ML20063H947

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Supplemental Info to Fourth Revised Final Deficiency Rept Re Inadequate Transfer Canal & Cask Loading Area Spent Fuel Pool Gates.Initially Reported on 800501.Intermediate Restraints Added to Meet Seismic Requirements
ML20063H947
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/27/1982
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8209020212
Download: ML20063H947 (2)


Text

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s TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEC 37401

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400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 27, 1982

,. j g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SPENT FUEL POOL GATES - NCR SQN NEB 8012 - SL?PLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO THE FOURTH REVISED FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector J. D. Wilcox on May 1, 1980 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Reports were submitted on May 29, June 18, July 2, September 8, and October 15, 1980 and May 18, 1982. Enclosed is supplemental information pertaining to this deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

. M 11s, nager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure oc:

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 1CIALCOPY,

8209020212 820827 PDR ADOCK 05000327 27 S

PDR An Eaaat Opportunity Employer

- s ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SPENT FUEL POOL GATES NCR SQN NEB 8012 10 CFR 50.55(e)

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION The Sequoyah gate designs for the transfer canal and the cask loading area were reanalyzed under new design criteria. The gates were found to be inadequate. At the present time, there is no spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pit. Therefore, if a seismic event occurred, failure of these gates would not create a safety problem. The gates will be modified before placing any spent fuel in the spent fuel pit.

The transfer canal and the cask loading area gates at Sequoyah were designed with paired restraints attached to the pool wall at the top and at the bottom of the gates. Intercediate restraints will be added for both gates at Sequoyah to meet seismic requirements.

The previous SQN reports addressed the gates for WBN and BLN. Those gates were also reanalyzed under the new design criteria and were found to be inadequate. Separate 10CFR50.55(e) reports are being prepared on those plants.

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