ML20063E632
| ML20063E632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1982 |
| From: | Leddick R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, G3-82-826, GO3-82-826, NUDOCS 8208300321 | |
| Download: ML20063E632 (76) | |
Text
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4 Docket Nos. 50-508/509 o
[ 50.55(e) ReporL Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206)482-4428 ,
Docket Numbers 50-508 and 50-509 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 1
Subject:
PROJECT NOS. 3 AND 5 POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS - UNITS 3 AND 5 (D/N #19)
References:
a) NRC Letter, Docket No. 50-508/509, dated April 21, 1982, Mr. T. W. Bishop to Mr. R. S. Leddick, same subject.
b) Letter, G03-82-101, dated January 29, 1982, R. S.
Leddick to B. H. Faulkenberry, Structural Steel Connections - Unit No. 3.
c) Letter, G03-81-2756, dated November 17, 1981, R . S .
Leddick to B. H. Faulkenberry, Structural Steel Connections - Unit No. 5.
Reference a) requested additional information to facilitate evaluation of the Supply System's resolution of the subject deficiency. Specifically, questions were asked concerning the final 10CFR50.55(e) reports for Units 3 and 5 (submitted as Reference b and Reference c respectively). As a result, both reports have been revised to reflect additional inspection data and provide a more detailed design analysis. The revised reports have received Supply System concurrence and are attached for your review.
It should be noted that Reference b) and c) stated that the deficiencies (reported as D/N #19) were significant and reportable per 10CFR50.55(e).
However, subsequent investigation has determined that the deficiencies are not significant and were they to have remained uncorrected they would not have adversely affected the safety of operations of the facility.
Therefore, the deficiencies are not reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).
The Supply System-approved response to the NRC questions concerning Ref-crences b) and c) is as follows:
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Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 2 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Reference c), Final Report of Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Structural Steel Connections - Unit No. 5 NRC Question:
A. (1) Visual Inspection and Torque Testing Program w
Since your conclusions of acceptability of the structures and the supporting statistical analysis is based upon the projected occurrence or nonoccurrence of loose bolts, it is important that we understand how the reinspections were conducted. We are aware that at the beginning of the reinspection effort, 100% torque testing was performed on all accessible bolts, but this was later reduced to torque testing of 20% of the bolts of each connection.
In addition, page E4-14 adds the caveat that, "I bolt out of 20 may be loose, but only 1 bolt was able to be tested. This report will only indicate 1 out of 20 bolts were loose." Please explain the effect of this method on your study of connection integrity (discussed on page E4-10 and E4-ll), i.e. on what basis you assume that 992 (1020-28) connections have 100% design strength if less than 100% of the bolts in those connections were torque inspected.
We understand, also, that incorrect job inspection torque values were used during the torque reinspections. Please discuss the effect of these values on your analysis.
You have not provided a definition of " inaccessible" bolts. Our inspections have disclosed that many of the pipe chase bolts, al-though having the bolt head embedded in concrete, are accessible
! for partial visual inspection and torque inspection. Please indi-cate why these bolts were classified as " inaccessible" and provide your definition of this term.
Answer:
A. (1) Visual Inspection and Torque Testing Program l
- a. The statistical analysis of connections based on a percentage of design strength outlined in pages E4-10 through E4-15 of the original report was never intended to form the basis of the evaluation of the nonconformances. This portion of the statistical analysis, which was included in the original re-port, has been deleted by the revised report (Attachment I).
The answer to Question A.(3) provides further discussion of i the statistical analysis.
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4 Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 3 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Answer: (Continued)
A. (1) Visual Inspection and Torque Testing Program (Continued)
- a. (Continued)
An early and short-lived attempt was made to visually rein-spect and torque-check 100% of the accessible bolts. On February 13, 1981, this reinspection approach was changed to 100% visual inspection with a torque-check of 20% or a mini-mum of 2 bolts per connection.
- b. When the reinspection was started, the " job inspection torque" value was established daily using the Skidmore-Wilhelm machine and the approved procedure. Shortly after starting the rein-spection, it was discovered that the procedure used to estab-lish the job inspection torque yielded values that were sub-stantially in excess of the minimum torque values actually required. Consequently,-the procedure was revised. All of the bolts were retorqued using the revised " job inspection torque" values. As a result, the original job inspection torque values were not used and did not affect our analysis,
- c. An " inaccessible" bolt was any bolt in which the bolt head and/or nut was not visible. Visual inspection was not per-formed on these bolts because only limited information could be obtained by such an inspection. The " inaccessible" bolts were not torque-checked where:
- 1) The torque wrench could not be used on the bolt.
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- 2) The bolt could not be prevented from turning during the i torque-check.
The " inaccessible" bolts in the pipe chase which could have been torque-checked were not checked because of a concern that the torque-check could potentially damage concrete, or damage the bolt, bolt threads, nut and nut threads. This damage would be exceedingly difficult to repair.
Most importantly, partial visual inspection or torque-checking of these " inaccessible" bolts is not considered necessary due to the large proportion of the population (sample size) which was visually inspected and torque-checked. The sample included a large number of pipe chase hangers to floor beam connectors.
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Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 5 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Answer: (Continued)
A. (2) Statistical Method Synopsis
- c. The total number of bolts visually reinspected in linit No. 5 was 9440. Approximately 58% of these bolts were torque-checked.
The 54 bolts which turned at the " job inspection torque" in-cluded the deficient bolts documented on NCR 5504. The original report (Reference c) stated that 61 bolts did not meet minimum torque requirement. However, a reinspection only identified 54 bolts that did not satisfy the revised job inspection torque discussed in Paragraph A.(1)b. above. A further discussion of the reinspection is provided on page 3 of Attachment I.
NRC Question:
A. (3) Non-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts The raw data listing on page E4-10 indicates that loose bolts tend to be distributed among relatively few connections (28 connections out of 1020 connections). For this reason we have calculated the binomial distributions for connections with zero design strength and for connections with less than, or equal to, 50 percent design strength using the raw data of page E4-10. These calculations indicate a probability of 16 percent that 5 connections will have zero design strength and a probability of 9 percent that 11 connec-tions will have less than or equal to 50 percent design strength.
Please address these results or justify your design strength prob-abilities on page E4-ll wherein you have combined 992 connections with 100% assumed design strength with the 28 connections exhibit-ing one or more loose bolts thereby arriving at a random loose bolt distribution and correspondingly low probabilities of low design strength. Also, justify your conclusions on page E4-3 in light of the above questions.
Answer:
A. (3) Non-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts The statistical analysis of the connections based on a percentage cf the design strength of a connectionis invalid for two reasons.
First, it assumes that a bolt which turned at the " job inspectior, torque" has zero strength. This is NOT TRUE. A friction connec-tion resists shear forces as a result of the clamping force caused by the bolts. The amount of shear resistance is a function of
Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 4 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 NRC Question:
A. (2) Statistical Method Synopsis Please explain the basis for your assumption that the percentage of design strength can be estimated based on a simple ratio of bad versus good bolts in any one connection. This assumption is valid for simple shear connections but may not be valid for mo-ment and other types of connections.
Probabilities and confidence levels have been determined using a binomial distribution curve which is valid only if the items checked are selected at random. Please indicate the randomness of your sampling techniques.
On page E4-6 you have indicated that 9940 bolts were tested with 61 bolts failing to pass the test. Please indicate if all 9940 bolts were torque tested. In addition, indicate if the 61 bolts failing to pass the test include the deficient bolts documented on NCR 5504 and, if not, the basis for their omission.
