ML20063F395
| ML20063F395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1982 |
| From: | Leddick R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20063F374 | List: |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO3-82-826, NUDOCS 8208310229 | |
| Download: ML20063F395 (59) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regu.istory Commission, Region V
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Office of Inspectica and Enforcement M lETERSON.
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1450 Maria Lane, Suitet260 .o 4
'60-W0/A g g <. 8 )UAMME-723. Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 - d, g A-707 Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg bh jfg Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 1 --
iOREf4SEN-340-W0/A (RAPP-761.
Subject:
PROJECT NOS. 3 AND 5
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-lgy(4 gfg F0TENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFir E" 's . o ;HETTY-708-W/A STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS - Uti T (0/N #19) 3Ak
References:
a) NRC Letter, Doc' et No 50 '06, 00, dated April 21, E g .i 1932, Mr. T. W., 8sy to Mr R.C. Leddick, same subject. / 2 %
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b) Letter, G03-82-101 cm.ev January 29, 1982, R. S. 5 Y Leddick to B. H. Fau.bmoerry, Structural Steel - 9 Connections - Unit No. 3.
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[ c) ter, G03-81-2756, dated November 17', 1981,' R . S. T\ ick to B. H. Faulkenberry, Structural Steel ig
. tions - Unit No. 5. f g
\ w Refe er, e'a) requhp.-d additional information to facilitate evaluation of I he S ,p. S Specifically, i -
estic s ../e"re.. tem'sconcerning asked resolution the of the subject final deficiency. reports for Units 10CFR50.55(e) M S 4d50 mitted as Reference b and Reference c respectively). As'a ' M igstMt, both reports have been revised to reflect additional inspection b 8k [ f dat4'and provide a more detailed design analysis. The revised reports p have received Supply System concurrence and are attached for your review. . V., ',@g}g 9 i It should be noted that Reference b) and c) stated that the deficiencies
< % ji Ei _ _ J (reported as 0/N #19) were significant and crportable por 10CFR50.55(N . ; 8 ,., i However, subsequent investigation has determined that the deficiencies " o '
l are not significant and were they to have remained uncorrected they would 8 .d 'i j not have adversely affected the safety of operaticos of the facility. I !$ ; 1 Therefore, the deficiencies are not reportable in accordance with lg tiii ! l 10CFR50.55(e). LgQ '
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The Supply System-ap; roved response to the NRC questions concerning Ref- 4 .[ erences b) and c) is as follows: - - - -Ml 4 1 f 8208310229 820824 i PDR ADOCK 05000508 S PDR E
Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 2 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Reference c), Final Recort of Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Structural Steel Connections - Unit 'io. 5 NRC Question: A. (1) Visual Inscection and Torque Testing Program Since your conclusions of acceptability of the structures and the supporting statistical analysis is based upon the projected occurrence or nonoccurrence of loose bolts, it is important that we understand how the reinspections were conducted. We are aware that at the beginning of the reinspection effort,100". torque testing was performed on all accessible bolts, but this was later reduced to torque testing of 20% of the bolts of each connection. In additicn, page E4-14 adds the caveat that, "I bolt out of 20 may be loose, but only 1 bolt was able to be tested. This report will only indicate 1 out of 20 bolts were loose." Please explain the effect of this method on your study of connection integrity (discussed en page E4-10 and E4-11), i.e. on what basis you assume that 992 (1020-28) connections have 100% design strength if less ' than 100% of the bolts in those connections were torque inspected. We understand, also, that incorrect job inspection torque values were used during the torque reinspections. Please discuss the effect of these values on your analysis. You have not provided a definition of " inaccessible" bolts. Our inspections have disclosed that many of the pipe chase bolts, al-though having the bolt head embedded in concrete, are accessible : for partial visual inspection and torque inspection. Please indi- [ cate why these bolts were classified as " inaccessible" and provide your definition of this term, f i Answer: e i ' i A. (1) Visual Inspection and Torque Testing Program j l _ L
- a. The statistical analysis of connections based on a percentage j of design strength outlined in pages E4-10 through E4-15 of 4 the original report was never intended to form the basis of
, the evaluation of the nonconformances. This portion of the i statistical analysis, which was included in the original re-port, has been deleted by the revised report (Attachment I). l The answer to Question A.(3) provides further discussion of 5 the statistical analysis.
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Mr. D. . Ster <: erg Page 3 August 13, }E2 G03-32-S26 _ i f p - Answer: (Csntinued) - A. (1) Visual Inscection and _ Torque Tes;ing Program (Continued)
- a. (Continued)
An early and short-lived attempt was made to visually rein-spect and torque-check 100% of the accessible bolts. On February 13, 1981, this reinspection approach was changed to - 100% visual inspection with a torque-check of 20~ or a mini-mum of 2 bolts per connection.
- b. When the reinspection was started, the " job inspection torque" value was established daily using the Skidmore-Wilhelm machine and the approved procedure. Shortly after starting the rein-spection, it was discovered that the procedure used to estab-lish the job inspection torque yielded values that were sub-
- tantially in excess of the mini um 7 torque values actually required.2 Consequently, the' procedure was revised. All of the bolts were retor'oed using.th'e revised " job inspection torque" values. As a result, the original job inspection torque values were not used and did not affect our analysis,
- c. An " inaccessible" bolt was any bolt in which the bolt head and/or nut was not visible. Visual inspection was not per-formed /on these bolts because only limited information could be obtsjned by such an inspection. The " inaccessible" bolts ,
were not< torque-checked where:
- 1) The torque wrench could not be used on the bolt.
- 2) The bolt could not be prevented frcm turning during the
,to rque-chec k .
The " inaccessible" bolts in the pipe chase which could have , been torque-checked were not checked because of a concern that the torque-check could potentially damage concrete, or da~ age the bolt, bolt threads, nut and nut. threads. This I damage wou?,d be exceedingly difficult to repair.
"ast importently, partial visual inspection or torque-checking of these " inaccessible" bolts is not considered necessary
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due to the.:large proportion of the population (sample size) < iich was.'lisually inspected and torque-checked. The serple - included a large number of pipe chase hangers to floor beam - connectc"s. I l l
/ , , Mr. D. ". Sterr ee ; Pa90 4 ' Agus: 19, ,. _: c. 2
. G03-82-826 ,
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NRC Questicn: A. (2) Statistical Method Syn;psis Please e.-plain the basis for your assumption that the percentage of design strength can be estimated based on a simple ratio of f bad versus good bolts in any one connection. This assumption is valid for simple shear connections but may not be valid for mo-ment and other types of connections. < Probabilities and confidence levels have been determined using a i binomial distribution curve which is valid only if the items checked are selected at random. Please indicate the randomness of your sampling techniques. On page E4-6 you have indicated that 9940 bolts were tested with ; 61 bolts failing to pass the test. Please indicate if all 9940 r bolts were torque tested. In addition, indicate if the 61 bolts failing to pass the test include the deficient bolts documented on NCR 5504 and, if not, the basis for their omission. Answer: A. (2) Statistical Method Synopsis, j t-
- a. The statistical analysis of the connections based on a per- r centage of the design strength of the connection (outlined !.
in pages E4-10 through E4-15 of the original report) was a ; part of the original statistical analysis; however, it was ! never intended to form the basis of the evaluation of the i nonconformances. This portion of the statistical analysis has been deleted by the revised report (Attachment I),
- b. The visual reinspection criteria was a "100% visual inspec- g
. tion of all accessible bolts." Clearly, the attempt was to + l visually inspect the entire population, or as large a sample as possible. I'o attempt was made to select a random sample j l of bolts for visual reinspection. The torque-check criteria 1 was for 20% or a mininum of two bolts per connection, which- l ever as greater. The bolts to be torque-checked in a connec- ! l tion ..are selected at randca by the QA inspector as represen-tative of the connection. This selection nethod utilized j ws sufficiently " random" the.t, in our cpinion, the torque- l checked bolts are representative of the entire population I and the selection method does not invalidate the results of , the bin;mial distribution analysis. l l . _
ll It g Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 5 - August 19, 1989 l G03-82-826 ' i E Answer: (Continued) i A. (2) Statistical Method Synoosis
- c. The total number of bolts visually reinspected in Unit No. 5 was 9440. Approximately 58% of these bolts were torque-checked. i The 54 bolts which turned at the " job inspection torque" in- !
