AC power source shall be evaluated for-applicability and corrective action taken to reduce subsequent failures.
I The AAC diesel generator is procured from the same manufacturer and is of the same basic design as the Class lE diesel generator installed as an EDG on the Class lE 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11. When potential common mode failures are uncovered in the future, appropriate corrective actions will be taken to eliminate / reduce the failure mechanism. Any j
corrective actions identified for one SACM diesel generator will be reviewed for incorporation on the other SACM diesel generator.
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ATfACHMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA (e)
No single point vulnerability shall exist whereby a likely weather-related event or single active failure could disable any portion of the on-site emergency power sources or the preferred power sources, and simultaneously fall the new AAC power source (s).
Protection for AAC diesel generator structures, systems and components (SSCs) from likely weather-related events is provided by 1) housing the AAC diesel genecator in a structure designed to meet SBC requirements and 2) routing cabling from the AAC diesel generator to the plant through ductbanks described in Criterion B.3.
The design of the AAC power source precludes a single active failure from. disabling any portion of the existing power sources listed above and simultaneously fail the new AAC power source.
(f)
The AAC power system shall be capable of operating during and after a station blackout without any support systems powered from the preferred power supply, or the blacked-out unit's Class IE power sources affected by the event.
Mechanical systems and electrical distribution systems for the AAC diesel generator are self-supporting and do not require support from the blacked-out unit's huses or from existing on-site electrical power sources in order to cope with an SBO event. The discussion under Criterion B.8.(a) describes the SBO Diesel Generator Building 125 VDC distribution system.
A AC diesel generator auxiliary systems are provided with adequate amounts of starting air, fuel oil, lube oil and cooling water in order to meet the requirements of the AAC diesel generator during the SBO event.
(g)
The portions of the AAC power system subjected to maintenance activities shall be tested prior to returning the AAC power system to service.
The AAC power system is designed for periodic maintenance and testing through the Class 1E engineered safety features huses. Procedures will be established to ensure portions of the A AC power system subjected to maintenance activities shall be tested prior to returning the AAC power systi to service.
B.9 The AAC power system shall be sized to carry the required shutdown loads for the required coping duration of four hours and be capable of maintaining voltage and frequency within the limits consistent with established industry standards that will not degrade the performance of any shutdown system or component.
j The AAC diesel generator is sized to accom.modate the largest loading on any of the four i
engineered safety features buses for at least a four hour duration. This capacity includes margin to accommodate possible growth due to future modification work and/or accommodate certain discretionary nonsafety-related electrical loads. - Since the AAC diesel generator is similar to one being installed as a safety-related emergency diesel generator (EDG) serving 6
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ATTACIIMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA Class 1E 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11. the AAC diesel generator is also designed to maintain voltage and frequency within the limits specified by IEEE 387-1984.
B.10 Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications, the AAC power source shall be started and brought to operating conditions that are consistent with its functions as an AAC source at intervals not longer than three months, following manufacturer's recommendations or in accordance with plant-developed procedures. Once every refueling outage, a timed start (within the time period specified under blackout -
conditions) and rated load capacity test shall be performed.
Procedures will be established that start and load the AAC diesel generator, in a manner consistent with its functions as an A AC source, at intervals not longer than three months.
In addition, a timed start and a rated load capacity test of the A AC diesel generator will be performed once every refueling outage for either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
11.1 1 Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications, surveillance and maintenance procedures for the AAC system shall he implemented considering manufacturer's recommendations or in accordance with plant developed procedures.
Periodic maintenance and operability testing will be in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.
1 H.12 Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications, the AAC system shall be i
demonstrated by initial test to be capah'e of powering required shutdown equipment j
within one hour of a station blackout event.
l Acceptance testing for the AAC diesel generator will demonstrate the capability to power required shutdown equiprnent within one hour.
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ATTACllMENT 1 NUMARC 87-00 ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA
- 11. 1 3 The Non Class lE AAC system should attempt to meet the target reliability and availability goals specified below, depending on normal system state. In this context, reliability and availability goals apply to the overall AAC system rather than Individual
~l machines, where a system may comprise more than one AAC power system.