Answer:
A. (2) Statistical Method Synopsis
- a. The statistical analysis of the connections based on a per-centage of the design strength of the connection (outlined in pages E4-10 through E4-15 of the original report) was a part of the original statistical analysis; however, it was never intended to form the basis of the evaluation of the nonconformances. This portion of the statistical analysis l has been deleted by the revised report (Attachment I).
- b. The visual reinspection criteria was a "100% visual inspec-tion of all accessible bolts." Clearly, the attempt was to i visually inspect the entire population, or as large a sample
! as possible. No attempt was made to select a random sample of bolts for visual reinspection. The torque-check criteria was for 20% or a minimum of two bolts per connection, which-ever was greater. The bolts to be torque-checked in a connec-tion were selected at random by the QA inspector as represen-tative of the connection. This selection method utilized was sufficiently " random" that, in our opinion, the torque-checked bolts are representative of the entire population and the selection method does not invalidate the results of the binomial distribution analysis.
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Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 6 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Answer: (Continued)
A. (3) Non-Random Distribution of Loose Bolts (Continued) the bolt tension. If the shear resistance due to the clamping force is exceeded, the connection can become effective in bearing.
Therefore, to assume that a bolt which turned at the " job inspec-tion torque" has zero strength is incorrect and is certainly ex-cessively conservative. Secondly, this approach assumed that if all the bolts torque-checked in a connection turned then any bolt which could not be torque-checked also had zero strength.
This also leads to the excessively conservative conclusion that the corresponding connection had zero strength. For these reasons, this portion of the statistical analysis (pages E4-10 through E4-15 of the original report) which was proposed by the install-ing contractor was not used as a basis for evaluation of the non-conformances, and has been deleted by the revised report (Attach-ment I).
Reference b), Final Report of Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Structural Steel Connections - Unit No. 3 NRC Question:
B. (1) General Backup data showing the distributions of deficient bolts within connections and methods of statistical analysis were not provided with this report as had been provided with the Unit 5 report.
Accordingly, if you intend to utilize this data, please provide sufficient information to permit us to evaluate the deficiency and your corrective actions, i
Answer:
B. (1) General l
l The requested back-up reference material for the Unit 3 report is provided in Attachment II to this letter.
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- NRC Question
I i B. (2) Description of the Deficiency and Item of Concern Results of reinspections are provided but are not definitive, e.g.
" fifteen (15) connections with loose bolts, two (2) connections l
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r Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 7 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 NRC Question: (Continued)
B. (2) Description of the Deficiency and Item of Concern (Continued) with missing bolts." These results do not permit us to perform an evaluation of the deficiency and evaluate the adequacy of your statistical analysis. In this regard, please provide the same type of information as was supplied for the Unit 5 report. Also, please indicate if the unsatisfactory bolt projections were cases of ex-cessive projection and, if so, whether or not the nut was run up on the bolt shoulder giving an erroneous torque indication. In addition, indicate the reinspection procedure used (visual and or torque); the percent which were torque inspected (twenty per-cent or 100); and the actual job inspection torque applied.
We understand that torque inspections were discontinued shortly after being initiated on Unit 3. Please discuss the rationale for discontinuance of these torque inspections in light of the deficiencies reported on page 2 of your report.
Answer:
B. (2) Description of the Deficiency and Items of Concern
- a. The attached back-up reference material provides response to the first part of this item.
- b. The statistical analysis for this report has been revised to reflect the results of the rework performed on the bolts with excessive projection and also to reflect the nonconforming conditions identified on two NCRs written after this report was issued to the NRC. This revised statistical analysis does not chenge the conclusions of our report nor does it affect the evaluation of the nonconforming conditions.
- c. Initially the reinspection criteria specified 100% visual inspection with a torque-check of 20% or a minimum of 2 bolts per connection. On March 19, 1981, the reinspection criteria was changed to require 100% visual inspection and no torque-check. Paragraph "d" below discusses the reasons for deleting the torque-check.
The job inspection torque values are included in Attachment II to this letter.
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Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 8 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Answer: (Continued)
B. (2) Description of the Deficiency and Items of Concern
- d. Torque-checking was terminated on March 19, 1981, after com-pletion of the Unit No. 5 reinspection and 20% of the Unit No.
3 reinspection. At this time less than 3% of the torque-checked bolts turned at the " job inspection torque." In addi-tion, the visual inspection included inspection for number of bolts, type of bolt, diameter of bolt, bolt projection, type of nut, type of washer, position of washer, tight faying surfaces, turn-of-nut tightening marks, and impact marks.
This visual inspection would discover improperly installed bolts.
Based on the small percentage of bolts discovered which turned at the " job inspection torque," the quality and extent of the visual inspection program performed and because the'large sample of bolts needed for statistical analysis were torque tested, it is our opinion that termination of the torque-checks was reasonable and does not affect the conclusions of our report or the evaluation of the nonconforming condi-tions.
NRC Question:
B. (3) Corrective Actions Taken Please review your data base, statistical analysis techniques, l and conclusions in view of our comments on the Unit 5 report and provide the same supplemental information for Unit 3, as appli-cable.
Answer:
B. (3) Corrective Action Taken The final reports for Units 3 and 5 have been revised accordingly and provided as Attachments I and II of this letter.
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Mr. D. M. Sternberg Page 9 August 19, 1982 G03-82-826 Should you have any questions or desire further information, please con-tact me directly.
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- R. S. Leddick (760)
Program Director, WNP-3 I
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Attachments I cc: J. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter -_BPA Ebasco - New York
- WNP-3/5 Files - Richland i
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s ATTACHMENT I
UNIT NO. 5 - STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY (D/N #19)
FINAL ENGINEERING REPORT (REVISION 1)
July 23, 1982
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ABSTRACT This report addresses the finding of documentation and hardware deviations in the structural steel connections in the WNP-5 Reactor Auxiliary Building.
A reinspection of all visible bolts was performed by the erection contractor and the results of this reinspection were used to prepare a statistical analy-sis. This statistical analysis, was used to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not accessible for reinspection.
All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions.
All contractor construction and engineering supervision and quality control per-sonnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoc-trination on structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The hardware deficiencies discovered during the reinspection have been repaired or reworked in accordance eith the recommended dispositions of the NCRs.
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A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN On January 21, 1981, Morrison-Knudsen Company (M-K), the erection contractor of the structural steel for the Reactor Auxiliary Building, issued a Stop Work Order preventing any further bolting, welding, and erection of structural steel by their employees. On the same day, M-K issued a Corrective Actiot Request which described the conditions which must be met prior to lif ting the Stop Work Order. The Stop Work Order and CAR were initiated based on the discovery, by the on-site NRC inspector, of numerous documentation and hardware inconsistencies in the bolted connections of structural steel members.
The CAR required that the following three actions be performed prior to lifting the Stop Work Order:
- 1. All accessible structural steel bolted and welded connections in both units are to be reexamined to verify conformance to drawings, specifications, etc.
- 2. All QC structural steel permanent plant documented records shall be verified for acceptability and conformance to actual field conditions.
- 3. To preclude recurrence, all Construction, QC, Engineering and supervisory personnel involved with structural steel erection shall receive documented training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The reinspection performed per Item 1 of the CAR discovered:
- 1. In 1981 n total of 1020 connections containing 9440 bolts were inspected. As part of this inspection 20%, or a minimum of 2 bolts per connection, whichever was greater, were tested to the job inspection torque. Of the 5449 bolts that were so torque tested, sixty-one (61) bolts in twenty-eight (28) connections turned below the job inspection torque. However, the job inspection torque values were established using a procedure which yielded values substantially in excess of the minimum torque values actually required and the procedure was subsequently revised.