cluded the deficient bolts documented on NCR 5504. The original { report (Reference c) stated that 61 bolts did not meet minimum torque requirement. However, a reinspection only identified 54 bolts that did not satisfy the revised job inspection torque discussed in Paragraph A.(1)b. above. A further discussion of the reinspection is provided on page 3 of Attachment I. NRC Question: A. (3) Non-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts The raw data listing on page E4-10 indicates that loose bolts tend to be distributed among relatively few connections (28 connections out of 1020 connections). For this reason we have calculated the binomial distributions for connections with zero design strength and for connections with less than, or equal to, 50 percent design strength using the raw data of page E4-10. These calculations indicate a probability of 16 percent that 5 connections will have zero design strength and a probability of 9 percent that 11 connec-tions will have less than or equal to 50 percent design strength. p Please address these.results or justify your design strength prob-abilities on page E4-il wherein you have combined 992 connections ! with 100% assumed design strength with the 28 connections exhibit- [o ing one or more loose bolts thereby arriving at a random loose bolt distribution and correspondingly low probabilities of low { j design strength. Also, justify your conclusions on page E4-3 in l light of the above questions. , t i f Answer:
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A. (3) Non-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts The statistical analysis of the connections based on a percentage t of the design strength of a ccnnectionis invalid for two reasons. , First, it assumes that a bolt which turned at the " job inspection torque" has zero strength. This is NOT TRUE. A friction connec-e tion resists shear forces as a result of the clamping fcrce caused ; j by the bolts. The amount of shear resistance is a function of ;. O _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
Mr . : . '4 Stern erg Dage 5 : Aug; - 19, 1982
- G03-E2-826 ?
I t 1l Answer: (Continued) A. (3) fion-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts (Continued) i the bolt tension. If the shear resistance due to the clamping y force is exceeded, the connection can become effective in bearing. t Therefore, to assume that a bolt which turned at the " job inspec- k tion torque" has zero strength is incorrect and is certainly ex- ! cessively conservative. Secondly, this approach assumed that , if all the bolts torque-checked in a ccnnection turned then any bolt which could not be torque-checked also had zero strength. This also leads to the excessively conservative conclusion that ! the corresponding connection had zero strength. For these reasons, I this portion of the statistical analysis (pages E4-10 through ; E4-15 of the original report) which was proposed by the install-ing contractor was not used as a basis for evaluation of the non- l confornances, and has been deleted by the revised report (Attach-ment I). Reference b), Final Report of Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Structural Steel
~ Connections - Unit tio. 3 llRC Question: p
- 8. (1) General Backup data showing the distributions of deficient bolts within f connections and methods of statistical analysis were not provided I with this report as had been provided with the Unit 5 report. i Accordingly, if you intend to utilize this data, please provide sufficient information to permit us to evaluate the deficiency and your corrective actions. ;
l Answer: : B. (1) General The requested back-up reference material for the Unit 3 report is provided in Attachment II to this letter. IIRC Questicn: ;. B. (2) . Description of the_ Deficiency and Item of Concern f-(< Results of reinspections are provided but are not definitive, e.g. ( "fif teen (15) connections with loose bolts, two (2) connections , t : f l
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l Mr. D. M. Stern's?; Page 7 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 ; i NRC Question: (Cor inued) B. (2) Descriptico of the Deficiency and Item of Concern (Continued) with missing bolts." These results do not permit us to perform an evaluation of the deficiency and evaluate the adequacy of your ; statistical analysis. In this regard, please provide the same type j of information as was supplied for the Unit 5 report. Also, please L indicate if the uasatisfactory bolt projections were cases of ex-cessive projection and, if so, whether or not the nut was run up [ on the bolt shoulder giving an erroneous torque indication. In j addition, indicate the reinspection procedure used (visual and ; or torque); the percent which were torque inspected (twenty per-cent or 100); and the actual job inspection torque applied. We understand that torque inspections were discontinued shortly after being initiated on Unit 3. Please discuss the rationale for discontinuance of these torque inspections in light of the deficiencies reported on page 2 of your report. Answer: f (2) Description of the Deficiency and Items of Concern i B.
- a. The attached back-up reference material provides response to the first part of this item.
- b. The statistical analysis for this report has been revised to e reflect the results of the rework performed on the bolts with !
excessive projection and also to reflect the nonconforming [ conditions identified on two NCRs written after this report I was issued to the NRC. This revised statistical analysis does not change the cenclusions of our report nor does it affect the evaluation of the nonconforming conditions. . t
- c. Initially the reinspection criteria specified 1005 visual I inspection with a torque-check of 20% or a minimum of 2 bolts per connection. On March 19, 1981, the reinspection criteria was changed to require 100% visual inspection and no torque- l check. Paragraph "d" below discusses the reasons for deleting the tcrque-check. ,
i The job inspection torque values are included in Attachment b II to this letter. L t
h Mr. D. M. Sternberg [ Page 8 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 i Answer: (Continued) B. (2) Descripticn of the Deficiency and Items of Concern
- d. Torque-checking was terminated on March 19, 1981, after com-pletion of the Unit No. 5 reinspection and 20% of the Unit No.
3 reinspection. At this time less than 3% of the torque-checked bolts turned at the "jcb inspection torque." In addi-tion, the visual inspection included inspection for number of bolts, type of bolt, diameter of bolt, bolt projection, type of nut, type of washer, position of washer, tight faying surfaces, turn-of-nut tightening marks, and impact marks. This visual inspection would discover improperly installed bolts. Based on the small percentage of bolts discovered which turned at the " job inspection torque," the quality and extent of the visual inspection program performed and because the large sample of bolts reeded for statistical analysis were torque tested, it is our opinion that termination of the torque-checks was reasonable and does not affect the conclusions of our report or the evaluation of the nonconforming condi-tions. t NRC Question: B. (3) Corrective Actions Taken Please review your data base, statistical analysis techniques, f and conclusions in view of our comments on the Unit 5 report and provide the 'same supplemental information for Unit 3, as appli-cable. l l Ansv.ar: , B. (3) Corrective Action Taken l The final reports for Units 3 and 5 have been revised accordingly j and provided as Attachm:nts I and II of this letter. I k I [t i r t t
Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 9 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Should you have any questions or desire further information, please con-tact me directly.
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~ll f).S.Leddick(760)
Program Director, WitP-3 DRC/tt Attachments cc: J. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA { i Ebasco - flew York WNP-3/5 Files - Richland I i h I l i i ! l t i
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' fili i40. 5 - STRUCTURAL STEEL C0fiNECTIONS
! POTEriTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIE? ICY (D/fl #19) r l h FIfiAL EtlGINEERIf!G REPORT (REVISI0tl 1) i; j July 23, 1982 t l- ! A t t i g i i i k k i r o b i l e f n i' L i I i t l l . . ; a-_-._.----_.-----.-__--.-.-_..-.. . _ . .. .., .- . . - _ .
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i i I A3STRACT F i This report addresses the finding of documentation and hardware deviations in i the structural steel connections in the '4:P-5 Reactor Auxiliary Building. A reinspection of all visible bolts was performed by the erection contractor and the results of this reinspection were used to prepare a statistical analy-sis. This statistical analysis, was used to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not accessible for reinspection. All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions. All contractor construction and engineering supervision and quality control per-sonnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoc~ trination on structural steel erection and inspection requirements. The hardware deficiencies discovered during the reinspection have been repaired or reworked in accorda..ce with the recommended dispositions of the NCRs. L k t r I t t. E f _l-1
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1 l A. DESCRI?! ION OF EI 3EFICIE'.;CY A'O I2MS OF CCNCERN On January 21, liil, Marrison-Knudsen Company (M-K), the erection contractor of the structural steel for the Reactor Auxiliary Building, issued a Stop Work Order preventing any further bolting, welding. and erection of struc: ural steel by their caployees. On the sa=e day, i M-K issued a Corr s:tive Action Request which described the conditions which cust be cet prior to lif ting the Stop Work Order. The Stop Work Crder and CA7. were initiated based on the discovery, by the on-site NRC inspe: tor, of numerous documentatien and hardware inconsistencies in the bolted connections of structural steel serbers. F The CAR required that the following three actions be performed prior to lif ting the Stop Work Order:
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- 1. All accessible structural steel bolted and welded connections I in both units are to be reexamined to verify conformance to (
d rawings , sp ec ifications , etc.