(a)
Systems Not Normally Operated (Standby Systems)
System reliability should be maintained at or above 0.95 per demand, as determined in accordance with NSAC-108 methodology (or equivalent)
(b)
Systems Normally Operated (On-line SystemM Availability Alternate AC system normally ca-line should attempt to be available to its associated unit at least 95% of the time the reactor is operating.
Reliability No reliability targets or standards are established for on-line systems.
The AAC diesel generator is maintained as a standby system. - The AAC diesel generator design features, periodic. testing, and maintenance programs are designed to maintain system reliability at the target of 0.975 per demand. This reliability is consistent with the reliability requirements established for the safety-related SACM diesel generator.
8 Rev. O
W A'ITAClIMENT (2)
- 1 l
ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT i
Italtimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos,50-317 & 50-318 March 7,1994 P-
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ATTACilMENT 3 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT 1.0 OUALITY ASSUR ANCE Structures, systems and components (SSCs) for the alternate AC (AAC) power system are classified as safety-related, nonsafety-rehted or augmented quality, depending upon the function of the SSC.
Chapter 6.0 of the SACM Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report; dated July 20, 1993, describes Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's implementation of an NRC approved quality assurance (QA) program for construction of the safety-related SACM diesel generator at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Safety-related components added as a result ofinstallation of an AAC diesel generator are in accordance with these established QA programs (as described in Chapter 6.0 of the S ACM Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report) which meet the requirements of 10 CUR 50, Appendix B.
Requirements for nonsafety-related SSCs added during installation of the AAC diesel generator are in accordance with established design basis documents and other established procedures.
Regulatory Guide 1.155 provides guidance on QA activities and specifications for new nonsafety-related equipment used to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63 that are not already addressed by Appendix A and Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. SSCs which require a higher level of quality assurance to ensure that the design basis requirements of the AAC diesel generator are maintained are classified as augmented quality. These augmented quality SSCs are in accordance with the recommendations of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.155.
Augmented quality SSCs are designed to be as independent as practicable from existing safety-related SSCs.
2.0 DESIGN or STRUCTURES The function of the SBO Building is to house an AAC diesel generator and its associated support systems. As a minimum, it is designed to meet the structural requirements of the Standard Building Code (SBC).
2.1 Cl.ASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES. SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Structmes for the AAC diesel generator building are nonsafety-related. In order to prevent a structural fa. lure which could result in a collapse of an A AC structure into safety-related SSCs, AAC structures whose failure could adversely impact safety-related components are evaluated for Category 11/1 considerations. All other components of the building are classified as Category 11.
Category 11 structures, systems or equipment are defm' ed as those whose failure would not result in the release of significant radioactivity and would not prevent reactor shutdown. The failure of Category 11 structures, systems and equipment may interrupt power generation by the main plant, but not the IE Diesel Generators, Structures evaluated for Category 11/1 considerations are those whose continued function is not required but whose failure could reduce, to an unacceptable safety level, the functioning of any plant feature designated as safety-related. Such structures are designed and constructed so that the design 1
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ATTACilMENT 2 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT basis earthquake, five operating basis earthquakes (OBEs) followed by a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), would not cause impairment of a safety-related feature.
2.2 DESCRIPTION
OF Tim STRUCTURE The SBO Diesel Generator Building is designed as a two-story structure with a basement and a penthouse. It is rectangular in shape, approximately 70 feet by 75 feet in plan, and nominally 40 feet in height. The basement consists of a Battery Room, Diesel Generator Pedestal Area and a Cable Spreading Area. The first floor consists of a Control Room, Switchgear Room and the Diesel Generator Room. The second floor consists of the Tank Room and a general area for auxiliary systems for the AAC diesel generator. The penthouse contains miscellaneous components for diesel generator and building auxiliary systems.