During May 24-27, 1982, a second test of these twenty-eight (28) connections was performed to determine the torque value at which the bolts would turn. The results of this test showed that fif ty-four (54) bolts turned at torque values below the job inspection torque. These 54 bolts were found in twenty-three (23) connections.
- 2. Seven (7) connections had miscellaneous hardware deficiencies. These deficiencies included 1) excessive bolt projection, 2) missing hardened washers, 3) undersized washers, 4) presence of burrs in bolt holes,
- 5) missing re-entrant corners, and 6) lack of " flush nut" p roj ec tion.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN (CONT'D)
The review of the documentation records performed per Item 2 of the CAR discovered:
- 1. Twenty-five (25) original inspection reports covering all of the connections in the EL 351 pipe chase slab had documentation errors and inconsistencies. The documentation errors and inconsistencies included incorrect identification of vendor drawings, incorrect member identification, incorrect quantity of bolts in the connection, and identification of nonexistent connections.
- 2. Thirty-two (32) connections for which no previous traceable documentation could be found.
As a result of the inspections and verifications performed per Items 1 and 2 of the CAR, M-K generated three NCEs for Unit No. 3 and six NCRs for Unit No. 5. The deviations discovered in Unit No. 3 were addressed in a separate report dated January 8, 1982 and sent to the NRC on January 29, 1982.
The items of concern for Unit 5 were as follows:
- 1. Since the hardware deficiencies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all connections to determine the extent of the problem and the repair and/or rework activities necessary to ensure that the bolting materials and completed connections meet drawing, specification, and code requirements.
- 2. Since documentation errors, inconsistencies, and inadequacies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary
- to reinspect all connections and review existing documentation to establish a package of complete and accurate documentation.
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l B. DESIGN ANALYSIS The reinspection data for Unit 5 is as follows:
- Total number of connections in Unit 5 1814 Total number of connections torque tested 1020*
Total number of connections not tested 794 Total number of connections in which the bolts turned below job inspection torque 23 Out of these 23 connections, number of connections which are partially embedded in concrete 15 Fully accessible connections 8 All of the above twenty-three (23) connections were t.orqued to some varying degrees of torque values. For most of the connections, the average torque value for the joint is very close to the required torque value. Out of 15 partially embedded connection, eight (8) connections are within 2.5% of the required . torque values, six (6) connections within 10% of the required torque value and in one connection the torque value varied up to 30%.
Out of the remaining eight connections, three connections are within 2% of the. required torque value, four connections are within 10%
of the required torque value and in one connection the torque value varied up to 20%.
Out of the total, twenty-three connections, considering the total joint clamping force, 11 connections are within 2.5% of the required torque value, ten (10) connections within 10% of required torque value and two connections in less than 90% of the required torque value.
Engineering evaluation demonstrated that if the joint ef ficiency is reduced by 10%, the connection would still be adequate for the design loadings. Therefore, twenty-one of twenty-three l connections are acceptable as is.
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( Since the bolt holes are normally 1/16" larger than bolt diameter, i the bolts will slip into bearing when they cannot function in friction.
Once the connection becomes ef fective in bearing, the connection is going to function in shear and bearing. In reality, the connection may already be in bearing due to the effect of dead load or due to the bolting sequences. In such cases, the connection could function partly in friction and partly in bearing. The connections which vary more than 10% of the required torque value could be assumed to
. work in bearing. Two sample connections which varied in excess of 10% of required torque value have been evaluated to act in bearing j and are found to be accepted.
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B. DESIGN ANALYSIS (CONT'D)
From the statistical analysis it can be seen that at a maximum probability of 2.14%,17 out of the remaining 794 connections which were not inspected could have one or more bolts which are not properly torqued. For a 95% confidence level, the number of bolts which are not properly torqued varies from 21 to 44.
On the basis of the above analysis, these deviations are acceptable to use as is.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The reported deficiencies, taken as a whole, constitute both a breakdown in Morrison-Knudsen's Quality Assurance program and a deficiency in construction. However, if left uncorrected, the deficiencies would not have adversely affected the safety of operation of the plant and are not significant or reportable per 10CFR50.55(e) .
D. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN All accessible bolts were reinspected for conformance to drawing, specification, and code requirements.
All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions.
All contractor construction and engineering supervision and quality control personnel involved with structural steel crection have received training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The fif ty-four (54) bolts in twenty-three (23) connections which turned at the job inspection torque will be reworked by tightening to the proper torque.
The seven (7) connections with miscellaneous hardware deficiencies will be repaired or reworked in accordance with the recommended disposition of the NCR.
- Denotes number of connections which had 100% visual check and a minimum of 20% torque check or two (2) of the bolts in that connection, whichever was greater.
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EXHIBIT 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION RE0 VEST 33 i
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.. . rC - C c.: .c;.1 C MORRISON IN KNUDSEN e c c n m 5 c ir.1 A c i;c.4 REcussi Satsoo iC;me rse.asr we, 33 as NC. nn_x, 31 6 usir aC- tert eus urg 1.2,_:1 A,M Structural Steel PAC; I .
CF lCNOIDCM O!$ C21? D C N .
) ~ 10 CFR 50, Criteria X, states in part, "A program for inspection: of~ ictihities
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aTTecting quality shall be established and executed...to verify conformance with the une documented instructions, procedures and drawings for ac~complishing the activity."
) Centrary to, the above requirements, the NRC has noted numerous instances where tru fnsp'ctural 1 Steel has been . erected ib. properly and subsecuently accepted by Q.C.
ec3 on. eeTerence NRC Docket !S0-05-04 and NRC Weekly Inspection Report for the week or January 23, 1981. '
s a rasult of the above, a Stop Werk Order (ref. IOC-31-73) has been issued for all
.ructura: Steel welding, bolting and erection. (continued Face 2) i .
UtY 22CU!s723 12 CM eCt F4anager
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NAME :ATI 0 4 I iCiv i sOCN B:f t!. 57 EC U C W *JF C .A. IbC;N Ei1 - ATI C.A. INC;N E31 ATE 11Y!N13 1.
/4CJEC CUAUrr SC;NEil : A TI
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.' COP.RECTIVE ACTION !33 (cont.)
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Structural Steel Unit 3 & 5
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The following conditions must be met p'rior tio resumption of work:
- 1. . All accessible Structura'l SteeTphysical bolted and welded
. connections in both units are to be examined by zdne to verify confomance to drawings, specifications, etc. -
2.
All QC Stuctural Steel pemanent plant documented records sha11 be verified for acceptability and conformance to actual field conditions.
3.
To preclude recurrence, all construction, QC, engineerino and
' supervisory personell involved with Structural Steel Erection shall receive documented training and indoctrination in Structural Steel Erection and Inspection Recuirements.
As evidence of compliance to the 'above conditicas are submitted and found acceptable lifted by zones. to. the Project Quality Manager, the Sto,6 'Jork Ordar may be
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-o O EXHIBIT 2
[0B INSPECTION TOROUE VALUES FOR REIN $PECTION E2-1
M O R RIS O N-KhlI.J OS EN CIO M YAN'r N C.
DHTER. OFFICE CORRCSPONDENCE IOC-81-163 su 'n' - -
. . -. oir e, February 13,1 1 81
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ro, Richard Davis . ,
rno , Jack Da i
e O-Loc 4rios, Satsop Power Plant toc 41 as, Contract 2879 Elma, Washington suescer. Verification of Structural Bolting Per CAR #33 . '
Engineering having reviewed the varying job torque as noted per IOC-81-154, is now assigning the values for minimum torque required by AISC.
During the verification of structural bolts per CAR #33 the inspection teams shall perform 100% visual and-20% actual torque verification using the ft-lb values noted on attached sheet.
, If there are any questions please contact this office.
