ML20064F497
| ML20064F497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1982 |
| From: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064F501 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6820 5211-82-296, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8301060382 | |
| Download: ML20064F497 (58) | |
Text
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
GPU Nuclear Q
g7 P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 717-944-7621 Wriier's Direct Dial Number:
December 30, 1982 5211-82-296 Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn:
Mr. R. C. llaynes, Director Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 IE Bulletin 79-02/14 Final Report LER 81-007/99X-0 Enclosed, please find 5 copies of TMI-l revised response to U. S. NRC IE Bulletin No. 79-02, topical report #002, Rev. I with reference 1, TDR #211, Rev. I and revised response to IE Bulletin 79-14, topical report #003, Rev. I with refer-ence 1, TDR #194, Rev. 3.
These revisions contain the final list.ed number and identification of supports modified. The revisions to the 79-02 reports contain the clarification of the factors of safety using the SSE total design loads as resolved with members of your staff.
These revised reports are our notification to the Commission that our commit-ment to modify supports to achinve expansion anchor factors of safety equal to greater than 2 has been fulfilled. These reports document the disposition of the long term corrective actions of LER 81-007.
Sincerely, 1ukill Director, TMI-l llDil:PCD:CJS:j rg Enclosure cc:
J. Van Vliet R. Conte (w/o attachment) 8301060382 821230 PDR ADOCK 05000 b\\\\
GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pt.bbc Utikties System
f THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT - 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 USNRC I.E. BULLETIN NO. 79-14 FINAL REPORT TOPICAL REPORT # 003 REV. 1 PROJECT NO: 5020-G5301 I tlt $89-AWMR
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APPROVALS:
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ITEM PAGE I
INTRODUCTION 1
II ACTION ITEMS AND RESPONSES 1-6 III REFERENCES 6-7 l
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F Page 1 of 7 i
I.
INTRODUCTION The following is a summary response for GPU Nuclear's Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, to each Action Item of the USNRC I E Bulletin 79-14. Attached is TDR-TMI-194, Rev. 3, which is the final 1
j report that explains our detailed compliance to the requirements of IE Bulleting 79-14.
This supercedes our previous response dated 10-23-81 transmitted via letter LIL 307. TDR-TMI-194, Rev. 3, will hereaf ter l1 be called Reference 1.
II.
ACTION ITEMS AND RESPONSES BULLETIN ACTION ITEM 1
" Identify inspection elements to be used in verifying that the seismic analysis input information conforms to the actual con.
figuration of safety-related systems. For each safety-related system, submit a list of design documents, including title, identification number, revision, and date, which were sources of input information for the seismic analyses. Also submit a de-scription of the seismic analysis input information which is contained in each document. Identify systems or portions of systems which are planned to'be inspected during each sequential inspection identified in Items 2 and 3.
Submit all of this in-formation within 30 days of the date of this bulletin."
SUMMARY
RESPONSE TO ACTION ITEM 1 A list of design documents, with their contents, and a listing of inspection elements was initially transmitted via CQL 1092 dated 8-24-79.
A detailed description of the elements of inspection and their inspection methods, systems, or portions of systems inspected and a tabulation of associated design documents with a description of their contents have been assembled and documented in Reference 1.
Page 2 of 7 BULLETIN ACTION ITEM 2 "For portions of systems which are normally accessible, inspect one system in each set of redundant systems and all nonredundant systems for conformance to the seismic analysis input information set forth in design documencs."
"..... submit a description of the results of this inspection."
SUMMARY
RESPONSE TO ACTION ITEM 2 Incpections have been completed on all systems or portions of systems subject to the Bulletin requirements. The inspections were conducted utilizing an approved inspection procedure, written specifically to include elements of inspection required by the Bulletin. Inspections were conducted utilizing measurement techniques appropriate for the task.
Nonconformances found between the physical installation of the piping and supports and the design documents were noted on inspection reports and forwarded for Engineering evaluation. Inspection findings are explained, and tabulated by the analysis identification number in Reference 1.
l l
Details of inspections which were affected by adverse conditions such.
as radiation, accessibility or pipe insulation are listed on a case-by-case basis in Reference 1.
An explanation of each situation along with justification for same is provided.
BULLETIN ACTION ITEM 3 "In accordance with Item 2, inspect all other normally accessible safety-related systems and nll normally inaccessible safety-related systems."
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Page 3 Of 7 as that pre-same is the are lletin Requirement Inspections m 2 above.
response to this BuResponse to ActionAction Items 2 Ite both mmary required by The sented under Su completed as been are planned.
considered to have s
No further inspection 4A opera-and 3 ITEM system BULLETIN ACTION are identified:onconformance and comply with ap-ifications in-upon ke loadingstechnical spec If nonconformances n
effect of the specified earthquastatements in your
" Evaluate the bility underaction ting."
s plicabiccluding prompt repor for Engi-ACTION ITEM submitted 4A in pections, were original TO
SUMMARY
RESPONSE
nd during a f fe ted the s
c ces noncon-Honconformances, fou nonconforman If the If the conducted.
support Evaluat ion.
was piping reanalysis alysis the pipe neering Seismic Analysis, a original piping an cr iter ia.
In affect with the design ili-the tormances did not compliance for lo d carrying ab a
7 evaluated for evaluated was were
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hardware supports case, the pipe ances.
nonconform e ither ecific i
s, ty considering sp support evaluat on adopted for pipe ee Mile Island Nu-has been of Thr ts, any h
The following approac condition TMI-l FSAR commitmen 1
wn shutdo fe support due to the present sa with ith pipe ce accordanI piping systems, w i 1 In with a clear Station, Un tn Seismic Category support hardware ipe supports allowables, or p I
o pipe code i
ve steel stressed abo
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1 lished in reconmended loads pub less than 2.5 based onrepa ired prior to I
re-1 of safety redesigned an('
and redse.ign is descr ibed tor n
idors' catalogs, have bee evaluation ifications, a anchor expansion with the Technic.s1 Spec
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Concrete 7
1981 007-99X-0, dated July 1, art.
accordance In a TMI-1 TR-002.
t Report (LER) #81-
- eneric Licensee Even USNRC.
ass baan fileo with the fermauces.on thein the Final 4B BULLETIN ACTION ITEM of identified nonconasi des cr ibed i
ents.
pport analysesother'URC approved documsubmit your of
" Submit an evaluationvalidity of piping and su (FSAR) orreanalysis is necessary,is, (ii) comparisonscr iter 1a,
Safety Analysis ReportWhere you determine that
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l (i) completing the reana ys of' reanalysis."
tenco other NRC approved accepof the rssulfs schedule for:
AR or the results to FS descr iptions and (iii) submitting ION ITEM 4B i i: re-
SUMMARY
RESPONSE TO ACT formances and subsequent se sm are reanalysis of identifiod noncon hhc lts o Evaluations completed and the resu of these re-Compa r ison analysis have been IIIA of Reference 1 is tabulated in t
presented in Appendix existing pipe supports 1
adequacy of the n.
sults to the 1.
