ML20064B037
| ML20064B037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1990 |
| From: | Shelton D CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 1779, NUDOCS 9010040241 | |
| Download: ML20064B037 (4) | |
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t Donsed C. Shonon 300 Madtson Avenue -
Vce President Nuclear Toledo. OH 43652-0001 -
D a Besse (419)249 2300
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, Docket Number 50-346-License' Number NPF-3 4
a Serial Number'1779 v.
September 26, 1990 Document Control Desk-United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Vashington, D..C.
20555 C
Subj ect:. Course of Action Progtam Completion 1
- t Gertlement-
-Toledo Edison-is-pleased to inform-you that the Course of Action Program committed:to'following the June 19, 1985 Loss of Feedvater Event is nov
. complete.s N.
Following.the June 9, 1985 Loso-oflFehdvater Evsnt at'the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power; Station,JToledo Edison undertool.an extensive corrective action' program.
The docin ;atation~ of' this program becaae kuovn 'asi the Course of ~ Action (C0A)..
Since 1985, Toledo Edison has kept the PRC' informed of.the progress.'of the-icommitiaents:made under:this-program., At'the end of the sixth refueline outage, two COAL commitments. remained open. Thase two items are to submit conclusions of thel System Review and Test Program'(SRTP) and to install a' Plant' Specific
- Simulator. 'Information'to close these commitments relative to the C0A is
-v Epre"ided belov.-
Plant SimulatorE Subsequent:to Toledo Edison's commitment'to install. plant specific simulator, 10.CFR 55.~45 was promulgated requiring all plants to.have such a-i simuletor'by.May 26, 1991.
Promulgation of this rule is, considered sufficient; N
eto'closeithis commitment'as it' relates to the Course of Actio~n.
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SRTP p amaryl LThe design of1tik Stea:n/Feedvater Rupture Control System-(SFRCS) and the i
tinadequateimaintenance and. testing of the Auxiliar~ Feedvater (AFV) isolation f
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- valves"AF-599 &'AF-608 discovered-during the.Junw 1985 Loss Of Feedwater Event',iraised broad concerns !about' the adequacy of safety systems and engineered safety. features at Davis-Besse.
As a result Toledo ~ Edison vas-
,;askedft'o p0cvide a plan of action:to resolve these concerne related to j
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'Page 2 1) the adequacy of safety system testing including verification that safety-systems were tested in all configurations required by design-basis analysis; and 2) the adequacy of other engineeted safety features, including design considerations, in light of the concerns identified in the SFRCS and AFV system.
To address these and other concerns related to equipment maintenance and problems of a recurring nature, Toledo Edison instituted the System Review and Test Program (SRTP).
The SRTP was designed to provide a comprehensive evaluation of selected systems. The system evaluation was intended to identify and resolve concerns and specify required testing to verify the ability of the system to perform.its intended function. The conclusion of the system evaluation vould verify that the system would function as designed.
The systems selected tur review in tha SRTP vere those systems deemed to have-the most impact.on the safe operation of the Davis-Besse Nucliar Power Station. These systems included fcr example, main feedvater which performs an important function which when disrupted could result in a challenge to a safety system.
An improved main feedvater system would result in fever challenges to-AFV, thereby decreasing risk. These systems were classified important to safe plant operation. The following systems were within the scope of the SRTP:
Reactor Coolant High-Pressure Injection Core Flooding.
Decay Heat Removal and Low-Pressure Injection col *ainment Spray.
Containment Emergency Ventilation Containment Air Cooling and Hydrogen Control Makeup and~ Purification Elec:rical 125/250-V de (included battery room heatit.g and ventiladon)
Electrical 4.16-KV (13.8/4.16-KV transformers)
Electrical 480-V distribution (included inverters and required transformer 3)
Electrical 13.8-KV (included startup and auxiliary transformers)
.Emergen-v Diesel Generato.a-(included "0" fuel oil tanks and diesel rrom ventilrtion).
Ins.ument AC rover (included inverters and required transformers)
Anticipatory Reactor Trip Control' Rod Drive Control Incore Monitoring (included core exit thermocouples)
Reactor Protection Steam and Feedvater Rupture Concrol Safety Features Actuation Integrated Control /Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Security
'Contro) Room Normal and Emergency Heating and Ventilation Station and Instrument Air Station Fire ?rotection
. Component Cooling Water i
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. Licen.e: Number! NPF-3 Serial Nomber 1779 E
Page 3
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Service Vater Auxiliary Feedvater Main 5:?am
' Steam Genecotor Main Feedvater Gaseous Radvaste Post-Accident Sampling Miscellaneous Containment Isolation Valves The SRTP reviewed the history of the above systems tos-1) identify important
-and recurring design, maintenance, and operational problems and to determine
~'he corrective-actions required
- 2) to evaluate the scope of existing-
. riodic testing and identify additional testing needed to ensure system operability:
- 3) to conduct a test program to ensure the system's function as
' intended; and 4) to verify the adequacy of modifications completed during the
- June 9,1985 outage. Completion of the testing portion of the program was documented on March 23, 1987 (Serial 1-716).
The SRTP approach-to identifying problem areas proved to be valuable and productive. The system reviews identified approximately 150 problem areas that required resolution prior to restart from the June 9, 1985 outage.
Another approximately 700 it' vere identified that were categorized as Non-Restart Related. These were scheduled to be dispositioned after restart from the June 9, le
,tage based on their significance.-
These items. vere dispositioned during the fifth refueling outage, Operating Cycle Six and the Sixth Refueling Outage. Of these 700 Non-Restart Related items 23 remain open following the sixth refueling outage. These items continue to.be tracked on the Toledo Edison Regulatory Management System
- (TERMS).
1 The.SRTP.Vas effective in identifying system problems and correctly resolving them. This is supported.by the operating history of Davis-Besse since restart-
.from 'he outage following the June 9, 1985 event.L The plant has established i
an excellent. record in areas of plant capacity, availability,Egross~ electrical generation andLforced outage rate. Toledo Edison has also established performance measures to monitor the availability e r critical systems such as auxiliary:feedvater high pressure injection, and emergency AC.
For Cycle 6 e
the availability of.these systems met the established goal.
-Additionally, Toledo Edison continues efforts to maintain and improve
-equipment performance as. indicated by the reductica in the Maintenance _Vork Order backlog, the increased percentage of total maintenance hours spent on PMs, and the motorLoperated and air' operated' valve programs.
-In conclusion, the Sh?P approach utilized at Davis-Besse identified and corrected concerns with critical systems. These corrections contributed to an' improved' equipment avellability and operation of Davis-Besse over the last two operuting cycles.
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Dockat Nu;b:r 50-346
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License Number NPF-3
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Serialidomber 1779 Page 4-If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. R. V. Schrauder, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (419) 249-2366.
Very trul) yours, l
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cci P. M. Byron,'DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III li D. Lynch,_DB-1 NRC Senior Project Manager Utility Radiological Safety Board r
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