Attachment
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D. Reed ' '
c1 R. Wisdom M. Lentz -
M-K File I
EXHISIT 2 l
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A325 .
- ~ MINIMUM -
TENSION REQUIRED -
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DIAMETER PER TABLE 3 AISC TOROUE -
IN.-LB FT.-LB:
7/8" 39,000! 6,825 569' la 51,000! 10,200 850 1 1/8" .
56,000! , 12,600 1,050
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. .. MINIMUM
~ TENSION REQUIRED OIAMETER .. .
PER TABLE 3 AISC
. - _ . . . . ... TORQUE IN.-LB FT.-LB 7/8" 49,000! 8,575 71 5 1" -
64,000! 12,800 1,067 1 1/8" 80,000! 18,000 1,500 -
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EXHIBIT 3 CONNECTIONS WITH BOLTS WHICH TURNED AT THE " JOB INSPECTION TORCUE"
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4 EXHIBIT 3 CONNECTIONS WITH BOLTS WHICH TURNED AT THE " JOB INSPECTION TORQUE" REVISED PER REINSPECTION REPORT 35E 1359 NCR 5501 LOOSE BOLTS NO. BOLTS NO. BOLTS REPORT NO. CONNECTION BOLTS TESTED VISIBLE IN CONNECTIONS SSB- .
152 265C-44A-298C 6 8 8 20 296G-44A-298E 2 4 4 16 297B-41A-271G 3 4 4 16 .
297C-41A-299A 2 4 4 16 297D-41A-299B 4 4 4 16 266B-425B 1 7 8 14 153 93K-280F 4 4 4 4 159 248A-407A-252A 2 19 20 24 252A-423B-245E 1 16 18 22 268F-248A-264G 1 16 16 16 267A-245C-262F 2 8 8 8*
162 47A-428B-40A 3 8 8 14 295G-40A-297G 2 2 2 8 295D-40A-272E 2 4 4 16 165 243B-402A-243A 7 26 26 26*#
278A-248B-275C 3 8 8 8*
166 93AD-266B 1 4 4 4 93AC-41A 2 4 4 4 175 245C-423A-244A 1 16 18 26 44A-425B-41A 1 8 18 22 -
158 252B-430B-252C 2 18 18 24 290E 45A-294A 1 4 4 16 271E-426B 1 8 8 14 54 204 220 354 I
l i
l
- The term " loose bolt" indicates only that the bolt turned at the job inspection torque. ;
Since all bolts were at least hand tightened, the bolts could still resist some shear ,j stress.
- Bolts for this connection were not tested in May 1982. Thus, the test result obtained l in 1981 is given.
! E3 2
EXHIBIT 3 TORQUE VALVES AT WHICH THE BOLTS TURNED Measured Required Connection Torque Valve Torque Valve ft-lb ft-lb f 265C-44A-298C 1@350, 1@425, 2@450, 29550 569 296G-44A-298E 1@450, 1@550 569 297B-41A-271G 1@l25, 1@450, 1@525 569 297C-41A-299A 1@425, 1@475 569 297D-41A-299B 10200, 1@275, 1G400, 1@475 ,569
+266B-425B 1@550 559
- 93K-280F 3@50, 1@75 569
+248A-407A-252A 1@950, 1@975 1067
+252A-423B-245E t@725 850 268F-248A-264G 1@l50 569 267A-245C-262F 1@300, 1@325 569 47A-428B-40A 1@800, 1G900, 1@l225 1500 295G-40A-297G 1@50, 1@525 569 295D-40A-272E 1@200, 1@275 569 243B-402A-243A Not Tested 278A-243B-275C 1@225, 1@250, 1@300 569
+93AD-266B 1@525 569 93AC-41A 1@450, 1@475 569 245C-423A-244A 1G850 1067 44A 425B 41A 16650 1500
.f - 252B-430B-252C 1@450, 1@700 850 290E 45A-294A 1@375 569 271E-426B 1@l25 569
- The measured torque valves indicate that an impact wrench was not used on this connection.
+ The measured torque valves are se close to the required torque valves that for all int'ents and purposes the connections are acceptable.
E3-3
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E3-10
EXHIBIT 4 STATISTICAL STUDY OF POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL STEEL BOLTS NOT FULLY TORQUED IN UNIT NO. 5 l
E4-1 l
_m - - _ _
EXHIBIT 4
SUBJECT:
Statistical Study of Possible Structural Steel Bolt Torque Deficiencies in Unit No. 5.
REFERENCE:
Ronald Walpole and Raymond Meyers, Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, MacMillan Company, New York.
t i
1 E4-2 l
C0hTENTS PAGE TITLE PAGE . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . E4-2 CONTENTS . . . .. . . . . . . . . .............. E4-3 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . .. . . . . .............. E4-4 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM . . . . . . . . .............. E4-5 STATISTICAL METHOD SYNOPSIS . . . . ............. . E4-6 BOLT FAILURE - PROBABILITY STUDY . . .............. E4-7 PROBABILITY STUDY . . .............. E4-8 PROBABILITY STUDY . . .............. E4-9 CONFIDENCE LEVEL . . .............. E4-10 CONNECTION FAILURE - PROBABILITY STUDY . ............ E4-11 E4-3
~
CONCLUSIONS BOLTS
- 1) Of the 3273 bolts not accessible for reinspection, the highest probability of not fully torqued bolts is 0.98% and occurs at 32 bolts.
- 2) of the 3273 bolts not accessible for reinspection, the expected number of not fully torqued bolts varies from 21 to 44 for a 95% confidence level.
CONNECTIONS Of the 794 connections not reinspected, the highest probability of having one deficient bolt in a connection is approximately 2.14%
with 17 connections out of 794 affected.
{
l i
E4-4 I
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM Nonconformance Reports 5500, 5502, and 5503 deal with the fact that documenta-tion deficiencies existed for a portion of Unit No. 5 that preceded the accep-tance of structural steel bolts. The bolts in question were either loaded with concrete or otherwise inaccessible, such that conventional bolt testing methods became impossible. This report has been generated to support the recommended disposition of Use-As-Is for these NCRs.
Data to prepare the statistical analysis was based upon tht. results of the re-inspection performed per CAR-33.
4
/
I l
l l
l i
o E4-5 l
5 STATISTICAL METHOD SYNOPSIS All data was based upon that furnished by Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. on ;
Inspection Report 35E 1359. The raw data for this statistical analysis is shown in Exhibit 3.
l '
A portion of structural steel bolts in Unit No. 5 were retested. The statistics involved in finding the probability and confidence level in-volving individual bolts was the binomial distribution curve. This type i of distribution is appropriate since all the testing was done on a " pass-reject" basis. Thus all probabilities and confidence levels on bolts
- were estimated in the binomial distribution basis.
- l I
t 1
i 1
i i
e i
f E4-6 t
i
- -. - - - - - - , , . , - ,, -,----,--..w,----,,--..,,--.-,- ,,...,-,e .,, . . . . - . - - ~--n. ,,- , e-. _, ,--,4p&,, -
. ~ _ ~_
. .. .- . . - - . . . . .. ~a
SUBJECT:
Statistical Study of Bolt Failure Test *
REFERENCE:
Ronald E Walpole and Raymond H Meyers, Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, MacMillan Company, New York,1972, pps. 81-84.
A. Given Conditions:
Bolts torque tested: 5449 pieces 1
Bolts which turned at " Job Inspection Torque": 54 pieces Bolts not inspected: 3273 pieces B. Assumption: Probability of failure is 54 or 0.00991 5449
- C. Numerical Study: From reference, the Binomial Distributions can be presented as: '
b(x;np)=(f)p*q"-*, x = 0, 1, 2, .....n
- Please refer to sample calculation (page E4-8)
D. Results: See attached table E4-I and Figure E4-1.
E.
