ML20063N949
| ML20063N949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1982 |
| From: | Milligan M LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, SNRC-773, NUDOCS 8210070384 | |
| Download: ML20063N949 (3) | |
Text
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY
- Ed"O es SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 September 28, 1982 SNRC-773 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-322
Dear Mr. Grier:
On August 27, 1982, in accordance with 10CFR50.55 (e), we reported verbally to Region I a potentially reportable deficiency involv-ing analogue controllers supplied by Bailey Controls Company.
Our review has ascertained that a reportable deficiency applies in this case.
Therefore, this letter will serve as our 30-day written report pertaining to this deficiency.
Description of Deficiency We have determined that a significant deficiency exists in appli-cational usage of thirty (30) Bailey 720063AAANI Manual / Automatic Stations at Shoreham.
Specifically, following a loss of power to the Bailey controllers used in safety-related systems, it was observed during startup testing that upon return of power the Bailey controllers re-energized in the manual control mode, rather than in the normal automatic control mode.
Additionally, it has been determined that the controllers would transmit a 0 % (4mA) signal when re-energized in the manual control mode.
Thus, the loss and subsequent return of power, e.g.,
LOCA with loss of offsite power followed by the initiation of the diesel generators would result in a constant manual mode 0% (4mA) signal being applied to the associated valve or damper actuators.
If this situation remained uncorrected, the following events would occur:
8210070384 820928 DR ADOCK 05000 d
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SNRC-773 September 28, 1982 Page 2 1.
All M50 System chilled water supply valves would be maintained in a closed position and, therefore, no cooling R,
would exist.
2.
RBSVS (Reactor Buildirg Stand-by Ventilation System) exhaust dampers would be maintained in a closed position.
Both events would contribute to a Reactor Building pressure in-crease above atmospheric in the short term.
First, since chilled water would be unavailable to the unit coolers heat could not be dissipated and, thus, pressure in the Reactor Building would increase.
Second, with RBSVS dampers closed, filtered ventila-tion would no longer be available and pressure in the Reactor
~
Building could not be vented via RBSVS.. Therefore, short1.y after an event <such as a LOCA, Reactor Building pressure-could be above atmospheric - pressure which could cause an unfiltered effluent leakage from the Reactor Building in the short term.
It should also be noted that chilled water supply valves servicing.the unit coolers (UC) and air conditioning units (ACU) for motor control centers (MCC), motor generators (MG), emergency switchgear, Relay and Control Rooms would also fail closed and, thus, cooling. water would not be available to these areas.
Loss of cooling water to UCs and ACUS could result in temperature increases in the short term.
Other controllers reinitiate in an acceptable manner following a restoration of power and are, therefore, not a significant concern.
However, all of the con-trollers involved are listed below with a brief statement regarding systematic functioning.
. Equipment Mark No.
Comment LIE 41*PIC142 Re-energizing these units results in IE51*PIC142 chilled water' supply valves remaining open and supplying more cooling water than necessary to the HPCI and RCIC lube oil coolers.
IT46* TIC 022A,B On RBSVS initiation, these units are no IT46* TIC 023A,B longer controlling.
Control is switched IT46* TIC 024A,B automatically to IT46*PDICO43A,B.
IT46* TIC 025A,B IM50*PDIC019A,B Dc-energizing these units results.in a IP41* TIC 055A,B
-Reactor Building pressure increase due IP41* TIC 060A,B to the loss of cooling water as pre-IT46*PDIC043A,B viously discussed.
.h
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..s SNRC-773 September 28, 1982' Page 3-IT46* TIC 028A,B Re-energizing ' these units results in
'IT46* TIC 059A,B loss of cooling water to UCs and ACUS
-IT46* TIC 060A,B serving MCC, MG, Emergency Switchgear, IX41* TIC 021A,B Relay and Control Rooms as previously IX61* TIC 021A,B discussed.
IT46*FIC004A,B Re-energizing these units re_alts in RBSVS filter train dampers closing and contributing to a Reactor Building pressure increase as previously discussed.
Corrective Action Corrective action in our case involves circuit modifications and the addition of a relay network whereby upon restoration of power
.(startup and loading of diesel generators) all controllers listed above will return in the automatic mode.
These modifications are currently being implemented by E&DCR F-42213 (already issued) and CCF M50/06.
These modifications will be completed prior to fuel load.
General Electric has been asked by Stone & Webster to con-firm Stone & Webster's finding that no other Bailey controllers of this type have been utilized in safety-related applications by General Electric.
Upon receipt of this confirmation and comple-tion of work as outlined in E&DCR F-42213, no further action in this regard will be required.
Very truly yours, Q.
M. H. Milligan Project Engineer Shoreham Nuclear Power Station BWC/ law-cc:- Mr. Victor Stello, Director NRC Office of InspectorLand Enforcement Div. of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, D.C. 20555
.3 Mr. J. C.
Higgins USNRC Resident-Inspector NRC Site Trailer All Parties u
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