- 2. All QC structural steel permanent plant documented records shall -
be verified for acceptability and confor:ance to actual field conditions.
- 3. To preclude recurrence, all Construction, QC, Engineering and supervisory personnel involved with structural steel erection shall receive docucented training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The reinspection performed per Item 1 of the CAR discovered:
- 1. In 1981 a total of 1020 connections containing 9440 bolcs were inspected. As part of,this inspection 20%, or a mininun of 2 bolts per connection, whichever was greater, were tested to the -
job inspection torque. Of the 5449 bolts that were so torque l tested, sixty-one (61) bolts in twenty-eight (28) connections j turned bd ow the job inspection torque. However, the job ' inspection torque values were established using a procedure which yielded values substantially in excess of the minimun
- orque values actually required and the procedure was subsequently revised.
Curing M2y 24-27,1982, a second test of these twenty-eight (23) connecticas was performed to determine the torque value at which the bolts would turn. The results of this test showed that I fifty-fcur (34) bolts turned at torque values below the job ! inspection torque. Chese 34 bolts were found in twenty-three (23) ' connections. t_ t i
- 2. Sevin (7) connecticas had niscellaneous hardware deficiencies. These i deficiencias included 1) excessive bolt p roj ec t ion , 2) nissing h,rdened '
washers, 3) under s ized washers , 4) presence of burrs in bolt holas, i
- 3) missiag re-entrant c o rn e r s , and 6) lack of " flush aut" p ro j ec t io n. i 1
i I A. DRSCRIPTION CF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CCNCEFE (CONT ' D) l The review cf the documentation records perfor:ed per Ites 2 of the i CAR discsverad: I
- 1. Twenty-five (25) original inspection reports covering all of the i connections in the EL 331 pipe chase slab had documentation errors and inconsistencies. The docu:entation errors and inconsistencies included incorrect identification of vendor drawings, incorrect member identification, incorrect quantity of bolts in the connection, and identification of nonexistent connecticas.
- 2. Thirty-two (32) connections for which no previous traceable documentation could be found.
As a result of the inspections and verifications perfor cd per Itans 1 and 2 of the CAR, M-K generated three NCRs for Unit No. 3 and six NCRs for Unic No. 5. The deviations discovered in Unit No. 3 were addressed in a separate report dated January 8,1982 and sent to the NRC on January 29, 1982. The iters of concern for Unit 5 were as follows:
- 1. Since the hardware deficiencies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all connections to '
determine the extent of the problea and the repair and/or rework activities necessary to ensure that the bolting caterials and completed connections meet drawing, specification, and code requirenents.
- 2. Since docu=entation errors, inconsistencies, and inadequacies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary l to reinspect all connections and review existing documentation to establish a package of cocplete and accurate docu:entation.
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- 3. DFSIGN ANALYSIS The reinspection data for Unit 5 is as follows: I I,
Total nuaber of connections in Unic 5 18'; _ 2 t Total number of connections torque tested 1020* } Total nu=ber of connections not tested 794 Total number of connections in which the bolts turned below job inspection torque 23 i Out of these 23 connections, number of I connections which are partially embedded in concrete 15 Fully accessible connections S t I t All of the above twenty-three (23) connections were torqued to some
. varying degrees of torque values. For cost of the connections, the average torque value for the joint is very close to the required torque value. Cut of 15 partially embedded connection, eight (8) connections are within 2.5% of the required , torque values, six (6) "j connections within 10" of the required torque value and in one connection the torque value varied up to 30%. l 1
1 Cut of the recaining eight conneer ans, three connections are within 1 2% of the. required torque value, _ cur connections are within 10% i of the required torque value and in one connection the torque value varied up to 20%. b Out of the total, twenty-three connections, considering the total j oint clanping force, 11 connections are within 2.5% of the required f torque value, ten (10) connections within 10% of required torque [ ealue 2nd two connections in less than 90% of the required torque ! value. l k Engineering evaluation demonstrated that if the joint efficiency ' is reduhed by 10%, the connection would still be adequate for the design lo:Mings. Therefore, twenty-one of twenty-three connections are acceptable as is. Since the bolt holes are normally 1/16" larger than bolt diaceter, the bolts will slip into bearing when chey cannot function in friction.
- Cnce the connection beccces ef f ective in b ea ring , the connection is going to function in shear and bearing. In reality, the connection nay already be in bearing due to the ef f ect of dead 1 cad or due to the bolting sequences. In such cases, the connection could function ,
I partly in friction 2nd partly in bearing. The connecticas which [ ! /ary nore than 10" of the required torque value could be assumed to I r work in bearing. Two sa ple connections which varied in excess of 10". of required torque value have bcen 2 valuated to act in bearing and are f ound to be acc epted. .
- 3. DESIGN ANALYSIS TONT'D)
Frcn the statisti:al analysis it can be seen that at a n2xinua ' probability of 2.14%,17 out of the renaining 794 connections which were not inspected could have one or acre bolts which are not , properly torqued. For a 95% confidence level, the number of bolts which are not preperly torqued varies from 21 to 44 L t I On the basis of the above analysis, these deviations are acceptable r to use as is. t C. ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS ! [ The reported deficiencies, taken as a whole, constitute both a breakdown i in Morrison-Knudsen's Quality Assurance program and a deficiency in construction. However, if lef t uncorrected, the deficiencies would not have adversely affected the safety of operation of the plant and are [ not significant or reportable per 10CFR50.55(e) . j I D. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN All accessible bolts were reinspected for conformance to drawing, { specification, and code requirements. All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions. All contractor construction and engineering supervision and quality control personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination in structural steel erection j and inspection requirements. The fif ty-four (54) bolts in twenty-three (23) connections which turned at the job inspection torque will be reworked by tightening to the proper torque. i I l The seven (7) connections with miscellaneous hardware deficiencies f l will be repaired or rework d in accordance with the recocnended [ i disposition of the NCR. L
- Denotes nunber of ccanections which had 100% visual check and a minimum of 20% torque check or two (2) of the bolts in that connection, which eve r was greater, f
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- ru'ctural Steel has been . erected 'i6 properly and subsequently accepted by Q.C.
nspection. eek of January Reference 23, 1981. NRC Cccket 'n0-05-04 e and NRC *n'iekly Inspectica F.eport for the [ i esult of the above, a Stop Mcrk Crdei- (ref. IOC-31-73) has been issued for all I tural Steel welding, bolting and erection. (continued ? age 2) / 1.u ..-. , e 5 . .t m s .s g C,u
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- 3. '
To preclude recuerence, all construction, QC, enginest-ing and superviscry , arsenell involved with Structural Steel Erectica shall receive doctr.ented training and indoctrina tica in Structural Steel Erectica and Ins.:ection Rec.uiramen s. f As evidence of c:mpliance to the 'abcve condi:icas are submitted and found acceptable
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l i L t F i i l EXHIBIT 2 IC3 INSPECTION TORCUE VALUES FOR REINSPECTION i. l l l t i e I-r L I e f h c E2-1
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- .ima, Washingt:n svenc ,
Verification of Structural 5:1 ting rer Ca,r,, 2-- :2: Engineering having reviewed the varying job torque as noted per IOC-81-154, is now assigning the values for minimum torque required by AISC. , . J During the verification of structural bolts per CAR #33 the inspecticn teams shall perform iCC: visual and'20% actual torque verificarica using i the it-lb values noted on attached sheet.