Conclusion:
From Figure E4-1, the highest probability of having bolts not fully torqued is 32 bolts out of 3273 uninspected bolts, which is 32 1
= 0.0098 3273 OR 0.98%
4 O
E4-7
Sample Calculation:
Note: Formula: b(x;n,p) = (";) p q"~*, x = 0,1,2. . .n where b(x;n, p) : binomial distribution x: number of failures (or successes) n: total number of trials p: success or failure probability q=1-p: failure or success probability Example: In this study, the failure probability was assumed as 54 or 0.00991. Find the probability that exactly 32 5449 of the next 3273 bolts tested will turn at the " Job >
Inspection Torque".
p = 54 = 0.00991 ,
5449 q = 1-p = 0.99009 x = 32 n = 3273 b(x;n,p) 3273! -
=
(0.00991) 0 (0.99009) 321 (3273-32)!
= 7%
E4-8
TABLE El.-I THE PROBABILITY OF FINDING SOT FULLY TORQUED BOLTS Number of Not Fully Torcued Bolts Probability
-11 1 2. 2 E :: 10 7 %
5 2.2 x 10 ,%~
10 2.7 x 10 '_ll 15 2.77 x 10 ~%
18 0.2%
20 0.55%
25 3.1%
30 6.6%
31 6.95%
32 7.05%
33 6.9%
34 6.6*
35 6 . l*.
40 2.8%
. 45 0.667%
FIGURE E4-1 ,..
BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION OF NOT FULLY TORQUED BOLTS n
10 1 4
0 ..
V g
g ::r - -
x' ..
O ..
O ..
L -- ,
& IC 15 20 25 30 Siir 40 49 NUMSi5R. Ci= BCLTS HCT i=LJL L.Y. TO R QLJED E:.-9
4
SUBJECT:
Confidence Level Interval of Failures of Bolts
REFERENCE:
Ronald E Walpole and Raymond H. Meyers, Probability and Statistics; for Engineers and Scientists, MacMillan Company, New York, 1972, pp.
203 A. Given conditions Bolts tested: 5449 Bolts which turned at the " Job Inspection Torque": 54 pieces Bolts not tested - n: 3273 pieces B. Assumption: Probability of failure, p is 54 = 0.00991 5449 C. Numerical Study: Confidence interval can be approximated as:
oq (p
^
P-: g n pQ
+ z Uhere p is the probability of failures in an unte'sted sample of size n, p is. ne probability of failure in the sample tested and q = 1-p, z is the _z value of the standard normal curve leaving an area of d/2 to the right where d = 1 - % confidence interval. (see reference)
In our case, the untested sa=ple number n = 3273 and the probability of failure is p = .00991. Using the value of z = 1.96 from reference for 95% confidence interval, the 95% confidence interval of failure ~(p) can be calculated as:
0.00991 (0.00991) (0.99009) jg
- 1.96) 3273 p 0.00991 d*
1.96 (0.00991 (0.99001) 3273 OR 0.006516 p 0.013304 21 p 4354 OR 211 No. of failures 44 for 95% confidence level P
E4-lO
CONNECTION FAILURE - PROBABILITY STUDY A. Given Conditions Connections Tested: 1020 Connections with 1 or more loose bolts: 23 Connections Not Tested: 794 ,
Total Connections: 1814 B. Assumptions:
Probability of 1 or more loose bolts / connection: *
- 10 0 C. Numerical Study: From reference, the binomial distributions can be presented as:
b(x;n,p) = ( ") p* q "-* , x = 0,1,2,3 . . . n from reference, the normal approximation to the binomial distribution D.
Conclusions:
From Table E4-II the highest probability of 1 or more
~
loose bolts per connection is approximately 17 __
connections of 794 affected, which is '
17
= 0.0214 794 OR 2.14%
l l
t E4-11
TABLE E4-II THE PROBABILITY OF FINDING CONNECTIONS WITH 1 0F. MORE LOOSE BOLTS No. of Connections I Probability 1~ 2.5x10 't
~
5 2.4x10 7.
10 1.57.
15 8.1%
17 9.57.
20 7.97.
25 2.27.
1 3
0
?
s,.
F E4-12
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9 to 15 20 29 SO l H LJ M B i" R OF CONNECTloHS l E4-13 l
+
E i
I ATTACHMENT II N
9
UNIT NO. 3 - STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY (D/N #19)
FINAL ENGINEERING REPORT (REVISION 1)
July 23, 1982
i . .,
STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECT:t'.5 - C;!~ .C. ; e De; *19)
. LOOSE BOLTS - MALPRACTICE IDn: <21)
ABSTRACT This report addressed the finding of documentation and hardware deviations in the structural steel connections in the WNP-3 Reactor Auxiliary Building.
A reinspection of all visible bolts was performed by the erection contractor and the results of this reinspection were used to prepare a statistical analy-sis. This statistical analysis along with calculations of the design stresses in the bolts was used to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not accessible for reinspection.
All structural steel erection documentation was reviewed for acceptacili y an'd conformance to field conditions.
All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and quality control personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination on structural steel erection and inspection requiraments.
The hardware deficiencies discovered during the reinspection will be repaired, reworked, or used-as-is in accordance with the recommended dispositions of the NCR's. This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The deficiencies reported as D/N #19 constitute both breakdowns in Morrison-Knudsen's quality assurance program and deficiencies in construction as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
The deficiencies reported as D/N #21 are not significant nor. reportable as de-fined by 10CFR50.E5(e). .
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEMS OF CONCERN .
On January 21 , 1 981, Morrison-Knudsen Co. (M-K), the erection contractor of the structural steel for the Reactor Auxiliary Building, issued a Stop Work Order preventing any further bolting, welding, and erection of structural steel by their employees. On the same date M-K issued a Corrective Action Request which described the conditions which must be met prior to lifting the Stop Work Order. The Stop Work Order and CAR were initiated based on the discovery, by the on-site NRC inspector, of numerous documentation and hardware inconsistencies in the bolted connections of structural steel mem-bers.
The CAR required that the following three actions be performed prior to lifting the Stop Work Order.
- 1. All accessible scructural steel bolted and. welded connections in both units are to be examined to verify conformance to drawings, specifica-tions, etc. -
- 2. All CC structural steel permanent plant documented recorcs shall be verified for acceptability and conformance to actual fiele conditions. P
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY AND ITEM!'0F CONCERN (Continued) 3.. To preclude recurrence, all construdtion, QC, engineering and super-visory personnel involved with structural steel erection shall re-ceive documented training and indoctrination in structural steel erec-
- tion and inspection requirements.
The reinspection performed per Item 1 of the CAR discovered:
- 1. Fifteen (15) connections with loose bolts.
- 2. Two (2) connections with missing bolts.
- 3. Two (2) connections with A325 bolts installed instead of A490 bolts.
- 4. One (1) connection with two (2) A307 bolts installed instead of A325 bol ts. -
- 5. Thirty-five (35) connections with bolts having unsatisfactory projec-tion.
- 6. Fourteen (14) connections with miscellaneous hardware deficiencies in-cluding improper plate washers over slotted holes, lack of contact be-tween faying surfaces, minor damage on the structural member, incorrect washer size, etc.
The review of the documentation records performed per Item 2 of the CAR dis-covered four hundred and eight (408) Unit No. 3 structural steel connections which had documentation errors and/or inconsistencies. The documentation errors and/or inconsistencies included 1) errors in bolt count, 2) lost or nonexistent documentation and 3) miscellaneous errors on documentation.
