ML20063H208
| ML20063H208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1982 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8207290358 | |
| Download: ML20063H208 (8) | |
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", '" 1 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
- 89 EAST AVENUE. ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649
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$ 0Y Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Haynes:
, Enclosed,is,one copy of the expanded scenario for our a January l 21,1982 exercise. The scenario contains more details of the one forwarded to you and FEMA on December 15,1981 by Mr.
D. Davidoff of the State of New York Emergency Planning Group.
Included is a narrative summary of the exercise and a set of -
the messages which will be relayed by the controllers to the Control Room, Technical Support Center, and other utility participants in the exercise.
A copy of a letter sent to official RG&E observers is also included'which gives the schedule of training and review sessions relative to the exercise.
Very truly yours,
~ tr&,OLQ5 JoMn E. Maier
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pr Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Inter-Office Correspondence January 11, 1982
SUBJECT:
Emergency Preparedness Drill - January 21, 1982 To:
Observers and Visitors of Ginna Drill The following persons are assigned as official observers in the designated areas:
Smith Consolidated Edison Official E. Leach Niagara Mohawk Official T. Perkins Niagara Mohawk Unofficial C.
McNeill Fitzpatrick Unofficial D. Hintz Kewanee Unofficial J.
Rivello LILCO Unofficial N.
Mascio LILCO Unofficial Control Room C.
Steinhardt Kewanee Official Survey Center P.
Volza Niagara Mohawk Official N.
Avrokatos Fitzpatrick Official Operations Support Center T. Meinz Kewanee Official Headquarters EOF - Recovery Center C.
Luoma Kewanee Official C. Davario LILCO Official E. McGrath Consolidated Edison Unofficial PASNY Unofficial EOF - Dose Assessment G. Leibler Consolidated Edison Official Headquarters - Engineering Team W. Renz I,ILCO Official s
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- News Center (89 East Avenue)
D. Stoller LILCO Official E. Kaish Niagara Mohawk Official E. Livingston Consolidated Edison Official C. Patrick PASNY Official G. Spieler PASNY Unofficial R. Burtch Niagara Mohawk Unofficial T. Yorte LILCO Unofficial Survey Teams M. Hedrick Niagara Mohawk Official H. Boauer LILCO Official K. Sullivan LILCO Official M. Donegan LILCO Official G. Lawler RG&E Official PASNY Official The unofficial observers are also listed above according to the locations in which they have expressed an interest.
Unofficial ob-servers are also welcome to attend any of the pre-drill and critique sessions which are scheduled.
The TSC, CR and OSC are located within the restricted area of the plant and require security clearance for free access within the area.
This clearance can be obtained by attending a security class which wiL1 be given at 1300, Wednesday, January 20th at the Brookwood Training Center.
Proof of good citzenship will be required, 3-year continuous employment, or screening in accordance with ANSI-18.17-4.3.
All observers should attend a scenario review session which will be held at 89 East Avenue, 7th Floor EOF at 0900, January 20th.
At this time the activities expected of observers will be reviewed and the scenario details explained.
That afternoon a tour of the Control Room, TSC and Survey Center will be available at 1500.
At 1400 a briefing for Federal and State observers will be held at the Lake Dis-trict ODP office, in Lyons, New York.
i On Thursday the drill will start in the Control Room at 0600 with
" Unusual Event" conditions at the plant.
The TSC will be manned shortly after 0800 and the EOF at Headquarters at 0900.
At this time survey teams will be dispatched and the News Center activated.
The I
drill will terminate about 1700 on Thursday.
On Friday, January 22nd, a critique, at which the official ob-servers' comments will be given, will be held at the Brookwood Train-ing Center at 0830.
This will be followed by the NRC comments at about 1030.
On Saturday, also at the Brookwood Training Center, FEMA and NRC will make their exit review of the drill at 1000.
This is an open meeting with no public comments allowed.
Thank you for your assistance at the Ginna Drill.
LVQM Edward L. DeMeritt Emergency Planning Coordinator
(
e CuNiROLLED COFi N O.
S Narative Summary of Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's Ginna Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Drill to be held on January 21, 1982 The scenario commences with the Ginna Nuclear unit operating at a stable 100% full power condition.
The Ginna Nuclear Unit has been operating at this power level in excess of one-hundred days.
