ML20064C835

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Inservice Leak & Hydrostatic Testing Exception
ML20064C835
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/1994
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML20064C832 List:
References
NUDOCS 9403100257
Download: ML20064C835 (8)


Text

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d ATTACHMENT 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING EXCEPfION HOPE. CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 9403100257 940304 PDR ADOCK 05000354 P

PDR

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PEN AND INK CHANGES The following Technical Specifications for Facility operating License No. NPF-57 are affected by this.

License Amendment Request:

Technical Specification Paaes Index xv and xxi Table 1.2 1-11 3/4.10.8 3/4 10-8-(New)

B 3/4.10.8 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4.5.3 B 3/4 10-2 (New) r r

t INDEX' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION' High Water Level.......................................

3/4 9-17 Low Water Level.........

3/4 9-18 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY............................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM..............

3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS.........................

3/4 10-3 1

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS............

3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION..............

3/4 10-5 3

3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS.

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION - INITIAL CORE LOADING............

3/4 10-7

/4.11 RADIDACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration..........

3/4 11-1 Table 4.11.1.1.1-1 Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis Program....

3/4 11-2 Dose.................................................

3/4 11-5 Liquid Waste Treatment....................................

-3/4 11-6 Liquid Holdup Tanks.....................................

3/4 11-7 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate.

3/4 11-8 Table 4.11.2.1.2-1 Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program....

3/4 11-9 Dose - Noble Gases..................

3/4 11-12 i

Dose - Iodine-131, Iodine-133, Tritium, and Radionuclides q

f i n P a rt i c ul a t e F o rm.......................................

3/4 11-13' 1

Gaseous Radwaste Treatment..

3/4 11-14

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Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System...................

3/4 11-15

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INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE-3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.......................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R0D SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM............

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS......

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS............

B 3/4 10 3/4.10.5 0XYGEN CONCENTRATION.......

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS........

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION - INITIAL CORE LOADING......

B 3/4 10-1 3j4.11 RADIDACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration......

B 3/4 11-1 Dose..

B 3/4 11-1 Liquid Radwaste Treatment System..........................

B 3/4 11-2 Liquid Holdup Tanks...........................

B 3/4 11-2 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate.............................................

B 3/4 11-2 Dose - Noble Gases...............

B 3/4 11-3 Dose - Iodine-131, Iodine-133, Tritium, and Radionuclides in Particulate Form.......................

B 3/4 11-3 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System and Ventilation Exhaust Treatment Systems...................

B 3/4 11-4 Explosive Gas Mixture..............................

B 3/4 11-4 i

Main Condenser............................................

B 3/4 11-5 Venting or Purging.................................

B 3/4 11-5 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT.........................

B 3/4 11-5 3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE............................................

B 3/4-11-5

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HOPE CREEK xxi

s TABLE 1.2 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS MODE SWITCH AVERAGE REACTOR CONDITION POSITION COOLANT TEMPERATURE 1.

POWER OPERATION Run Any temperature 2.

STARTUP Startup/ Hot Standby Any temperature 3.

HOT SHUTDOWN Shutdown #'***

> 200 F

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COLD SHUTDOWN Shutdown #'##'***

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REFUELING

  • Shutdown or Refuel **'

< 140 F W

  1. The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run, Startup/ Hot Standby, or Refuel position to test the switch interlock functions and related instrumentation provided that the control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by 'a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

If the reactor mode switch is placed in the Refuel position, the one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.

    1. The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod drive is being removed from the reactor pressure vessel per Specification 3.9.10.1.
  • Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.
    • See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3.
      • The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod is being recoupled or withdrawn provided that the one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.8 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.10.8 When conducting inservice leak or hydrostatic testing, the average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table 1.2 for OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 may be increased to 212*F, and operation considered not to be in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3, to allow performance of an inservice leak or hydrostatic test provided the following OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 LCO's are met:

a.

3.3.2 " ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION", Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d and 2.e of Table 3.3.2-1:

b.

3.6.5.1,

" SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY";

c.

3.6.5.2,

" SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAMPERS"; and d.

3.6.5.3,

" FILTRATION,' RECIRCULATION AND VENTILATION SYSTEM."

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, with average reactor r

coolant temperature >200*F.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately enter the applicable condition of the affected specification or immediately suspend activities that could increase the average reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce the average reactor coolant temperature to 5200*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

S11RVEILLANCE REQIllI1El4ENTS 4.10.8 Verify applicable OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 surveillances for specifications listed in 3.10.8 are met.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 10-8 I

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES ECCS-0PERATING and SHUTDOWN-(Continued)

With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the GPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified' automatic depressurization system and both the CSS and LPCI systems.

In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition.

The HPCI out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooi%g systems and the RCIC system.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required.

Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor to be in HOT SHUTOOWN with vessel pressure not less than 200 psig. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

.l Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automa-tically causes selected safety-relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200 F.

ADS.is conserva-tively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psig.

This-pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves although the safety analysis only takes credit for four valves.

It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out-of-service for up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability.

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CSS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA.

This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recircJlation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.

Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable.

This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum requireo I

water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200 F.t Since pressure suppression is not required below 212 F, the minimum water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus asa,f,e!,1maygin,fordon

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3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.8 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING This special test exception allows reactor vessel inservice leak and hydrostatic testing-to be performed in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 with reactor coolant temperatures < 212*F.

The additionally imposed OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 requirement for SECONDARY-CONTAINMENT operability provides conservatism in the response of the unit to an operational event.

This allows flexibility since temperatures approach 200*F during the testing and can drift higher because of-decay and mechanical heat.

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