As a result of the inspections and verifications performed per Items 1 and 2 of the CAR, M-K generated three NCR's for Unit 3 and six NCR's for Unit No. 5. The deviations discovered in Unit No. 5 were addressed in a separate report dated October 31, 1981 and sent to the NRC on November 17, 1981.
In addition, a Quality Finding Report was issued by Ebasco against M-K on February 23, 1981. The QFR identified a connection in which two bolts were discovered to be loose. The bolts were deliberately tampered with by un-known individual (s). This item has been identified as D/N #21.
The items of concern were as follows:
- 1. Since hardware deficiencies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all connections to determine the extent of the problem and the repair and/or rework activities necessary to ensure that the bolting materials and completed connections meet drawing, spe-cification and code requirements.
- 2. Since documentation errors, inconsistencies, and inadequacies were found in a number of bolted connections, it was necessary to reinspect all con-
- nections and review existing documentation to establish a package of ccm-plete and accurate documentation.
B. DESIGN ANAL.YSIS Deficiencies noted above can be divided into two categories:
- 1. Bolts which did not meet torque requirements - 17 connections.
- 2. Bolts with hardware problems - 52 connections.
Connections which were not inspected were found to be in the pipe chase area. These connections are generally 4 Dolt connections.
Design evaluation demonstrated that for a 25% reduction in joint capacity, these connections are still adequate for the design loadings.
Those connections in which bolts turned at job inspection torque can function partly in friction and partly in bearing. Since the bolt holes are nonnally 1/16" larger than bolt diameter, the bolts will slip into bearing when they cannot function in friction. Once the connection becomes effective in bearing, the connection is going to function in shear and bearing. All the above connections are evaluated to act in bearing and are found to be acceptable.
From the statistical analysis it can be seen that at a maximum probability,150 bolts out of 18,301 untested bolts would turn at the job inspection torque. On the basis of analyses performed on those connections with bolts that did not meet torque requirements or bolts with hardware problems, it is concluded that the above probabilities would not adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant.
The connections with miscellaneous hardware problems were individually evaluated and it was found that these deviations are not critical with respect to the intended design function of the connections.
However, these deviations were corrected.
From the statistical analyses, it can be seen that at a maximum probability 2 connections out of remaining 280 connections which t were not inspected could have one or more bolts which were not I
properly torqued, It can also be seen that at maximum probability only one connection out of 280 connections which were not tested could have two or more bolts which are not properly torque tested.
On the basis of the above analysis, these deviations are acceptable to use as is.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE SAF:TY IMPLICATIONS
^
D/S #19 The reported documentation and hardware deficiencies taken as a whole, constitutute both breakdowns in Morrison-Knudsen's quality assurance program and deficiencies in constructiori. The reported deficiencies would not have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant and, therefore are not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
D/N #21 The QFR identified a condition in which 2 bolts in the 4 bolt connections of pipe chase hanger 1465 to beam 3975 were loosened after placemer.: of con-crete in the pipe chase slab.
Calculations were made by ESSE to determine the maxiinum expected load on this hanger. This load was compared with the AISC allowable tension load fcr the two remaining 7/8"S A325 bolts. This comparison shows that the hanSer could safely carry the expected design load with 2 of the 4 bolts removed.
This deviation in construction and quality assurance,'were it to have re-mained uncorrected l would not have adversely affected the safety of opera-tions of the plant and, therefore, is not reportable as defined by 10CFR50.55(e).
01 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN The following Corrective Actions concern D/N #19:
All visible bolts were reinspected for conformance to drawing, specification, and code requirements.
All structural steel erection ' documentation was reviewed for acceptability and conformance to field conditions.
(
All contractor construction and engineering supervision, and quality control personnel involved with structural steel erection have received training and indoctrination in structural steel erection and inspection requirements.
The results of the reinspection were used, to orepare a statistical anal.ysis.
The statistical analysis indicated that:
- 1. Of the 18,326 bolts not accessible for reinspection the expected number of deficient bolts varies from 122 to 183 for a 99%' confidence level and 130 to 178 for a 95% confidence level and
- 2. Of the 280 connections not reinspected, the highest probability of having l at least one deficient bolt occurs at two connections, and the highest i probability of having two or more deficient bolts occurs at one connection.
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. . 1 D. CORRECTTVE ACTIONS TAKEft -(Continued) '
5 This st tistical analysis along with belt stress calcelations for forty-five (45) representative bolted connections and stress cal' cult.tions for the typical pipe chase connections were uset to justify acceptance of the "AS-BUILT" condition of the bolts which were not' accessible for reinspec-tion. -
Fifteen (15) of the seventeen (17) connections with loose or missing bolts will be reworked by tightening all of the bolts in the connection to the proper torque. The other two connections will be repaired by first tight-ening the accessible bolts to the proper torque and then fillet welding the accessible portion of the clip angle to the connecting member. This .
work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The two connections which have been erected with A325 bolts instead of the required A490 bolts will be repaired by fillet welding the clip angles on (
the beams to the columns. The one connection which had two (2) A307 bolts installed will be reworked by replacing the A307 bolts with A325 bolts.
This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
The thirty-five (35) connections with bolts having ansatisfactory bolt pre-jection and the fourteen (14) connections with miscellaneous hardware deff-ciencies will either be used-as-is or reworked in such a manner as to make; the bolts and connections conform to the drawing, specification and code requirements. This work will be completed by April 1,1982. ,
)
The following corrective / preventive Actions concern D/fl #21:
The two loose bolts in the connection identified by the Quality Finding Re-port will be reworked by tightening the bolts to the proper torque. This work will be completed by April 1,1982.
Morrison-Knudsen Craft were issued impact and torquing equipment from a cc/:,
trolled tool crib enabling only authorized personnel the right to withdraw r tools.
Morrison-Knudsen QC personnel were required to complete a final " walk through" ,
just prior to concrete placement to preclude the possibility of loose bolts in a connection and the tampering of those connections. .
l All dismantling required written notification from Construction to the Quality Assurance department.
A Corrective Action Request (CAR) was issued and resulted in significart changes to M-K's structural steel erection and inspection programs.
The results of Morrison-Knudsen's reinspection showed no evidence of nalprac-tice.
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9
- a e
O STATISTICAL STUDY OF POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL STEEL BOLTS NOT FULLY TORQUED IN UNIT #3 i
9 l
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SCOPE The erection contractor, Morrison-Knudsen, found that one of their Quality Control Inspectors involved in the structural program was keeping inadequate documentation of the bolt up process. M-K took it upon themselves to reinspect every bolt in every connection in both Units 3 and 5. This report pertains only to Unit 3. Every connection at elevation 390.00 and on down, that was accessible, was reinspected. Those connections which were inaccessible were limited to those embedded in concrete. The reinspection took two forms, one was visual and torque check while the other was a visual inspection.
1 9
CONCLUSIONS After many weeks of data gathering, Morrison-Knudsen's Quality Assurance Department wrote an NCR identifying where documentation was inadequate.
Through the analysis, outlined in the body of this report, the following conclusions were arrived at:
I. There were 3,964 connections reinspected, of 4,244 total connections. Seventeen (17) of these had bolts which turned at the job inspection torque or missing, 20 had " shanked out" bolts and twenty-five (25) of these had two (2) or more 4 bolts which turned at the job inspection torque, missing or shanked out.
II. In the 3,964 connections reinspected, there were a total of 30,860 bolts. Of the 30,860 bolts, 13,678 were accessible for either visual reinspection or reinspection by use of a torque wrench, where 10% or two (2) bolts were inspected, whichever was the greater. These reinspection procedures are outlined in the following pages. Of the 13,678 bolts reinspected, 54 were found to turn at the job inspection torque and 61 were shanked out.