~
If there are any questions please contact this office. Attachment MCL/kh ' - ' " a /. -
. cc: D. Reed "'- "~-
R. Hisdom M. Lentz . M-K .ile t F ( F i l
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DIAMETER PER TABLE 3 AISC TOROUE . . I IN.-LS g . r. .::. - ! e 7/8" 39,000! 5,825 559 -> 1" 51,000! 10,200 850 ! 1 1/8" - 55,000! . 12,500 1,050 [ i t t ( A 4e nu0
. . . . . MINIMUM
' TENSION REQUIRED -
DIAliETER [.1 PER TABLE 3 AISC TOROUE
~ .
IN.-L3 U.-L3 I 7/8" 49,000! 8,575 71 5 f 1" - 54,000! 12,800 1iC57 1 1/8" 80,000! l8,000 1,500 - k e a
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i s EXHIBIT 3 1 s CONNECTICNS WIU BOLTS WHICH TURNED AT THE "J03 INS?ECTICN TORCUE" ! 4 I i i.- t k i I I t I i 53-1 #
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. . .C .d TURNED AT ~~dE ".JC3 iSPECTION TORQUE" r PEVISED ?ER REINSPECTICN REPORT 35E 1359 k R 5501 LCOSE 30LTS N0. 30LTS L reco? NO. CO2;!!IC m N NO. 30LTS POLTS TESTED VISIBLE IN CONNECTICNS 553-152 265C-4LA-295C 6 3 8 20 296G-46A-293E 2 4 4 2973 41A-271G 16 3 4 4 297C-41A-299A 16 2 4 4 297D-41A-2993 4 16 4 4 2663 4253 16 1 7 S ic 153 93K-230F 4 4 4 c 1
159 243A-LO7A-252A 2 19 20 24 252A-4233-2G5E 1 16 18 22 263F-2G3A-26LG 1 16 16 16 267A-2a5C-262F 2 8 8 3* 162 67A-L2S3 40A 3 8 8 14 295C-40A-297G 2 2 2 3 2950-40A-2725 2 4 4 16 165 2433-402A-2L3A 7 26 26 26*J 27BA-2aS3-275C 3 8 8 3* 166 93AD-2663 1 4 4 . L i 93AC-41A 2 4 4 4 o 175 2G5C 423A-2LM 16 1 i 13 26 ! L4A-0253 11A 1 8 18 22
'53 2523 4303-252C 2 13 18 24 (
290E 45A-296A 1 4 6 271E-6263 / 1 3 16 I 8 14
/
54 204 220 354 h F The Since:eallr abolt "1cese s werebolt" a: indic t:es only th.it the bolt turned at the j ic inspection tarque. Y stress, leas- hand tigh:ened, the bolts could still resist scme shea- ; b i i 301.03 fOr thiS ConneC!.On erl COC CeSCAd in 'idf' 1952. IhuS i _ 'he C *SO resul ObE310ed ! in 1931 13 3 i Ve3.
- 1 1 a
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a - - _.. .- EXHI3IT 3 TCROUE VAL'/ES AT WHICH THE 3CLT3 TURNED Measured Required Connection Torque Valve Torque Valve ft-lb ft-lb 265C 4LA-293C 13350, 15425, 23450, 23550 569 i 296C 44A-298E 12450, 1@550 569 2973 41A-271G 17125, 10450, 17525 569 297C 41A-299A 1 425, 13475 569 20 7D- 41 A-2993 132C0, 13275, 13400, 1@475 569
-2663 4253 13550 569 *93K-230F 3350, 1@75 569 +248A-407A-252A 1@950, 1@975 1067 +252A-4233-245E 1@725 850 263F-248A-264G 1@l50 569 267A-245C-262F 1@300, 1@325 .
569 l 4 47A 4283 40A 1 300, IJ900, 1@1225 1500 295G 40A-297G 1@50, 1G525 569 295D-40A-272E 1@200, 1@275 569 2433-402A-243A Not Tested 278A-2433-275C 1@225, 1@250, 1@300 569
+93AD-2663 13525 569 93AC 41A 1@450, 1@475 569 245C 423A-244A 1@350 1067 44A 4233 41A 13650 1500 2323 4303-252C 1:450, 1@700 850 290E 45A-294A 1@375 569 271E 4263 13125 569 e
I
- The meuured torque valves indicate that an impact wrench was not used on this connection.
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+ The measured torque valves are so close to the required torque valves that [
for all intents and purposes the connections are acceptable. ! i i i i E2-3
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i i l i i r i l i t E'GI3IT 4 ! l STATISTICAL STUDY OF POSSI3LE STRUCTURAL STEEL , SOLTS NOT FULLY TORQUED IN UNIT No. 5 a h l i J
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1 I i . . EXHIB:7
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SUSJECT: Statistical Study of Fossible Structural Steel Bolt Torque
- eficiencies in Unit No. 5.
REFERDCE: Ronald Walpole and Raymond Meyers, Probability and Statistics _ , for Engineers and Scientists, MacMiTlan Ccmpany, New York. k i t I [ I F.4 -2 _ _ _ _ _ _ , . , - . , . .m _ __.7 ,
i, 1' I l u, .u r, .. S
? AGE TITLE PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . E4-2 CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . E4-3 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E4-4 STATEMENT OF PR03LEM . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . E4-3 STATISTICAL MET'40D SYNOPSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . E4--6 30LT FAILURE - PR03A31LITY STUDY , . . . .. . . .. ... .. . E4-7 PR03A31LITY STUDY . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . E4-8
?R03 ABILITY STUDY . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . E4-9 CONFIDENCE LEVEL . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . E4-10 CONNECTION FAILURE - PR03A3ILITY STUDY . . . . . .. . . .. . . E4-11 r
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I t i 1 l t i CONC LL'S IC::S ! 6 k t EOLTS t t*
- 1) Of the 3273 bolts not accessible for reinspection, the highes* "
probability of not fully torqued bolts is 0.987. and occurs at 32 bolts.
- 2) of the 3273 bolts not accessible for reinspection, the expected nunber of not fully torqued bolts varies fron 21 to 44 for a i 95% confidence level. i t
a n t C0:aECTIONS [ 5 r of the 794 ccnnections not re inspect ed , the highest probability of r having one deficient bolt in a connection is approximately 2.147, r with 17 connections out of 794 af fected. I c t t t 1 l l l l i I i t 5 l l _ _ . . _
-.. _ _ _ . - - _ -. - --. - - -=- __.--._.-____ _ _ _ . - . . _ _ - - - . - -
i i 4 i l STATEM.5.NT OF PRC5!.5h i-i 0 1 1 l ! i i i Ncaconformance Reports 5500, 5502, and 5503 deal with the fact that documenta-tion deficiencies existed for a portion of Unit No. 5 that preceded the accep-tance of structural steel bolts. The bolts in questien were either loaded with concrete or otherwise inaccessible, such that conventional bolt testing methods became impossible. This report has been generated to support the recerar. ended disposition of Use-As-Is for these NCRs. Data to prepare the statistical analysis was based upon the results of the ec-inspection performed per CAR-33. l c s l-e I. '
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STATISTICAL ME!200 SE C?s:3 All data was b::e: upon that furnished by Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. on
- nspection Reptet 35E 1359. The raw data for this statistical analysis is shuwn in Exh ib it 3. I A portion of st r.:tural steel bolts in Unit No. S were retested. The statistics inv:~ c ad in finding the probability and confidence level in--
volving individ_al bolts was the binomial distribution curve. This type of distribution is appropriate since all the testing was done on a " pass-reject" basis. Thus all probabilities and confidence levels on bolts - were esticated ir. the binomial distribution basis. l,
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a . SU3 JECT: Statistical Study of Bolt Failure Tes:
REFERENCE:
Ransld E 'o'alpole and Raymond H Meyers , Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, MacMillan Company, New York,1972, pps. 81-34 A. Given Conditions: Bolts torque tested: 5449 pieces Bolts which turned at " Job Inspection Torque": 54 pieces 3olts not in spect ed: 3273 pieces
- 3. Assumption: Probability of failure is 54 or 0.00991 5449 l l
C. Nuaerical Study: Frca reference, the Binomial Distributions can be , presented as: n x n-x b(x;n,p) = (7)p q , x = 0, 1, 2, .....n
^?lesse refer to sacple calculation (page E4-8)
D. Results: See attached table E4-I and Figure E4-1. E.
Conclusion:
Fron Figure E4-1, the highest probability of having '::olts not fully torqued is 32 bolts out of 3273 untaspected bolts, which is I I 32
= 0.0098 3273 CR 0.987.