Appendix IIIB of Reference BULLETIN ACTION ITEM 4correcting nonconformingAlso sub-C design documents. establish. conf or eance.
schedule for of B, submit a they conform to thework required to I
"In lieu so that of the systems mit a description ON ITEM i ing Sys--
4C
SUMMARY
RESPONSE TO ACTI of Seismic Category I P p
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with the reanalysis support repair / rework ipe conjunction Bulletin requirements, p correct a -
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required to tens, subject to t e This 4 ction is
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Page 5 of 7 4
nonconformance found during inspections or to implement the output of the pipe reanalysis.
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The construction plan for this work has been divided into two phases:
Phase 1: Concrete expansion anchors having a factor of safety of less i
than 2.0 for SSE Loads, and pipe support hardware having a factor of safety less than 2.5 for OBE Loads, will be 1
l redesigned and repaired prior to restart.
Phase 2: Concrete expansion anchors having a factor of safety between 2.0 and 5.0 for SSE Loads, and pipe support hardware having a factor of safety between 2.5 and 5.0 for OBE Loads, will 1
be repaired af ter restart.
l A detailed breakdown of support repair / rework and new support design i
j-due to I.E.Bulletin 79-14 can be seen in Appendix III of Reference 1.
Examples of pipe oupport repair / rework are as follows:
Add additional structural bracing to existing support Add shear lugs to pipe to resist axial pipe loading l
Replace existing spring or snubber with different size i
I Reset existing variable support i
i Revise function of existing support (i.e., tension rod to sway strut) i l
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Page 6 of 7 Add bracing to existing U-bolt type support to resist side load-ing on U-Bolt.
Revise baseplate and concrete expansion anchors in conjunction with the requirements of I.E.Bulletin 79-02.
BULLETIN ACTION ITEM 4D i
" Revise documents to reflect the as-built conditions in plant, and describe measures which are in effect which provide assurance that future modifications of piping sysiens, including their supports, will be reflected in a timely manner in design docu-ments and the seismic analysis."
j
SUMMARY
RESPONSE TO ACTION ITEM 4D Documents have been prepared to reflect the "as installed" condition of all piping and pipe supports subject to the Bulletin requirements.
These documents are the result of updated design control procedures which provide for review and acquisition of as-built data after field modifications have been completed. These procedures are to be used to monitor and to control future modificatior.s as required. A summary of the procedures is as follows:
Drawings are prepared to depict a proposed modification. The modifi-cation is initiated, monitored and completed using approved QA proce-dures. The completed installation is then inspected by Quality Con-trol for conformity to drawings and specifications. When the instal-I i
lation is approved by QC, the drawings, including approved design changes to these drawings, provide the "as-built" documentation.
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Page 7 of 7 III.
REFERENCES 1.
GPU Nuclear, I.E.Bulletin 79-14 Rev 3 Response, TDR-TMI-194 1
dated August 31, 1981.
2.
GPU Nuclear, I.E.Bulletin 79-14 Initial Response - August 24, 1979.
3.
AISC " Specifications for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings," November 1, 1978.
4.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.3, " Concrete and Steel Internal Structures of Steel or Con-crete Containments," NUREG-75/087, dated 11/24/75.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.4, "Other Seismic Category I Structure," NUREG-75/087, dated 11/24/75.
5.
Grinnell, " Pipe Hangers and Supports," Catalog PH-69 Grinnell Company, Inc., Providence, R.I., 1969.
Grinnell " Pipe Hangers," Catalog PH-72. Grinnell Corporation, Providence, R.I.,
1972.
Basic Engineers, " Pipe Hangers," BE-168, BE Division of NAVC0 -
National Valve and Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., no date.
6.
GPU Nuclear, I.E. bulletin 79-02 Response July 22, 1981.
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THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT - 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 USNRC I.E. BULLETIN NO. 79-02 FINAL REPORT TOPICAL REPORT f 002 REVISION 1 PROJECT NO:
5020-G5300 A. Makitka Al,
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DATE December 2, 1982 APPROVALS:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l
ITEM g
I.
Introduction 1-2 II.
Action Items and Responses 2-19 III.
References 19 Appendices I
I I-3 II 11 II-14 III III III-6 t
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1.
INTRODUCTION An inspection and testing program to comply with USNRC I.E.Bulletin 79-02 (entitled " Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expan-sion Anchor Bolts") requirements including engineering evaluations has been completed. Selection of anchors for inspection and tasting have utilised both sampling methods that are recommended by the Bulletin.
The Seismic Category I systems, as well as portions of other systems defined as Category I that were inspected, tested and evaluated are as follows:
System System Emergency Feedwater Condensate Spent Fuel Core Flooding Waste Disposal Decay Heat Removal Reactor Coolant Decsy Heat Removal 3Chilled Water Feedwater 1 Intermediate Cooling Instrument Air Building Spray Monitoring Post Accident Purge River Water Leak Rate Main Steam Make-Up & Purification Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling
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1FSAR Seismic Category III System. Inspected Portion - Seismic Category I.
2FSAR Seismic Category II System. Inspected Portion - Seismic Cate-gory I.
FSAR Listing - Vital Ventilation System, Control Building.
Per bulletin requirements, the anchor bolts were evaluated such that the necessary factors of safety as defined by the bullecin were satis-fied. Anchors that have a factor of safety less than five (5) during the Design Basis Earthquake SSE were designated for repair / redesign.
1 Those supports that have a factor of safety less than two for the SSE Load have been modified for plant start up.
The effect due to two times the OBE was used to conservatively ap-1 proximate the SSE.
The following is a list of action items that were required by I.E.
Bulletin 79-02 with CPUN's response signifying compliance for TMI-Unit 1.
Bulletin Action Item 1 Verify that pipe support base plate flexibility was accounted for in the calculation of anchor bolt loads. In lieu of supporting analysis justifying the assumption of rigidity, the base plates should be con-sidered flexible if the unstiffened distance between the member welded to the plate and the edge of the base plate is greater than twice the thickness of the plate. It is recognized that this criterion is con-servative. Less conservative acceptance criteria must be justified and the justification submitted as part of the response to the Bul-letin. If the base plate is determined to be flexible, then recalcu-late the bolt loads using an appropriate analysis. If possible, this is to be done prior to testing of anchor bolts. These calculated bolt loads are referred to hereaf ter as the bolt design loads.