III. From Conclusion I above, it can be seen that there are 280-connections which were not reinspected. As these connections happen to be in the Elevation 351' pipe chase and the majority of these connections have 4 bolts per connection. Thus, it is estimated that there are another 1,120 bolts not reinspected.
This would mean that there is a total of 31,980 bolts l with 18,302 of these not reinspected. It can be seen in Figure 1, for a maximum probability 150 bolts or 0.82% of the 18,302 unreinspected bolts would not meet the inspection requirements. The number of bolts which did not meet job inspection torque varied from 122 to 183 for a j 99% confidence level and from 130 to 198 for a 95% confidence l level.
IV. Finally, by using the connections listed on the Fought Bolt List, a total of approximately 4,244 connections were found to exist at elevation 390.00 and below. As stated in Conclusion I,
! 3,964 of these were reinspected, leaving only 280 connections l not reinspected. These connections are limited to the Elevation 351' pipe chase, as at the time of the reinspection most of this pipe chase slab was poured, thereby embedding a number of connections.
CONCLUSIONS (CONT'D)
IV. (Cont'd)
Again, the binomial distribution formula was used to predict the number of connections which would not meet the inspection requirements in 280 unreinspected connections. From Table II, the highest probability of connections in which one or more bolts which would not meet torque requirements is approximately two connections or 0.71% out of 280 affected. From Table III, the highest probability of connections in which two or more bolts would not meet the torque requirements is approximately one connection or 0.35% out of 280 affected.
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS The reinspection was done in two stages:
- 1. The first 12,306 bolts were inspected visually and 1750 bolts out of 12,306 were torque tested.
- 2. There were 11,900 accessible bolts out of the next 18,554 bolts in the connections which were inspected only visually. The remaining 1120 bolts were not inspected.
The inspection procedures are explained below:
- 1. Torque and Visual Inspection Procedure A Quality Control Inspector, an Engineer, and two Iron Workers would gain access to a connection, torque test 10% or two (2) of the bolts in that connection, whichever was greater, and also visually inspect 100% of all accessible bolts. The torque test would be done with a torque wrench, that was calibrated using a skidmore, at the.beginning of the shift. The following is a summary of the data that was documented:
Total Bolts in Connections Inspected 12,306 Total Bolts Torque Tested in Connections Inspected 1,750 Total Bolts Which Turned at Job Inspection Torque, in the Connections Inspected 35
- 2. Visual Inspection Procedure A Quality Control Inspector and an Engineer would gain access to a connection and visually inspect bolts in that connection for turn of the nut marks, type of bolt, bolt projection, type of nut, type of washer, position of washer, number of bolts, and if the bolt was tightened -
or not. This information was cross checked with specifications, fabrication drawings, bolt list, erection and contract drawings.
If discrepancies were found, they were listed on an NCR. The following is a summary of the data that was documented. A loose bolt was one which was not impacted from snug tight position.
Total Bolts in Connections Inspected 18,554 Total Bolts Accessible for Visual Inspection 11,900 Total Bolts Loose in Connections Inspected 19 r .
There were 1120 bolts in 280 connections in the pipe chase at the 351' elevation not reinspected due to inaccessibility.
For the purpose of probability _ analysis, the results of the inspections were tabulated and used in binomial distribution formula to predict the probability of loose bolts as follows:
A. Total-Bolts in Connections:
12,306 + 18,554 + 1,120 = 31,980 Total Bolts Actually Inspected:
1,778 + 11,900 = 13,678 Total Bolts Which Turned at the Job Inspection Torque in the Connections Inspected 54 Total Bolts " Shanked Out" 61 B. It can be assumed that the probability of having a loose bolt would be:
115
= 0.0084 13,678
= -0.84%
. The. binomial diatribution formula that was used is shown below. This formula is used to predict the probability of failure (or success) in an. untested population. This prediction is based on the results gained from a tested population in which both the tested and untested population combine to form the total population.
Binomial Distribution Formula:
- "~*
B(x; n; p) = n! p q , x = 0, 1, 2, (n-x) lx!
e
j '
x: number of failures n: total number of trials p: Failure probability q: Success probability = (1-p)
(Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, by R E Walpole
- and R H Myers)
TABLE I n = 17,182 + 1,120 = 18,302 x = 0 , 1, 2 . . .
p = 0.0084 q = 0.9916 x b(x, n. p) %
120 .0006 0.06%
125 .0020 0.2 %
130 .0050 0.5 %
135 .010 1.0 %
140 .0178 1.78%
145 .0257 2.57%
l 150 .0312 3.12%
160 .0279 2.79%
170 .0132 1.32%
l 180 .0035 0.35%
190 .0005 0.05%
l i ei
FIGURE 1 Binomial Distribution of Bolts Not Fully Torqued n
i 9--
D 4--
J ~
3- -
[
2- -
0 --
ff i--
[ ._
29 50 75 loo 12b 15 o 17 9 200 6OLTS \\? HIC-4 \\POLJL.D NOT Mi=.ET TORQLJC RC.QLJIPP: MENT 9 P
em ao
a CONFIDENCE LEVEL INTERVAL OF FAILURE OF BOLTS A. Given Conditions Bolts Tested 13,678 Bolts Turned at Job Inspection Torque 54 Bolts not Tested (n) 18,302 B. Assumption: Probability of failure, p is 115 = .0084 13,678 C. Numerical Study. Confidence interval can be approximated as:
p-z pq /p p-z P9
% ,n h n 957. z = 1.96 997. z = 2.575 For 997. confidence level:
.0084 - 2.575 A .0084 + 2.575
(.0084 (.9916) p (.0084 (.9916) 18.302 18,302 A
.0084 - .0174 p .0084 + .0174 A
.0666 p .0010 OR 122 $ 183 l For 95% confidence level:
.004 - 1.96 (.0084 (.9916) (b .0084 + 1.96 (.0084 (.9916) 18,302
\ 18,302
.0084 .0013 h .0084 + .0013
.0071 h .0097 OR 130(h<178 9
The binomial distribution formula was used to determine the probability -
of the connections with bolts which would not meet torque requirements.
The reinspection data is as follows:
i A. Total number of connections 4224 Total connections inspected 3964 Total connections with one or more bolts which did not meet torque requirements 37 Total connections with two bolts which did not meet torque requirements 25 B. Probability of having a connection with 1 or more bolts which do not meet torque requirements 37
= .0093 3964 C. Probability of having a connection with 2 or more b' sits which do not meet torque requirements 25
= .0063 3964 The following sheet shows the data points gathered.
I t
P 1
1
, TABLE II
^
ONE OR MORE BOLTS WOULD NOT MEET THE TORQUE REQUIREMENT IN A CONNECTION x = 0,1,2 i p = 0.0093 q = 0.9907 i
l 'n = 280 i
x b(x;n;p) 7.