This operating time is used because as a general rule af ter a power reactor has operated at full power in excess of one-hundred days, the fission product inventory is at its maximum.
The containment depressurization valves are opened early in the scenario to assure a path, later in the scenario for radioactive gases and iodines to the atmosphere.
The scenario continues with the alarming of R-9, the letdown radiation monitor with a significant rate increase to indicate enough fuel cladding failure for the declaring of an Unusual Event.
The Reactor Coolant System sample is requested to verify that these indications are true.
The continued degradation of the fuel cladding (indicated by the R-9 letdown bonitor offscale h1 and the latest Reactor Coolant Sample results of 1000 uci/gm) is accomplished for two reasons.
One being to upgrade the emergency to an alert class.
The s6cond to buildup the fission product inventory in the Reactor Coolant System, thus increasing the radioactive release to the atmosphere later in the scenario.
v When the fission product inventory in the Reactor Coolant System is considered sufficient, a three-quarter inch sample line on the Main Reactor Coolant Loop is severed completely, allowing the escape of greater than two-hundred gallons per minute of highly radioactive Reactor Coolant System water to the Containment Vessel.
This also is done for two reasons; first to produce a large enough leak from the Reactor Coolant Sytem to initiate an
CONTROLLED COPY NO.
upgrading of the emergency to a Site Eme cer:e mud secona, to release a large amount of fission gases and iodines to the Containment Vessel.
This ultimately will be released from the Containment Vessel to the atmosphere through the previously opened containment depressurization valves that fail to close on intitation of safety injection.
Safety injection is actuated by low pressurizer pressure and causes several automatic actions.
One action is to start both Emergency Diesel Generators even though offsite power is not interupted.
The "B" Emergency Diesel has a malfunction at this time to test the emergency personnels' perception of the Diesel Generators importance to emergency operations.
A reactor trip has occured almost simultaneously caused by low pressurizer pressure and two control rods are stuck out.
This tests emergency personnels' awareness to assure the reactor has a safe shutdown margin.
The safety injection signal has caused containment isolation and containment ventilation isolation which prevents the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere.
For this scenario one path through the depressurization valves is not isolated due to an object being stuck in both isolation valves.
This provides a path through the Auxiliary Building Ventilation system to the atmosphere.
The release rate of forty curies per second is injected into the scenario to test the ability of the dose assessment personnel to make dose projections and from these dose projections, make reasonable recommendations for public protection.
After this, the release rate is increased to forty-five hundred curies per second to further test dose assessment techniques and to upgrade the emergency to a General Emergency.
Another increase in the release rate to forty-five thousand curies per second is affected so that the State will declare a State of Emergency and take over all public protection
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CONTROLLED COPY No. %
functions for the emergency.
During this timd tr.: ;12nt telephone system is declared inoperable to test backup communications between the plant and the Recovery Center (EOF).
Af ter enough radioactivity has been released to the atmosphere to assure that required scenario conditions were achieved, the outside Containuent Vessel Depressurization valve is repaired and closed.
This action secures the release of radioactive gases and iodines to the atmosphere thus bringing the radioactive release part of the emergency under control.
Parallel to this action, the plant has been cooling down the Reactor Coolant System for approximately four hours and reducing the Primary Coolant System pressure and thus the leakage from the break.
The reduced leakage allows the plant to handle the problem with the normal Reactor Coolant System makeup equipment.
This allows the securing of all safety injection pumps and provide RCS makeup using the charging pumps.
Now that the release of radioactivity to the atmosphere has been secured and the plant brought to a controlled condition, the scenario is gradually downgraded to an Alert Condition; at this time, recovery operations can begin and af ter recovery operations have been demonstrated the drill will be terminated.
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i Initial 2
05:15 l -shift i Control Message #2
- All participants proceed Situation Super-
- Unit stable at 100% full with normal activities.
visor power.
-Control
- Unit has been running Room continuously at this Coments:
Power level for greater than 100 days.
- Primary Coolant activity
= 15uci/gm.
- Wind direction is from 60* @ 10 mph.
= 330 ppm.
- Core is in cycle #11.
- Operations Engineer has ordered that the con-tainment depressuriza-tion values remain open all the midnight shift for a test this day.
- Boric acid storage tanks levels = 60%.
- Temperature at i
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Message number indicates key. action that will require issuing the contingency nessage if actiom are not perfbrmed l
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