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Sarple Calculation: n x n-x
- cte: Formula: b(x; ,:) = (;) p q , x = 0,1,2. . .c ahere b (x;c , p) : bincaial distribution x: nurbar of failures (or successes) n: total nucher of trials p: success or failure probability q=1-p: failure or success probability Example: In this study, the failure probability was assuced as t 54 or 0.00991. Find the probability that exactly 32 '
5449 of the next 3273 bolts tested will turn at tha " Job Inspec tion To rque", p = 54 = 0.00991 5449 t q = L-p = 0.99009 x = 32 . a = 3273 b(x;n,p) = 3273'* 32! (3273-32)! (0.00991)20 (0.99009)3273-32 a 7% J l I l I i I t 1 - t Ei-d b
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18 0.2% 30 0.33 ,. 25 3.12 ' 30 1 6.6% 31 6.95* 32 7.05" 33 6 . 9 ". 34 6 . 6." ; 35 6.1% 40 2.57. i
., 45 0.6677.
e FIGURE E4-1 _L 3ISOMIAL DISTRI3UTION OF NOT FULLY TORQUED 30LTS f
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3;'3J E CT : C:nfidence *2 vel ~.nter.si of Fa: lures of 5.i: 3 i
REFERENCE:
?.:nald E Walpole and Raymend H. Meyers, ?:itabili:'. and S:atis:i:s.
for Eneineers and Scientists. Ma Millan Company, ';ew York, 1972. pp. I 203 j i A. Given ::ndi-1:ns 3ci:s tes:ec: 5 49 [ Hol:s which turned a: :he " Job Inspection Torque": SL pieces 3ol:o not tes:ed - n: 3273 pieces i I
- 3. Assump: ion: probability of failure, p is 56 = 0.00391 $
5449 C. Numerical Study: Confidence intarval can be approximated as: 1 oe o-: - -
/\ oc N n o o - 2 N n Where p is the probabili:y of failures in an unte'sted sample of size n, p is.:he probability of failure in the sample tested and q = 1-p, is the -
value of the s:andard normal curve leaving an area of d/2 to the right 'l where d = 1 - 7. confidence interval. (see reference) I_ In our case, the untested sample number n = 3273 and the prebability of , failure is p = .00991. Using the value of : = 1.96 frem reference for 957. confidence interval, the 957. confidence interval of failure'(p) can be f calculated as:
,{
V 0.00991 (0.00991) (0.99009) /s , l
- 1. 9 o, \ 3273 p 0.00991 _p , t s
{ 1.96 (0.00991 (0.99001) I g 4 e 3273 j, OR 0.006516
/ p 0.013304 21 p 1354 [
. i OR 21 No. of f ailures 44 for 95% confidence level p
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C.~. ~:;ECTICS F A.: LURE - ?? 1.2.3;L;TY 57';DY c
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i A. Given Ocndi- .:ns i Connect 1:ns Tested: 1C20 i Connecti:ns ith 1 or more locse bolts: 23 Connecti:n: Not Tested: 794 Total Cor.ections: 1816
- 3. Assumptions: g Probability of 1 or more loose bolts / connection: - = 0.0225 1020 C. Nucerical Study: Frem reference, the binomial distributions can be presented as:
X n-X b(x;n,p) = ( nX ) p q , x = 0,1,2,3 . . .n from reference, the normal approximation to the binomial distribution D.
Conclusions:
From Table E4-II the highest probability of 1 or mora
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loose bolts per connection is approximately 17 _ connections of 794 affected, which is - 17
= 0.0214 794 OR 2.14%
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HUMPXR Of= CCNNECTioHS i 5. 5b~1
i t. I 1 l i t i i j - I i ATTACHMENT II I I t e r h t I t h I I . t. k
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i ; i, ! t i t ! l l l! l l U!11T 110. 3 - STRUCTURAL STEEL C0!ii4ECTIO!is i ! ! I l POTEtiTI AL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY (D/N F19) i 1 i Fli!AL ENGINEERING REPORT (REVISION 1) l July 23, 1982 l i i I i I I l l l l . t I i i i I 1 i
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~hi s re: Ort ad:re:st: the findi9: Of :: umenta:i:n an: car:..are deviati:ns in ! . e s: rue ural steel connections ir :r.e UN?-3 Rea:::r luxiliary Building. ;
A reinspe:: ice of ai' visibia bci ts was perforr.ed :y :ne erectice ::ntra:::r i and ne results of this sinspe: ion were usid :: ;re;2re a sta:is:i:ai analy- I sis. This statistica; analysis along with calculations of the design stresses in the belts was uset to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" c ndi:icn of the bol ts which were no: accessible for reinspection. All structural steel erection cocumentaticn was reviewed fcr accepta:iii:y ard conformance to field conditions. ' All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and cuality con rel personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination on structural steel erection and ins:ecticn requiremen:s. [ The hardware deficiencies discovered during the reiaspection will be repaired, reworked, or used-as-is in accordance with the recommended dispositions of the NCR's. This work will be completed by April 1,1982. - The deficiencies reported as 0/N #19 constitute both breakdcwns in J yorrison-Knudsen's quality assurance program and deficiencies in construction as defined by 10CFR50.55(e). The deficiencies reported as 0/N #21 are not significant nor reportable as de-~ ivcc ..30. s s-(e). rine, by ... , L A. CESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITE45 0F CONCERN . P Cn January 21 , 1981, Morrison-Knudsen Co. (M-K), the erection contractor of s the structural steel for the Reactor Auxiliary Building, issued a Stop Work Order preventing any further bolting, welding, and erection of structural steel .by their empicyees. On the same date M-K issued a Correc:ive Ac:fon i Request which described the conditions which must be me prior to lif:ing (. the Stop Work Ceder. The Stop Work Crder and CAR were initiated based on ( the discovery, by the on-site NRC inspector, of numerous documenta-ion and hardware inconsistencies in the bolted connections of structural steel mem-bars.
- The CAR required that :ne failcwing :hree actions :e performed prior to lifting the 3::p Work Order.
t i.
- 1. All accessible s:ructurai s:ael bol ted an6 welded connec:icns in both !
units are to be examinad to veci fy conformance to draaings, specifica- ; ti:ns, etc. - t t-
- 2. All CC structural s:sei permanen plan: docuc+nted ec:rds shall be earifiac f r a; e;;abili y and cccf:rrance o actual #ial: ::ndi:icns. T
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DESC:I :::1 Cr A. DEFIC:INCY AND :TE.'d CF ::NCERN ;;;n ti nu ed )
- 3. T: predude s:urrence, all c:nstructi:n, CC, engineering ar.d su:er-vis:ry pers:- ei involved with structural steel erection shall re-ceive ::cumi :ed training and indcctrination in struc: ural steel erec-tien and ins:ection requirements.
The reinspectior ;erformed per Item 1 of the CAR disc:vered:
- 1. Fifteen (15) :ennections with loose bolts.
- 2. Two (2) connec:f ons with missing tolts.
- 3. Two (2) connections with A325 bolts installed instead of A490 bolts.
4 One (1) connection with two (2) A307 bolts installed instead of A325 bolts. ,
- 5. Thirty-five (35) connections with bolts having unsatisfactory projec-tion.