A description of the analytical model used to verify that pipe support base plate flexibility is accounted for in the calculation of anchor bolt loads is to be submitted with the response to the Bu'11etin.
Response to Action Item I I
Base plates were considered rigid in the original design. Analytical techniques were developed for reexamination of base plates and anchor-ages considering base plate flexibility and expansion bolt stiffness both for moment and axial load applied to the plate surfaces (Appendix I).
The equations were derived from statics and deflection compati-bility. The prying force on the plate and, subsequently, forces in the anchors and stresses in the plates were calculated. The expansion bolt stif fness (i.e., K, in Appendix I) was derived from force-displacement curves provided by the manufacturer. For both the moment and the axial load case, e criterion was formulated to determine whether prying exists based upon the geometry of the detail and material properties of the plate and anchor. Analyses of the design review showed that prying effects were small or negligible. Addition-al analyses on a large variety of base-plates substantiated the find-ing. This result was attributed to low expansion bolt stiffness and the lack of appreciable bolt preload. Although the original design assumption of rigid plate behavior is considered justifiable, considerations for prying were conservatively used for all subsequent bulletin evaluations performed on concrete expansion anchors. A de-scription of the analytical model and more information are included in Appendix I.
Bulletin Action Item 2 Verify that the concrete expansion anchor bolts have the following minimum factor of safety (FS) between the bolt design load and the
Bulletin Action Item 2 (cont'd) bolt ultimate capacity determined from static load tests-(e.g., anchor bolt manufacturer's) which simulate the actual conditions of installs-tion (i.e., type of concrete and its strength properties):
a.
Four - For wedge and sleeve type anchor bolts, or b.
Five - For shell type anchor bolts.
The bolt ultimate capacity should account for the effects of shear-tension interaction, minimum edge distance, and proper bolt spacing.
If the minimum factor of safety of four for wedge type anchor bolts and five for shell type anchors cannot be shown, then justification must be provided. The Bulletin Factors of safety were intended for the maximum support load including the SSE. The NRC has not yet been provided adequate justification that lower factors of safety are acceptable on a long term basis. Lower factors of safety are allowed on an interim basis by the provisions of supplement No. I to I.E.
Bulletin No. 79-02.
The use of reduced factors of safety in the factored load approach of ACI 349-76 has not yet been accepted by the NRC.
Response to Action Item 2 A.
Anchor Type The anchors originally used at TMI-1 on Seismic Category 1 piping are the Red-Head self-drilling "shell" type anchors manufactured by ITT Phillips Drill Division. These are an approved equal to the "RAWL" anchors, which were specified on the design drawings. Some Hilti "TZD" shell anchors were used in the Chilled Water System. "Shell" type anchors require a minimum factor of safety (FS) of five (5).
B.
Ultimate Anchor Capacity l
1.
Shear and Tension Effects For all base-plates, shear and tension effects were combined directly to evaluate the anchors with the resultant shear force being distributed equally to all anchors in the con-nection. The following paragraphs describe the method for combining these effects.
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ResponsetoActionItem2(cont'd}
The factor of. safety (FS) is determined using the following shear-tension interaction equation:
FS =
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= Tension Force induced into an anchor (con-sidering plate flexibility)
T
= Ultimate tension capacity of an anchor *, **
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= Shear Force induced into an anchor V
= Ultimate shear capacity of an anchor
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- Ultimate tensile and shear capacities were based on the manufacturer's anchor capacity data. However, some evalua-tions had the advantage of larger ultimate tensile pullout capacities, obtained from the on-site testing program once the data became available. See Appendix II, Att. 1, pg. 1 of 9.
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- In those cases where a small permanent deformation (anchor extraction) due to test loads (explained in Response to
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Action Item 4 page 14) were exhibited and the anchor had a deviation from the acceptance criteria, the anchor was 4
l either discounted or had its allowable tension capacity reduced to a percentage of the manufacturer's allowable '
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Response to Action Item 2 (cont'd) anchor capacity. The effect of this reduction 'was an in-creased factor of safety when compared to the use of manu-facturer's ultimate capacity. The anchor was not evaluated using the increased factor of safety, but using the reduced factor of safety resulting from reducing the ultimate ten-sile allowable. The evaluation was done and if required, the support was designated for repair / redesign per the guidelines established in the introduction on page 1.
2.
Minimum Edge Distance Effects The minimum edge distance between the anchor centerline and the edge of a concrete member is required to be 5 shell diameters or 4 inches, whichever is greater.
If this cri-terion was not met, anchor capacities were linearly reduced.
3.
Bolt Spacing Effects In accordance with the manufacturer's instructions for Phillips ITT Red Head self-drilling shell type anchors, anchor-to-anchor spacings greater than 7 shell diameters develop 100% of the published ultimate strength, and spac-ings of 3-1/2 shell diameters develop 80%. Therefore, in those cases where the spacing is less than 7 and greater 1
than 3-1/2 shell diameters, the anchor capacity has been linearly reduced. These factors were later checked and found to be conservative by the on-site testing program for close-spaced anchors (Appendix II, Act.2).
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Response to Action Item 2 (cont'd)
C.
Original Design Loads Versus Bulletin Requirements 1.
Original Design Load Pipe support loads were generated as an output of a dynamic piping analysis and were utilized for the design of the individual pipe supports.
Load combinations considered are:
1.
Deadweight + Thermal + OBE* Seismic + Occasional Mechanical Loads = Total design load 2.
Deadweight + Thermal + 2 OBE Seismic + Occasional 1
Mechanical Loads = Total Design Load SSE
- 0BE = Operating Basis Earthquake 2 OBE = SSE (Safe Shutdown Earthquake) = Maximum hypothetical earthquake as defined in FSAR =
Bulletin Requirements An anchor bolt inspection and test program, per Bulletin i
Action Item 4, as well as a support "as-built" program in conjunction with NRC Bul'letin 79-14 has been complete. All anchor loads and factor of safety are based on engineering evaluations of the above programs, which may differ from the original design loads, due to "as-built" conditions.
Revision 2 of the Bulletin clarified the intent of Revision 1 and Supplement No. I requirements by stating that the FS
Response to Action Item 2 (cont'd) of 5.0 for shell type anchors was intended for 'the " worst case" load combination including the SSE.