Reinforced concrete is used for the building mat foundation, diesel generator pedestal and basement walls. Structural steel components are used for the columns, floor beams, bracing, girts, platforms and miscellaneous equipment supports. Floor framing for the building consists of composite beams and a composite slab with structural steel floor grating on the first floor in the vicinity of the diesel generator. Metal decking is used for the roof and insulated metal siding is used for exterior walls.
In accordance with the AAC power criteria of NUMARC 87-00, Revision 1, the SBO Diesel Generator Building is designed to withstand likely weather conditions (e.g., high winds, snowfall, etc.) as identified and addressed in the SBC for the area of the plant. The AAC structure is designed to remain intact, but not necessarily functional, following a design basis earthquake or under tornado-generated wind loads (Regulatory Guide 1.76). Therefore, based on the AAC power criteria of NUMARC 87-00, Revision 1, the new diesel generator and other equipment k)cated within the new SBO Diesel Generator Building are not provided with protection from tornado wind or tornado-generated missiles.
2.3 EARTilOUAKE ANALYSIS The acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.7.2 require interfaces between Category I and non-Category I structures to be designed for dynamic loads and displacements-produced by both the Category I and non-Category I structures.
The seismic displacement of both the Category I Diesel Generator Building and the non-Category I SBO Diesel Generator Building were calcolated. In order to prevent structure <o-structure interaction between the two buildings, each building is mounted on its own foundation, separated by a minimum seismic gap of approximately three inches at grade (45'-0" elevation) and approximately six inches-at the SBO Diesel Generator Building roof (83'-6" elevation).
Collapse of the non-Category I SBO Diesel Generator Building onto the Category I Diesel Generator Building is prevented by evaluating the design of the SBO Diesel Generator Building to ensure it can withstand SSE loads postulated during a design basis earthquake. The SSE loads used to design the SBO Diesel Generator Building are calculated using the equivalent static load method of analysis' described by Section II.I.b of SRP 3.7.2.
The design response spectra from Regulatory Guide 1.60, Revision 1, is used to define the seismic i
input for the SBO Diesel Generator Building. The design response spectra is normalized to the 2
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ATTACIIMENT 2 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT maximum horizontal (0.15 g) and maximum vertical (0.10 g) 5SE ground acceleration. Seven percent damping is used to determine the peak acceleration, which corresponds to the Regulatory Guide 1.61 SSE damping value for a bolted steel structure.
For the two horizontal axes (North-South and East-West), the acceleration corresponding to the roof of the SBO Diesel Generator Building is defined as the maximum acceleration from the applicable design spectrum multiplied by a multimode factor of 1.5. The acceleration at the intermediate floor is determined by interpolating linearly between the roof acceleration and the maximum horizontal ground acceleration.
For the vertical direction, the acceleration corresponding to the roof of the 500 Diesel Generator Building is defined as the maximum acceleration from the applicable design spectrum multiplied by a multimode factor of 1.0..A multimode factor of 1.0 is used in the vertical direction since the overall behavior of the building in the vertical direction can be represented by a single degree of freedom system. The acceleration at the intermediate floor is determined by interpolating linearly between the roof acceleration and the maximum vertical ground acceleration.
The seismic accelerations used in the SSE analysis are obtained as described above.
The contributions to a given response from the three compenents of earthquake motion are then combined by the Square-Root-of-the-Sum-of-the-Squares method. As an alternative method, the response may be determined directly using the assumption that, when the maximum response from one component occurs, the responses from the other two components are 40 percent of the maximum (100-40-40 percent rule).
3.0 HUILDING and DIESEL GENERATOR MECIIANICAL SYSTEMS The cooling water, starting air, lube oil and combustion air intake and exhaust systems for the AAC SACM diesel generator are similar to those provided for the safety-related SACM diesel generator.
These auxiliary systems and their function are described in Section 3.0 of the SACM Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report. The design bases of SBO diesel generator augmented quality auxiliary systems are significantly different from the descriptions provided in the SACM Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report and are summarized below:
The SBO diesel generator and its auxiliary systems are not designed to remain functional during and after a safe shutdown earthquake.