0 0.073 7.3 1 0.192 19.2 2 0.251 25.1 3 0.219 21.9
^
4 0.142 14.2 5 0.074 0.74 TABLE III TWO OR MORE BOLTS WOULD NOT MEET THE TORQUE REQUIREMENT IN A CONNECTION x = 0,1,2 i p = 0.0063 1
q = 0.9937 n = 280 x b(x;n:p) %
0 0.170 17.0 1 0.302 30.2 2 0.268 26.8 3 0.157 15.7 4 0.069 6.9 5 0.024 2.4 ,;
i SO- -
4 0 i 2&- -
~ 20 --
h 'l~
15-- ,
b 10 - -
L s- -
l : : : ,
1 2 3 4 &
CONNECTION IN WHICH ONE OR MORE BOLTS WOULD NOT MEET TORQUE REQUIREMENTS l
Figure 2 9
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m 30- -
8 <
I 29--
g_
/
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[5--
N
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_I l l l i i 2 3 4 9 l CONNECTION IN WHICH TWO OR MORE BOLTS WOULD NOT MEET CONNECTION REQUIREMENTS l
Figure 3 P
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, i i
j REFERENCE MATERIAL G
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9 ms-
pr . ~
v:o z a 5 A t- e rONMEMI a e
. 3. c. d'm 1 gT a .g ,w 4g go%:n%f u :;tn?.U w F fr. i
[=,p !. C ATE _ Februa ry 23 1981 c. M.A.h nog N/A f) 2.0:N7dac ac. 3240-263 5. c:;7 30, 263-11
" 5. cRG ANita7IC N l
- 7. at.:,scN c:NT;.c ID/717tE
- Morrison-Knudsen R Davis - QA Manager
!. F1NCING : . . ~ _ . .
Procedural were not met.provisions for the dismantling of structural steel after inspection Discussion: I During conduct of Audit 263-10 it was found that, for the structural steel connection of members 397B to 146S, located along the Unit 3 pipe chase at the off. elevation, 2 bolts had been dismantled by craf t af ter QC inspection sier. .
386' .
Corrective actions to preclude this type of situation were in the process l of being taken Engineering by Morrison-Knudsen as a result of NRC and kPPSS/Ebasco QA concerns. !
These corrective actions included requirements for final walk through inspections, as builting of connections and provisions for craf t notification of dis =antling subsequent to inspection but prior .o concrete S. CAft ?.E37CNSE OUC
- 10. AU7hCR l
Acril 21, 1981
_( Continuad en rane 9T T F Tully
sart or svu. ::.upu ::::
3-10-81 l M-K Craft are issued impact & torquing equipnent from a controlled tool crib. M-K QC com- ; l pleted a final rcquired Documented written notificationwalkfromthrough just prior to concrete placement, all dismataling Construction. j 5
zgccan c; ic-.;w l e /coc=c;r- ser ;u E s to etr *! o N s
O ATE OF U t.;
COM P'. A N CI' 3-10-81 I i
All able ofat M-K's the time QA/QC Docunentation and Investigation indicate the connection as being accept-of placement.
The only conclusion is the bolts in question were deliber- i ately tampered with after placement.
One is planned by M-K at this time. No further action other than mentioned in Section j
.I E 04-14-81 assac:Essai.: cajaNi:AnCN ue.usz.vE.N7 ::::
L cvawancN: :::p, a m::
m D. E. Reed, Project Directo;- -
s ,
- M M L.H T 5 a. ;;M v sainc; M t.Nii n cN , ac c?T,=t.c
- ;
W .<.. s., + < .: a. , .t . r u l, l T u v % it .7< 4t4 i
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- V 6 71 Y I1 ci Y s.- $/
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R
- 3. ,L 4 j Jr j,f
=: .
v w L Ca7g February 23, 1981 2.cturaa: nc A suRvElu.aNCE No. N/ A 32!.0-263 5. aut1T Na
___ 263-11 Discussion: (Continued) loading of the c: ember.
These requirements are reflected in Morrison-Knudsen Construction Procedure CP-05, revision 5. This area was reported as a follow-up item in Audit 263-10.
In performing this follow-up during Audit 253-11, it was found that reinspec-tion of the subject connection was performed and documented by R Polly of Morrison-Knudsen on December 4, 1980. Subsequent to this inspection:
- 1) bolts on the reverse of the reinspected connection were dismantled without the required QC notification documen-tation being provided;
- 2) concrete was placed along the pipe chase supported by the referenced Connections.
It could or not be determined by the auditor whether dis =antling occurred prior subsequent to concrete placement.
If it is assumed that dismantling occurred prior to loading, then this finding is valid as written, in that QA H I program provisions for distantling were not met. If the dis =antling occurred af ter the loadins;, then it would be considered by the auditor to be deliberate 3
A malpractice and therefore, outside the purview of the QA program. Per conver-sation with R Davis, Morrison-Knudsen Project Quality Engineer, it was indicated that he suspected the latter assumption to be the case and therefore, in conjunction with B Wisdom, Morrison-Knudsen's General Craf t Superintendent, he was preparing a program to prevent recurrence.
In their responca Ferrison-Knudsen shall indicate what actions were taken specific to the, connection in question and what actions have been or will be taken to prevent =alpractice in the future.
l e
8 83-AQ-4 2: S ( 3-25 -79 ) EdU aCf a
M O R RI S O N- K N IJ OS E N C O .Y, P A NY, I N C.
. isri:= oretice cenar:qq.cnscc
', 10C-31-154 c.rc February 10, .c31 vo:. Richard Davis r :w Jack Davic <-
so:* rien Satso,p Pcwcr Plant . oc . r.c .s . Contract 28/9 s u sucr.
Verifying Torque on Structural. Steel Elma , '.'a shinnton for CAR 33 It has been brought to Engineerings attention that there is a wide variation in job torque frcm day to day. To eliminate this problem, effective' 2/10/01 for all verification of torque, in accordance with Corrective Action Report number 33, torque wrenches will be set at the mininum torcue value required by A. I.S.C. and all bolts that meet this requircriant will be accept.'.ble. T?.c e wi l l be no further need for " job torcue" for the verification.
If there are any questions please contact this office.
Thank you J'.10/ kh ,
cc: 0. Reed R. Wisdom '
M. Lentz M-K File F
m r;:n.cmcc .:cwcsr e .or.>.cc IOC-SI-163 n - .' ..- c re, February 13, i'431
\
to: P.ichard Cavis . ,
re. Jack Ca- . we -
toc. es, Satsop Fower Plant toe .es, Contract 2879 Elma, Washington su an cr. Verification of Structural Bolting Per CAR !33 Engineering having reviewed the varying job torque as noted per IOC-81-154, is now assigning the values for minimum torque required by AISC.
During tiie v'erification of structural bolts per CAR #33 the inspection teams shall perform 100% visual and 20% actual torque verification using the ft/lb values noted on attached sheet.
If there are any questiYns please contact this office.
, Attachment MCL/kh cc: O. Reed R. Wisdom
"- M. Lentz -
M-K File D
a b
e 9
9
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. A325 -
L' ~
MINIMUM TEt:SION REQUIRED .
DIAMETER PER TABLE 3 AISC TCROUE IN.-LB FT.-LB 7/8" 39,0001 6,825 569 1" 51.0001 10,200 350 1 1/8" - 56,0001 12,600 1,050 A490 -
MINIMUM TENSION REQUIRED DIAMETER PER TABLE 3 AISC TOROUE IN.-LB FT.-L3
~
7/8" 49,000! 8,575 715 1" 64,000! 12,800 1,057 1 1/8" 80,000! 18.000 1,500 I
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, Page 11 of 12 CONNECTIONS WITH LOOSE OR MISSING BOLTS Total bolts / Bolts Loose bolts /
Connections Connection' Accessible Connections 2368 - 229A 8 8 8 428 - 431B 20 11 2 282G - 409A 12 12 12 2238 - 2338 - 2100 8 8 1 238E - 223A 4 4 1 209A - 208A 24 24 1 2823 - WC 4 4 4 307C - 270 12 11 1
~304A - 270 16 15 1
- 3170 - 27A 8 8 2 304C - 438A - 329A 24 24 6 1465 - 3978 4 4 4
~
301C - 268G 6 6 1 2100 - 216G - 2320 8 8 4
, 413A - 48A 28 16 2 279F - WC 4 4 2 279F - WC 4 4 2 1
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