As a result of this clarification which represented more conservative re-quirements than had been previously applied to the TMI work, an extensive investigation was carried out to determine the consequences of using a " worst case" load combination in-cluding SSE.
Results for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)
SSE = Maximum Hypothetical Earthquake as defined in FSAR Based on an engineering evaluation of the as-built condi-tion, 27.7 percent of the supports (253) include anchors l1 with an FS less than 5.0 assuming a " worst case" load com-1 bination including SSE.
1 Any support with an anchor which had a factor of safety less than five (5) for the SSE load case was designated for l1
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repair / redesign. All supports with a governing factor of safety less than two (2) for the SSE load case will be l1 reevaluated in conjunction with 1.E.Bulletin 79-14 and repaired / redesigned before plant start-up. The redesigns will be done to accommodate the SSE loads.
1 Bulletin Action Item 3 Describe the design requirements if applicable for anchor bolts to withstand cyclic loads (e.g., seismic loads and high cycle operating loads)..
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Response to Action Item 3 Concrete expansion anchor loads are derived from pipe support reac-1 tions which are generated as an output of dynamic analyses. These analyses include seismic and mechanical loads as the governing load combination. Occasional operating loads were identified during start-up testing. Pipe support system modifications were made at that time to accommodate these vibrating loads.
Bulletin Action Item 4 Verify from existing Quality Control (QC) documentation that design requirements have been met for each anchor bolt in the following areas:
1 (a) Cyclic loads have been considered (e.g., anchor bolt preload is i
equal to or greater than bolt deaign load). In the case of the shell type, assure that it is not in contact with the back of the 2
support plate prior to preload testing.
(b) Specified design size and type is correctly installed (e.g.,
proper embedment depth).
If sufficient documentation does not exist, then initiate a testing program that will assure that minimum design requirements have been met with respect to sub-items (a) and (b) above. A sampling technique is acceptable. One acceptable technique is to randomly select and test one anchor bolt in each base plate (i.e., some supports may have more than one base plate). The test should provide verification of sub-items (a) and (b) above.
If the test fails, all other bolts on that base plate should be similarly tested. In any event, the test program should assure that such Seismic Category I system will perform its intended function.
The preferred test method to demonstrate the bolt preload has been accomplished is using a direct pull (tensile test) equal to or greater l
than design load. Recognizing this method may be difficult due to accessibility in some areas; an alternative test method such as torque testing may be used.
If torque testing is used, it must be shown and substantiated that a correlation between torque and tension exists.
If manufacturer's data for the specific bolt used is not available, or is not used, then site specific data must be developed by qualifica-tion tests.
Bolt test values of one-fourth (wedge type) or one-fifth (shell type) of bolt ultimate capacity may be ~used in lieu of individually calcu-lated bolt design loads where the test value can be shown to be con-servative. -
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Bulletin Action Item 4 (cont'd)
The purpose of Bulletin No. 79-02 and this revision is to assure the operability of each Seismic Category I piping system. In all cases an evaluation to confirm system operability must be performed.
If a base plate or anchor bolt failure rate is identified at one unit of a multi-unit site which threatens operability of safety related piping systems of that unit, continued operation of the remaining units at that site must be immediately evaluated and reported to the NRC. The evaluation must consider the generic applicability of the identified failures.
Appendix A describes two sampling methods for testing that can be used. Other sampling methods may be used but must be justified.
Those options may be selected an a system by system basis.
Justification for omitting certain bolts from sample testing which are in high radiation areas during an outage must be based on other test-ing or analysis which substantiates operability of the affected system.
Bolts which are found during the testing program not to be preloaded to a load equal to or greater than bolt design load must be properly preloaded or it must be shown that the lack of preloading is not det-risental to cyclic loading capability. Those licensees that have not verified anchor bolt preload are not required to go back and establish preload. However, additional information should be submitted which demonstrates the effects of preload on the anchor bolt ultimate capa-city under dynamic loading.
If it can be established that a tension load on any of the bolts does not exist for all loading cases, then no preload or testing of the bolts is required.
If anchor bolt testing is done prior to completion. of the analytical work on base plate flexibility, the bolt testing must be performed to at least the original calculated bolt load. For testing purposes, factors may be used to conservatively estimate the potential increase i
in the calculated bolt load due to base plate flexibility. After completion of the analytical work on the base plates, the conservatism l
of these factors must be verified.
For base plate supports using expansion anchors, but raised from the supporting surface with grout placed under the base plate, for testing purposes, it must be verified that leveling nuts were not used. If leveling nuts were used, then they must be backed off such that they are not in contact with the base plate before applying tension or torque testing.
I Bulletin No. 79-02 requires verification by inspection that bolts are l
properly installed and are of the specified size and type. Parameters which should be included are embedment depth, thread engagement, plate bolt hole size, bolt spacing, edge distance to the side of a concrete member, and full expansion of the shell for shell type anchor bolts.
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Bulletin Action Item 4 (cont'd)
If piping systems 2,1/2 inch in diameter or less were computer-analyzed, then they must be treated the same as the larger piping. If i
a chart analysis method was used and this method can be shown to be highly conservative, then the proper installation of the base plate and anchor bolts should be verified by a sampling inspection. The parameters inspected should include those described in the preceding i
paragraph.
If small diameter piping is not inspected, then justifica-tion of system operability must be provided.
Response to Action Item 4 QC documentation for the original installation was incomplete. An on-site inspection and testing program was conducted to check if de-sign and installation requirements were met.
4a.
Since "shell" type anchors were used at TMI-1, anchor preload was 1
j-not a factor in the inspection program (i.e., bolt preload is not needed to set bolt). Testing was accomplished, for the most part, by a direct tension pull of the anchor shell. A section of a site approved inspection and testing procedure provided for shimming base-plates which prevented contact Letween the base plate and shell for testing of shell anchors protruding from the concrete surface. A Torque / Tension correlation test was con-ducted on-site to substantiate any anchor testing accomplished by torquing.
4 Anchors installed with plug depth within procedure tolerance and satisfying all the other acceptance criteria were loaded to a value of 20 percent or 1/5 of the manufacturer's ultimate tensile capacity (TEST LOAD). Anchors installed that did not meet the procedure acceptance criteria were loaded to a value of 40 per-cent or 2/5 of the manufacturer's ultimate tensile capacity _ - _ _. _ -. _ _ _ _. _ ~... _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _. _.. _ _., _. _......,,...
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Response to Action Item 4 (cont'd)
(PROOF LOAD). In either case, if the load was achisved with less than 1/16 i'ch shell movement (extraction) the anchor test was considered acceptable.