- 6. Fourteen (14) connections with miscellaneous hardware deficiencies in-cluding improper plate washers over slotted holes, lack of contact be-tween faying surfaces, minor dacage on the structural membar, incorrect washer size, etc.
The review of the documentation records performed per Item 2 of the CAR dis-covered four hundred and eight (408) Unit No. 3 structural steel connections which had documentation errors and/or inconsisten'cies. The documentation errors and/or inconsistencies included 1) errors in bolt count, 2) lost or nonexistant documentation and 3) miscellanecus errors on documentation. As a result of the inspections and verifications performed per Items 1 and 2 of the CAR, M-K generated three NCR's for Unit 3 and six NCR's for Unit No. 5. The daviations discovered in Unit No. 5 were addressed in a separate report dated October 31, 1981 and sent to the NRC on November 17, 1981. In addition, a Quality Finding at; ort was issued by Ebasco against M-K on February 23, 1981. The QFR identified a connection in which two bolts were discovered to be loose. The bolts were deliberately tampered with by un- [ kncun individual (s). This item has been identified as 0/M #21. i The items of concern were as folicas:
- 1. Since hardware deficiencies were found in a number of bolted ccnnecticns, it was nacassary to reinspect ali ccanections to detarnir.e the extent of
- he problem and the repair and/or rework ac:ivities necessary to ensure that the bolting materials and c:mpleted connec:icns meet drawing, spa- ;
cification and ccde requirements. l i
- 2. Since documentation errors, inc nsistencies, and inadaquacies were #:und ;
ia a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspec: all c:n- 4 aections and review existing documentation to estaolish a package of c: - ' pl ate and actura:e documentation. , e
I B. EESIGN ANALYS:I Ceficiencies r.::ed above can be divided int: :w: :2tegories:
- 1. Bolts whicr did no: mee: torque requirements - 17 ::nnections. i
- 2. Eolts with ardware probie:s - 52 connections.
Connections whi:5 were not inspected were founc to be in the pice chase area. Thise connections are cenerally a bol: :onnections. - Design evaluati:n demonstrated that for a 25% reduction in joint capacity, these connections are still adequate for the design loadings. l l Those connecticns in which bolts turned at job inspection torque can > function partly in friction and partly in bearing. Since the bolt I holes are normally 1/16" larger than bolt diameter, the bolts will slip into bearing when they cannot function in friction. Once ! the connection becomes effective in bearing, the connection is i going to function in shear and bearing. All the above connections are evaluated .to act in bearing and are found to be acceptable. From the statistical analysis it can be seen that at a maximum probability,150 bolts out of 18,301 untested bolts would turn at the job inspection torque. On the basis of analyses performed on those connecti.ons with bolts that did not meet torque requirements
~.~i..or bolts with hardware problems, it is concluded that the above probabilities would not adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant.
The connections with miscellaneous hardware probl. ems were individually evaluated and it was found that these deviations are not critical l with respect to the intended design function of the connections. ! Mcwever, these deviations were corrected. ' L From the statistical analyses, it can be scen that at a maximum i probability 2 connections out of remaining 280 connections which ! were not inspected could have one or more bolts which were not properly torqued, It can also be seen that at maximum probability only one connection out of 280 connections which were not tested ! could have two or more bolts which are not prcperly torque tested. [ t On the basis of the above analysis, these deviations are acceptable ! to use as is; i t i i t
C. AML:'5:5 0F T=E SM TY :' ' : 37:CN5 D / 'l - 19_ The reported documentaticn and hardware deficiencies taken as a whole, constitutute both breakdenns in Morriscn-Knutsen's quali ty assurance progran and deficiencies in cons ruction. The rescrted ceficiencies would no: have adversely affected the safety of operations cf the plan; and, therefore are not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e). D/N #21 The QFR identified a condition in which 2 bolts in the 4 bcit c:rnecti:nt ;f pipe chase hanger 1465 to beam 2973 were loosened after placemen cf c:n-crete in the pipe chase slab. Calculations were made by ESSE to determine the maximum expected lead en this hanger. This load was compared with the AISC allowable tension load for the
- tm remaining 7/8"3 A325 bolts. This comparison shows that the hanger could safely carry the expected design load with 2 of the 4 bolts removed.
This deviation in construction and quality assurance, were it to have re-mained uncorrected l would not have adversely affected the safety of opera-tions of the plant and, therefore, is not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e). 01 CORP.ECTIVE ACTIONS TAXEN _
,T,he following Corrective Actions concern D/N 319:
All visible bolts were reinspected for conformance to drawing, specification, and code requirements. All structural steel erection ' documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to ff. eld conditions. All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and quality control personnel invo.lved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements. [ The results of the reinspection were used, to precare a statistical anal.ysis. l l l The statistical analysis indicated that-
- 1. Of the 13,326 bolts not accessible for reinspection the e.cected numcer ;
of deficient bolts neies frcm 122 to 133 for a 99", confidence level and i 130 to 178 for a 95", confidence level and l
- 2. Of he 280 ccnnections not reinspected, the highest probability of ' raving l at least cne deficihnt bolt occurs at two connections, and the highest :
probability of having two or Tore deficient bolts cccurs at one
, [
connec ti o n . t l l 1 [
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This s: ;istical 1 alysis along with bolt strass calculati:ns f:r fce y. ' five (15) repre: 3 :3tive bolted connections 3-d s:ress cal:ulati:ns for the typical pipe ; ase connections were used :: ; ustify acceptance of the l "AS-5UILT" condi:#:n of the bolts which were not ac:essible for reinspec-
- tica. -
Fiftaen (15) of :~ e seventeen (17) connections with 1:cse er missing toits [ will be reworked :/ tightening all of the bolts in the :onnection to the ! proper torque. T e other two connections will be repaired by first tight-ening the accessi:le toits to the proper torque and then fillet welding the ac:essible pce:icn of the clip angle to the connecting member. This I J work will be completed by April 1,1982. h The two connections which have been erected with A325 bolts instead of the required A490 bolts will be repaired by fillet welding the clip angles on h the beams to the columns. The one connection which had two (2) A307 bolts installed will be reworked by replacing the A307 bolts with A325 bolts. h This work will be completed by April 1,1982. [L The thirty-five (35) connections with bolts havin'g unsatisfactory bolt pro- u jection and the fourteen (14) connecticns with miscellaneous hardware deft- " ciencies will either be used-as-is or reworked in such a manner as to make the holts and connections conform to the drawing, specification and code requirements. This work will be completed by April 1,1982. The folicwing corrective / preventive Actions concern 0/N #21: The two loose bolts in the connection identified by the Quality Finding Re-
; ort will be reworked by tightening the bolts to the proper torque. This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
Forrison-Knudsen Craft were issued impact and torquing equipment from a con-trolled tool crib enabling only authorized personnel the right to withdraw tools. ; t 4
"orrison-Knudsen QC perscnnel were required to complete a final " walk thrcugh" L just prior to concrete placement to preclude the possibility of loose bolts l in a connection and the tampering of those connections.
r [ I All dismantling required written notification from Construction to the Quali:y , Assurance department. A Carrec fve Action Request (CAR) was issued and resulted in significant changes to M-K's structural steel erecticn anc inspection programs. The results of Morrisen-Knud:en's reinspection sn wed nc evidence of tal;rac-tice. t I 8 L s a b
I i i' i e STATISTICAL STUDY OF POSSISLE STRUCTU?AL STEEL I l J 30LTS !;0T FULLY TORQUED IN UNIT #3 ) I' p P i I. 5, I I i t.