Active components of the SBO diesel generator and its auxiliary systems are capable of being tested as described in Criteria B.8, B.10, and B.12 of Attachment 1.
Quality assurance (QA) requirements for mechanical systems are discussed in Section 1.0.
1 3.1 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
.I From the fuel oil ' ay tanks to the diesel engines, the nonsafety-related fuel oil system for the AAC d
diesel generator is similar to the safety-related fuel oil system for the safety-related SACM diesel generator.
3 Rev.0
ATTACllMENT 2 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT The AAC diesel generator is provided with two fuel oil day tanks, connected in series, which have a combined capacity sufficient to allow AAC diesel generatoi operation at 100 percent nominal load, 1
without fuel oil transfer to the day tanks, for the design SBO coping period-of four hours.
Replenishment of the fuel oil d:y tanks is accomplished using the existing No.11 Fuel Oil Storage Tank Nonsafety-related piping connects the fuel day tanks to the No.11 Fuel Oil Storage Tank.
The nonsafety-related piping will be isolated from the safety-related fuel oil storage tank by a normally closed safety-related manual valve.
Appendix B of NUMARC 87-00, Revision 1, (Criterion B.8 (c)) states that "A separate day tank supplied fmm a common storage tank is acceptabic provided the fuel oil is sampled and analyzed consistent with applicable standards prior to transfer to the day tank." The fuel oil day tanks are i
sized to supply fuel oil to the AAC diesel generator for four hours of operation at 100 percent nominal load. Therefore, operation of the fuel oil transfer pump is not required during an SBO event
]
and the transfer pump is equipped with a three position starting switch, OFF-AUTO-ON. Since the fuel oil day tanks are capable of supplying the fuel oil needs of the diesel generator during a SBO event, the switch is normally selected to (and administratively controlled in) the OFF position. This position prevents automatic transfer of fuel oil from the No. Il Fuel Oil Storage Tank without prior sampling.
In the AUTO position, operation of the fuel oil transfer pump is automatically controlled by fuel oil day tank level switches. A fuel oil day tank low level switch automatically starts the transfer pump.
If the fuel oil day tanks level continues to drop, a low-low level switch activates a nonsafety-related level alarm. The transfer pump is automatically stopped by a high level switch prior to actuation of the high-high level alarm.
3.2 DIESEL GENERATOR LIUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM (HVAC)
The SBO Diesel Generator Building's heating, ventilation and cooling requirements are served by augmented quality and nonsafety-related HVAC subsystems. The llVAC subsystems are designed to maintain the SBO Diesel Generator Building's temperatures within equipment manufacturers' j
specifications.
i llVAC subsystems include:
Augmented quality exhaust fans for the Diesel Generator Room.
.i Two augmented quality air handling units (AHUs).
j An augmented quality fan that exhausts air from the Tank Room and the Cable Spreadmg Area. A second augmented quality fan exhausts air from the Battery Room.
Nonsafety-related fans that exhaust air from the second Door when the diesel generator is not in operation.
A nonsafety related stairwell pressurization fan.
Four augmented quality fans are provided to exhaust air from the Diesel Generator Room. Each fan is equipped with a manual start-auto-stop switch and may be started either manually or automatically.
When placed in automatic, the fans are individually thermostatically-controlled so that the number of fans in operation provide sufficient air flow to meet the Diesel Generator Room's cooling requirements without overcooling 4
Rev.0
ATTACilMEET_2 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT Four augmented quality motor-operated dampers are provided to supply air to the Diesel Generator Room. Each damper is interhicked to open when its associated exhaust fan is operating. In addition to the motor-operated dampers, the SBO Diesel Generator Building is provided with a relief damper.
During diesel engine start and operation, this damper opens, as necessary, to allow combustion air intake into the Diesel Generator Room.
The Tank Room and Cable Spreading Area are equipped with a common augmented quality fan that exhausts air directly outside the SBO Diesel Generator Building.