Any anchor that exhibited shell movement more than 1/16 of an inch during the application of the TEST or PROOF LOAD was dis-counted during engineering evaluation.
Af ter an acceptable anchor test (i.e., no movement or less than 1/16 inch novement) the following occurred:
A.
If the anchor accepted the TEST LOAD,(i.e., no procedure deviations) the manufacturers ultimate tensile capacity was used for engineering evaluation.
B.
If the anchor accepted the PROOF LOAD (i.e., one or more deviations) the ultimats tensile capacity was reduced to 40 percent of the manufacturer's ultimate tensile capacity.
The reduced ultimate te$sile capacity was then used for engineering evaluation. The working load was also devalu-ated and reestablished at a maximum of 10% of ultimate ten-sile capacity for engineering evaluation.
The ultimate capacities used as a basis for determining the test and proof loads were obtained from the manufacturer's bolt capacity data.
Based on actual site anchor bolt test-ing, the manufacturer's bolt capacity data is conservative.
Response to Action Item 4 (cont'd)
(refer to Appendix II). The 20% of manufacturer's ultimate capacity test load value was also proven conservative by subsequent engineering evaluations which included considera-tions for plate flexibility. Inspection & testing was done on large bore (2 1/2 inch diameter and larger) Seismic Cate-gory I piping systems.
4b.
Selection of anchors for inspection and testing utilized both sampling methods recommended by the Bulletin. All supports within scope were inspected for existence, con-formity to design, and integrity. Some supports were not tested due to physical limitations; however, a case by case evaluation was conducted to justify system operability.
Appendix III contains a list of inspection parameters and l
l sample documentation forms that address Bulletin require-ments.
Grouted Base Plates A total of 76 supports utilized grouted base plates. For 1
anchors with grouted base plates, no testing was performed due to the destructive nature of the testing (i.e., removing grout).
In addition, initial attempts at testing such an-chorswithoutremovingdroutresultedinbrokenbolts. This i
was caused by bonding between the stud and shell, resulting from the grouting process. Further attempts at " testing with l
grout removal would have damaged the shell, resulting in an I -
Response to Action Item 4 (cont'd) anchor defect and major repair. A high degree of confidence is had in the original installation of such anchors, since accessibility and ease of installation is inherent in a floor level anchor application. The anchor size and loca-tion along with base plate parameters were inspected and recorded. Leveling nuts used in conjunction with grouted base plates do not affect the load bearing capacity of shell type anchors.
In the case of systems inspected by the ran-dom sample method, an additional anchor was selected for inspection and testing to complete the sample population.
A system operability evaluation of supports with grouted base plates was also conducted. This evaluation considered type and magnitude of loading, potential deviations in an-chor inctallation, along with interaction of subject sup-ports. The results were acceptable and system operability was substantiated.
Small Bore Piping Seismic Category I small bore (two inch nominal diameter and smaller) pipe was designed using a seismic support spacing criteria. The criteria were developed for a multi-span model for each pipe diameter and schedule based on a con-servative pipe stress of 25 percent of the code allowable stress (ANSI B31.1,1967). The spacing criteria provided maximum pipe spans and support loads for that span. The w....
t Response to Action Item 4 (cont'd) support spacing criteria approach was independently verified by dynamic computer analyses on randomly selected systems.
Typical support configurations were designed and analyzed for structural adequacy of all members, including the an-chors.
In generating the load rating, the geometry combina-tion of the maximum distance from the pipe to the structure, in conjunction with the smallest spacing between anchors resulted in the worst load case. Typically, the computer-analyzed pipe system indicated factors of safety in excess of 15 for 85 percent of the anchors. No anchor had a factor of safety less than five. A sample of small bore Seismic Category I pipe supports, with anchors, was inspected and tested. The sample was selected to represent a variety of installation situations (i.e., floor, wall, difficult ac-cess, etc.).
A total of 70 anchors in 53 supports from seven (7) systems were included in the sample. The results of the testing indicated one (1) anchor was " defective".
1 Defective is defined as an anchor which was found in a con-dition such that it could not provide resistance equal to the 20% of rated ultimate c&pecity or greater test load.
The defective anchor had no adverse effect on system opera-1 bility and was scheduled for repair. No further inspection and testing of small bore piping was performed.
15 -
~
Bulletin Action Item 5 Determine the extent that expansion anchor bolts were used in concrete block (masonry) walls to attach piping supports in Seismic Category 1 systems (or safety related systems as defined by Revision 1 of I.E.
Bulletin No. 79-02).
If expansion anchor bolts were used in concrete block walls:
Provide a list of the systems involved, with the number of sup-a.
ports, type of anchor bolt, line size, and whether these supports are accessible during normal plant operation.
b.
Describe in detail any design consideration used to account for this type of installation.
Provide a detailed evaluation of the capability of the supports, c.
including the anchor bolts, and block wall to meet the design loads. The evaluation must describe how the allowable loads on anchor bolts in concrete block walls were determined and also what analytical method was used to determine the integrity of the block walls under the imposed loads. Also describe the accept-ance criteria, including the numerical values, used to perform this evaluation. Review the deficiencies identified in the In-formation Notice on the pipe supports and walls at Trojan to determine if a similar situation exists with regard to supports using anchor bolts in concrete block walls.
d.
Describ'e the results of testing of anchor bolts in concrete block walls and any plans and schedule for any further action.
Response to Action Item 5 Response Sa - No supports were found anchored to hollow block walls.
The solid block wall supports are accessible during plant operation. The total extent of concrete expan-sion anchors used in solid block walls is as follows:
SYSTEM: Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling.
Nominal Support Analyses Number Anchor Type Pipe Size Number (ME-No.)
W/ Size Supported NSH-101 187 Red-Head - 1/2"$
4"9 NSH-106 188 Red-Head - 3/8"$
4"9 NSH-107 188 Red-Head - 5/8"$
4"9 NSH-117 186 Red-Head - 1/2"9 4"9 NSH-122 140/142 Red-Head - 1/2"$
6"9 [
n_.
Response to Action Item 5 (cont'd)
Response 5b -
The design considerations for supports anchored to solid block walls were the same as these given to supports anchored to poured concrete walls.
Response 5c and 5d - The anchors were inspected and tested per the approved ' inspection procedure. All anchors accepted a tension test load of forty percent of t
r the rated ultimate capacity for concrete instal-lation and were found to have an acceptable fac-tor of safety against this proof load. Tne i
capacity of the block walls has been evaluated 1
under the I.E.Bulletin 80-11 scope of work.