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o . SCCPE The erection contractor, Morrison-Enudsen, found that caa" ' .o #~ '" ~~ "*l"C7 Control Inspectors involved in the -- uca ~1 4 P g inadequate detunentatian of the bolt uP oro ess. e
- .. - ok 1. upon .he- al"es *'
r e., n sp ec t every bolt in avery connection in both Un4 a-
-- 3 and .;. --is t- repott p ertains only ~o Up < ,very connection at elevation
- 390.00 a""a " '" ~ " '
that was accessible was re'ns ec~ed" Th - i s hi h were inaccessible were liaited to those embedded in cone ete. The reinspo'" tion cok t c one was visual and torque check while the other was a visual inspection. I L i l { t f t i l'
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CN:C _LUSIOSS Af ter rany weeks of f ata gathering, Morrison-Enudsen's Quality Assurance 2epartnent wrote an NCR identifying where docunentation was inadequate. Thr: ugh the analysic, outlined in the body of this report, the following conclusions were arrived at: I. There were 3,964 connections reinspected, of 4,244 total connections. Seventeen (17) of these had bolts which turned at the job inspection torque or missing, 20 had " shanked out" bolts and twenty-fiva (25) of these had two (2) or core bolts which turned at the job inspection torque, missing or shanked out. II. In the 3,964 connections reinspected, there were a total of 30,860 bolts. Of the 30,860 bolts, 13,678 were accessible for either visual reinspection or reinspection by use of a torque l wrench, where 10% or two (2) bolts were inspected, whichever was the greater. These reinspection procedures are outlined in the following pages. Of the 13,678 bolts reinspected, 54 were found to turn at the job inspection torque and 61 were shanked out. III. From Conclusion I above, it can be seen that there are 230 connections which were not reinspected. As these connections happen to be in the Elevation 351' pipe chase and.the najority of these connections have 4 bolts per connection. Thus , it is estinated that there are another 1,120 bolts not reinspected. This would nean that there is a total of 31,980 bolts with 13,302 of these not re in sp ec t ed. It can be seen in Figure 1, for a =axinum probability 150 bolts or 0.82% of the 18,302 unreinspected bolts would not neet the inspection requirenents. The nunber of bolts which did not neet job inspection torque varied from 122 to 183 for a 99% confidence level and froa 130 to 198 for a 95% confidence ! level.
;7. Finally, by using the connections listed on the pcught Zolt List, :
a total of approxicately 4,254 ccnnecticns were found to exist at elevation 390.00 and belev. is stated in Conclusion I, 3,964 of these were reinspacted, 1 caving enly 230 connections ; not reinsp ect ed. These connections are liaited to the i Elevation 351' pipe chase, as at the time of the reinspection ; nost of this pipe chase slab was poured, thereby enbedding a ' number of ccnnections. i
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)
IV. (Cent ' d) Again, the binomial distribution formula was used to predict the number of connections which would not meet the inspection requirements in 230 unreinspected connections. From Tabla II, the highest probability of connections in which one or core bolts which would r.ot meet torque requirements is approxi.astely two connections or 0.7L". out of 280 af fected. From Table III, the highest probability of connections in which two cr more bolts would not meet the torque requirements is approximately one connection or 0.35% out of 280 affected. l 1 4 k I. a I v l. , r r [ t h L I J i j j _ , _ , r,, , , p._p m. _ , , , .
T 5T!.T15I:rAL ANALYSIS The re'.nspe:tien was done in two stages: l
- 1. The first 12,305 bolts were inspected visually and 1750 bolts out of 12,336 were torque tested. j
- 2. There were 11,900 accessible bolts out of the next 18,554 bolts in the connections which were inspected only visually. The re=aining 1120 bolts were not inspected.
The inspection procefures are explained below:
- 1. Torcue and Visual Inspection Procedure A Quality Control Inspector, an Engineer, and two Iron Workers would gain access to a connection, torque test 10% or two (2) of the bolts in that connection, whichever was greater, and also visually inspect 100% of all accessible bolts. The torque test would be done with a torque wrench, that was calibrated using a skidcore, at the beginning of the shif t. The following is a so--ary of the data that was documented:
Total Bolts in Connections Inspected 12,306 Total Bolts Torque Tested in Connections Inspected 1,750 Total Bolts Which Turned at Job Inspection Torque, in the Connections Inspected 35
- 2. Visual Inspection Procedure A Quality Control Inspector and an Engineer would gain access to a connection and visually inspect. bolts in that connection for turn of the nut marks, type of bolt, bolt proj ec t ion, type of nut, type of washer, position of washer, number of bolts, and if the bolt was tightened or not. This inforantJon was cross checked with specifications, fabrication drawings, bolt list, erection and contract drawings.
If discrepancies were found, they were listed on an NCR. The following is a summary of the data that was documented. A loose bolt was one which was not i=pacted froa snug tight position. Total Bolts in Connections Inspected 18,554 Total Eolts Accessible for Visual Inspection 11,900 Total Bolts Loose in Connections Inspected 19 _5
. ~ _
I Tht:2 were 1120 bolts in 230 connec:ians in the pipe chase a: the 351' ; ele:ation not reinspect ed due to ina ess ibility. (- f For the pu~ "ose of probability analysis, the results of the insnec:icns were tabulated and used in binomial distribution formula to predict the l probability of icosa bolts cs folicws: A. Total 3olts in Connections: 12,306 + 13,554 + 1,120 = 31,930 Total Bolts Actually Inspected: 1,778 + 11,900 = 13,678 Total Bolts t?hich Turnad at the Job Inspection Torque in the , Connections Inspected 54 Total Bolts " Shanked Out" 61 t
- 3. It can be assumed that the probability of having a loose bolt would be:
115
= 0.0084 _
13,678
= 0.347. .
The bincaial distribution formula that was used is shown below. This formula is used to predict the probability of failure (or success) in an untested population. This prediction is based on the results gained fran a casted , population in which both the tested and untested populatica conbine to fora i-I the total population. L Binomial Distribution Formula: x ( ~"-x) x=0, 3(x; n; p) =, n! p q , 1, 2 , ( n-x) 1 x !_ r f. e 4 h i Y I. _3
.~
- nu:bar of f ailur t s n: total number of trials i p: Failure p cbability q: Success probabi.lity = (1-p)
(?robability and Sta-istics for Engineers ar.d Scientists, by R E 'Jalpole and R H F.yars) I I L l' TA3LE I a = 17,132 + 1,120 = 13,302 - r x = 0 , 1, 2 . . . L t p = 0.C:084 q = 0.9916 x b(x, n. p) c. 120 .0006 0.06" 6 125 .0020 0.2 % 130 .0050 0.5 % 135 .010 1.07. E.. i 150 .0173 1.78% [ t i 145 .0257 2.57% ' l-t 150 .0312 3.127. 160 .0279 2.79% ! I i, 170 .0132 1.32% I 130 .0035 0.35% 190 .C005 0.05% ! r I i f 4 1 1 i. _6 5-r
- . v- . .-.= ,.
Ein:rizl Distri':ction of 301:3 No- Fu ll,. To qued l A
.c E7--
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] .
3- - x 1-0 ._ f( _1- -
. . , . .- . , , n 1
25 50 79 fco (19 15 o 17 9 2co [ l SOCTs \VHICM \\70LJLO NOT Mi=.i"T t TCRQL!C RC _QL_llR~cMENTS [t
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A. O i . e n 0 ; r. h t i c - ' i 301:s Tes:ed 13,678 22.:s im e, a: ..a: ,nspect,on: .orque . Sc1:s not Teste: (n) 18,302
- 3. Assu, .12n: Pr : :- ab ili ty o f f a ilure , p is 115 = .0034 i 13,678 i
\
C. Nucerical Study. Confidence interval can be apprcximated as: i l p-z pq Ap p-: P9 I {
\ n \ n 957. : = 1.96 99". : = 2.575 For 99*'. confidence level:
.0C84 - 2.575 (.C034 (.9916)
A
.0084 + 2.575 _
( .0034 (.9916) 13.302 \p 18,302 A
\
.0034 .0174 p .0034 + .0174 '
A
.0666 p .0010 GR s
122 9 183 $ For 95". confidence level: (
.006 - 1.96 (.COS4 (.9916) Ap .0034 + 1.96 (.0034 (.9916) (
\ 18,302 1' 13,302 i t,
.0034 - .0013 Ap .0084 .0013 '.