Two augmented quality AllUs provide conditioned air to the SBO Diesel Generator Building. One provides air for the Battery Room, Switchgear Room, Diesel Generator Room and the Tank Room.
A second AHU provides air to the SBO Diesel Generator Building Control Room.
The stairwell in the SBO Diesel Generator Building is ventilated and pressurized by a non-safety-related fan. This fan is designed to maintain a positive pressure to ensure the stairwell is not obscured by smoke during a fire.
SBO Diesel Generator Building is heated by a combination of electric unit heaters and duct-mounted heaters.
3.3 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, This section describes the methods used to detect and protect against fires in the SBO Diesel Generator Building.
Fire protection systems for the SBO Diesel Generator Building are nonsafety-related and are designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) requirements. In order to protect nearby safety-related SSCs, the regulatory positions of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 applicable to nonsafety-related SSCs were incorporated into the design of the SBO Diesel Generator Building. Therefore, fire protection systems for the SBO Diesel Generator Building meet the intent of guidelines outlined in Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1.
The fire protection systems for the SBO Diesel Generator Building are designed to mitigate the effects of fires in the building and its contents. The SBO Diesel Generator Building is protected by the following fire protection systems:
.j 1
q
- Suppression system' Detection system 4
Fire alarm system Standpipe system Portable extinguishing system The suppression system is designed in accordance with NFPA 13 and consists of a zoned preaction system that is actuated by a fire detection system. In order to prevent unwanted water discharge, this system is only actuated by the detection of a fire in the associated detection zone. The preaction The suppression system protects the Cable Spreading Room, Battery Room, Diesel Generator Pedestal Area, Diesel Generator Room and the Tank Room.
5 Rev.0
L i
1 ATTACilMENT 2 ALTERNATE AC DIESEL GENERATOR REPORT system, which is filled with pressurized air, is monitored to warn operators in the event of air leakage from the sprinklers or piping.
j The automatic functions of the fire protection system are controlled by a local control panel. Fire detectors are supplied and located in accordance with NFPA 72E and NFPA 90A. Failure of the smoke and heat detectors, or their associated circuits, is indicated by a trouble signal on the local control panel. The local control panel provides alarms and indications for the detection system. The detection system identities the zone where a fire or trouble has been detected, and then transmits an alarm or trouble signal from the local control panel to the main fire protection control panel in the Main Control Room. The indication in the Main Control Room is only for the local control panel; a check of the local control panel is required to determine the nature of the alarm or trouble signal.
The standpipe system is designed in accordance with NFPA 14. Portable fire extinguishers are provided in accordance with NFPA 10.
4.0 ELECTRIC POWER l
I The AAC diesel generator is electrically isolated from the engineered safety features buses, and no provisions exist for automatically cross-connecting redundant safety features busses or the AAC diesel generator. The design of power connections from the AAC diesel generator allow for manual alignment to any one safety-related train in either unit via a Class IE engineered safety features bus.
Manual switching capability is provided through Class 1 E disconnect switches and Class iE breakers.
Attachment I describes physical separation criteria, electrical isolation, electrical independence, diesel generator alignment, alignment of power supplies and common mode failures for the AAC diesel l
l generator.
4.1 SACf. DIESEL GENERATOR f
The augmented quality AAC diesel generator is designed to furnish power upon loss of offstte and onsite AC power in order to reliably shut down one unit and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
during a station blackout event. This diesel generator is not designed as a part of the engineered safety features system and, therefore, is not designed as a Class IE system as defined in IEEE 308-1991. Ilowever, the SBO diesel generator was procured from SACM under a safety-related ~
specification.
The tandem-engine SBO diesel generator is nominally rated at approximately 5,000 kW. This capacity exceeds the power necessary to supply safety-related loads at the blacked out unit. The excess capacity allows the diesel generator to supply loads ir excess of the existing safe shutdown loads of either of the units plus the auxiliary and facility lods associated with the SBO Diesel Generator Building.
The mechanical and electrical capabilities of the diesel generator are in accordance with regulatory position C.I.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3 (April 1992).
6 Rev.O L
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