Bulletin Action Item 6 Determine the extent that pipe supports with expansion anchor bolts used structural steel shapes instead of base-plates. The systems and lines reviewed must be consistent with the criteria of I.E. Bulletin No. 79-02. Revision 1.
If expansion anchor bolts uere used as de-scribed above, verify that the anchor bolt and structural steel shapes in these supports were included in the actions performed for the Bul-latin. If these supports cannot be verified to have been included in the Bulletin actions:
Provide a list of the systema involved, with the number of sup-a.
ports, type of anchor bolt, line size, and whether the supports are accessible during normalsplant operation.
b.
Provide a detailed evaluation of the adequacy of the anchor bolt design and installation. The evaluation should addreas the as-I sumed distribution of loads on the anchor bolts. The evaluation can be based on the results of previous anchor bolt testing and/or analysis which substantiates operability of the affected system.
c.
Describe any plans and schedule for any further action necessary to assure the affected systems meet Technical Specifications operability requirements in the event of an SSE.
1.
Response to Action Item 6 The 79-02 Response Program for TMI-l has included pipe aspports ntili-sing structural shapes as well as base-plates in the scope of work.
Bulletin Action Item 7 For those licensees that have had no extended outages to perform the testing of the inaccessible anchor bolts, the testing of anchor bolts in accessible areas is expected to be completed by November 15, 1979.
the testing of the inaccessible anchor bolts should be completed by the next extended outage. For those licenses that have completed the j
anchor bolt testing in inaccessible areas, the testing in accessible areas should continue as rapidly as possible, but no longer than March 1, 1980. The analysis for the Bulletin items covering base plate flexibility and factors of safety should be completed by November 15, 1979. Provide a schedule that details the completion dates for I.E.
Bulletin No. 79-02, Revision 2, items (1), (2), and (4).
Response to Action Item 7 Response to Action Items one (1),' two (2), and four (4) is considered complete at this time. No further testing is planned. Supports in-accessible for testing were justified by evaluation.
I2 Bulletin Action Item 8 i
Maintain documentation of any sampling inspection of anchor bolts required by item 4 on-site and available for NRC inspection. All holders of operating licenses for power reactor facilities are re-quested to complete items 5, 6, and 7 within 30 days of the date of issuance of Revision No. 2.
Also describe any instances not previous-ly reported, in which the revised (R2) sections of items 2 and 4 were not met and, if necessary, any plans and schedule for resolution.
Report in writing within 30 days of the date of this revision issu-ance, to the director of the appropriate Regional Office, completion of your review. For action not yet complete, a final report is to be submitted upon completion of action. A copy of the report (s) should be sent to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,,0ffice of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555. These reporting requirements do not preclude nor substitute for the applicable requirements to report as set forth in the regulations and license.
. 4
-a---
~ - -
I Response of Action Item 8 i
Compliance to the action item is complete in that documentation has I
been filed at the site and response to Revision 2 of the Bulletin has been sent to the USNRC (REF. GOL 1582 dated 1/10/80). In addition, the intent of this report is to be the final report on all activities completed in response to I.E.Bulletin 79-02 and in compliance with technical specifications.
Bulletin, Action Item 9 l
All holders of construction permits for power reactor facilities are requested to complete items 5 and 6 for installed pipe supports within 60 days of date of issuance of Revision No. 2.
For pipe supports which have not yet been installed, document any action to assure that items 1 through 6 will be satisfied. Maintain documentation of these actions on-site available for NRC inspection. Report in writing with-in 60 days of date of issuance of Revision No. 2, to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, completion of the review and describe any instances not previously reported, in which the revised (R2) sections of items 2 and 4 were not met and, if necessary, any plans and schedule for resolution. A copy of the report should be sent to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspec-tion, Washington, D.C. 20555.
Approved by GAO (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Response to Action Item 9 Not applicable to THI-1.
III.
REFERENCES 1.
GPUN I.E.Bulletin 79-02 Rev. 1 Response July 9, 1979 1
2.
GPUN I.E.Bulletin 79-02 Rev. 2 Response January 10, 1980.
3.
TMI-Unit 1 FSAR Section 5 0 4.
ITT Phillips Drill Division, " Red-Head Concrete Anchoring Hand-book and Specifiers Guide," 1973
= _ -,,,
um-1 III. REFERENCES (cont'd) 5.
Anchor Plate Analysis Computer Program " Pry" 6.
AISC " Specification for the Design Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings," November 1, 1978 7.
GPUN I.E.Bulletin 79-14 Response l
8.
ANSI B31.1, 1967 9.
GPUN I.E.Bulletin 80-11 Response 1
- 10. TDR-TMI-211 Prepared by Gilbert Associates, Inc. for GPUN e -
W 4
e APPENDIX I FLEX 1BLE PIATE N ALYSES s
9 O
FLEXIBI.E PLATE ANALYSIS NOMENCLATURE V = She ar force in plate between attaelunent and tension belt line
!!gg = Applird sesnient loading T = Total tenr. ion fort.e in bolts on one side of plate (includes any prying force)-
C = Crepression force on base plate due to moment loading P = Total trying force on one edge of plate y
E = !!<dulus of clasticity of base plate material G = Shear inodulus of base plate material E, = ! pring constant f or all anchors on one side of plate e = Instanc e from tension bolt line to face of attachment 1 - 1.1tective bate plate moment of inertia on plate tension side I, - I'.I f ertive base plate moment of inertia on plate compressive side
)
- 1. = 1.mation of compressive force for moment loading measured frora face of a: Loclunent L = Dintance from bolt line to plate edge g
4 = Deflection quantities o, = Anchor bolt deflection A = Plate shear area (equals effective width times plate thickness)
W = Width of attachment Q = Attaclunent and base plate rotation under moment loading S
e I-1 1
-~
s FLEXIBLE PLATE ANALYSIS FOR TENSILE LOAD _
f I
_ 4
.ATTAC MENT
'~
BASE PLATE
-I (V EXPANSION ANCHOR g
CONCRETE SURFACE V
W
.<., n s.
t*I g
.*j ??.
.'.*y.,,, ;
I l lt --
PV = PRYING FORCE e
u t
PROBLEM i = Y~+ Pr THE PROBLEH IS SOLVED CY SUPERPOSITION, USING' FARTS 1 AND 2 GIVEN BELON.
fY Ye3 y, [
J 3El N t N
"y 3 al 3El k\\ V
[N
,e
\\ Ve
^
i 2
' FART 1 Veli V'
A; = 2E1 Ks
} j, r -
^
Ai
- 1. j _ _
t Apv
(
J 1,\\
L.