I
.C071 Ap .C097 I OR j f
130 A p 173 - t t
.t -
The Sincrial distribution for:ula was u sed to deter:ine the crotability
- v. , ,
o f the tcanections with bolts which w:uld not meet torque requirements. l;
~T . e reinspection dat a is as follows: ll il A. Total number of connections 4224 ll l-l k
Total ccnnecti:ns inape:ted 3964 Total connect'. s with one or rote bolts [l shich did not .It torque require ents 37 l Il : Total connections with two bolts which did not meet torque requir2:ents 25
- 3. Probability of having a connection with 1 or more bolts which do not meet torque requirements 37
= .0093 3964 C. Probability of having a connection with 2 or more bolts which do not meet torque requirements 25 4 .0063 3964 The following sheet shows the <!ata points gathered. I 4
I i. i l-L 1 O ew
o o n... . _ , v.. ..r m
- r. 3 m-..- e , v- . _ ,. ..3 ..: r . . .n.e . .: .. . .. r_ m, - . ._ r.%_ . - - . ,
. .. r.1 . ..s w .s . ,. . C ~ "m .",
- e. s.
x = 0.ie2 ; p = 0.0093 q = 0.9907
~n = 230 x b(x;n;p) ?,
i i 0 0.073 7.3 i 1 0.192 19.2 2 0.251 25.1 I 3 0.219 21.9
! 4 0.142 14.2 5 0.074 0.74 i
TABLE III
- r 7,40 OR MORE 30LTS _tJOULD NOT MEET THE TOROUE REQUIREMENT IN A CONNECTION x = 0,1,2 t.
p = 0.0063
- q = 0.9937 i
[ n = 230 I x b(x;n:p) 7 ! r 0 0.170 17.0 i 1 0.302 30.2 6 I 9
- n.
u ap , a. . a, i t 3 0.157 15.7 i f I
+
i 4 0.C69 6.9 r J i 5 0.02L 2.5 j I
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CONNECTION IN '4HICH ONE OR MORE 30LTS WOULD NOT SEET TORQUE REQUIREMENTS f [' I. t t I l l t I t I I Figure 2
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[ MORE 30LIS WOULD NOT MEET CONNECTION REQUIREMENTS jf i g i l [
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- rrisen-Tnudsen ?, Davis - QA Manager }
M0iM G : -. .-
?rocedural vere not zer.provisir s for the disnan: ling of structural steel af te'r inspecti:n j .-
,F Lscussica: ,
During c:ndue: of Audi: 2 63 -10 it was f ound t': at , for the structural steel i I l ccnnectica of =enbers 3973 to 1465, located along the L'ai: 3 pipe chase a: :he ! 336' eleva:ica, 2 belt s had been dis =an-led b. craf t af ter QC inspection s1.. off. . 3
- 3 Corrective ac:fons of being taken bv Morrison.-?nudsen as a result to preclude this type of situatica vere in the p ocess lt Engineering concerns. of NRC and WPSS/Ebasco QA These corrective actions included requirc ents for final !!
walk through inspections, as builting of connections and provisicas for craf t notification of dis =antling subsequent to inspectica but prior to concrete .,
?
A pf-ct . Esacn SE out April 21, 1981 IC. Aun.ca
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3-10--31 .i
- -K Craft n.re issued i = set & torquing equi,coant frca a centrolled tcol crib. LK QC cco- l Leted aq2treda written fir.al Dcctracted notificationwalk frcmthrough Constructicn. just prior to centrete placement, all disrataling .
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.i i 1 of ile atLK'sthe tire QA/QC of clace. Dcctrentatica cont. Tne ard Investigatica f rdicate the cc=ecticn as being accept-
.ely tan:pered with after place rent. caly conclusica is the ':cits in questicn were celibar-
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i e is planned by LK at this ti:e. No further actica cther t'.an centicned in Sectica l,I{ [
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- 2. w ac T. 3210-263 5. n,ttr sc. 293-11 e
i: scussion: (Continued) loading of the ember. These requirements are reflected '- v orrison-r,udsen Consrrue ion ?rc:edure C?-05, revision 5. his area was reported as a follow- . up iten in Audi: 252-10. I In performing this folicw-up during Audit 263-11, it was found that reinspec-tion of the subject connection vo s perforced and documented by R Polly of Morrison-Kncdsen on Decem*cer 4, 1980. Subsequent to this inspection:
- 1) bolts on the reverse of the reinspected connection were dismantled without the required QC noti.ficarica documen-tation being provided;
- 2) concrete was placed along the pipe chase supported by the retereuced connections. .
It could not be deterained by the auditor whether dismantling occurred prior or subsequent to concrete placement. If it is assumed tha: dismantli.ng occurred prior to leading, then this finding is valid as written, in that QA progran provisicas for discantling were not cet. If the dismantling occurred after the leading, then it would be considered by the auditor to be deliberate calpractice and therefore, outside the purvicw of the QA program. Per conver-sation with R 2 avis, Morrison-?nudsen Project Quality Engineer, it was indicated that he suspected the latter assumption to be the case and therefore, in conjunction with 3 Wisdon, Morrison-7mudsen's General Craft Superintendent, he was preparing a progran to prevent recurrence. In their responsa Ferrison-?nudsen shall indica t e what ac:icas were taken specific to the, connection in question and what actions have been or will be taken to prev = ~ ' practice in the future. 7 W l l
- . - - - -- ..n-...~ ---.-n-. ~ . - - - - - . . , . . -
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s u s n :- Veritying 2 rque cn StructurSl Steel
- for CAR 33 It has been troui:ht t-o Enainesrines attenticn that there is a wide variation 1n Jcb torque frcm day to day. Tc elimina te this problem, effective' 2/].gf rj]
ror all varitication or torque, in acccedance with Corrective Action .ce port number 33, torque wrenches will be set at the mini, mum torcue value required by' A.I.S.C. and all bcits that meet this recuirer.ent will be acceptable. 1".ere wi l l be no further need for " job torque" for the verifica tion. If there are any questions please contact this office. inank ycu JWD/kh . cc: 0. F.eed ~ R. 'iisdom ~ M. Lentz i, .-d e l. l e e e l-o
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Enginearing having reviewed the varying job torque as noted par .7CC-81-I'4, is n .; atsigning the values for minirum torcue racuired by AISC. Curing the '!erification of structural bolts per CAR 133 the inspection teams shall perform 100% visual and 207, actual torque verification usinc the f t/lb values noted on attached sheet. 4 I r. t.nere are any questions please contact ta..is orrice. __. t.
, Attachment MCL/kh '
cc: O. Reed . t R. Wisdom M. Lentz - M-X File l i f I
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4 Cyj:ETER PER TABLE 3 AISC TORCUI i vt.ir . - L ,s . . .
.- i . l.2 ,
s 8" 39,000! 5,325 [i $1,000! io,200 559 350 l I/8" - 56,000! 12,500 1,050 l i l A490 - MINIMUM k TE.'5 ION REQUIRE 0 ! DI.4tETER PER TABLE 3 AISC_ TOROUE k IN.-LS, FT.-L3 r 7/3" 49,000! 8,575 715 i 1" - 64,000! 12,300 1,067 2 1 i/8" 30,000! 18,000 - 1,500 i. 1 t
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't' c O i t, 33 Total bol:s/ Scits !.0 se bolts /
C= nactions Ccnnection A::gssible C nnecti3ns
^ ^
c .' .: :. - 7 7.:.A
. __ 8 c c v
423 4313 20 11 2 252G - AC9A 12 12 12
-2233 - 2333 - 2100 8 3 1 238E - 223A 4 4 1 209A - 208A 24 24 1 2323 - WC 4 4 4 307C - 270 12 11 1
~304A - 270 16 15 1 3170 - 27A 8 8 2 30aC 435A - 229A 24 24 6 1465 - 3973 4 4 4 301C - 263G 6 6 1 2100 - 215G - 2320 8 8 a
. 413A - ASA 28 16 2 j l
279F - WC 4 4 2 279F - WC 4 4 2 i
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