Py 02 Py E
PART 1 3
PvL;2e PyLj + 6 PvL;
= (A -4 ) *
+
A 4
2 3
El 3El 5 AG 1
A pr = :..py + FvL g e + Pvl;3 2
py(
+
i
" Ks.
El 3El 5
AG 3
r
-52L1 1
1 Lg,
2 L1 6 L1 i
EQUATION 1 - EQUAli,NG A3 = Apv: Py
- + - + - + - - -
Ks - El 3El 5 AG V
2fl Ks 1r 2
h 1y et IF "K1 2El NO PRTING EXISTS AND T = V f.
1 a tj IF hs <,El.OLUTION OF EQUATION 1 WILL YlELD THE PRYlHG FORCE S
.4 m
R-R
ve---.--m - mm_ _
8 FLEXIBLE PLATE ANALYSIS FOR APPLIED MOMENT 4
t 4_
t
\\
if T
l Aa = Ks 0
'm L
Py I'
- I * '
C 8
1 r T=V+PV T
V+Pv
=
Aa =
,c2 0
=
2Elp t
ye3
)
Pyl e2 3
~*
Aa-L =7 2El 3El
~
_ MDES + Pylt_ _
l e+1+L
~
~
2e t,
_ QLg y
,2El Ks_
1 Py
=
2 3
L1e Lj 6 L1 l
j i
-+
+
+ - -
Ks El 3El 5 AG 2
Ve Li y
IF Ks + QL1 >-
NO PRYING EXISTS AND T = V 2El 2
Ve L; 2El. SIMULTANEOUS SOLUTION OF THE SIX EQU IF 1 + OL <
j Ks GIVEN ABOVE WILL YlELO THE LOCATION OF THE
}.
C0!!PRESSIVE FORCE "C" AND THE EAGNITUDE OF THE PRYING FORCE "PV'.
I-3
' ~
s e
e o
APPENDIX II THI-1 ANCHOR TEST PROGRAM m -
i.
e
's
}
TMI-l ANCll0R TEST PROGRAM A test program using Red Head Self-Drilling echors was conducted to determine the following:
1.
Tension pull-out capacity of anchors installed in concrete representative of concrete throughout the plant.
2.
Tension pull-out capacity of double anchor groups with center to center spacings between 2-1/2 and 3-1/2 shell diameters.
Summarized test results for the two series of tests are presented in Attaciunent I.
Evaluation of the test data indicates that for the small diameters and shallow embedments utilized, the classical 45' failure cone is not reprecantative of the failure mode exhibited by the test samples. Figures 6-1 a.:d o-2 illustrate that the total included angle of the failure cone of the TMI t e:;t specimens is in the neighborhood of 120*.
The following is a excerpt from ACI FA-76, Appendix S Commentary on Steel Embedments (197SC) which discusses this phenomenon for shallow embedments:
The nominal inclination of the failure plane for pullout of the concrete is 45 deg due to principal stress orientation if the concrete is stress free transverse to the pullout force.
As the crack propagates toward the surface the uncracked portion flexes as a shallow disc putting the outer surface in compression around the perimeter and causing a change in the failure plane inclination. For shallow embedments, generally less than 5 in., the flexural strength due to the disc action is greater than the cone pullout strength such that an increase in load is required to propagate th'e crack. For this reason, the normal 90 deg failure cone (total angle) will approach 120 deg with I
decreasing anchor depth in correlating failure loads to calculated valuesusing4ff'asauniformstress. The actual concrete spall for shallow depth anchors will produce an even wider area of failure.
However, caution should be observed in the utilization of inclination O
II-1
)
angles greater than 45 deg because of the possibility of surface
~
cracking which might restrict flexural action. For this reason the committee does not recommend the use of inclination angics greater than 45 deg for shallow depth anchors.
Section B.I.3 of ACI 349 Appendix 3 permits the use of design limits based on experimental investigations. With the code requirements as a basis, the TMI anchor test program results were used in the engineering evaluations reported herein.
With reference to in-place concrete strength in the Seismic Category I structures, the TMI test program was carried out in a non-Seismic Category I 3000 psi design mix concrete. Several cores were taken from the test site and the average in-place concrete strength was found to be approximately 5400 pai. Since the
'l. nign mix of the Seismic Category I structures was originally 5000 psi, the current in-place strengths would be considerably higher. Therefore, applying the altimate tensile capacities pbtained using a 3000 psi design mix to a 5000 psi
!csign mix concrete is conservative.
Design allowables based on results obtained from the testing program are presented in Attachment 2.
II-2
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A O~
FIGURE 6-1 SINGLE ANCHOR-TYPICAL TENSION TEST FAILURE CONE II-3
p..-
e 4
W g
ee -
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J.
C)
- \\
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.O FIGURE 6-2 DOUBLE ANCHOR-TYPICAL TENSION Al ONE II-4
Page 1 of 9 Tension Pull-Out Capacity for Reil IIcad Sel f-Drilling Anchors Average Anchor Catalog Test Diameter Value Value (inches)
(Ib)
(lb) 1/2 7480 8480 5/8 10296 10445 3/4 14256 15547 7/8 15708 20468 Tension Pull-Out Capacity for Close Spaced Red llead Self-Drilling Anchors O
Anchor Spacing, S, 2-1/2 D < S < 3-1/2 D Average Anchor Test Diameter Value (inches)
(Ib) 1/2 4820 5/8 9940 3/4 10925 7/8 18336 4
0 ATT. 1 II-5
w.-...
1 h
Suwnary of Single Anchor Test 1/2-inch Dianwter Red Heads Failure Average 1
Test Load Load I
ID (1bs)
Sbs) 1 S200 2
9900 3
9460 4
9690 5
9900 8480
)
6 9100 3A 7140 1A 5740 2A 7200 f
l O
ATT. 1 II-6
~~ '
%.n 9
O t Single Anettor Test
'> Di.inieter Re.1 II ads Failure Ave rage Lead Load Test
.slbs)
(Ibs)
!0 10200 11
!13SO 9350 US00
,,.?
- 25*0 ig443
=
O 0
=
==UV e
% q
. k(
9'-J
.' i O
O ATT. 1 II-7
W Sunuaary of Single Anchor Test 3/4-inch Diameter Red !!eads
-Failure Average Test 1.oa d '
I.o.nl
_ I,bs)
_ 1bs)
(
(
ID 2
17200 3
13360 4
16000 9
11000 15547 5
13380
.)
6 15S00
=
7 20140 S
17500 l
l l
f 1
eO ATT. 1 l
II-8 l
l l. - -
l i
Summary of Single Anchor Test 7/8-inch Diameter Red lleads Failure Average Test Load T.oad
_Ibs)
ID (lbs)
(
2 24980 3
23620 4
25400 5
25800 20463 1A 172S0 h
2A 16200 3A 12700 4A 17770 l-l I
l i
l i
ATT. 1 I
II-9 l
l
u,-
d O
Suuunary of Double Anchor Test Groups 1/2-inch Diameter Red Heads Anchor Spacing S, 2-1/2 D > S < 3-1/2 D Group Load Avg. Load Test Failure Load Per Anchor Per Anchor ID (Ib)
(Ib)
(Ib) 1 11000 5500 2
8300 4150 4
10500 5250 5
11020 5510 6
9700 4350 4320 7
9380 4o90 '
8 9940 4970 9
9300 4150 9620 4810 G
O ATT. 1 II-10
D Summary of Double Anchor Test Groups 5/8-inch Diamet.cr Red Heads Anchor Spacing S, 2-1/2 D > S < 3-1/2 D Group Load Avg. Load Test Failure Load Per Anchor Per Anchor ID (lb)
(1b)
(Ib) 32 19390 9695 34 24180 12090 35 17550 8775 36 21020 10510 9940 37 15900 7950
- )
38
'20250 10125 39 21300 10650 40 19460 9730 ii i
ATT. 1 II-11
---,,,.,.,s
r.-
.c u.s -.
'D Summary of Double Anchor Test' Groups 3/4-inch Diameter Red lleads Anchor Spacing S, 2-1/2 D > S < 3-1/2 D Group Load Avg. Load Test Failure Load Per Anchor Per Anchor ID (1b)
(1b)
(Ib) 44 22350 11175 46 25320 12660 47 19850 9925 1A 21880 10940
,10925 2A 24010 12005 3A 21900 10950 4A 21500 10750 SA 18000 9000 4
jerT. 1 II-12
Y h
Sun. mary of Double Anchor Test Groups 7/8-inch Diameter Red 1(eads Anchor Spacing S, 2-1/2 D > S < 3-1/2 D Group Load Avg. Load Test Failure Load Per Anchor Per Anchor ID (Ib)
(Ib)
(Ib) 49 35700 17850 52 41140 20590 55 39520 19760 56 36900 18450 57 37940 18970 13336
- )
51 37040 18520 53 39700 19850 54 39120 19560 1A 23000 11500 ATT. 1 II-13 I
ATTACID1EST 2 e
CC@CIE3bU@ @,. Gilbert / Commonwealth January 8, 19S0 to:
Distribution Listed from:
J. C. Here nD,e:t-Three Mile Island - Unit No. 1 Red Head Self-Drilling Anchors In-Place Capacity W.O. 04-4692-503 Based on site testing, the average ultimate pullout capacity for subject anchors has been detersined for TMI-1 concrete. Evaluation of pipe supports rei;uiri::4 this information will use this data. Shear capacities will be based on Red Head published data.
Ultimate Capacity For Single Anchors Min Palt Diameter Pullout Shear Spacing p
(
u (pgp,)
(4,3 Inches)
(P - kips)
_ Inches) 1/2 S.5 7.3 5
5/8 10.4 13.1 6
3/4 15.5 17.8 7
7/8 20.5 20.3 8
Ultinate pullout capacities for close spaced anchors are calculated by:
~
1 - 0.6
( d, - d, )
PR*
u Om
)
R = Reduced ultimate capacity for close spacing P
P and d defined in above table d = ActEal spacing with a minimum of 0.35 d, J. C. Herr JCH:rli F. L. Moreadith, R. M. Rogers, J. B. Groncki, G. A. Delp, R. T. Boyd, cc:
h T. D. Biss, Support Evaluation Group ATT. 2 II-14 m,,,,,,,
af e
APPENDIX III ANCl!0R BOLT INSPECTION AND TEST DOCUMENTATION G
e O
iO ANCIIOR EVALUATION SIIELL TYPE 1.
Anchor. Identification 2.
As-Found-Torque 3.
Bolt Diameter 4.
Bolt Length 5.
Washer Thickness 6.
Plate Thickness 7.
Manufacturer 8.
Top-of-Plate to Top-of-Shell 9.
Thread Engagement 10.
Shell Placement (Hec, Flu, Pro) j 11.
Top-of-Plate to Top-of-Plug 12.
Plug Depth (Top-of-Shell to Top-of-Plug) 13.
304t Replaced (Length if Replaced) 14.
Shim:; Sequired for Inspection (If Ds, Go to Step 19) 15.
TEST LOAD / TORQUE (circle) 16.
Shell Movement 17.
lWaF LOAD /TORQlT. (circle) 18.
Shell Movement y
19.
Test With Shims Top-of-Plate to Top-of-Plug a.
b.
Top-of-Plate to Top-of-Shell i
c.
Plug Depth l
SUPPORT NO.
TORQUE WRENCH PLATE LOAD CELL SUPPORT DWG. NO.
DATE INSPECTOR REVIEWER i
III-l
DATA SHEET *1 SUPCORT PLATE ENRLC'ATION Qf4}sOz.
5
- w. :. v.<pt suppcR r No.
PLATE suPPcRi NG No
!1.
e.tsure
.d h, Ic.sth, sad thicknes; of p11.te.
Record.
l0. Note Ices:icn e.d si:e of holes (Note e.t::2 or enlar;ed holes).
'3.
No:e :rientati:n of pla:c, visus 1*.y c:sp : :: suppor: d 2 wing. Nota diffar: ness.
-}
lc.
.~tJusily'c:ngste gusse:: and 2::a..en 4 to support drswinf. No:e d-fierences.
{3. Measure ':ol hole :s piste ' edge dia:ancas (:so plate edges). Record.
,o.
Nusser anchers io.dentifics: ion.
- . No
- e ii ;;ou:ad, indics:e thickness.
i'. i. Note ;sps under p12:e, = essure and record.
'9.
- .e'.;eling nuts presen: - indics e.
(F::wsid Action *:en Report.)
. COMMENTS :
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h TEST AND PROOF LOAD REQUIRE}1ENTS ANCHOR: Pl!ILLIPS RED-IIEAD, TYPE 2 Bolt Test Test Proof Proof Diam.
Ibs in-lbs lbs in-Ibs (ft-lbs)
(ft-lbs) 3/8 610 140 2000 390 (32) 1/2 1130 175 3000 420 (35) 5/8 1810 300 4120 630 (53) i
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